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CRAFTING MASCULINE SELVES: 
CULTURE, WAR AND PSYCHODYNAMICS 
AMONG AFGHAN PASHTUNS 
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Major Professor:  Thomas Barfield, Professor of Anthropology 
ABSTRACT 
Based on 18 months of ethnographic fieldwork carried out in Afghanistan from 
2009 until 2013 within a majority Pashtun ethnic community in the city Jalalabad and  
outlying rural districts of Nangarhar province, this dissertation examines concepts of 
masculinity in a socio-cultural environment that is patrilineal, patrilocal and strongly 
androcentric, with a firm tradition of female segregation (parda). Because only individuals 
of opposite sex who are closely related by blood or marriage can have social relations, the 
research focused entirely on men.  
Given this context, cultural idioms about masculinity acquire extraordinary social 
and psychological importance. To be considered respectable and honorable, Pashtun men 
are expected to live up to the demanding standards of a cultural environment that requires 
displays of fearlessness, courage, aggressiveness and self-assertiveness. This includes a 
willingness to engage in violence when that is deemed necessary. The dissertation focuses 
on the psychological dynamics and subjectivity produced by these strict and demanding 
cultural norms in a sample set of individual Pashtun males as they matured into adulthood. 
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The findings presented here were derived from multiple psychodynamic and one-on-one 
interviews with four select informants, which are supplemented with an analysis of more 
extensive data gleaned from participant observation in the Pashtun community. This 
methodological approach was designed to elicit material pertaining to these men’s deep 
emotional states, inner thought processes, conscious and unconscious attitudes and self-
concepts that were related to their interpretations and enactments of the cultural mandated 
norms of masculinity, as well as their resistance to them. 
Notable findings include striking evidence for well-established patterns of inner 
psychological conflict, contradiction and suffering that the men I interviewed underwent 
as they coped with internalizing the uncompromising standards of behavior and attitude 
that constituted “being a real Pashtun man.” These standards are not static, and the analysis 
of the data reveals a striking shift toward the legitimization of unprecedentedly violent 
behaviors that stem from thirty-five years of nearly constant conflict in Afghanistan.  
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Prologue 
 
During one of our conversations, Rohullah recounted the following story: 
 
Rohullah – My older brother Zair was coming back home from work that day, and 
met one of the sons of our neighbor in front of their house gate. He started talking 
to the guy, asking him why they were being so difficult and disrespectful about this 
problem [their neighbor had recently added two stories to his house, from which 
the courtyard of Rohullah’s family’s house could be seen, compromising the 
privacy of Rohullah’s family’s female members]. Then, I don’t know exactly what 
happened, or what they said to each other. I heard Zair screaming outside, and the 
other guy screaming back at him. You know how Zair is, he does not have much 
patience when he thinks that he is being disrespected, he gets upset quickly. By the 
time I got in the street they were hitting each other. I called out Iqbal [a younger 
brother] and my father, and when they arrived there were two or three other people 
from the other family outside. They had sticks with them, and when my father tried 
to separate Zair and the other guy, they intervened and hit my father on the head. 
When I saw my father being hit, I completely lost myself. I went back to my 
courtyard, picked up an ax, and went outside. I started swinging the ax, and I think 
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I got someone in the arm. Zair and Iqbal had gotten ahold of a stick too, and were 
fighting with the other guys. Soon after, other people from the neighborhood came 
to the scene and put themselves between us and the other family. So we stopped 
fighting. At least one of them ended up at the hospital, I believe. My father later 
went to the police and denounced what had happened, so that we would be on the 
safe side. We have yet to reach a solution to the problem of the wall, and to solve 
the issue of the enmity [dukhmani] between families that has started with this fight. 
Andrea – How do you feel about the fight? 
Rohullah – Well, that was good ghairat [the masculine virtue of defending one’s 
family’s respectability]. I saw my father being hit, what else could I do? And also, 
these people, they are doing something really wrong…I mean, they are not 
respecting the parda [privacy] of the women of our family. What else could have 
we done? Sooner or later we would have ended up fighting, one way or another. I 
think that it is good when I manage to be aggressive in a situation that really 
requires it. This is good ghairat. I am proud of my ghairat in situations like these. 
It makes me feel like a real Pashtun. 
 
This incident took place in mid-2012 in a middle-class, Pashtun-majority 
neighborhood of Kabul, home to many rural Pashtuns who relocated to the city from the 
eastern provinces of Afghanistan (where I conducted my fieldwork research). Rohullah is 
one of the close informants (Chapter 3), with whom I worked on a regular basis while in 
the field. As we will see, he is a young man in his late twenties, is married with a daughter, 
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has a college degree, and lives now in Kabul. He hails from a middle-class and 
“intellectual” Pashtun family. The incident he recalled in this passage represents not an 
“exception” within the Pashtun socio-cultural context, and certainly not an event which 
one would expect to take place only in a rural environment, or among the less-educated, 
more “traditionalist” strata of the population. The moral values, emotional affects, and 
behavioral ethics that emerge from this short passage pervade the life of any Pashtun man, 
wittingly or unwittingly, regardless of social and economic background. During my 
fieldwork I discovered that life (particularly psychological life) in such an environment 
represented a daily challenge for most of my informants, and presented constant 
interpersonal frictions. My work consisted in understanding and presenting their private 
predicaments.  
 
 
A psychodynamic framework of investigation 
 
In the following dissertation I explore the dynamics of subjectivity in male Pashtun 
individuals from the south-east of Afghanistan. I do so by exploring the impact that cultural 
idioms of masculinity (prominent in a strongly androcentric cultural milieu, such as the 
Pashtuns’) obtain on the inner reality of my informants, and the ways in which they adjust 
their public lives accordingly (if at all).  My research positions itself at the intersection 
between the psychological and the socio-cultural realms. Exploring one’s subjectivity 
means trying to understand thought processes, emotional reactions, and unconscious 
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dynamics of the individual under observation. In turn, doing so from an anthropological 
perspective means assuming that subjectivity is not an aspect of the “self” that exists in a 
vacuum, independent of the social and cultural contexts in which the individual is 
immersed, but rather that the workings of the mind must be read and interpreted through 
the lens of the socio-cultural environment in which such mind developed. Psychological 
and psychoanalytic literature has been acknowledging, and critiquing, the “myth of the 
isolated mind” for about two decades now (see Stolorow and Atwood 1994:233-250). 
However, it is still uncommon among psychoanalysts to fully conceive of what affects the 
human psyche beyond interpersonal dyadic relations (be it between patient and analyst, or 
between the patient and a third person in daily life), or triadic oedipal constellations at best 
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(for a remarkable exception, see Dalal 2002, 2006).1 2 While it is true that within 
psychoanalytic and psychological circles there exists a “resistance” (to use an apt term in 
this case) to recognize the role of cultural and social milieus in shaping the inner dynamics 
of each individual, it is also true that within anthropological circles one encounters a similar 
                                                          
1 Certainly, psychoanalysts-cum-anthropologists such as George Devereux and Erik Erikson 
expanded psychological investigation fully into the realm of cultural and social spheres already in 
the 1940s and 1950s, yet their approach to the study of mind was still strongly informed by a 
Freudian metapsychology and its assumptions, which curtailed their appreciation of the depth of 
culture’s reach into the individual’s mental and emotional processes. Robert Levy, also a 
psychoanalyst/anthropologist, moved away from psychodynamic research, and chose to delve into 
what became later known as “ethnopsychology” (Levy 1973). Two “full-time” psychoanalysts who 
decided to carry out outright ethnographic work, in the 1950s and early 1960s, are G.M. Carstairs 
and Wulf Sachs. Carstairs (1958) remained rather anchored to the school of “culture and 
personality” studies opened by Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead (with all the pitfalls that it 
entailed), while Sachs (1968 [1947]) produced an extremely successful experiment at a culturally-
informed psychological study of one single individual (which, maybe for this reason, has 
unfortunately remained peripheral to the interest of professional anthropologists). More recent 
attempts at bridging the gap between psychoanalysis and socio-cultural context, carried out by 
professional psychoanalysts, are Erich Fromm’s (with anthropologist Michael Maccoby. Fromm 
and Maccoby 1970), and Alan Roland’s (Roland 1988). Neither of them broke much ground among 
anthropologists, for various reasons (not least of which was parochialism), in spite of many 
interesting and insightful aspects that both works presented (ironically, and somehow tellingly, 
however, Maccoby went on to have a very successful and well-paid career as a private consultant 
for multinational corporations, in the field of country marketing studies. He was tasked to better 
adjust corporate marketing strategies to cultural and social characteristics peculiar to specific 
countries). A professional anthropologist, fully-trained in psychoanalysis at the Chicago 
Psychoanalytic Institute, under Heinz Kohut, is Robert LeVine, who is still very much active today. 
In 1973 he published a groundbreaking volume (revised in 1982) in the theory and practice of 
psychoanalytic ethnography, which has widely influenced the following generations of 
psychological anthropologists, including myself (one of his students, Waud Kracke, has been very 
successful in the production of a psychoanalytically-oriented ethnography. Kracke 1978).  Notably 
among them, also fully-trained in psychoanalysis and privately practicing part-time, is Douglas 
Hollan, to whose ideas I am indebted in many respects.             
2 The contemporary field of developmental psychology, especially in its more specific branch 
dedicated to “attachment theory” (derived from the initial propositions of psychoanalyst John 
Bowlby in the 1960s, and his student Mary Ainsworth later), is particularly impervious to the 
acknowledgement of the importance of the cultural and social context in which the child develops 
his/her first mental functions. Two very recent edited volumes have been published to counter this 
strong and wide-spread attitude in developmental psychology, one mainly authored by 
anthropologists (Quinn and Mageo 2013), the other mainly by psychologists (Otto and Keller 
2014).   
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resistance to the acknowledgement of the importance of individual psychic dynamics for a 
fuller understanding of broader social phenomena. The distaste that Clifford Geertz 
expressed for what he termed “psychologism” (Geertz 1973:17), or the sharp criticism of 
psychoanalytic interpretations in cultural studies that Victor Turner voiced (Turner 
1967:32-39), are still very much present in contemporary academic anthropology. My work 
aims at reconciling these two seemingly mutually exclusive realms of investigation. My 
primary goal is that of elucidating the psychological processes my informants go through 
in their daily lives, and understanding the subjective meanings they give to their private 
and social experiences.  The relevance of this main objective to a broader picture of Afghan 
Pashtun society (and any society in general), lies in the realization that, as Norbert Elias 
suggested long ago, every society is a “society of individuals” (Elias 1991 [1939]). Far 
from constituting a “superorganic” structure with its rules and impalpable reality (a la 
Kroeber), or a set of fixed social roles/functions embodied in turn by different individuals 
(a la Radcliffe-Brown), I believe with Elias that every society is in fact represented by the 
mutual relations of interdependence between its members – the individuals (Elias 1994 
[1968]:225). Investigating the way each individual privately interprets and inhabits his/her 
socio-cultural environment means understanding those very relations of interdependence 
on which society is premised.3 Thus, I believe my main contribution will be in the realm 
of the study of private subjectivity and psychic reality of individuals immersed in their 
specific socio-cultural setting. However, this achievement would be attained merely for its 
own sake, if I did not believe that it would in fact lead to a better understanding of broader 
                                                          
3 Importantly, conflict is one such kind of relations of interdependence. See below for details. 
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social and cultural phenomena (as I hope I will show), relevant not only to the milieu 
wherein I worked, but also to any given human context at large.4 
As will become clearer later on, in the field I operated with a “person-centered” 
ethnographic methodology (in addition to a standard participant observation approach, see 
below for details), through a long-term series of one-on-one interview sessions with a select 
number of informants. Such interview sessions were carried out in a psychodynamic 
manner, leaving free rein to my informants to express their emotions and affects, 
associative thoughts and transferential processes, while trying occasionally to elicit details 
and elaborations from them where I thought that conflicting aspects of their subjective 
experiences and memories were emerging. Conscious of the inherently and unavoidably 
“asymmetrical” character of the relationship between ethnographer and informant (as 
between patient and analyst; see Devereux 1968, Aron 1991, Hoffman 1994), as well as 
the co-constructed realm of subjective experience that a one-on-one dialectical experience 
                                                          
4 Edward Sapir, a contemporary to Norbert Elias, tackled similar issues as Elias, only starting from 
the opposite side of the continuum – the individual. While he wrote that “the individual in isolation 
from society is a psychological fiction” (Sapir 2002:141), he also stated that “we have no right to 
assume that a given pattern or ritual necessarily implies a certain emotional significance or 
personality adjustment in its practitioners, without demonstration at the level of the 
individual…You have to know the individual before you know what the baggage of his culture 
means to him” (183). An obvious corollary to this, I would add, is that a close study of individual 
dynamics is necessary to fully understand how the individual not only creates private meaning of 
shared cultural material, but operates onto his/her cultural milieu on the basis of such private 
meanings, thereby promoting social and cultural change. Aside from foreshadowing an 
epistemological position that psychological anthropologists have only recently fully reaffirmed 
(see, for example, LeVine 1982 [1973], Hollan 1992), Sapir’s approach countered vehemently a 
classical Freudian interpretation of ethnographic fieldwork and material (see, among many others, 
Spiro 1965). My contention is that we need to pay serious attention to the individual in order to 
have a well-rounded understanding of the cultural production and dynamics of the social milieu in 
which such individual lives, is inspired also by the pivotal work that Edward Sapir carried out in 
this regard.  
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obtains in two interlocutors (Orange, Atwood and Stolorow 1997), I will not claim to have 
attained any “objective truth” in my conversations with my informants.5 However, I am 
convinced that the intersubjective “space” created by the intellectual and emotional 
exchange my informants experienced with me did result in the emergence of a different, 
and perhaps heightened, awareness of their own states of subjectivity (or “selves”), which 
resonated “authentically” (according to them) with their past and present life experiences 
(“authenticity” in a private, psychological sense. See Bion 1962, and details in chapter 4). 
It is this heightened self-awareness that I relied on to propose an interpretation of their 
unconscious dynamics and thought processes in the present, and over the span of their life 
trajectory.  
A research project of this kind has been pursued in the past only by a handful of 
anthropologists (Kracke 1978, Obeyesekere 1981, Devereux 1951, Crapanzano 1980). I 
leave it to the reader to determine whether I offer a less dogmatic, more comparative and 
inclusive epistemological perspective in dealing with the task.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5 Byron Good, fully understanding the “intimacy” that exists between the role of the analyst and 
that of the ethnographer, writes that “anthropologists do not and cannot “know better than” the 
members of society with which they work. We can only discover what everybody else already 
knows, or discover in collaboration with the members of a society what is not easily knowable, 
what is bound up in the complicities and the “after the facts”, what lies at the complex intersection 
of the psychological and the political” (Good 2012:32). 
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The search for “meaning” within a shared psychic reality 
 
 Precisely because I consider undeniable that each person’s subjectivity does not 
exist and function as a “stand-alone” and impermeable microcosm, with its endogenous 
and autonomous mechanisms, I chose to explore the subjective states of my informants 
through the lens of a very specific cultural idiom – masculinity  ̶  which is of paramount 
importance for the social life of Pashtun communities in Afghanistan. Such a choice rests 
on a few epistemological convictions on my part. For the reasons mentioned above, I 
believe that a subjective system of psychic functioning cannot work in isolation: it has to 
“attach” to some aspect of outside reality in order to operate. Psychic processes have to be 
“triggered”, so to speak, by external contingencies. Such external contingencies, cultural 
and social in kind, trigger idiosyncratic processes in different individuals, and in so doing 
produce unique subjectivities. Thus, while I believe, alongside mainstream psychoanalytic 
thought, that common, shared patterns of psychic functioning may be recognized in 
individuals from diverse social and cultural backgrounds, I also believe that the specific 
ways in which these patterns are in fact enacted and pragmatically performed by each 
individual are totally context-specific, and respond to precise environmental cues. The 
specific constraints that Pashtun cultural idioms of masculinity engender in Pashtun (male) 
individuals, the social arrangements and peculiar forms of interdependent relationships that 
they produce between those same individuals, and the emotional ramifications they obtain 
in them, all impact profoundly the way shared patterns of psychic functioning are played 
out in real life by my informants, in their own idiosyncratic ways. As Jerome Bruner 
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pointed out, the crux of the issue lies in “meaning” (Bruner 1990). It is important here not 
to equate the function of a mechanism with its supposed explanatory power. Psychiatrists 
Littlewood and Lipsedge (1989:29), discussing projective identification and its (mis)use 
by clinicians to explain a vast and diverse gamut of psychological phenomena, famously 
wrote that “projection is a mechanism, not an explanation”. It is the “meaning” that 
individuals give to the psychic processes which they (consciously or unconsciously) make 
use of, that leads us closer to a fuller explanation and understanding of the reasons why 
they do so, and, more broadly speaking, why they behave (and “believe”) in a certain 
manner. I believe that “meaning” can hardly be extracted only from the study of 
intrapsychic dynamics and endogenous mechanisms.6  As I see it, “meaning”, as Clifford 
Geertz understood in his quasi-Weberian approach to anthropological theory, is created by 
each individual through privately interpreting and reworking the cultural material and 
social constraints in which he/she is immersed (in fact, Geertz was much more of a 
“psychologist” than he might have liked to admit). However, such acts of interpretation 
and “manipulation” (“acts of meaning”, in Bruner’s words) are attained only through the 
workings of psychic processes and dynamics, whose general patterns are common to 
humans in general, but whose manners of utilization are peculiar to each individual in a 
specific socio-cultural context. It is in this sense that “meaning” becomes really “personal”, 
                                                          
6 Sure enough, what developmental psychologist Jerome Kagan calls “temperament” (an 
idiosyncratic and unique aspect of one’s own personality configuration), has also a crucial role in 
how individuals respond to certain specific environmental cues. However, our understanding of 
what “temperament” is, its origins, and its impact on one’s psychological profile is still too vague 
to be taken into consideration as an acting variable in our investigation of human behavior (Kagan 
2013).  
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for it couples cultural and social material with idiosyncratic psychic processes (the 
“subjectification of cultural symbols”, as Gananath Obeyesekere termed this phenomenon. 
Obeyesekere 1981. See also Hollan 2000). And it is also following this path that each 
individual obtains in turn the possibility of affecting his/her socio-cultural milieu as an 
actor of change. Understanding these private dynamics, on the part of the ethnographer, 
means opening a window to how the individual  functions, as well as to how he/she might 
be able to actively impact his/her milieu, ushering in patterns of change. 
I find that my theoretical stance was somehow anticipated in psychoanalytic 
thought, already in the 1950s, by radical thinker Sigmund Foulkes. Proposing an 
uncompromising social constructivism in psychological research, Foulkes put the group at 
the center of the stage: “The group, the community, is the ultimate primary unit of 
consideration, and the so-called inner processes in the individual are internalizations of the 
forces operating in the group to which he belongs” (Foulkes 1971:212).7 Breaking with all 
Freudian metapsychology (for which he had previously been a strong advocate), Foulkes 
believed that “ego and id arise from a common matrix, beginning at birth or perhaps even 
prenatally” (Foulkes 1973:236), and that “the superego and the ego develop pari passu 
                                                          
7 The British psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion, during WWII, pioneered a “group” approach to 
psychodynamics, working with groups of traumatized wounded soldiers, who had been 
hospitalized for psychiatric reasons. In Experiences in Groups (1961), he gave a remarkable 
account of his work with them, and his approach served as a foundation for the contemporary 
mainstream school of group-analysis. What Bion studied most intensely in his groups, however, 
was the interpersonal reality that obtains among people interacting with each other, in the here-and-
now of each session. The group is considered by Bion somehow as if in a vacuum – particularly a 
social and cultural vacuum. Although he shows perceptiveness in the discussion of many dynamics, 
which he saw emerging among his patients in session, his consideration of the life experiences, and 
socio-cultural milieus, of the patients he treats is negligible. In this, Bion stands fast within the 
Kleinian tradition of psychoanalysis, from which he intellectually originated in the first place.    
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with the id inside the family context” (Foulkes 1974:276). Even more radically, Foulkes 
concluded that “the individual is pre-conditioned to the core by his community…and his 
personality and character are imprinted vitally by the group in which he is raised” (Foulkes 
1966:152). It is with such a perspective that Foulkes coined the term “social unconscious”, 
on which he focused his research, and analytical practice. While Foulkes certainly does not 
represent a mainstream current in contemporary analytical thinking, there exists 
nonetheless a school of thought today that is explicitly inspired by his ideas, and that is 
extremely attentive to the cultural and social environments in which the patient is 
immersed. Farhad Dalal is one of these modern Foulkesian thinkers. He incorporates into 
his propositions insights from different authors, such as Norbert Elias and Frantz Fanon. 
Dalal writes: “Each of us, as a particular individual, is born into a pre-existing society 
constituted by a multiplicity of overlapping and conflicting cultures. The cultures 
themselves, as well as the relationships between cultures, are constituted by power 
relationships. As we grow and develop, we imbibe, of necessity, the pre-existing cultural 
forms, habits, beliefs, and ways of thinking around us. These introjections are not taken 
into an already-formed self; rather, they come to contribute to the formation of that self” 
(Dalal 2006: 145, emphasis in original). Dalal’s position does not give way to any sort of 
social determinism: “To think in the way described does not mean denying the existence 
of individuals, each with his or her own unique sense of self, nor denying that all are 
biological beings in bodies” (ibid.).  
It is clear why the ideas proposed by Foulkes, and, more recently, Dalal, may appeal 
to an anthropologist interested in the psychocultural study of the individual. My overall 
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way of looking at my informants’ inner reality, the context in which they lived, and the 
relationships between them, falls mostly within an approach such as that which Foulkes 
and Dalal present. It diverges from it in few respects. My unit of analysis is still the 
individual, and my acceptance of a social constructivist stance is not “unconditional”, so 
to speak. While it is true that I believe that culture “affects the deepest layers of the human 
psyche” (in Alan Roland’s words, personal communication), I also came to be convinced 
that there exists an “evolved deep structure” of the human psyche that is common to 
humans as a species, irrespective of an individual’s proximal context.8 Upon exquisite 
better examination, the two positions are not so mutually exclusive and contradictory as 
might seem at first sight. Alongside psychoanalysts Malcolm Owen Slavin and Daniel 
Kriegman (both trained also in anthropology), I believe that “what we inherit (as unique 
individuals, and in our shared, universal inheritance as a species) are largely internal 
structural and dynamic features (ways of organizing and disguising experience, 
sensitivities, vulnerabilities, etc.) that through interaction with a given social and cultural 
environment will be manifested overtly (behaviorally) in a whole range of different ways” 
(Slavin and Kriegman 1992:76 fn.10). To this they add that “we would expect that a major 
feature of the universal deep structure [of the human psyche] must consist of mechanisms 
or strategies for dealing with inevitable individual variation” (77, emphasis added).9 What 
                                                          
8 From a more exquisitely global perspective, anthropologists Biehl, Good and Kleinman aptly 
argue that “in a ‘world in pieces’, older notions of the subject who is cultural ‘all the way’ seem 
inadequate” (Biehl, Good and Kleinman 2007:8). 
9 Slavin and Kriegman make large use, in their theorization, of premises derived from mainstream 
contemporary evolutionary anthropology and biology. They are equally critical of the reductionist 
and deterministic conclusions that have been drawn in the recent past by some among socio-
biologists and evolutionary psychologists, who too speedily link behavioral patterns to genetic 
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Slavin and Kriegman argue does not take anything away from the inherent social and 
cultural embeddedness of our ethnographic subjects, nor from the individual’s 
“uniqueness” in psychological terms. It only suggests that the evolutionary past of humans 
as a species (premised specifically on the development of mutual interrelationships and 
social cooperation) must have a bearing, in some way, on the general mechanisms with 
which our minds function.  
My emphasis on the interpersonal and relational aspects of my informants’ lives 
does not imply that conflict, competition, and aggression should be seen only as 
epiphenomena, vis-à-vis a more deeply rooted inclination towards social cooperation.  My 
point is that the very concepts of relatedness and interdependence include necessarily 
within themselves competition, friction, and possibly conflict. Conflict, whether social or 
interpersonal, is but one aspect of the relatedness on which human lives are premised. It is 
a relational, interpersonal, ecological rationale for the emergence of conflict (as opposed 
to the endogenous, intrapsychic rationale peculiar to the vast Freudian and ego-
psychological tradition in psychodynamic studies). Within a similar paradigm, Slavin and 
Kriegman again explain the existence of aggressive and destructive affects (still in a 
context of social relatedness) by resorting to an evolutionary approach:  sparked by the 
instinct for survival, each individual’s self-interest maintains a considerable pull within the 
final economy of pragmatic choices,  and its clash against other individuals’ own self-
interest, as well as the clash between social and private priorities, are all variables in the 
                                                          
heritage, and disregard evidence about the strong impact of social and cultural factors on the 
shaping of one’s subjectivity and public behavior.    
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equation of human relatedness (either consciously or unconsciously), whose interplay 
creates antagonism, competition, and conflict.  A considerable part of the material I 
gathered from my informants is pervaded by such dynamics, which they handled and 
managed both consciously and unconsciously, and which I try to analyze accordingly. A 
complementary way to look at conflict, and its roots, is by considering the idea of “power”. 
Alongside Norbert Elias, I believe that all relationships of relatedness and interdependence 
are inherently informed by “power”, which structures relatedness and interdependence 
along lines of domination and subordination - whether material, or symbolic. The way Elias 
conceives of “power” is nuanced, eschewing essentialist and reductionist views of it. 
Power, he writes, “is not an amulet possessed by one person and not by another; it is a 
structural characteristic of human relationships – of all human relationships” (Elias 
1978:74, emphasis in original). Power entails, among other things, conflict and 
antagonism. For this reason, the concept of relatedness fully comprises instances of social 
and interpersonal conflict as well. Again, dynamics of domination and subordination are 
omnipresent in the material that my informants presented to me, whether with regards to 
masculinity, violence, or personal agency.  
    It would certainly be a Herculean task to try to disentangle our evolutionary 
heritage from our social and cultural realities, and it is not my objective to do so. The study 
of the individual within his/her socio-cultural environment, which I have attempted during 
my fieldwork research (and in this dissertation), does not require necessarily that I do so in 
order to maintain its cogency. It would be beyond its scope, and not strictly relevant to my 
informants’ subjectivities. What is relevant, however, is a much broader epistemological 
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stance. The idea that humans are evolutionarily adapted to a world of interpersonal and 
social relationships, which has shaped the deep structure of their psyche in order to be able 
to build and maintain such relationships (through the creation of basic psychic mechanisms 
and processes of functioning), is simply the necessary theoretical pre-requisite for being 
able to relate the study of any one individual to the rest of human individuals as a whole, 
and any given human social and cultural community to the rest of the existing human 
communities. It is an idea that negates the irreducibility and incommensurability of any 
two given socio-cultural human milieus, and which allows us, as anthropologists, to find 
and give broader meaning to what we discover in the field about our subjects of study. 10 
 The idea that human beings are inherently driven towards interpersonal relatedness, 
and social coexistence, is certainly not new in psychoanalytic thought. Harry Stack 
                                                          
10 Incidentally, the position I just described is not much far removed from the sense of the metaphor 
that Clifford Geertz used (couched in terms of  “hardware” and “software”, we would say today) 
in order to describe the importance and impact of culture on human beings. Geertz wrote that 
“culture is best seen not as complexes of concrete behavior patterns…but as a set of control 
mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, instructions (what computer engineers call “programs”) – for 
the governing of behavior” (Geertz 1973:44). Geertz, in the same essay, makes also ample reference 
to our evolutionary past, as the locus of the development of a “hardware”, possessed by every 
human being, which needs a “software” (cultural material) in order to function. Geertz, however, 
seems to consider irrelevant to the study of culture the investigation of the ways in which the 
“hardware” functions in order to run “programs”. In this regard, I find myself in disagreement with 
Geertz. It is erroneous to try to separate the two parts of the system, and try to study only one of 
them (whether the “hardware” or the “software”). Both are an abstraction without each other, and 
unable to function in the absence of each other. This is why the same program does not run in the 
same way on all hardware surfaces, and why the same hardware surface does not perform with the 
same promptness when operating different programs. In order to evaluate the real capabilities of a 
computer (not in abstract terms), one has to study the modes of its overall functioning under 
different circumstances, that is, operating diverse sets of programs. In a human context, psychic 
processes, cultural material and social constraints inform profoundly each other, and can only be 
fully understood when studied in relation to each other. What I tried to do in this dissertation is 
focus on the psychic processes and subjective reality of my informants, while always pitting them 
against the background of their context’s cultural and social features.   
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Sullivan, Erich Fromm, W.R.D. Fairbairn and Donald Winnicott were among the first, and 
most influential, to break with Freud’s assumptions about the “hardwired” aggressive and 
sadistic attitudes of individuals towards each other (Heinz Kohut, in the 1970s, and in his 
own terms, spearheaded a “second wave” of this movement). John Bowlby, in the 1960s 
and 1970s, proposed a similar view of interpersonal relationships, but firmly grounded it 
on evolutionary biological premises (which developed in a now-widely adopted, although 
exceedingly rigid, theory about infant attachment). Many contemporary developmental 
psychologists and psychoanalysts have come to interpret the roots of human relatedness in 
these terms as well (among the most notable ones, see Stern 2001 [1985], Fonagy 2001, 
Mitchell 1988). The position that I am proposing here takes inspiration from these previous 
models, yet leaves more room for the workings of cultural idioms and social constraints. I 
am certainly not advocating for the classical, yet today limiting and anachronistic, concept 
of the “psychic unity of mankind”, which Adolf Bastian courageously advanced more than 
a hundred years ago (see Koepping 1983). I only believe that, in the words of Adam Kuper, 
“unless we separate the various processes that are lumped together under the heading of 
culture, and then look beyond the field of culture to other processes, we will not get far in 
understanding any of it…We all have multiple identities, and even if I accept that I have a 
primary cultural identity, I may not want to conform to it…If I am to regard myself only 
as a cultural being, I allow myself little room for maneuver, or to question the world in 
which I find myself” (Kuper 1999:288).  
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Engaging masculinity 
 
If a dynamic of individual subjectivity (as I have delineated it so far, inextricably 
related to the cultural and social realities of the context where it unfolds) has to be 
investigated, it cannot be done in abstraction from that very same context. In other words, 
I have to select a “turf” onto which the game gets played. Without a specific turf, and a 
specific opposing team, the game remains only a set of abstract and theoretical rules, 
without any experiential meaning. In order to relate my informants’ subjective dynamics 
to their experiential sphere (cultural and social), I chose the “turf” of masculinity. 
Masculinity represents the cultural lens through which I explored the subjectivity of my 
informants. In this sense, this dissertation is not stricto sensu about masculinity. I made 
instrumental use of this cultural idiom, which I knew was central to the lives of my Pashtun 
male informants, in order to investigate their psychological dynamics. However, I believe 
that what comes out of the conversations I had with Pashtun men opens nonetheless a 
valuable window also onto the current features and development of that bundle of moral 
values, cultural tenets and ethical injunctions categorized as “masculinity”. Precisely 
because there cannot be any psychology without the social, or any society without the 
individual, the close study of any one’s subjectivity will provide us with a piece of the 
puzzle about the socio-cultural reality in which he/she was immersed. I am confident that 
the reader will complete the reading of this dissertation with an enhanced comprehension 
of the meaning and expression of masculinity among Afghan Pashtun men, which in turn 
will facilitate the understanding of similar cultural patterns in other socio-cultural contexts. 
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There was also a more personal, subjective side to my choice of “masculinity” as 
the “turf” on which to play out my research. Manliness, its cultural significance, its ways 
of social expression, and its public role in society held a peculiar spot in my personal 
experiences. After graduating from college, in 1997, I served three and half years in the 
Italian army, prior to moving to freelancing journalism (as a war correspondent in the 
Middle East). I returned to my unit in 2004, and served there three more years, after 
realizing that working as a freelance journalist was not enough to pay the bills. As officer 
in an army’s regiment, I lived and operated within a very distinct sub-culture, encapsulated 
by the “regular” Italian socio-cultural environment. In my military world, moral values 
such as honor, respect, sacrifice, and ethical qualities such as courage, valor, and 
fearlessness, were integral parts of the role that each of us played qua soldiers. Our 
manliness, our manly worth, depended on how well we could demonstrate we possessed 
such moral values and ethical qualities. Furthermore, my unit was a paratroopers’ special 
unit, trained for particular tasks, which magnified and enhanced in its members the 
necessity to display these ethico-moral requirements. Only such a man could be considered 
an adequate and dignified soldier, and, more importantly, deserving to belong to our 
specific regiment (note that, at that time, women were not yet allowed to serve in the Italian 
army, which they are now. To this vey day, however, women are not allowed to serve in 
my former special unit). Sure enough, there were those among us who took these ideal 
standards more seriously than others, and others who more pragmatically adjusted to a 
reality which did not always live up to those standards. Yet the ideal model was clear to 
everybody, and everyone was implicitly evaluated against this yardstick. During my last 
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three years of military service, in 2004-2007, I started to seriously deconstruct the meaning 
that these cultural patterns held for me, and to radically question the very essence of the 
role that I was embodying as a soldier (especially during my deployment to Iraq, in 2006). 
Yet the features of what had constituted a crucial part of my experience in uniform 
(manliness, and masculinity as a whole), remained inescapably a focus of interest for me. 
We will see in this dissertation that narratives regarding honor, respect, courage, 
and fearlessness, are central to the framing of a culturally appropriate and adequate 
masculine subjectivity among Pashtun men. When I realized, through my studies and my 
preliminary research visits, that Pashtun men’s cultural and social universe revolved 
around patterns that seemed so familiar to me (though enacted in very different ways, of 
course), I felt that it would “make sense” for me to follow this research lead as a cultural 
anthropologist. In the end, through the exploration I carried out in my research about 
Pashtun men’s subjectivity, sense of masculinity and manly worth, I explored mine as well.  
 Indeed, most of the ethnographic and historiographical literature about Pashtun 
populations, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, agrees in considering “manliness” (as a 
personal quality and a moral virtue) a pivotal issue within the Pashtun social world. I was 
well aware of this cultural trait, and the reality I immediately found in the field did not 
contradict this overall knowledge. True to its ethnographic fame, the Pashtun social and 
cultural milieu did indeed present itself to me as a strongly androcentric, patrilineal and 
patrilocal environment, in which a strong segregation of sexes is maintained, and men’s 
control over the family’s women’s behavior is considered crucial to the attainment of social 
respectability. The dominant cultural narrative of masculinity revolves around concepts 
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such as honor (izzat), courage and fearlessness (ghairat), revenge (badal), respect 
(ihtiram), and shame (sharm). Interpersonal and interfamilial assertiveness, and 
aggressiveness (even violence), have traditionally been the means through which these 
values are upheld, displayed, and perpetuated. Indeed, violence among Pashtuns does seem 
to be indissolubly linked to cultural concepts of masculinity. Yet I also approached such 
context with carefulness and skepticism, as it were. I suspended my judgment, so to speak, 
until I would be able to investigate in more depth the dynamics internal to this seemingly 
consistent scenario. Informed by insights deriving from the practice theory of Pierre 
Bourdieu, Sherry Ortner, and Marshall Sahlins (Bourdieu 1977, Ortner 1984, Sahlins 
1985), the transactional analysis proposed by Fredrik Barth (1966), and the psychodynamic 
understanding of fieldwork research offered by Robert LeVine, Robert Levy and Douglas 
Hollan (LeVine 1982 [1973], Levy and Hollan 1998, Hollan 1992, 2000, 2001), I set out 
to investigate the “behind-the-scenes” reality of what had been theretofore presented by 
previous ethnographers about Pashtun masculinity, and their social dynamics more in 
general. I suspected that what seemed coherent and consistent on the plane of cultural 
idioms and public behavior, would reveal contradictions and fragmentation if investigated 
from the subjective perspective of individual actors. I suspected that the subjective states 
and emotional dynamics of my informants, if allowed to come to the surface, and express 
themselves, would expose a markedly more conflicted and multivocal reality (particularly 
under the challenging conditions of internal tension, and external intervention, prevailing 
in Afghanistan at the time – on which see next chapter).  And in fact, one of the major 
findings of my ethnographic research is that my informants did often reveal (to various 
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degrees) psychic conflict, suffering, and an inner rejection of shared cultural idioms, 
alongside outer conformity to social injunctions. These contradictions, and their 
ramifications for the public life of my informants’ communities, became a focus of my 
analysis. I hope that the material I collected and analyzed will help better understand the 
personal, subjective (and often painful) efforts of individuals to adjust to the socio-cultural 
context in which they were born and raised, whether in Afghanistan among Pashtuns, in 
Kenya among Kikuyu, or in Manhattan’s Upper East Side among upper class white 
Americans.11 
 The cultural schemata and social arrangements related to masculinity, and 
manliness, that Pashtuns by and large publicly display, are certainly not unique to Pashtuns 
alone. There exists an abundant ethnographic literature about “honor and shame”, 
patriarchal structures, and female sexual purity, which indicates that certain socio-cultural 
patterns and moral beliefs about how “to be good at being a man” (Herzfeld 1985:16) are 
shared by a considerable portion of the world’s population. In areas geographically, 
ecologically, religiously and culturally as different as southern Spain and Italy, northern 
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, Iran, South Asia, and the southern States of the US (to name 
just a few), we find differences in the degree to which the same kind of general patterns 
are (seemingly) accepted and enacted by a relevant-enough share of the population (see, 
among many others, Peristiany 1966, Gilmore 1987, Giovannini 1984, Herzfeld 1985, 
                                                          
11 It is worthwhile to point out here that the very socio-cultural context in which my informants 
were born and raised changed radically in the last thirty-five years, due to the continuous conflict 
in which the country plunged, ongoing up to this day. Their effort at adjusting one’s own 
subjectivity to the socio-cultural milieu was rendered even more complex and, sometimes, painful 
precisely by these shifting conditions that the milieu itself was undergoing. 
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Nisbett and Cohen 1996, Blok 1981, Aase 2002, Johnson and Lipsett-Rivera 1998). 
However, as I remarked above, this dissertation will leave the main social ramifications of 
such cultural patterns somewhat in the background. It was not my intention to participate 
in the debate about perceived apparatuses for male domination, hegemonic patriarchy, and 
the consequent denial for women of a conspicuous and meaningful participation in the 
public and political sphere of their own communities (all of which irrefutably apply also to 
Pashtun society, as we will see from my informants’ accounts). Ethnographic literature and 
anthropological theory have produced a vast amount of work in this realm, especially 
during the decades of feminist and post-modernist scholarship (from the mid-1970s 
through the 1990s. See particularly Leacock 1981, Sanday 1981, Ortner 1996, Rosaldo and 
Lamphere 1974, Lamphere, Ragone and Zavella 1997). My approach aims to explore 
cultural configurations of Pashtun masculinity less from a political and sociological 
perspective, than from a truly experiential and individual-centered one. In this regard, it 
runs more along the lines of the ethnographic research that Marcia Inhorn has recently 
pursued (Inhorn 2012), which focused on the problem of male infertility and artificial 
insemination among Middle-Eastern Arab couples. Inhorn used the difficult medical 
condition of her male informants to provide insight into her informants’ sense of manly 
worth. The portrait that comes out of her research sheds light on today’s position of cultural 
idioms of masculinity in the Arab Middle Eastern context, as well as on the struggle that 
men are putting up in order to adjust to an objectively punishing condition, while at the 
same time operating on their society’s cultural idioms through their acts of “resistance” 
and assertion of personal (and masculine) agency. Likewise, my research focuses on the 
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lived experience of my male informants, within a cultural framework of demanding and 
taxing expectations about appropriate masculine behavior, onto which they, as we will see, 
operated either as reinforcing agents, or disavowing ones. I rely heavily (as did Inhorn) on 
the scholarship that sociologist Robert W. Connell produced on the idea of hegemonic and 
subordinate masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995). Connell concerned himself specifically 
with the relations of power and subordination within the male sex, rather than between the 
male and female sexes. He emphasized that, just as it is undeniable that there exists a social 
relationship of unequal power between men and women in most societies in the world, it 
is equally undeniable that there exists a hierarchical stratification of masculine roles within 
male-only milieus as well, with a hegemonic role on top, and many others subordinated to 
it, in relation to the socio-cultural context. More recently, Demetriakis Demetriou refined 
Connell’s concept, pointing out that also within a hegemonic category of masculine cultural 
idioms, we should talk of masculinities, mutually competing, instead of simply one 
hegemonic masculinity (Demetriou 2001). The analysis that Connell and Demetriou carry 
out is particularly fitting for a strongly homosocial context, such as the Pashtuns’. We will 
see from my informants’ accounts of their daily lives’ vicissitudes and trajectories, that 
they had constantly to grapple with, and navigate through, a cultural world that provided 
them at times with the “luxury” of being able to choose (if often unconsciously) from 
among several hegemonic masculine roles, in competition with each other, while at other 
times it forced them to embody one only configuration for a hegemonic masculinity (or 
else resign to suffer the social consequences of being the bearers of a subordinate one). 
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Relations of power, expressed often through aggressive and even violent behaviors, were 
a central component of my informants’ lived experiences among their peers. 
 
 
Methodology 
 
I have mentioned above that the fulcrum of my research was built around a person-
centered ethnographic methodology. The main theoretical guidelines of this type of 
ethnographic work were set by Robert LeVine, in Culture, Behavior and Personality (1982 
[1973]), and were spelled out more pragmatically in later papers by Robert Levy and 
Douglas Hollan (Levy and Hollan 1998, Hollan 2001). LeVine aimed at defining the 
epistemological and methodological foundations for the ethnographic and psychological 
study of the individual, as a fully cultural and social being. He explained his advocacy for 
a person-centered, psychoanalytically-informed ethnography by creating an analogy: the 
classical participant-observation approach to fieldwork research is akin to reading an aerial 
map of any given geographical region of our planet. Person-centered fieldwork is akin to 
exploring the same area on foot, from the ground. Imagining one is looking at a map of a 
forested region, the aerial map will allow the observer to detect the composition, structure 
and features of the vegetation on the ground. The explorer of the same area will be able, 
from the ground, to observe what is concealed from an aerial view by the canopy of the 
forest, to observe the complex relationships that connect the different types of vegetation 
and animal life that compose the forest, and to navigate the details of it. Obviously, no 
single approach alone will provide the full, complete picture of what a forest, as an 
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ecosystem, really is and how it works. An integration of the two is always necessary in 
order to accomplish this overarching task. Yet, through his elegant elaboration of this 
epistemological proposition, LeVine gave definitive and convincing legitimacy to a sphere 
of social and cultural investigation (the psychological sphere) that had been neglected by 
academic anthropology in the wake of the theoretical shortcomings displayed by the 
“culture and personality” school of the 1940s and 1950s (led by Ruth Benedict, Margaret 
Mead, and their followers). My approach to fieldwork is fully in line with LeVine’s 
analogy. I tried to observe what was happening beneath the canopy of the social and 
cultural forest in which I worked.  
 Over the first years of my research in Afghanistan, from 2009 until 2012, I spent 
relatively short periods of time in the country on a regular basis: three months during 
summers, and three weeks during the academic Christmas breaks. These repeated visits 
gave me the opportunity to refine the objectives of my research, get acquainted with the 
social and cultural reality of my fieldsite, and become proficient in Pashto (the local 
language). More importantly though, they allowed me to build a network of friends, 
acquaintances and occasional contacts, who constituted a reliable and trustworthy 
environment, on the basis of which I could safely conduct the long-term fieldwork that was 
to come. Indeed, by summer 2012, when I started my ten months-long period of continuous 
research, the region of my fieldsite had become a hotbed for the insurrection against the 
foreign occupation that is still engulfing the country.  The security situation in Nangarhar 
province was rapidly deteriorating by the week. Without the people that I had come to 
know well during the previous visits, it would have been impossible for me to reside stably 
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in my fieldsite for so long. Through one of them I was able to rent a house for myself in 
Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province, in the south-east of the country, near the 
border with Pakistan. The house was the former headquarters of the civil society 
organization that this person had led until a short time earlier. He allowed my presence 
there because the house was not his personal house, which meant he was not fully 
responsible for my presence there. Also, having been a “public” space until recently, the 
building had had a continuous flow of strangers coming in and out of it, rendering the 
presence of a yet one more stranger (myself) less visible. Nonetheless, after a few months, 
my neighbors all knew that there was a foreigner living in the house, yet the arrangement 
did not look completely out of place. The fact that I was paying rent was not enough to 
allow me to stay. The danger for someone who had close familiarity and relationships with 
a foreigner was too high at that time for him to rent his house to me merely for economic 
gain. Rather, our friendly, personal relations were the crucial factor (about the situation of 
myself as a foreign researcher in my specific fieldsite, see details in the following chapters).        
 In this house I held many of the interview sessions on which my person-centered 
research was based. I would sit in one of the rooms with my informant, and with nobody 
else present. The series of sessions ranged from a minimum of five, to a maximum of thirty-
seven. Each of them lasted between forty-five minutes and two hours, depending on the 
circumstances. In this dissertation I will present the detailed account of the series of 
sessions I had with four informants, and a shorter profile of four more.  I only met one of 
my informants exclusively at my place. The others I had known for several years, and had 
participated with them in the social activities and events they attended either in Jalalabad, 
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or in their home village, or even in Kabul. My informants came from diverse backgrounds: 
urban, rural, educated, illiterate, semi-literate, religiously-minded, secular (relatively to the 
context), even iconoclastic. Some had been refugees in Pakistan, others had never left 
Afghanistan, even at the height of the conflicts. Some spoke some English, others good 
English, others only Pashto. The age range is also very diverse: one of my informants was 
sixteen when I first met him, and (barely) twenty-one when I left. His grandfather, also an 
informant, is in his mid-seventies. Some of my informants lived in Jalalabad, others in rural 
villages, a few more in Kabul, and in one rural district of Paktia province. I met them in 
both Jalalabad and their home villages (or Kabul). From my permanent base in the house I 
rented in Jalalabad, my life in the field was spent moving from one place to another, in 
order to find the best logistical solution to meet the people I wanted to talk to, in the least 
possible “disruptive” way (socially, culturally, and with regards to security). In this sense, 
my fieldsite proper comprises a large area of Nangarhar province, given that many of the 
people I worked with lived in rural villages scattered around several districts of the 
province. From this standpoint, it amounted to a “multi-sited” fieldwork. In fact, security 
concerns represented the major variable upon which my meetings with informants were 
arranged, particularly during the last months of my fieldwork. With each informant I met, 
we had to consider the security situation of the area where we decided to meet, at any given 
time during my research. We took into consideration the most recent range of activities of 
the insurgency, and what was expected from them at that time. Sometimes Jalalabad was 
the only safe place where I could meet one of my informants, while at other times it would 
be viable to meet in his village, and maybe stay there for a few nights. Sometimes one of 
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my informants would not consider safe for him to be seen in Jalalabad at all, and at the 
same time it would not be safe for me to meet him in his village. In these cases, we would 
meet in a third location, usually a friend’s house, away from other people’s gaze.  
While the total number of people with whom I interacted on a regular basis was 
obviously large, for the purpose of my person-centered project I selected those who I felt 
were more inclined to talk openly about personal issues, and displayed an interest in 
introspection. Not all of those whom I asked to participate in my project accepted. Some 
declined. Some started to have sessions with me, but after a while cut their ties with me. 
Those about whom I write in this dissertation seemed more than happy to sit with me for 
hours talking about themselves. There was no monetary reward involved – I did not pay 
any of my informants to talk to me. Only one case, Baryalay, was different. As we will see, 
Baryalay was my Pashto language conversation teacher, and I obviously paid him for his 
time and efforts. Our Pashto conversations, however, turned soon into something of much 
more value to me than just small talk and grammar rules. Baryalay opened himself up in 
our conversations, and became one of the major subjects of my research as well. I continued 
to pay for his visits as we had arranged from the beginning. Baryalay was also the only one 
with whom my interaction was solely during our sessions. Baryalay lived in a village south 
of Jalalabad, where the security situation was so problematic that he never allowed me to 
go visit him there. We went together a couple of times to a restaurant in town, but that was 
the only time we met outside of the instructional framework.  
 Although there was no apparent material reward for my informants in talking to 
me privately, and at length, there was nonetheless a mutual exchange between us. They 
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seemed just as curious about me, and the world I represented in their eyes, as I was about 
their lives and struggles. We exchanged knowledge (and fantasies), as it were. Thus, our 
conversations were not at all unidirectional. This is an important element from an 
epistemological standpoint, even more than from a methodological one. The setting, 
internal features, and rhythm of our sessions tended to mimic a psychotherapeutic or 
psychoanalytic session. With some of them this aspect was more marked, with other less 
so (we will see how in more detail during the discussion of the material). The reader will 
have some idea of how our sessions proceeded through the verbatim excerpts of them that 
I present in each chapter. So, while I aimed at the emergence of thought processes, 
subjective experiences, and unconscious dynamics in my informants – which has its 
equivalent in the psychotherapeutic/psychoanalytic session – I will certainly not suggest 
here a complete identity between the latter and what was revealed during interview 
sessions. There are definitely important, distinctive differences between the two 
experiences. First, the most obvious one: it was I who went to them, who “needed” them, 
and not vice versa, as it happens in a patient-analyst dyad. Second, I did not intend to 
provoke any psychological change, development, growth (or whatever we want to call it) 
in my informants. Likewise, my informants did not feel (at least openly) that they had any 
problem they needed help with from me. In short, my role in relation to them was not 
intended to be a “therapeutic” one (not that it might not have ended up being so, yet I 
cannot tell for sure). Related to this point is the issue of the temporal length of our 
relationships. The series of my interviews ranged from a minimum of five, to a maximum 
of thirty-seven sessions (with Baryalay). Even in this last case, calculating an average of 
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one and half hour for each session, I spent 55 full hours of face-to-face conversation with 
Baryalay. Each analytic session, on the other hand, usually lasts for forty-five minutes. In 
“analytic time”, I had 68 sessions with Baryalay. Considering an average of three sessions 
per week in the course of an analytic treatment, our 68 sessions would have spanned 22 
weeks, which equal about five months and half. Five and half months are considered today 
as the starting period of a full-fledged analytic treatment, a period of time which cannot 
possibly warrant the resolution of profound psychic conflicts and suffering.12 It is a period 
in which usually the analyst manages to gain a good understanding of the system of psychic 
and mental functioning that the patient is using in order to navigate his/her own life and 
personal vicissitudes. The patient’s main problems come to the surface, and the analyst is, 
on average, able to become aware of the mechanisms which enhance, or hinder, the 
patient’s ability to cope with them.  Yet it is only the beginning. My relationship with my 
informants could not aspire to reach further than this initial stage in understanding the 
complexities of their inner lives and reality. Nevertheless, as I detail below, during the 
sessions I had with each of them a rich psychodynamic work could be constructed and 
developed.  
A final point of differentiation between analytic sessions and my ethnographic 
meetings, is represented by the issue regarding the money, which goes from the patient to 
                                                          
12 It is interesting to note that in Freud’s intentions, a psychoanalytic treatment should have lasted 
about six months only, beyond which it should be brought to a conclusion. This emerges from a 
close reading of his paper Analysis terminable and interminable (Freud 1937). Psychoanalytic 
theory and practice has evolved enormously since the publication of Freud’s paper, and today six 
months are considered to be certainly an inadequate amount of time for a full understanding (and 
possibly “resolution”, in whatever fashion it may happen) of a patient’s deeper conflicts. 
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the analyst. There is a material “loss” that the patient incurs into in order to have a session 
with a therapist or analyst. This is considered by most to be an important part of the 
relationship, in order to “responsibilize” the patient towards the meaning of the work done 
together. Opinions in this regard are changing quickly, becoming much less rigid and 
uncompromising, by taking into consideration other kinds of symbolic losses that a patient 
might incur, other than mere economic loss. At any rate, the money issue still matters. 
There was no money flow in our sessions, and if anything, in the case of Baryalay the flow 
was inverted (from me to him).  For all these reasons it would be certainly a stretch to 
equate my sessions with informants to a therapeutic or analytic session. Nevertheless, I 
believe that some of the goals that an analytic session sets for itself were reached with 
many of my closer informants in our sessions.  
First and foremost, both transferential and countertransferential material surfaced 
during our conversations. A well-known aspect of the psychodynamic exchange between 
two individuals, transference is conceived in psychoanalytic theory as the repetition of 
certain patterns of behavior and/or emotional engagement with the analyst, which the 
patient had with some significant other person during his/her life. In other words, the 
patient unconsciously addresses (and deals with) the analyst as he/she might have done 
with some important figures in their life, say, the mother or father. Within the analytic 
setting, together with the analyst, the patient will be in theory able to become aware of 
those otherwise unconscious patterns of behavior and emotional expressions, and “work” 
on them. Countertransference is represented by the conscious and unconscious reactions of 
the analyst (whether in the realm of fantasy, rational thought, or unconscious dynamics) to 
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the material presented to him/her by the patient. Both transference and countertransference 
need not happen exclusively during an analytic session, but rather are understood to be one 
of the ways in which the human mind works during any sort of interpersonal exchange. 
What changes in the analytic session is the specific attention and “monitoring” that analyst 
and patient, together, lend to these processes, rendering them therapeutically meaningful. 
Interpreting the occurrence of a transference phenomenon is precisely that – a subjective, 
interpretive endeavor. As such, it is perforce prone to be questioned as to its 
appropriateness and “legitimacy”. In the analysis that I carry out of my informants’ 
material, I will alert the reader of the passages in which I believe a transferential process 
was taking place between my informant and myself. I hope the verbatim passages of our 
conversations will give the reader the opportunity to evaluate first-hand my interpretation 
in this regard. 
The case of countertransference is certainly more open to a transparent elaboration 
(Wilfred Bion calls this process “reverie”), because the analyst (or, in my case, the 
ethnographer) is not only the person who is subject to the process, but also the one who 
will write and elaborate about it. I have underscored in the text those instances in which I 
managed to become aware of the emotional reactions, and streams of thought, which my 
informants’ words triggered in me, and the cases in which I believe the 
countertransferential material helped me better understand the dynamic of the exchange 
between me and my informants. As always happens, there have surely been instances in 
which my emotional reactions remained unconscious, and as such not perceived openly by 
me. In general, however, whatever the features and character of the countertransferential 
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material, I am convinced with anthropologist George Devereux (and many contemporary 
psychoanalysts – in this respect Devereux was much ahead of his time even by the 
standards of psychoanalytic theory) that countertransference, or reverie, is a crucial and 
positive aspect of any close interpersonal encounter. Devereux, in  From Anxiety to Method 
(1968), spelled out convincingly not only the reasons why, in his opinion, the work of the 
ethnographer is intimately related to the work of an analyst with his/her patients, but also 
the reasons why the ethnographer needs to factor into his/her account of the reality he/she 
studies his/her own emotions, which derive directly from the “trauma” of the protracted 
exposure to a subjectively unconventional and alien environment. Devereux writes that the 
ethnographer who declares he/she remained a detached and objective observer, who claims 
to suffer no emotional backlash from the things he/she saw and experienced personally, is 
simply in a state of denial. Such state obfuscates and distorts the account itself that the 
ethnographer will later produce in writing. It is necessary, in Devereux’s view, to accept 
the reality that we, as ethnographers, are the “victims” of (often negative) affects while in 
the field, and we must to try to deconstruct and understand them before putting hand to pen 
and paper.  
When I definitively came back from the field, in summer 2013, I felt bitter. After 
four years of research, I felt resentful towards the people among whom I worked, for all 
the hostility and rejection that they had expressed against me. I obviously felt all the more 
grateful to those with whom I did manage to work closely. Yet, as will become clear 
through the chapters of this dissertation, in my fieldsite I lived surrounded by an ocean of 
hostility, acrimony, and fear. Those who decided to work closely with me were among the 
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minority who did not see in me either a dangerous enemy, or a despicable infidel, or both, 
for religious and political reasons. I was often considered a potential spy, or a potential 
missionary, or the representative of those who had inflicted onto the Pashtun population of 
Afghanistan death and sorrow (i.e., the international troops), and for this reason morally 
responsible. Those who worked intimately with me had often to respond to public criticism, 
or moral reprobation. Some decided to interrupt the relationship they were having with me, 
while others tried to keep it as low-key as possible. Still others chose to go against the 
stream, and collaborated closely with me. 
As a result, I felt frustrated and bitter, not only because of the kind of experience 
that I personally had, and for the limitations that such state of facts exerted on my 
fieldwork, but mostly for all the personal discomfort, uneasiness, and even social problems 
that my friends and informants had sometimes to face because of their choice to help my 
research. I slowly became aware of this emotional process that was taking place in me, and, 
when I finally realized its full extent, I took it seriously, and started to judge all my 
interpretations and conclusions against the backdrop of such phenomenon. I did not try to 
deny, nor was I ashamed of my feelings. I embraced them as a “natural”, human reaction 
to a difficult and challenging environment, as Devereux posited. I figured that they would 
help me to better understand how to write properly about what I experienced. I read my 
overall reactions to my fieldwork experience as the broader countertransferential process 
that I went through during my stay in Afghanistan. I tried to deconstruct and analyze the 
feelings of rancor and resentment at being rejected by the social environment I had so 
enthusiastically embraced, and the narcissistic injury that I felt burning at the time of my 
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return to the US. I realized how some negative “judgments” that I had promptly levelled 
against those among whom I worked stemmed from the “narcissistic rage” of which I was 
a victim (as Heinz Kohut would put it [Kohut 1972]). My elaborations on such aspects of 
my emotions helped me achieve a better perspective on the conclusions I had drawn from 
my experience, and write about them. 
Certainly, absolute objectivity is a chimera, yet being aware of one’s own biases 
helps at least to take a step back, and proceed carefully towards a more balanced and 
accurate account. In reality, I obviously could not blame the people I worked with for 
behaviors they displayed, which, had I been in their shoes, I would have probably in turn 
also endorsed. This does not mean that I managed to “accept” as appropriate and legitimate, 
in a moral sense, all that I saw and experienced in Afghanistan. Such kind of extreme 
relativism would amount to falling into the trap that Devereux warned against: the denial 
of one’s own emotions and the power of one’s own cultural schemas. We are all 
inextricably entangled with our own moral and cultural world (perceived sometimes as 
universally valid), and it would be ethically dishonest (and epistemologically fallacious) to 
deny this. 
A second, equally important parallelism between my ethnographic sessions and an 
analytic/therapeutic relationship, was the emergence of unconscious dynamics in the life 
trajectory, and the present emotions, of the people I was interviewing. Associative thinking 
was a useful resource. In their free-flowing account of their daily lives, and past 
experiences, my informants associated at times thoughts that apparently had little in 
common with each other. When I could, I tried to understand the reason for the coupling 
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of two seemingly unrelated topics of conversation, or simple thoughts. The principle is that 
two streams of consciousness, however unrelated to each other they may seem, are in fact 
unconsciously articulated verbally together in order to express a third (and possibly a 
fourth, fifth…), underlying, set of meanings. This was helpful for me in understanding not 
only what the informant was trying to convey to my attention, but also how this 
“something” could be put in relation with what we had already discussed together (as well 
as the informants’ relationship with my position as a foreign ethnographer). I elaborate on 
these instances of associative thinking in the chapters that follow. 
Another aspect that also illuminated the unconscious dynamics that emerged during 
my conversations with informants, was the moments of contradiction, redundancy, and 
backtracking that my informants displayed in session. I was able to point out to them certain 
passages of their accounts that were in contradiction with something that had been 
previously said, especially with regards to affects and emotions. At times the contradiction 
would take place just a few sentences after the first assertion. Most of the times, my 
informants were not aware of having expressed conflicting ideas just moments earlier. 
Discussing the reasons for these “slips” often yielded interesting results. Likewise, the 
fixation on certain issues, and the disregard for others, was equally highlighted. Again, 
most of the times, my informants were not aware of the special weight they were giving to 
certain aspects of, or figures in, the account of their own lives, and discussing why it was 
so was useful for me as well as for them (as they told me). Sometimes, however, they 
denied engaging in this sort of unconscious “erasure”, which became interesting in and of 
itself. I elaborate on these cases as well in the chapters that follow.   
 
 
 
38 
A brief, final note on the writing style of this dissertation. As I have somewhat 
foreshadowed above, beyond attempting to discover and understand the thought processes, 
the emotional reactions, and unconscious dynamics that took place in those people with 
whom I worked more closely, I tried as well to draw for the reader an experiential picture 
of the social and cultural context which the individuals who are the protagonists of these 
pages inhabited. I use the term “experiential” to underline the fact that I tried to let the 
reader discover, to “feel”, as it were, my informants’ Pashtun socio-cultural milieu through 
their words. Each case study that I present will offer long verbatim excerpts from the 
conversations I had with my informants. In portraying the social and cultural context in 
which they operated, each chapter builds upon the preceding one(s), so that I hope the 
reader will be able to incrementally reach a better understanding of the lived reality through 
which my informants moved. Just like I slowly discovered such context by living close to 
my informants and participating (as best I could) in their own lived experiences, in the 
same way I hope to present to the reader material that will allow him/her to discover, step 
by step (experientially), not only the subjectivity of my informants, but also the social and 
cultural reality they navigated. An obvious corollary to this is that the very same 
ethnographic material might be in the end interpreted differently by the reader vis-à-vis the 
interpretation that I gave of it. Conscious of the eminently interpretive character of the 
ethnographic text, I set as one of my objectives that of providing the reader with enough 
tools to potentially reach a different picture from mine. Of course, the authorial voice can 
never be completely silenced, for it is true that I perforce had to select the material to be 
presented, which already expresses the bias (if unconscious) on the part of the 
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ethnographer. Yet I tried (consciously) to remain true to what I thought my informants 
wanted to communicate to me.  
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CHAPTER 1: ETHNOGRAPHIC BACKGROUND 
 
Prologue 
 
On December 20, 2001, early in a cold and crisp morning, I stood at the gate of the 
border crossing between Pakistan and Afghanistan, in Landi Kotal village, located on the 
Pakistani side. Kandahar had fallen definitively to the international troops just a few days 
earlier. Kabul had been taken a few weeks before that. The “war” against the Taliban 
regime was now considered over. I had been staying for about twenty days in Peshawar, 
Pakistan, waiting for a good moment to cross the border into Afghanistan. The roars of the 
heavy shelling on the Tora Bora mountains, in Nangarhar province, a few miles away from 
Landi Kotal, had just recently subsided. The rumor was that all the remaining hard-core 
Taliban militants had either been killed, or had escaped into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan 
(FATA). It seemed like just the opportunity I had been waiting to try and reach Kabul 
through the Khyber pass. At that time, I was working as a freelance journalist for a couple 
of Italian publications, as well as the English-language Saudi Arabian newspaper, The 
Saudi Gazette. It was my first “assignment” as a war correspondent. I would spend the 
following three years with the same job, spending most of my time amidst the war in Iraq, 
and then in Iran and Yemen. An advantage of being a freelance writer is that, not being an 
official employee of any media outlet, you can do whatever you want, go wherever you 
want, write about whatever you want. You only have to hope that those you are in contact 
with will buy your story once you have written it. A disadvantage, for the very same 
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reasons, is that nobody will care about what might happen to you, or look for you should 
you disappear (other than your own family), or feel responsible for whatever misfortune 
befalls you. You are alone, for better or worse. I personally appreciated the pros of my 
position, and did not worry too much about the cons.  Fresh from three and half years as 
an officer in the Italian army, I was interested in discovering, with no strings attached and 
no bureaucratic obstacles, what an environment “at war” really looked like, from the inside, 
from the other side of the fence. I had participated with my military unit in the 
peacekeeping NATO missions in Bosnia and Kosovo, but I quickly found out that in that 
capacity there is not much you really come to know of the people involved in the operations 
you carry out (that is, the reality of the lives of those people you encounter only cursorily 
and in a certainly unpleasant way). To be sure, part of the equation for me as well was the 
desire to look for an experience of independence, adventure and exploration. I did not know 
much about Afghanistan at that point, other than that it was the latest theater of a NATO-
led military operation, and that it had been a piece of the imperial pie to which the British 
Raj decided grudgingly to renounce a long time ago. I was certainly not prepared for what 
I found in that December-January period I spent in Afghanistan.  
On that December morning, I had started my trip from Peshawar very early, and 
reached Landi Kotal rather quickly (about 60 miles away to the west). The man who drove 
me there was a journalist for a local newspaper whom I had befriended in the weeks I had 
spent in Peshawar. I told him I wanted to check out the situation of the refugees who were 
going in both directions across the border, and that I would spend a few hours there. He 
did not investigate further, and drove back to Peshawar – there were plenty of shared taxis 
 
 
 
42 
in Landi Kotal to bring me back to the city anyway. The situation at the border was chaotic, 
to say the least. There was really not a border to speak of. A big green metal gate stood 
open on the spot of the crossing, while hundreds of people moved on foot to and fro as they 
passed through it in a continuous flow. The Pakistani authorities resigned themselves, 
given the dramatic situation, to the reality that it was not feasible to check everybody’s 
paperwork, and so they did not check anybody’s. I could pass through the green gate as 
easily as anybody else. I was wearing the local traditional garb (the shalwar kamiz), with a 
pakol (a woolen round hat) and a zader (a scarf over my shoulder). My Mediterranean 
features probably helped me to just blend into the crowd. On the other side, in a small mud-
brick shack along the main road into Afghanistan, three militiamen stood in worn-out 
military fatigues. That was all that existed of the Afghan “authorities”. I did not know who 
they were, but they behaved as if they were in charge of the border control procedures. 
They did indeed spot me, unlike their Pakistani colleagues, and called me in. One of them 
spoke a few words of English (I could not speak any of the local languages at that time), 
which he used to ask me who I was, where I was going, and why. After my brief 
explanation, they asked for 100 dollars to let me go, and for a piece of paper torn from a 
used notebook, written and signed by me, in which I declared that all that would happen to 
me beyond that point would be  my own responsibility. I happily agreed to the deal, and 
off I went. In Torkham, the first Afghan village just into the border, I found a shared taxi, 
with four other people, to drive me to Jalalabad, about 50 miles to the west. All I could see 
of the village were mud-brick houses with tall outer walls, gates and towers, and a dusty 
small bazaar made of mobile stalls which sold mainly foodstuffs. A long line of shacks 
 
 
 
43 
(former shipping containers) along the road were where scrap metal and used replacement 
parts for cars were sold and bought. It all looked very grim to my inexperienced eyes.  
It took us more than six hours to cover the 50 miles to Jalalabad. The paved road 
was reduced to a sad version of Swiss cheese, full of small- and mid-sized holes, as well 
as big craters which could have easily swallowed our entire car. The big transportation 
trucks, full beyond their limit with people and their entire lives’ belongings, had it a little 
better than us, for they could afford to cruise speedily over the holes, and worry only about 
the big craters. Kids seemed to be having a lot of fun “surfing” on top of the trucks, and 
waving at us. The memories that I have of Jalalabad in those days are no less grim than 
those I have of Torkham. I was dropped by the taxi near the main town bazaar, when the 
sun was already setting. I remember strolling through the alleys of the bazaar, where I 
found many wooden carts and mobile stalls, which sold all kinds of stuff, from food to 
clothes. The “real” shops were all closed for good. As the darkness fell around me, I saw 
hundreds of little bulbs light up, powered by many shared small gasoline generators. Each 
stall had one bulb, I remember. All around the stalls was pitch black. There was no 
electricity in the buildings in town, apart from a few places that could afford a bigger 
generator. I could see the moving flames of candles shining from inside the windows of 
the apartments upstairs from the shuttered shops in the streets. I recall feeling somewhat 
proud of being the only non-local that I could see around. Yet it seemed that nobody noticed 
me, thankfully. I do not even remember how I found a guesthouse for myself that night. 
Looking back, I am surprised that I did. Yet I did, and I recall the owner of the guesthouse 
welcoming me warmly, and entertaining me with tea and hot meat soup (shurba). He had 
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a large diesel generator which serviced the establishment, and even a TV with which he 
caught some Pakistani channels. We watched a cricket match on TV together with some 
other guests that evening (I used to play cricket in Italy, and they very much appreciated 
my competence), and discussed in English the country’s situation. I offered them my Italian 
Toscano cigars, which they politely declined. They were all exhilarated at what the future 
would bring for them, after the dark years of the Taliban regime.  
This, in a nutshell, was the beginning of my very first experience in what would 
become, seven years later, my doctoral research fieldsite. The few days I spent in Jalalabad 
in 2001, and the following weeks I spent in Kabul, left a strong and lasting impression on 
me. Although I had previously visited, as a tourist, several countries in the Middle East and 
Pakistan, the immediate reality I found in a post-conflict Afghanistan struck me in an 
unexpected way. The condition of abject destitution, and widespread destruction, that I 
witnessed, especially in Nangarhar province, was astounding. I remember I was struck by 
the faces of the men whom I met in the streets of Jalalabad (only men were to be seen in 
public areas). It seemed to me that I could literally read on their bodies the heavy toll that 
thirty years of war had exacted from them. The tremendous hardships though which those 
men had gone over the decades (either as refugees, or as victims of the circumstances in 
their own villages), seemed to me to be engraved in their faces, cut profoundly by the 
troubles of the conflict. Not even in post-civil war Bosnia of 1999 had I seen the scars of 
the war embodied so evidently by the people around me. The distance between that world 
and the world I was accustomed to seemed enormous. When I started my doctoral studies 
at Boston University, in 2009, I decided that I would find out more of that social and 
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cultural context, whose surface I had only scratched as a journalist. Even before the official 
start of my coursework, I set out to spend the summer of 2009 in Afghanistan again. I began 
preliminary research in Kabul, Jalalabad, and Gardez, in Paktia province, flying back home 
from Peshawar, Pakistan, where I reconnected with some old friends. I passed once more 
by car through Torkham and the Khyber Pass, which by then looked significantly different 
from seven years earlier. Jalalabad itself had very much changed, recuperating that flavor 
of “city-ness” that was completely missing during my first visit as a journalist. Not 
surprisingly, I settled on Jalalabad as the main base for my long-term fieldwork. I continued 
to pay visits to my fieldsite every summer and during Christmas breaks until I started the 
last, ten months-long stint of fieldwork research in summer 2012. By then, I had woven a 
solid network of friends, acquaintances and contacts, which allowed me to remain in the 
area continuously for such a long time, in spite of the quickly deteriorating security 
situation. 
 
The broader Afghan picture 
 
In fact, as will become clear in the following chapters, without the existence of such 
solid network of friends and acquaintances, my long-term fieldwork research would have 
probably proven impossible to complete. I will describe in more detail below how the 
situation deteriorated constantly since the first time I approached my fieldsite, in summer 
2009. Here I wish to clarify the broader picture of Afghanistan at the time of my first 
arrival.  
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For several years, since approximately 2004, the security situation in the south-
western provinces of the country (which is mostly inhabited by Pashtun people) had been 
worsening considerably. As the city of Kandahar was the political and strategic center of 
the defeated Taliban movement, and as Kandahar and Helmand provinces are among the 
most economically productive areas of the country (including the illicit economy created 
by opium poppy cultivation, see UNODC 2008), it is not surprising that the first sparks of 
a renewed insurrection against the international occupying troops would flare up in this 
region (comprising also Zabul province [Giustozzi 2008:99-106]). Two main factors were 
at play. First, was the resurgence of an anti-foreign, and strongly ethno-nationalist, 
sentiment among those Pashtuns who had constituted the rank-and-file of the Taliban 
movement, and who had most benefited from their rule. This sentiment was spurred on by 
those members of the movement who had not been killed, exiled or arrested (thanks, in 
part, to the conspicuous support from pro-Taliban elements in the Pakistani military and 
political apparatus). Second was the fierce competition, among the “new” military and 
political powerbrokers, for the exploitation of the resources that the region offered. Many 
of the “strongmen” that the United States (de facto in charge of the operations in 
Afghanistan after 2001) chose to bring back to (political) life in order to fight the Taliban 
in late 2001 had previously been among those mujaheddin who fought the Soviets in the 
1980s (also supported by the US, among others). After the Soviet withdrawal, and the 
collapse of the Afghan Communist government in 1992, these men became the protagonists 
of the gruesome civil war that followed, which laid waste of the whole country, and 
heralded (if inadvertently) the birth of a revolutionary, revivalist movement: the Taliban 
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(Giustozzi 2009:69-85). The Taliban, starting from Kandahar province and proceeding 
swiftly to the rest of the country, were at first welcomed with relief for their capacity to put 
an end to the chaos and lawlessness that had enveloped the country after 1992, at the hands 
of the myriad big and small strongmen who brutalized the population on a daily basis, 
mostly for their own benefit. The core of the Taliban movement was composed of Pashtuns, 
both from Afghanistan, and from the refugee camps in Pakistan (Edwards 1998), although 
individuals from other ethnicities were also known to participate in the movement 
(including Shia’ Hazaras, whom the Taliban otherwise fiercely persecuted as heretics)13. 
In Pashtun areas of the country, the former mujaheddin leaders who had been ousted by 
the Taliban, were given a new chance in 2001-2002 by the military apparatus of the 
international community present in the country (Giustozzi 2009:87-90). These men, who 
had been politically and militarily (and sometimes physically) obliterated by the Taliban, 
were put in charge of the political and security control of the areas that the Taliban were 
gradually losing to the international troops and their Afghan supporters. They reassured 
their international (mainly American) advisers that they still retained their own popular 
base and constituency, and that they could provide stability to the areas left without viable 
authority figures by the demise of the Taliban regime. While in the first years after the fall 
of the Taliban government it seemed that some stability had been regained, in reality the 
former mujaheddin (now also institutionalized political leaders) worked to build fiefdoms 
                                                          
13 Ismail Zakhi, personal communication, 2012. Mr. Zakhi, a Hazara man of about 55 years of age, 
is currently the leader of one of the largest civil society organizations in Bamyan. He spent over 
one year in a Taliban jail for his criticism of women’s conditions under the Taliban government. 
About the participation of Hazaras in the renewed insurgency led by the “Neo-Taliban”, see 
Giustozzi 2008:48. 
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for themselves from which they could extract resources and organize illicit economies 
(Nader Naderi, personal communication, 2009)14. While at times earnestly engaged in 
military struggles with a resurgent Taliban movement (the “Neo-Taliban”, as Antonio 
Giustozzi termed them, see Giustozzi 2008), the strongmen also took advantage of their 
institutional position of authority, and their connections to the international military 
apparatus, to play a double-sided game with the insurgents, exploiting the latter’s close ties 
with specific rural communities. Illicit economies based on opium poppy cultivation, as 
well as heroin production and exportation, thrived in the south-western provinces (more 
than they did in the rest of the country, where these activities had been an important source 
of livelihood for a long time. See UNODC 2008). Not surprisingly, the rise in economic 
and political power that the strongmen enjoyed went hand in hand with an intensification 
of the insurgents’ military operations in the same provinces. At the height of this situation, 
in late 2009, the US government decided to increase the number of troops operating in the 
south-west of Afghanistan, and implement a stronger military policy in the region (the so-
called “surge”). It has widely been recognized as an accomplishment of President Obama’s 
administration that the intensity of the insurgency in the south-west was curtailed by the 
“surge”. And indeed the operations of the anti-government and anti-NATO forces did 
measurably decrease in the region (Chivers and Filkins 2010). What is less acknowledged, 
however, is that, soon after this shift of events, insurgent activities increased elsewhere, 
                                                          
14 Nader Naderi was until 2011 the head of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights 
Commission. For a detailed study of the role and history of the so-called warlords in Afghanistan, 
see the excellent articles by political scientist Antonio Giustozzi (2003, 2006), and his 2009 
volume, Empires of Mud: War and Warlords in Afghanistan. 
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namely, in the north-east. What most likely happened (though there is no definitive 
evidence for it), is that, confronted with an overwhelming NATO military effort, the 
insurrectional forces quietly moved their fulcrum of operations to an area that had remained 
relatively peaceful, and therefore somewhat unguarded. The provinces of Nangarhar 
(where I conducted my fieldwork), Kunar, Laghman, and Nuristan bore the brunt of this 
strategic shift on the part of the insurgents. By 2009, when I reached Jalalabad for the first 
time (Jalalabad is the capital of Nangarhar province), the situation had already started to 
deteriorate, and would continue to do so at an increasing pace until I left the field in 2013. 
By moving from the south-west to the north-east, however, the insurgency also morphed 
into something slightly different from what it had previously been. The socio-economic 
environment wherein Pashtun populations live in the north-east is radically different from 
that in the south-west. Scarcity of natural resources and rugged terrain meant that the 
Pashtuns of the north-east (collectively known as Ghilzais, as opposed to the Durranis of 
the south-west) never developed the stratified, hierarchical social structure that could be 
found in the fertile plains of Kandahar, Helmand and Zabul provinces (Barfield 2014). 
Pronounced segmentation/fragmentation into nested social groups (traditionally 
categorized in Western scholarship as tribes, lineages, and families – in Pashto qawm, khel, 
and koranay, respectively), and a cultural ethos of strong egalitarianism and individualism, 
made a marked impact on the organization of the insurgency as it moved from its 
stronghold in the south-west to the mountains of the north-east. Even assuming that the 
insurrectional movement had ever existed as a truly centralized entity in the south-west 
(which is yet to be fully demonstrated), certainly it took a fragmented and “anarchoid” 
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character in the north-east. During my fieldwork in Nangarhar province, speaking of 
“Taliban” had already become a general, almost conventional shortcut to signify simply 
“rebel” or “insurgent”. None of my informants (including those who lived in very volatile 
and unstable districts of the province) knew exactly what the term “Taliban” meant any 
longer. They were unable to discern any unity of command, composition, or aims, in the 
military operations that were carried out against the Afghan and the NATO troops. It was 
also common, I was told, that the inhabitants of an area struck by a militant attack (whether 
against military or civilians) would not know where to turn in order to find and negotiate 
with the responsible group, in the effort of amending the possible frictions that could have 
led to the attack, and preventing future ones.   Multiple groups were at work – my 
informants explained to me -  each with different and sometimes incompatible motives, 
made up of both local and foreign elements, and possibly supported logistically by outside 
powers (such as Pakistan, for example, see Giustozzi 2008:21-23)15. Some groups, in my 
informants’ view, seemed to have retained that religious and puritanical spark that had 
characterized the Taliban movement in the 1990s. Others emphasized in their contacts with 
                                                          
15 The most common claim among my informants was that Pakistani Pashtuns were in large part to 
blame for much of the disturbance occurring in the area. ISI, the main Pakistani intelligence agency, 
was also considered to be the puppeteer for some of these “intruders”. Some mentioned the presence 
of Arab, Caucasian, and Central Asian fighters, hiding in the mountains (supposedly it was possible 
to recognize a Central Asian militant by the fact that his dead body did not show signs of 
circumcision). How much of all this was fantasy, and how much reality, is hard to tell. Certainly, 
the presence of Pakistani Pashtun militants in the south-east has been often confirmed by Western 
intelligence sources, and so has the supporting role of ISI. The same, though to a lesser degree, can 
be said of Arabs, Caucasians, and Central Asians, who are believed to train in the camps set up in 
the FATA, only to pour into Afghanistan at a later time. I myself have often seen groups of young 
Mehsud and Wazir Pashtuns from FATA wandering the bazaar’s alleys in Jalalabad (their clothes 
and haircut betrayed their origin). How much weight and relevance these foreign elements held in 
the broader economy of the insurgency, is very difficult to gauge. 
 
 
 
51 
the populace more ethno-nationalistic overtones, stressing the need to preserve a strong 
Pashtun cultural component at the helm of the Afghan state. Still others appeared to my 
informants as composed by little more than violent bandits, moved largely by hopes of 
personal gain and political rewards. Some groups claimed affiliation to a “Taliban” 
movement, others claimed to be closer to other insurgent factions (like the long-lived 
Islamic party Hizb-i-Islami Gulbuddin, or the more recent development of the Haqqani 
network from Khost province), while others did not even bother to declare any form of 
broader affiliation.16 All, however, shared similar guerrilla warfare tactics in combat, and 
targeted the same representatives of the Afghan institutions (both civilian and military), 
and the international military forces. The uncertainty of the situation created a sense of 
constant anxiety, fear, and helplessness in most of those with whom I had relationships.  
As we will see in more detail in the chapters that follow, this state of facts also reverberated 
powerfully onto my position as ethnographer. Not only was I a stranger, and furthermore 
a foreigner (which, in and of itself, holds a specifically suspicious connotation in many 
locals’ view – see below for more on this issue), but I also was a non-Muslim, and a citizen 
of a country that had several thousand soldiers in Afghanistan, engaged in the same military 
operations that the insurgents were battling in Nangarhar province as well (although the 
Italian military’s area of operations was thankfully far away from Nangarhar, in Herat 
                                                          
16 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Jalaluddin Haqqani are among the few “survivors” of the major 
original mujaheddin commanders who received enormous amounts of money and equipment from 
Western and Middle Eastern countries with the expectation that they would organize the resistance 
against the Soviet army and the Afghan government. Since the beginning, they displayed an 
extreme religious fervor and fighting spirit that was highly appreciated by their Western backers. 
Thirty-five years later, both in their seventies, Hekmatyar and Haqqani have turned that same fervor 
against those who once had supported them.  
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province, in the far west). I was seen with mistrust by many in my fieldsite, who considered 
me potentially either a spy or a Christian missionary (of whom there were in fact a handful 
in Jalalabad, often disguised as NGO workers, or English teachers), or possibly both. Even 
those who did not become convinced, or did not suspect, that I was either of those figures 
(or those who did not care whether I was one or not) still had to tread carefully around me, 
and keep their profile low regarding their relationship with me, due to the social pressure 
and reproach that those who associated too openly with foreigners were bound to suffer. I 
owe them the utmost gratitude for allowing me to carry out the research project that I had 
set for myself, in spite of the adverse situation. Nevertheless, the end result, as I noted in 
the preceding chapter, was that the fieldwork experience for me ended up being not only 
logistically and methodologically complex and problematic, but also emotionally and 
affectively conflictive, anxiety-provoking, and sometimes even outright frustrating.17  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
17 It is equally true, however, that over time I came to realize that my difficulties during fieldwork, 
which I just mentioned, sprang from the same dynamics and circumstances that were making my 
research possible in the first place. By this I mean that I was able to witness and become privy to 
the emotional hardships, psychic conflicts and cultural contradictions that my informants were 
experiencing, because  (yet not exclusively) of those same war-time socio-cultural disarticulations 
that Pashtun society had undergone for over three decades, and which were rendering my fieldwork 
methodologically and emotionally challenging. In this regard, I was reminded of the vibrant and 
empathetic assessment that Erik Erikson gave of his research (albeit short-term) among Native 
American Oglala Sioux and Yurok individuals (Erikson 1950:98-131 and 141-150). Erikson 
offered a powerful interpretation of the traumatic impact that protracted conflict, forced relocation, 
and imposed alien ideologies obtained not only on the socio-cultural fabric of the groups involved, 
but also on the private subjectivity and psychodynamics of each group member.  
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The fieldsite in perspective 
 
Jalalabad, the capital of Nangarhar province, is historically one of the intellectual centers 
of Afghanistan. Aside from hosting the second-oldest university in the country (after Kabul 
University), it has been (alongside Peshawar, Pakistan) the center of northern Pashtun 
culture (the southern fulcrum was Kandahar). The Pashtun groups (traditionally termed 
“tribes”) who to this day inhabit the area are common to both the Pakistani and Afghan 
side of the international border (a border which was imposed in 1893 with the name of 
Durand Line, through an agreement between the then-king of Afghanistan, Amir Abdur 
Rahman, and the British Raj). In fact, I discovered during my fieldwork that the cultural, 
social and economic bonds that tie Peshawar to Jalalabad are much stronger than those 
which tie Jalalabad to Kabul. A town of sizable proportions (around 250,000 inhabitants at 
the time of my fieldwork), Jalalabad is the only such center between Kabul and Kandahar.  
For decades the city has also been the locus of governmental visibility and administration. 
It is not a coincidence that Jalalabad was in fact never militarily “conquered” by the anti-
government and anti-Soviet mujaheddin in the 1980s and early 1990s, but rather withstood 
all their assaults, and capitulated only when the local military garrison of regular Afghan 
troops decided to relinquish control over the city after the collapse of the last Communist 
government in 1992 (Nojumi 2002:95-98). During the anti-Soviet conflict, and the civil 
war that followed it, the rural areas of Nangarhar province, as well as the largely rural 
provinces that surround it (Logar, Laghman, Kunar, Nuristan), provided a template for the 
social and political dynamics that to this day characterize public life in this broad region. 
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During the 1980s and 1990s the mujaheddin operated in a markedly fragmented and 
contradictory manner, divided as they were in multiple factions which swore a fragile 
allegiance to this or that strongman. Each strongman, in his turn, operated in a largely 
individualistic way, controlling a personal following of armed militiamen, and siding at 
times with one of the seven main mujaheddin parties that had been created in Peshawar at 
the beginning of the anti-Soviet war, while also choosing to follow more localized and 
parochial motives, such as affirming tribal affiliation, pursuing immediate political gains, 
or achieving personal ideological goals (as a case in point, see the example of Kunar and 
Nuristan provinces, as narrated by Barnett Rubin [Rubin 1995:242]). Militia leaders also 
squabbled and fought against each other, contributing to the chaotic nature of the 
insurrectional movement in the region (Rubin 1995:240-243). As a result, the anti-
government activities in this south-eastern area of the country were never as effective as 
they were in other areas (for example, in the mostly non-Pashtun north-east), so that 
insurgents were never able to wrest control of its political and administrative center 
(Jalalabad) from the hands of the Afghan state. In fact, the internecine fighting among 
mujaheddin factions was so pervasive, and the chaotic situation that ensued so disruptive 
for the civilian population, that one of my informants recalled with visible disgust the times 
when, during the civil war, it was customary for local residents in Jalalabad to set up a 
network of night sentries for each street, “recruited” from among the home owners. Each 
household would provide the service for a whole night. The sentries would remain on the 
watch for parties of mujaheddin who were known to raid people’s houses at night, in order 
to kidnap young girls or boys, usually for sexual exploitation. If a group of ill-intentioned 
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mujaheddin appeared, the sentry would sound the alarm to the rest of the households of his 
street, in the loudest way possible. They would then have the possibility of defending 
themselves, and responding in kind to the attackers.18 It is not surprising then, that when 
the Taliban made their appearance in Nangarhar province, in 1995, they took control of the 
capital without much fighting, and were said to have been welcomed by the local 
population as the only ones who could effectively rid the province of the mujaheddin 
militias.  
 During the Taliban regime, Nangarhar province, as well as those surrounding it, 
enjoyed a period of peace, albeit amidst economic struggle. Opium poppy cultivation, 
although officially forbidden by the government, was employed regularly as a cash crop 
by farmers on a small scale (differently from what happened in the south-western 
provinces, where it amounted to a large industry geared towards exportation. See UNODC 
                                                          
18 It is interesting to note that one of my informant, from a district south of Jalalabad, specified that 
in the rural villages these nighttime raids on the part of the mujaheddin were not possible. He 
explained: “In the villages people belong to the same lineages (khel), they are close together, and 
protect each other. If one of those groups of mujaheddin had tried something like that in a village, 
they would have had to face the revenge of the whole khel, and they could not confront the whole 
khel. They left the villages alone. But in the city it’s different. People don’t know each other well, 
they don’t belong to the same family, they are more vulnerable (zaif). It was easy to take advantage, 
with violence, of the people in the city”. My informant touched on one of the main features of the 
cleavage between rural and urban life in Nangarhar, on which I will expand in later chapters. It is 
also worthwhile noticing here that during the anti-Soviet conflict, and the subsequent civil war, 
Jalalabad suffered (like many other urban centers in Afghanistan) from the flight of much of its 
educated middle-class, only a few of whom have come back to their homes after the conflict(s). 
Today, Jalalabad is characterized by a more pronounced rural social population than it was before 
the wars, due to the large number of villagers who, for diverse reasons, gradually filled the void 
left by the middle-class exodus. To this day, the city is the site of an inflow of the rural strata of its 
provincial population.  Thus, another informant from Jalalabad, a college-educated man in his late 
thirties, now living stably in Kabul, voiced his burning disappointment at the whole situation: 
“Because of the war, the cities have been conquered by the countryside! Jalalabad was a 
sophisticated place, with cultural activities, and open-minded people… now we are subject to the 
ignorance and backwardness of these people from the countryside! Pashtun culture has fallen into 
the hands of ignorant!”.   
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2002). Families owning large swaths of land were rare, as had always been the case, and 
the latifundium model of production that was common in Kandahar and Helmand 
provinces (with its related relationships of quasi-serfdom for the landless laborers), was 
rare in Nangarhar (Kakar 1979:188). During the fall of the Taliban regime, Jalalabad and 
most of the region were spared the worst of the fighting. The aerial assault mounted by the 
international coalition was concentrated instead in the mountainous areas in the southern 
part of the province, on the border with the Kurram and Khyber Agencies of the Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan (FATA). Unlike Kandahar city, which fell to the international coalition 
after fierce clashes, Jalalabad experienced a smooth transition to the provisional 
government sponsored by the international community.  
 As I have mentioned above, Nangarhar province is part of a broader rural region. 
Cut deeply by the Kabul river in a west-east direction, and by the Kunar river (a tributary 
of the Kabul river) running north-south, Nangarhar and the surrounding provinces enjoy 
verdant and fertile plains along the main streams of water, while presenting a dryer 
landscape increasingly devoid of any vegetation, the further one ventures away from the 
rivers. Small scale agriculture, which is the main economic activity in the fluvial plains, is 
almost completely unfeasible in the arid and rocky soil of the rest of the region (Khaurin 
2003:4-12). Agriculture (where possible) is carried out in fields that can be either 
artificially irrigated (abi), or irrigated by rain (lalmi). Artificial irrigation is obtained in 
three ways: by channeling the water streaming down from a mountain slope, by channeling 
the water from the Kabul and Kunar river, or by a system of canals (karez), that bring water 
from the mountains down to the fields in the adjacent plains via underground tunnels 
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(Kakar 1979:184-187). The latter system has not changed much during the decades, as it 
was witnessed and described in detail by Anderson (1978), and confirmed by my personal 
observations. Karezuna (pl. of karez) have existed for hundreds of years in Afghanistan 
(Kakar 1979: 184-187). Modern karezuna were extensively put in place by the Soviet-
backed government in the late 1970s and 1980s, together with works of restoration carried 
out on the already existing tunnels. It is mostly through the effectiveness of these recent 
karezuna that intensive cultivation is possible to this day in the dry plains surrounding the 
two main rivers.19 Main crops include wheat, maize, barley, cotton, alfalfa, poppy, as well 
as various fruits and vegetables. However, the flat and cultivable strips of land adjoining 
the two major rivers soon become rugged and semi-arid mountainous terrain, rising up to 
the 15,620 feet of Mount Sikaram, within the Spin Ghar range in Nangarhar province. 
During the decades of war the luxuriant coniferous forests that once covered the 
mountainous areas in the provinces of Nangarhar, Kunar, Laghman and Nuristan, have 
been, incrementally cut down by the local population to supply firewood and construction 
materials (Delattre and Rahmani 2007). Wildlife, once comprising several species of 
ungulates and their predators, has been harvested for food, dramatically decreasing its 
numbers (Karlstetter 2008, Stevens et al. 2011). The population in Nangarhar province, 
                                                          
19 Interestingly, several of my informants complained to me, almost in disbelief, about the lack of 
infrastructural commitment that the international forces demonstrated during the twelve years (as 
of my fieldwork) of their occupation of Afghanistan. These informants could not understand how 
their “enemies” (the Soviets) managed to actually show some sort of concern (as perceived by 
them) for the welfare of the rural population in the area, by building large infrastructural 
ameliorations (such as canals, power plants, roads, residential compounds), while their “friends” 
(the US-led coalition) showed a complete lack of interest for the same issues. Those among my 
informants who were not sympathetic to the international intervention in the country (or those who 
had over time become so), interpreted the contrast as the apparent proof of the lack of good faith 
on the part of those who were leading the international campaign in Afghanistan.    
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who are largely Pashtun and Sunni Muslims, lives mainly clustered in small villages, whose 
inhabitants usually share close kinship ties. Large areas of the province, particularly in the 
south, are sparsely populated. The only “legitimately” urban area is the capital, Jalalabad. 
The rural districts’ centers are often little more than trading hubs for the population who 
live in the districts’ villages, and the centers for the thin administrative structures that the 
state offers in each district. People from the districts tend to congregate in the district’s 
center in order to exchange or buy goods, address the local authorities, and meet 
acquaintances and relatives from other, more distant villages. Inhabitants of the dryer areas 
carry out mostly a subsistence type of agriculture (where possible at all), and maintain 
small numbers of domesticated animals, also on a subsistence basis, and for barter.    
 
 
Pashtuns in ethnographic perspective 
 
Pashtun peoples, both in Afghanistan and Pakistan, have received the attention of 
scores of ethnographers and anthropologists in the past. These include, among others, 
Fredrik Barth (1959, 1966, 1969), Charles Lindholm (1982, 1996), Akbar Ahmed (1976, 
1980, 1991), Willi Steul (1980), Bernt Glatzer (1977), Jon Anderson (1975, 1978a, 1978b, 
1983, 1984), Benedicte Grima (1992), Inger Boesen (1980, Boesen and Christensen 1982), 
Nancy Tapper (1973, 1977, 1991), and more recent analyses by Bernt Glatzer (2002) and 
Thomas Barfield  (2008, 2010, 2014).20  In these works, the ecological settings, social 
                                                          
20 Among the very few Pashtun academics who researched and wrote in English about Pashtuns 
are the Afghan anthropologists Alef Shah Zadran (1977) and Ashraf Ghani (1978), and the 
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structure, and various cultural productions of Pashtun human groups inhabiting both sides 
of the Durand Line have been expounded in detail.21  
   Fredrik Barth (1959) opened the path in “Pashtun studies” with a full ethnography 
focused on political relationships and leadership dynamics among Yusufzai Pashtuns in the 
Swat valley, Pakistan. His work represents the first anthropological attempt to uncover the 
details of social arrangements and cultural idioms among Pashtun people. It also represents, 
however, a rather unique case. The Yusufzais among whom he worked moved to Swat 
from somewhere in (what is now) eastern Afghanistan during the 1500s, and colonized an 
ecological environment that was already inhabited by non-Pashtun peoples. The strongly 
                                                          
Pakistani legal scholar Haroon Baryalay (2005, 2006). Only the work by Ghani has been 
published.  
21 Of course, this list is by no means exhaustive. I mention here only the major ethnographers and 
anthropologists who have worked on Pashtuns, and whose work I feel proved most influential for 
subsequent research. Additionally, it must be remembered that there exists a ponderous colonial 
literature (mostly British) about the areas now covered by Pakistan and Afghanistan, and in 
particular about Pashtun people. Since the explorative journeys of Mountstuart Elphinstone into 
Afghanistan on behalf of the British Crown, at the beginning of the 19th century, until Olaf Caroe 
(the very last governor of the North-West Frontier Province in 1947), there have been countless 
accounts (official or private) on the people who live in the area straddling Pakistan and Afghanistan. 
Charles Lindholm, in a 1980 essay (Lindholm 1980), makes a case for the usefulness, to the 
contemporary scholar, of the colonial “ethnography”. He points correctly to the sharp differences 
in the kind of personal mindset and motives that lie behind each account. Whereas Elphinstone’s 
and Charles Masson’s, Lindholm argues, represented the report of individuals relatively removed 
from the political machinations that followed, others, like Alexander Burnes’s (the first British 
victim of Pashtun irredentism, in 1841 or 1842), and Olaf Caroe’s incarnated a relationship between 
parties that had already entered the phase of power struggle, and developed into full political control 
after the establishment of the British Raj. The diatribe, within anthropology, about the meaning of 
the “colonial encounter” has filled volumes (for the most conspicuous of which, see Asad 1973), 
and it is not my intention to participate in it. It is interesting to note, however, that to this day the 
bookshops of the main bazaar in Peshawar (Sadar bazaar), and the only extensive bookshop existing 
in Kabul, are still replete with the modern re-prints of the many colonial texts that were published 
over time, from the most well-known names (as the ones I mentioned), to the most obscure military 
gazetteers and bulletins, published for internal use of the administration during the colonial rule (of 
which I myself gathered several specimens). What this tells us about the state and ramifications of 
the “colonial encounter” (which is, in some regard, still ongoing) would be worth investigating.   
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stratified, almost caste-like social milieu that developed from this invasion (with a 
dominant Pashtun class/caste of landowners, and several non-Pashtun occupational (and 
landless) groups subordinated to it) embodies a reality that is hardly found anywhere else 
in a Pashtun context. Nonetheless, his analysis of the political dynamics unfolding in Swat 
represents a sophisticated introduction to more cultural aspects of a shared Pashtun 
heritage, which have close equivalents in other areas of the Pashtun region, and which I 
will elaborate on in the chapters that follow.22   
 The torch of Fredrik Barth was taken up by Charles Lindholm, who went back to 
Swat two decades later, and produced a second, full ethnography on Swati Pashtuns 
(Lindholm 1982). Lindholm’s goal, however, was not specifically to put Barth’s reading 
of the ethnographic milieu to a test. His work focuses on one village, and represents a lively 
and attentive effort at describing the different aspects of one community’s social and 
cultural life, to a degree that escaped Barth’s more encompassing and broader view on 
Swat. Despite Lindholm’s own claim, whereby his “own interest is here less analytic than 
descriptive” (Lindholm 1982:163), his work introduces a psychological (and hence 
                                                          
22 One of Barth’s major contributions in delineating Pashtun social relations lies on the stress he 
put on the voluntary, individualistic, and reversible character of the relationship between Pashtun 
landowning leaders (khan and malik), their Pashtun (also landowning) clients, and the non-Pashtun 
occupational groups. Additionally, Barth illuminates the interesting role of an ethnically non-
Pashtun diverse group, the “saints”, and the descendants of the Prophet Mohammed (sayyed, pir, 
baba, pacha). Talal Asad (1972) strongly criticized Barth’s interpretation of this supposedly “open” 
relationship between leaders and clients from a Marxist theoretical standpoint, underlying the 
irrefutable (in his opinion) de facto coercive power that the “class” of strongmen maintained over 
the “class” of their clients. From a different standpoint, taking issue with the impression of a 
functional “equilibrium” that Barth supposedly gives in his account, Michael Meeker (1980) also 
criticized him for what he considered a underestimation of the importance of force and violence in 
the perpetuation of the social system in Swat (for a critique of Meeker’s position, see Lindholm 
1981b).  
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analytical and interpretive) perspective that builds on Barth’s initial study, and yet 
surpasses it in this regard with its emphasis on male-to-male interpersonal relations of 
friendship in a contradictory social and cultural context pervaded by strong competition 
and (often) mutual resentment.23 Idealized friendship and hospitality among Swati men 
becomes, in Lindholm’s interpretation, the locus for the displacement of sentiments of love 
that are suppressed by the social and cultural arrangements of a harsh Pashtun milieu. 
Through a sophisticated use of ideas from psychoanalysts such as Bowlby, Fairbairn and 
Guntrip, Lindholm posits that the “natural” inclination of human beings to attachment, and 
to “fuse” oneself with an object of love (first the mother, then, in theory, a life companion), 
finds outlet in the only ways that are culturally permitted in a Pashtun context: friendship 
and hospitality.  
 Akbar Ahmed conducted his fieldwork research shortly before Charles Lindholm 
carried out his, also in Pakistan (1976, 1980).  Ahmed, however, chose to work on the 
cleavage he postulated between what he termed “tribal” Pashtuns, and “encapsulated” ones. 
By carrying out research both in a village within the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), and in one within the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA), he set out 
                                                          
23 One of Lindholm’s most remarkable accomplishments is to have been able to report on the 
intimate life of a family environment. Thanks to the favorable situation of his fieldsite, and the 
presence during all his fieldwork of his wife and adolescent daughter, Lindholm was able to gather 
precious insights into the private life of families inhabiting the village where he lived. He had direct 
and indirect clues to the ongoing relationship between husbands and wives, as well as between 
parents and children around the household. This stands out as unique among male ethnographers 
who worked with Pashtuns, and allowed Lindholm to elaborate on very peculiar aspects of Pashtun 
private lives. Because of the dramatically different situation of my fieldsite at the moment of my 
fieldwork research, and my position as a lone male ethnographer (except for the few instances in 
which my wife was joined me in Jalalabad), I had unfortunately no access to women, and to the 
more private corner of each house, where the inter-gender and inter-generational relations took 
place most of the times.        
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to show that an ideal, archetypical kind of Pashtun cultural features had been kept alive by 
those inhabiting the FATA, while they had been partially lost, or at least “diluted”, by those 
inhabiting the PATA (1980). Due to the Pakistani internal administrative regulations, 
PATA constitute a region in which Pakistani law, taxation and military coercive power 
supposedly enjoy full implementation, while FATA are to this day left to the administrative 
principles laid out by the British Raj in the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulations, which leave 
de jure, if not completely de facto, autonomy to the Pashtuns inhabiting the FATA (see 
Nichols 2013). In Ahmed’s paradigm, villagers living in the FATA retained a more “pure” 
(in his own words) kind of Pashtun cultural attributes (and hence are still considered 
“tribal”), while villagers living in the PATA were forced by the pervasive presence of a 
strong state apparatus to relinquish part of their “tribal” heritage, and adjust to a less-than-
adequate “Pashtun-ness” (and in this sense they are termed by Ahmed “encapsulated”). 
During his fieldwork, Akbar Ahmed was simultaneously a doctoral student at Oxford 
University, and the Political Agent (i.e., the state’s sole plenipotentiary official in each of 
the seven Tribal Agencies) in two of the Agencies where he carried out his research. Aside 
from the ambiguities that his positionality as ethnographer-cum-state official did certainly 
present (and which he does not fully address in his writing), what is most striking in 
Ahmed’s work is his steadfast conviction of the existence in FATA of an ontological, 
“true” way of being Pashtun, which embodies all the “positive”, proverbial attributes of 
Pashtun (male) people: sense of autonomy, egalitarianism, democratic manner of running 
a community, ideological (almost visceral) rejection of any degree of state control, martial 
character. PATA villagers, in contrast, represent in his model a “degeneration” of the pure 
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ideal type. Fully in the tradition of British functionalist anthropology, Ahmed’s produced 
an elegant and challenging set of works, which added extensively to ethnographic 
knowledge of the Pashtun culturj,.1al milieu, although their schematic character renders 
them problematic in many respects. 
 The only anthropologist to work and publish specifically about (non-nomadic)  
Pashtuns in Afghanistan was Jon Anderson.24 Unfortunately, Anderson left only a series of 
articles and book chapters (Anderson 1975, 1978a, 1978b, 1983, 1984), before devoting 
his studies to completely different topics.  He never published his doctoral dissertation on 
Ghilzai Pashtuns in Afghanistan.  In a writing style and theoretical orientation influenced 
by French sociological and philosophical works of the 1970s (particularly Pierre Bourdieu, 
Michel Foucault, and, to a lesser extent, Jacques Derrida), and often foreshadowing the 
post-modernist anthropological scholarship of the 1990s and early 2000s (strikingly so in 
the case of Mahmoud 2005), Anderson paints a complex portrait of the broader internal 
dynamics to the Ghilzai (read, eastern) Afghan Pashtun environment in which he worked. 
From the relation between “tribe” and the state apparatus (1983), to the contradiction 
between custom (rawaj) and religious doctrine (1984), to more specifically economic and 
ecological issues of modernization and mechanization in the countryside (1978a), 
Anderson employs his understanding of the local Ghilzai milieu to draw a general picture 
of political and cultural relationships obtaining among the people he observed. Lacking a 
full ethnography to complement the collection of his shorter works, it is difficult to 
                                                          
24 Important studies on nomadic Pashtuns in Afghanistan have been published by Richard Tapper 
(1979), Michael Casimir (2010), Bernt Glatzer (1977), Gorm Pedersen (1994) and Klaus 
Ferdinand (2006). 
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appreciate the actual degree of “embeddedness” that Anderson managed to reach within 
his fieldsite, and hence the correspondence between his theories and his informants’ lived 
“reality”.    
 Among the few female ethnographers who worked among Pashtuns (particularly 
Tapper 1973, 1977, 1991, and Boesen 1980, Boesen and Christensen 1982), Benedicte 
Grima, in my opinion, certainly stands out. A folklorist and anthropologist, Grima 
produced a full ethnography (1992) from the fieldwork research she carried out in two 
villages of the then-North West Frontier Province of Pakistan (now Khyber Pukhtunkhwa). 
She benefited from a strong command of Pashto language, and focused her research 
specifically on the language of emotions among Pashtun women in her fieldsites. Her 
ethnographic exploration of women’s lives in Khyber Pukhtunkhwa is a very intimate one, 
played out with tact and cultural appropriateness. As a lone foreign woman, accompanied 
by her young daughter and a local nanny, she was able to enter into women’s worlds and 
study the typical ways they expressed emotions through narrative, particularly in the 
context of culturally mandated occasions, such as weddings, funerals, and private family 
incidents. She participated in the ritualistic responses that women customarily are expected 
to display to the protagonists of either joyous or dramatic occurrences. Her theoretical 
premises are stated very clearly in her introduction: in the wake of Catherine Lutz’s (1986) 
and Michelle Rosaldo’s (1984) works, she posits that “emotion is rational, voluntary, 
controlled and cultural” (Grima 1992:6). A corollary to this belief is that “the more emotion 
is culturally molded to fit a norm, and the fewer the opportunities that are provided for 
personal expression, the more the personal is suppressed and becomes undefinable, even 
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by the individual” (Grima 1992:8). As will become apparent in the chapters that follow, 
the evidence that I gathered from the psychodynamic interviewing of my informants points 
exactly to the opposite direction. Nevertheless, the material provided by Grima, and its 
related analysis, represents an invaluable addition to the study of the subjectivity of Pashtun 
women, who are certainly underrepresented in the ethnographic study of the socio-cultural 
Pashtun milieu.        
 
The accounts by the ethnographers whose work I just briefly mentioned above 
spring from the observation of a shared socio-cultural environment (the Pashtun milieu), 
immersed into diverse political, economic and ecological realities. As I remarked, the 
Yusufzai whom Barth and Lindholm studied lived in a context radically different from that 
in which the Ghilzais studied by Anderson lived (albeit in the same historical period, in the 
case of Lindholm’s subjects). Such differences in context might have been strongly 
pronounced between Afghan Ghilzais and Pakistani Yusufzais, but less so between Afghan 
Ghilzais and the Pakistani Mohmands whom Akbar Ahmed researched.  These context-
dependent peculiarities, however, have apparently developed from a common “bedrock” 
of cultural material (idioms) and basic social arrangements that were shared by the 
Pashtuns analyzed by past ethnographers. Upon the basic nature of this “bedrock”, in fact, 
there was general agreement. I too found my fieldsite to present characteristics, in terms of 
cultural idioms, not dissimilar from those reported by previous scholars. Pashtun society at 
large appeared to me, as it did to earlier investigators, to be a strongly honor-based society, 
where the concept of public shame is equally strongly present. Patrilineally and patrilocally 
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structured, it presents a heavily-enforced segregation between sexes, whereby any kind of 
relationship between two people of opposite sex who are not closely related by blood is 
avoided as shameful. As it is the case with many ethnographic examples throughout the 
Mediterranean and Middle Eastern regions (see, among many examples, Bourdieu 1966, 
Giovannini 1981, Herzfeld 1985), among Afghan Pashtuns as well the behavior of women 
is taken as the yardstick for a judgment on the respectability and honor of a family as a 
whole.25 “The women of my family are my namus”, you often hear men say, which means 
that their honor, and that of their family members, rests on the appropriate behavior of their 
women. If the family’s women must, through their public performance, ensure the 
maintenance of the family’s honor and public respectability, it is upon the men to protect, 
and restore, such respectability when it becomes tainted by some delict or impropriety on 
the part of the women, or by a man outside the family towards its women. Usually such a 
taint entails some violent retaliation, either against the family’s woman, or the outsider 
                                                          
25 This is obviously true and inescapable in the case of the original family of an unmarried woman: 
her behavior reflects on the reputation of her family (i.e., her father, brothers, then mother and 
sisters). After a woman marries (or, more precisely, is married off to someone, for which there 
exists in Pashto language a passive verb construction, as opposed to the active verb construction 
that defines the act of marrying for a man), the responsibility over her behavior, and the 
consequences of it, become somewhat less clear-cut. Opinions among my informants varied as to 
who had the major responsibility to act in order to restore the honor of one’s family, should the 
married woman engage in any reproachable behavior (mostly related to proper inter-gender 
relationships, not necessarily involving sexual intercourse, whether suspected or flagrant). The 
original family of the woman invariably would suffer a blow because of her behavior. Her husband, 
however, would also in turn be considered beghairata (unmanly, see below) if he did not take 
action against her. This would definitely reverberate on the honorability of the husband’s family as 
a whole, prompting his brothers and father to pressure him into some sort of action. I was told of 
cases in which the initiative was first taken by the brothers of the married woman, or alternatively 
by her husband, or directly by his brothers. For more on the patterns of violence among Pashtuns 
as portrayed by previous ethnographers, see Lindholm 1981a, Ahmed 1980:126-160 and 181-213, 
Barth 1959.  
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offender, or both, if they are deemed to have acted in accord. A male family member who 
has ghairat (who is ghairati, or, alternatively, who is a ghairatman; see below for details) 
must take action in these cases, lest he be publicly disgraced and considered beghairata, 
i.e., unworthy of being a Pashtun, of being a nar (a “manly”, virile man; see below). The 
equivalent of namus in the male realm is izzat.  A man’s izzat is injured when the man sees 
his rights disrespected (for instance, by being cheated in an economic transaction), or is 
publicly insulted, or is not accorded the esteem, as a nar, that every Pashtun man, regardless 
of its social status, wishes to claim. As in the case of namus, so also in the case of injury to 
izzat, the way to restore its integrity often entails violent retaliation, which every man who 
calls himself ghairati is required to enact. Failure to do so carries with it the stigma of being 
beghairata, and the loss of personal respect within the community at large.  All the authors 
whose works I briefly described above present a general portrait of Pashtun society in 
which these cultural idioms and social arrangements are a central value.  
One concept that is pivotal for the development of this dissertation, and that is not 
discussed in depth by the previous literature, is nartob. Nartob, in a nutshell, refers to the 
moral and ethical qualities that a nar must possess. A nar is not just an “ordinary” man 
(saray, in Pashto), but rather a “manly man” (the suffix –tob in Pashto has the same 
meaning as the suffix  –ness in English. Thus, nartob is the exact equivalent of English 
“manliness”, or even more closely from a semantic standpoint, “virility”). Indeed, Micheal 
Herzfeld’s felicitous definition for his Greek Cretan context is here even more apt: a nar 
has “to be good at being a man” (Herzfeld 1985:16). Strictly related to nartob is  ghairat, 
which is the willingness and capacity to demonstrate publicly that one is a nar.  So, a nar 
 
 
 
68 
is a virile man, a man in all his masculine prerogatives, which correspond with certain 
characteristics that are often associated with virility in many other ethnographic contexts – 
courage, strength, fearlessness, assertiveness. Yet nartob has also another side to it, which 
is not directly linked to aggressiveness and violence. Protecting the rights of the weak, 
supporting the poor, defending women and children, awareness and cognizance of one’s 
qawmi lar (the ways/customs of one’s tribal group of ascription), diplomatic skillfulness 
in managing instances of social friction and conflict, are all expected in a nar. Obviously a 
nar is also someone who possesses and displays ghairat, which is the capacity to act 
promptly and effectively in cases in which one’s namus or izzat have been compromised 
by another person’s lack of respect or improper public behavior. Most of the time, when 
the public display of ghairat comes into play, it is in situations requiring retaliatory action, 
which are usually violent to some degree. Still, violence and aggressiveness per se are not 
necessarily the primary attributes of a nar. There exists, so to speak, a “good” violence, and 
a “bad” violence. One of my informants, a 26 year-old man from a rural village near 
Gardez, in Paktia province, told me:  
 
You know, there are two kinds of ghairat. There is good ghairat, and bad ghairat. 
For example, imagine you are walking in the street with your sister, and a strange 
man passes by and looks at your sister intensely, as if she knew her. If you start 
speculating that they are having an illicit relationship, and kill them both without 
even inquiring with any of them, you are not a ghairati man, you are ignorant and 
stupid [besauada aw kamaqal]. On the contrary, if you discover that your wife has 
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been the object of bad verbal or physical harassment against her will, and you kill 
the culprit, this is good ghairat, something obligatory [majbur]. 
 
In other words, violent behavior which is carried out as the proper expression of a 
man’s ghairat in defense of his namus or izzat is not only “good”, but strictly necessary, 
lest he be branded a beghairata (lacking manly attributes, in colloquial terms). 
Simultaneously, angry and unjustified acts of violence, which go against the principles 
upon which the idea of a nar rests, render the perpetrator beghairata. Abuse, bullying, and 
other behaviors that purposely offend the namus or izzat of others, are themselves 
shameful.  
 Notwithstanding the caveats that emerged from the material gathered during my 
own research, it is undeniable that the idea of revenge (badal), as the means to wash away 
a stain to one’s, or one’s family’s, honor, is a predominant cultural element in any Pashtun 
social environment; its presence remains pivotal for the social status of the individual, 
whatever his personal attitude towards revenge may be. Other shared values of Pashtun 
culture that previous ethnographers underscored (for example, the formal recognition 
accorded to the practice of hospitality (melmastia), the right of any man to seek refuge in 
the house of any other man (nanawatay), and the institution of an ad hoc council of elders 
(Jirga) in order to adjudicate cases of interpersonal or interfamilial conflict), remain 
generally relevant to this day, as I was able to corroborate during my fieldwork. Yet these 
aspects, it must be remembered, represent cultural idioms, which tell us about the “raw” 
material with which the individual’s subjectivity has to work, as a social and cultural being, 
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but cannot tell us much about how the individual himself inhabits these idioms, and how 
they have an impact on his psychological dynamics.26  
Because I am interested in this latter aspect, the reader will not find in this 
dissertation any frequent engagement with the previous literature about Pashtuns in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan that might be otherwise expected. My research in Afghanistan 
was of course premised on the knowledge about the Pashtun socio-cultural environment 
that the previous anthropologists passed onto new generations of researchers like myself. I 
studied and “internalized”, so to speak, the accounts that these scholars left us. Yet I 
interpreted my work in the field in a different way. I set out with the intention to look at 
my fieldsite, and the people I interacted with, with “fresh” eyes, trying almost to “forget” 
what I had absorbed about them from the previous literature. My aim was neither to prove 
(or disprove) any of the past ethnographers’ interpretations, nor to produce a comparative 
account between what had been in the past, and what I found in my fieldwork experience. 
In a way, I tried to suspend the judgments and preconceptions that I had drawn from my 
reading of the ethnographic literature, and tried instead to approach my informants as if I 
did not know anything about their environment. 27  
This choice I made was induced by several factors. The most obvious of them lies 
in the fact that, since the last full ethnographies about rural Pashtuns in Afghanistan or 
                                                          
26 Concerning this point, Melford Spiro wrote that “we have for too long – certainly since Durkheim 
– accepted the coercive power of cultural symbols on the human mind to be a self-evident truth” 
(Spiro 1982:45). 
27 I am well aware this goal will always remain a chimera (and one that not necessarily I would 
want to really achieve, either), for obviously one can never unlearn what he/she has already 
absorbed and intellectually metabolized. 
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Pakistan were published, over three decades of traumatic and disruptive events have taken 
place (namely, a popular insurrection against a foreign occupying force, a devastating 
internecine civil war, a short-lived and obscurantist, if religiously revivalist, political state 
system, and, finally, a new military foreign occupation that prompted a resurgent popular 
uprising). Thirty-five years of practically constant war and destruction enveloped 
Afghanistan, and indirectly Pakistan as well, since Charles Lindholm wrote his 
ethnography. Enormous (and traumatic) social changes and cultural shifts would be 
legitimately expected to have taken place given this tumultuous history (as in fact I found 
was the case). This simple fact alone forces the contemporary ethnographer to consider 
previous literature only as a general compass (unless the aim of the research is specifically 
historically comparative).  
Perhaps more significant was my research agenda.  I purposely chose a unit of 
analysis (i.e., the individual’s subjectivity, and his often tense relationship with the 
demands of his socio-cultural milieu) that the previous accounts did not fully reach. With 
the partial exception of the works by Lindholm and Grima, the scholars who dealt with 
Pashtuns did so in a structural, systemic fashion. A deep analysis of the subjectivity of the 
individuals who constituted their pool of informants is missing from the existing literature, 
to the advantage of a search for the structural linkages and relationships between socio-
cultural roles and public personae. The ethnographic methodology I employed was geared 
specifically towards the exploration of inner individual dynamics, subjective motives, and 
unconscious processes, in a very different fashion from the methodology that the previous 
researchers used. My method was to investigate the interstices, the cracks, the unspoken 
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and (at first sight) invisible contradictions that lie beneath the seemingly consistent and 
mostly coherent picture stemming from previous systemic and structural analyses 
(Pashtuns do so and so…, Pashtuns think that…). Convinced of the constant presence and 
substantial force of individual agency and subjectivity (and in the face of very stringent 
and demanding cultural idioms, as in the case of the Pashtun social world), my research 
acquired a somewhat “iconoclastic” character. Even vis-à-vis the most psychologically-
oriented among ethnographic accounts of Pashtun life (i.e., Lindholm’s and Grima’s), I 
tried not to discover any “rules” undergirding the Pashtun social and cultural milieu (which 
mostly, as Pierre Bourdieu argued, are not openly articulated), but rather to chronicle the 
daily struggles of individuals to strategize and negotiate around those “rules”. If anything, 
my research represents an attempt to re-conceptualize and reveal the contradictions and 
tensions that lie beneath the shared cultural and social threads running through the lives of 
most Pashtun individuals in my fieldsite.  I do so by bringing together and analyzing all 
the clues that emerged from the personal, subjective narratives and characteristic attitudes 
and behaviors of my informants.  Mine is an effort at building up knowledge from the 
ground, rather than starting from the top, with and analysis of structure and system. In this 
regard, also the very brief notes about the general features of Pashtun cultural idioms that 
I sketched above, must be interpreted as the expression of general idioms I deduced from 
my ethnographic material. They may corroborate or differ from earlier ethnographic 
accounts, but do not derive from them.  Rather, they spring from what my informants said 
and did.   
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Thus, the core of this dissertation aims toward a different goal than previous work 
among the Pashtuns: that is, the analysis of how real individuals subjectively deal with, 
reject, transform, and maneuver around, these shared general structures, values and idioms, 
and in so doing create new models, which may usher in (if imperceptibly) social and 
cultural change. As Judith Butler noted long ago, every time a behavioral or conceptual 
paradigm is (apparently) repeated, it also is necessarily disarticulated and recomposed in a 
slightly different shape (Butler 1988). There is never full duplication in repetition. 
 All of the above reasons are at the root of the fact that I do not substantially engage 
the previous ethnographic literature on Pashtuns throughout the chapters that follow. 
Instead, I tried to build a new, and alternative, standpoint, without questioning an 
ethnographic heritage that certainly had its own raison d’etre and rationale derived from 
different historical and ecological circumstances, as well as from particular epistemological 
and methodological paradigms.  Charles Lindholm writes that “People may not have the 
same personalities, but they do share an attitude toward life that makes human relations [in 
one’s fieldsite] predictable and regular” (1982:163). In this dissertation I look beneath such 
apparent and public “regularity” of human relations, in order to discover not only the 
private conflicts that lie behind them, but also the (unseen) dynamics that may give in time 
rise to change and “unpredictability”.    
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CHAPTER 2 – ROHULLAH: SHIFTING SUBJECTIVITIES, AND THE 
CRAFTING OF A PRIVATE MASCULINITY 
 
 
Prologue 
 
Rohullah is one of the first people I have met in Afghanistan, at the beginning of 
my fieldwork, in the summer of 2009. His father, Asadullah, is a professor at Kabul 
University, and has been for almost all his career – except a brief stint during the Afghan 
civil war (1992-1996), when he moved to Pakistan. They are members of the Mangal tribe 
(qawm, in Pashto), a group that has its traditional center in the north-east corner of the 
province of Paktia. The grandfather of Asadullah moved from the family’s ancestral area 
to a village near the capital city of Paktia province, Gardez (a couple of hours drive south-
west of Kabul), where they settled, and where most of the family is still living. Paktia 
province is a very traditional and conservative Pashtun area of Afghanistan, where people 
refer proudly to the “tribal system” (qawmi laar) as being still a very strong aspect of social 
life. It also lacks a real cleavage between rural and urban contexts: Gardez, the provincial 
capital, is little more than a square with four roads departing from it, around which extends 
a big bazaar. People go to Gardez from all over the province to buy and sell goods, meet 
friends, interact with the state’s administrative apparatus, and receive different types of 
services. Gardez feels just a large village: there is no university, nor civilian airport, no 
state-provided electricity (for most), nor running water. The socio-cultural environment is 
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extremely different from the one in Kabul. Cosmopolitanism, ethnic diversity and personal 
“anonymity”, educational infrastructures and better links to the outside world make of 
Kabul a place where certain cultural norms find a more “relaxed” application. In Paktia, 
the norms that define a “respectable Pashtun” are still very much a feature of daily life. We 
will see that this contrast had a strong impact on Rohullah’s inner trajectory. 
  Asadullah’s appointment at Kabul University made him relocate early from the 
village to Kabul, bringing the two daughters he already had and his wife with him (circa 
1978). Subsequently, one more daughter, three sons (Nur Mohammed, Zair and Rohullah), 
two daughters, and one last son (Iqbal), in this order, were born in Kabul.  Asadullah 
Mangal is one of the very few scholars of his generation who trained at the graduate level 
outside Afghanistan, earning his PhD in 1977. When I reached Kabul for the first time in 
June 2009, he was more than happy to help me with my research. I was able to visit several 
times his village in Paktia province, where I stayed for a few days each time as a guest in 
his family’s house. Zair and Nur Mohammed lived stably in the village back then – in 2012 
Zair was forced to move to Kabul because of security problems linked to his job as a civil 
engineer in charge of the construction of roads in the provinces of Khost and Paktia.  
The very first day that I met Asadullah Mangal in his office at Kabul University, in 
June 2009, Rohullah was with him, helping him solve some computer problems he was 
having. At that time, Rohullah was still a student at Kabul University, and has since 
graduated. During that first meeting, Rohullah remained in the background, respectful of 
the figure of his father, without speaking or addressing me. The importance of familial 
hierarchy is a feature of Pashtun society that I soon learned to recognize. Asadullah Mangal 
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came to visit me a couple more times in the subsequent weeks, always accompanied by his 
son Rohullah. During these visits I introduced myself to Rohullah, and started working on 
building a relationship that has lasted ever since. His good knowledge of English, higher 
education, and an interest in self-introspection that he soon displayed gave him an 
important role in my research. We met regularly both in Kabul in the following years, 
whenever I would drop by the capital. During my last period of fieldwork in Afghanistan, 
in 2012-2013, Rohullah agreed to participate in my person-centered ethnographic project. 
We met one-on-one seven times, for a total of approximately ten hours. He chose to 
conduct our interviews in English, which was useful practice for him in the first place, he 
told me. By then, however, I had already become fluent in Pashto, so I asked him often to 
integrate his English narration with the Pashto version of certain expressions or specific 
words that seemed more of interest to me.  
 
 
The impact of a different social milieu 
 
Rohullah Mangal was born in Kabul in (approximately) 1987. He lived in Kabul 
until 1992 with his parents and siblings. His paternal grandparents died before he could 
know either of them, while his maternal ones he remembers (they died in the recent past). 
His father talks about his own mother as being a very strong woman, someone who, in spite 
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of being illiterate, inspired her children and guided them to an honorable way of life. 
Rohullah talks about his mother in similar terms, praising her fortitude and rectitude, and 
highlighting that, in spite of her being illiterate as well, she always pushed her children 
towards education and betterment in life.28 Rohullah does not have clear memories of his 
early experiences in Kabul, except that his family had a comfortable life, in a well-
furnished and equipped house, thanks to the efforts of his father and his academic position. 
Then the civil war started, in 1992, and Kabul became the center for internecine fighting. 
The city was heavily shelled by several different mujaheddin’s parties in conflict with one 
another, with ensuing chaos and civilian casualties. In order to protect his family from the 
dangers of the war, Asadullah Mangal moved everybody to his village near Gardez, in 
Paktia province, where one party among the mujaheddin had gained complete control of 
the area, and prevented the turmoil from spreading. Rohullah remembers how they left 
everything they owned in Kabul, and how they reached Gardez with almost nothing but 
their own personal effects. He remarked multiple times that the situation was extremely 
difficult for his family in the beginning. They had to rent a house in Gardez city, because 
none of their relatives would help them in getting by (Asadullah and his nuclear family 
never had a house of their own while living in the village, sharing their extended family’s 
house with Asadullah’s brothers and parents). He justified his relatives by saying that, in a 
situation such as that, everybody had to take care of their own families, and could not worry 
                                                          
28 In fact, Rohullah’s three older sisters (who are older than all the male siblings) went to school 
and university, getting married in Kabul and having a career as physicians and school teachers. The 
two younger sisters, born during the war, could not attend school due to the security situation, and 
ended up being married off without attaining any academic degree.   
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too much about others. We will see that relations with relatives (from the father’s side) in 
the village will remain strained and conflictive. Rohullah’s family remained in the rented 
house for two years, until he was about 8 years-old. Deprivation and struggle for survival 
are the most vivid memories he has of those first years after relocation. Interestingly, one 
of the examples he used to describe their problems was the presence of jinns (i.e., spirits) 
in the rented house they occupied (which had the shape of a typical Pashtun house, with a 
main body, a courtyard for animals, garden and fruit trees, and a wall surrounding the whole 
complex). Since the very beginning, strange, inexplicable things happened in the house. A 
calf which was healthy during the evening, was found dead the morning after. Several 
chickens died without explanation in front of Rohullah’s mother. Noises at night were 
heard, as if something was hitting the walls of the house and doors. Rohullah told me that, 
having been raised in Kabul up to that point, he and his siblings did not know anything 
about jinns (“there are no jinns in Kabul – they usually live in areas where few people live, 
and in old abandoned houses. Our rented house had not been lived in for a long time, and 
was outside the city”). Yet his mother dreamed of the jinns, who urged her not to bother 
with them, pray, and keep on with their lives, because her children really needed her. It 
was not possible for me to ascertain whether Rohullah’s mother dreamed first of the jinns, 
or experienced some uncanny events in the house prior to having the dreams. It may not 
make much difference anyway. The perception of the inexplicability of certain events may 
have been directly related to the highly stressful and uncertain situation that the mother 
was undergoing. A cultural background in which jinns are believed to be part of the 
“behavioral landscape” (Hallowell 1955) will offer an available avenue to give shape and 
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concreteness to the anguish and despair deriving from being uprooted and in dire straits, 
which in turn renders anguish and despair bearable to some degree. In fact, Rohullah 
himself spoke of jinns as existing entities, of which indeed the Qur’an talks, and which he 
has therefore no reason to doubt about. Yet he approached the subject with balance and 
“rationality”: “If you don’t tease them, and bother them”, he said to me, “they will not 
bother you”. They did kill the family’s animals, however. For Rohullah, though, this was 
the patent, symbolic demonstration of the hopelessness of their condition at that time. 
Asadullah Mangal was seldom at home, while running a temporary business by 
transporting medicines from Kabul to Gardez, and selling them to the pharmacists, who 
had seen their stocks heavily reduced due to the war. The trip to Kabul and back was a 
dangerous one, and he managed to make ends meet for his family charging the pharmacists 
slightly more than the standard cost of the medicines. The resilience of his mother in the 
face of these hardships apparently strengthened the respect that Rohullah still displays of 
her, in spite of her being an illiterate woman.  
During those first two years in Gardez, Rohullah’s family subsisted through the 
small salary that Asadullah was providing, which paid for a cow, a few chickens and goats, 
from which they got milk, eggs and meat on an irregular basis. Rohullah and the male 
children were put in school, while the female siblings had to stop attending. The older three 
females, who had already started university, or were finishing school in Kabul, remained 
there and continued. The younger two remained confined to their home in Gardez, due to 
the harsh norms enforced by the mujaheddin in the area. “They were like the Taliban”, 
Rohullah commented, “they had a different name, but they behaved in the same way”. In 
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fact, despite the great fanfare with which the mujaheddin were publicized in the West 
during the anti-Soviet struggle, which still resonates somewhat today, their rule in the ‘80s 
and early ‘90s was largely characterized by a degree of religious fundamentalism similar 
to that of the Taliban regime a few years later. Girls were forbidden from public education, 
and women’s life conditions worsened considerably. Not that the implementation of such 
norms found strong resistance in Paktia province. Rohullah remembers proudly how his 
mother insisted in sending her sons to school, while many of their neighbors considered 
public schools as venues for anti-Islamic propaganda, that would eventually turn the 
students into kafirs (infidels).  
The brothers of Asadullah who lived in the area, the main blood relatives of 
reference in a strongly patriarchal society, were reluctant to help his family, and, if 
anything, tried to take advantage of its position of weakness. Such weakness was due to 
the fact that all the male children that Asadullah had available at the time were still in their 
childhood, or early adolescence. Nur Mohammed was 14-years old, Zair 12, and Rohullah 
only 6 (Iqbal was an infant). This made of Asadullah’s family a “weak” family. Where 
numbers make power, and call for respect, Asadullah found himself in a position of 
vulnerability vis-à-vis his own brothers, who all had older sons, already able to bear arms 
(Asadullah’s first three children had all been female). When it came the time to divide the 
land property that his father had left as inheritance, the brothers of Asadullah openly took 
the lion’s share and left him with a smaller and less productive plot of land. They ridiculed 
his lack of adult offspring, and, without even discussing, divided the land so to take the 
best sections for themselves. Rohullah, in recalling the facts, likely tapped from his father’s 
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memories as recounted to his sons at a later date – he would have probably been too young 
to remember. Nevertheless, the image of his father, emasculated by having to bow, if 
unwillingly, to the bullying of his brothers for the sake of pragmatism, sticks with Rohullah 
to this day, and is a counterpart to the subsequent events in the family and his life. The 
sense of humiliation, unfairness and injustice that he derived from his father’s treatment on 
the part of his brothers certainly influenced his subsequent behavior with his relatives and 
friends. While he did not have direct contact with his uncles (the brothers of his father), he 
did interact with their sons, his cousins. Of such relationships he remembers the continuous 
bullying he and his brothers had to go through. “They always made fun of us”, he said, 
“they called us names and ridiculed us for being poor and not being able to stand up for 
our rights”. The relationship between paternal cousins (tarbur, in Pashto) is traditionally 
fraught with jealousy and competition, and the term tarburwali, literally “the way of being 
cousins”, has become a synonym for enmity, or dukhmani in Pashto. In fact, when someone 
wants to refer to a paternal cousin in a way that does not imply enmity, he uses the term 
for the maternal cousin, de tror zoy. Rohullah remembers that, despite what Asadullah had 
to go through with his brothers (or maybe because of it), he always encouraged Rohullah 
and his older brothers not to be weak, to keep a strong attitude (kamzur ma wsega), 
although, at the same time, he constantly deplored the perpetuation of relationships of 
dukhmani, and feuding. The discussion of the concept and relations of power and respect 
that Rohullah gave me is interesting in this regard. He explained: 
In Paktia, if you don’t have power [qowat] nobody respects you. They will always 
take advantage of you and abuse your rights. Power is given by numbers, by the 
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number of sons and brothers that you can gather in protection of what is yours. My 
father at that time was alone. We were too young, and he had to confront his own 
brothers, who all had much older children than us.  If you don’t have numbers in 
your family people won’t treat you with respect, they will consider you a weak 
person, who is unable to protect his rights. They will not be afraid of you. 
Andrea – So, respect actually comes from fear? 
Rohullah – Yes, people will treat you well because they are afraid of what you will 
be able to do against them if they disrespect you. 
Andrea – Is there anything else that brings respect to a person? 
Rohullah – Well, obviously, if you are a learned person, or if you behave like a 
pious Muslim, or if you display wisdom and knowledge of your people’s laar 
[customs], they will think highly of you, but they still will consider you weak, and 
someone sooner or later will come and take what is yours. Also money brings 
respect. A rich person will be treated better than a poor person. They considered 
us less because we had no money.  
 
Thus, Asadullah was doubly “weak”: he was without adult male offspring that 
could defend his rights, and was not well-to-do enough to be considered fully respectable. 
Such situation continued for the first year and half of the family’s stay in Gardez. 
Subsequently, Asadullah found a job in an international NGO that worked with refugees 
in Pakistan, and started bringing more money at home. He would reside in Peshawar, 
Pakistan, most of the time, and come home to Gardez for a couple of days every month. 
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The family saved up a good amount of money, and started building a new spacious house 
in the village of his father (a qala), where they eventually went to live. Rohullah says: 
 
Then we became rich. We saved money and built a house for ourselves in my 
father’s village. Things started to change, and we were given more respect by the 
people in the village. I remember that when I was maybe 12, I was playing with my 
cousins and other kids in a field. We were playing a game in which we had to hit a 
ball with a stick. One of my cousins [one of his father’s brothers’ sons] was still 
teasing me, he was calling me bad names. I  was a handsome kid at that time, and 
he was calling me “bacha”. Then, all the times that in the past he and his brothers 
had teased us, and disrespected us, all those memories came back to my mind. I 
had grown up, and I did not want to go through that any longer. I grabbed my stick 
hard, approached him, and started beating him with the stick. He was older than 
me, maybe 19 or 20. But I was big too by then. I broke his arm. He went home and 
did not say anything to his father. He said that a cow had broken his arm when it 
kicked him. He did not want to be ridiculed for having been beaten up by his 
younger cousin. 
  
  Rohullah’s cousin called him “bacha” (“boy” in Persian), a term with which people 
describe the male children who are sometimes used as sexual toys by powerful male adults 
in the community. The practice brings shame to the child and his family, although it is 
somehow seen as a display of personal power by the adults who engage in it. Rohullah says 
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he was a “handsome” boy, and remembers that he had to be escorted by his older brothers 
when he went out of the house away from the beaten path, in order not to fall prey to those 
who might have wanted to take advantage of him, for whatever reason it might be (it has 
been reported to me that sometimes the abuse of children is used as a weapon during inter-
family feuds). Even at his young age of 12, Rohullah was already well aware of the 
insulting attempt at feminization that the word brought about, and reacted with rage. The 
sentiment of offense to one’s masculine honor in this case was perhaps magnified by the 
memory of the years of abuses that he and his family had to go through in the past, and 
from the subdued, emasculated image of his father that he was probably trying to rebel to. 
Both his older age and, probably, the realization that through their jump up in the social 
ladder his family had acquired a stronger public validation, rendered him bold enough to 
stand up to his abusive cousins, and finally heed his father’s advice of “not being weak” 
(kamzur ma wsiga).    
 
Crafting an alternative masculinity 
 
In fact, age 12 is when Rohullah remembers to have undergone a fundamental 
personal change, as a conscious choice. From the time he moved to Gardez, until he was 
approximately 12 years-old, Rohullah reports to have been a very quiet child. He did not 
get into fights, nor acted aggressively. He did not respond to provocations, and shied away 
from situations that could have turned violent. This in spite of the hostile environment that 
surrounded him in the elementary school he attended.  
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My classmates did not like me. They saw me as the city boy who comes to the 
countryside, and didn’t like it. I had different manners, a different way of dressing, 
a different way of speaking [Pashto]. They would come to class with their farming 
clothes, with which they would work in the fields after school, while I had always 
clean clothes that came from the city [Kabul] – I did not have to work in the fields. 
They were jealous [bakhil] because I was more intelligent, I was better educated, 
and the teachers liked me. I got better grades than they got. They would tease me 
and make fun of me. When we played volleyball in the school yard they used to hit 
me with the ball intentionally, just for fun, and laughed. My school was located one 
and half hour away from my home. I had to walk that much time to get there every 
morning. Sometimes, on my way to school or back to my house, I was bullied by 
some schoolmates. They made fun of me, threw rocks at me for fun, sometimes 
roughed me up [haghuay za uahalam]. They had this aggressive attitude that I did 
not have. They picked fights between each other. I did not participate, because I 
did not want to fight. Also, I liked going to school, my parents taught me that it was 
a good thing for me to go to school. The other kids did not like it. Their families 
sent them to school just because they needed to read and write in order to get a 
decent job, but in fact they thought that education was something that would make 
you less Islamic, not a good Muslim. They were ignorant, ignorant [besauaday, 
jahili]. 
Andrea – Why do you think they had this aggressive attitude? 
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Rohullah – I think it had a lot to do with the war. They were born and raised in this 
provincial environment where the war against the Russians, and then the civil war 
after that, affected society a lot. There was a lot of violence every day, a lot of 
conflicts also among local people, everybody was against everybody else. It’s 
difficult to live that way. After a while I guess it becomes normal. But it also has to 
do with ghairat. Ghairat is deeply engrained in Pashtun culture. A Pashtun man 
has to be ghairati [see below]. 
 
Rohullah is experiencing personally the traumas of children born and raised in a 
war zone – his classmates. He becomes the scapegoat for a set of moral values and ethical 
comportments that have already changed and adjusted to the unforgiving necessities of the 
long-lasting conflict. He is keenly aware, and with remarkable perceptivity, of the 
psychological consequences that the widespread and institutionalized violence had had 
onto his peers. As many of my middle-aged informants have repeatedly stated, morals and 
ethics in the Pashtun context received a painful blow during the war. The crucial concept 
of ghairat (manly prowess, courage, fearlessness), which had traditionally been linked to 
the honor of the family and the individual, in turn indissolubly tied to strictly regulated 
gender relations between men and women, and the control by men over women’s autonomy 
in the public sphere, during the many years of war had shifted in meaning, more and more 
becoming coterminous with sheer power, violence, and self-aggrandizement, due to the 
routinization and institutionalization of a moral state of exception introduced by the 
conflict. In a feedback effect, (reminiscent of Fredrik Barth’s transactional dynamics, Barth 
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1966), those aberrant behaviors, which would be normally stigmatized by society, and that 
had been at first justified by the equally abnormal necessities of a gruesome war, had been 
over time institutionalized, and had in turn created new moral values, and attendant ethical 
behaviors, which, at the time of Rohullah’s early adolescence, were being already 
internalized by his classmates. Raised mostly in an urban environment, and enculturated 
into more traditional Pashtun honor-related values by his father (kabarjan ma wsa, leken 
kamzur ma wsega), Rohullah finds himself at a loss when he clashes against a rural Pashtun 
context scarred by the war, and that already presents values and ethics adapted to the now-
permanent state of exception.  
 
Little by little, however, he grew fed up with such situation of helplessness and 
victimization to which his mild-mannered demeanor was condemning him. Some time in 
sixth grade, he decided to turn things around. 
 
I did not want to be considered weak any longer.  The fact that I was quiet, shy, and 
did not want to end up in fights was mistaken for weakness. I wanted that to stop. 
My father had raised me stressing values of peacefulness and calmness, unlike the 
fathers of the other kids did, and these values were what I considered right. But I 
was having a hard life outside the house, it was a nightmare…and I wanted it to 
stop. I chose to learn how to be more aggressive and assertive. I started following 
more closely what my elders and the stronger men in the village were doing, how 
they were behaving. I started attending the marakas and the  jirgas in the village 
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[councils of elders to discuss and solve intracommunity conflicts], so that I could 
see how they were asserting themselves and fighting for their rights. I also started 
to respond to the other kids’ provocations, and to fight back. I fought more often 
over time.  
Andrea – How did this new behavior of yours make you feel? How did you feel 
about fighting? 
Rohullah – I did not like it. I felt there was something wrong about it, and I 
remember that when I got home after a brawl [lanja] I felt unhappy [khapa]. But I 
had to do it. It was about survival. I had to survive in that world, I could not just 
let things go like they had gone until that time. I had to survive a bad situation. I 
used to tell myself that it was not my fault, I had to do it.  
Andrea – Was it like this all the times you came back home after a fight? 
Rohullah – Yes, but after some time something changed as well. You see, a Pashtun 
man has to be ghairati, he has to have ghairat. It is something very important for a 
Pashtun man. This is important for me as well. If need be [ka cherta da pa kaar wi], 
you have to show that you are a ghairati man. You have to protect your rights. 
When you do so, people around you admire you, and give you respect. The more 
you show ghairat, the more people talks about you in a respectful way. You start to 
have a reputation [nuum], you start to have power [qowat]. Until I kept quiet and 
did not fight, I had very few friends. After I started fighting back and standing up 
to the bullies who bothered me, a lot of other kids started hanging out with me, 
looked for my company. I felt I had gained power. It made me feel good. After some 
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time I think I became like addicted [amali] to the power that my aggressive behavior 
was giving me. I enjoyed a lot of popularity among my schoolmates. They wanted 
to play with me.  
Andrea – You did not feel bad any longer for fighting with other kids? 
Rohullah – Well, yes, I still felt bad about it, I still felt I should not have behaved 
like that. My father would not have liked it. But it was a strange feeling, it gave me 
pleasure to have all those kids following me as if I was their leader. I would also 
feel pleasure when I told my friends the stories of my brawls and fights. They were 
all excited and in admiration of me. So I think I really got out of control, and started 
behaving more and more violently and aggressively. Too much. You know, there 
are two kinds of ghairat. There is good ghairat, and bad ghairat. For example, 
imagine you are walking in the street with your sister, and a strange man passes by 
and looks at your sister intensely, as if she knew her. If you start speculating that 
they are having an illicit relationship, and kill them both without even inquiring 
with any of them, you are not a ghairati man, you are ignorant and stupid [besauada 
aw kamaqal].On the contrary, if you discover that your wife has been the object of 
bad verbal or physical harassment against her will, and you kill the culprit, this is 
good ghairat, something obligatory [majbur]. However, this being ghairati, it also 
brings lust for power [ghoror], as it has happened for me. It makes you feel good, 
important. And also, you have to continuously demonstrate you are ghairati to all 
the other people, so you try to always top the action that you have undertaken the 
previous times, to impress others, and fulfill expectations. Violence escalates in this 
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way. But I also think that greed for power is something inherent in human nature. 
Everybody is somehow affected by it. If a structure like the state does not exist, or 
is weak, like here [in Afghanistan], there will be no restraint in people. There 
should be a power like the state to punish people and prevent them from becoming 
so violent.29    
 
The intolerable frustration that Rohullah is subject to for years during his childhood 
reaches a peak in his early adolescence, and something snaps. Or rather, I argue, something 
coalesces around an alternative pole of self-representation. The years he spent as a 
spectator and victim of the dramatically different moral and ethical context that he found 
upon moving to the village, now formed a critical mass of unconscious experience from 
which to tap in order to save himself from a dramatic personal and social situation. The 
years spent until then in the village served as material for new, alternative meaning-creation 
in Rohullah (through a process of tapping processed unconscious material, that Wilfred 
                                                          
29 It is interesting to notice that the last passages of Rohullah’s account imply a “Hobbesian” view 
of human relationships that I found inconsistent with that of my informants from the rural 
province of Nangarhar. I take this as diagnostic of the shift in mindset that has already occurred in 
the adult Rohullah, who by now has lived stably to Kabul for many years. As Thomas Barfield 
(pers. comm., July 2015) has recently suggested, this view relies of an understanding of state 
power as the main and supreme provider of most social services (from security to infrastructural 
services), as well as the major adjudicator in public disputes. On the other hand, the view that 
emerges from the interpretation of social relationships in the rural areas where I worked implies a 
“Lockeian” model, whereby people manage their daily interactions (including conflict) without 
the help of a superordinate structure of authority such as the state. The state is expected to step in 
(if at all) only when the localized organization of social relationhips does not manage any longer 
to cope with its moments of crises (major intertribal conflicts, for example). The Hobbesian 
interpretation of social life seems to be peculiar to urban milieus, further removed from direct 
processes of economic production and subsistence. Incidentally, this is also consistent with the 
way Ibn Khaldun viewed the cleavage between city and countryside in his account of medieval 
Middle Eastern realities.   
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Bion calls  “learning from experience”, Bion 1962. For the importance of meaning-creation 
within any psychic process, see Bruner 1990). He remembers how the elders and his older 
brothers came to embody slowly a new paradigm that he step by step embraced. He 
internalized over time the same values and ethics that he was the victim of, and 
unconsciously opened a new avenue for expressing himself in a culturally meaningful and 
accepted way, a way that would assure his “social survival”, as he underlines. This, I argue, 
is an index of meaning-creation. Rohullah rendered meaningful for himself, if only in terms 
of “survival”, those moral principles that he observed turned into pragmatic behavior by 
those who surrounded him. He actively endorsed the constitutive elements of a hegemonic 
masculinity (Connell 1987, 1995), as defined in the context of Pashtun rural life, rejecting 
at the same time those that indexed his own subordinate masculinity, and which had 
condemned him up to that point to social ostracism. Such strategy for protecting social 
survival is adopted mostly in a non-conscious fashion, I believe. Rohullah does remember 
clearly when he decided to shift gears, and to start behaving in a more locally appropriate 
way. On the other hand, he seems to have been unaware of the laborious and difficult work, 
taking place backstage, needed to internalize those norms that were hurting him, in order 
to turn them to his own advantage. The pain and anguish he went through before he was 
ready to adjust his behavior was the backdrop of the unconscious labor he was putting up 
to craft a different masculine self, which could hold against the attacks his original 
masculine self was succumbing to. What I am tentatively describing here, is the crafting of 
diverse, interconnected yet dissociated states of subjectivity (or, in the words of Philip 
Bromberg, dissociated states of consciousness. Bromberg 1998:267-290), which index the 
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presence, coexistence and potential conflict of multiple selves. By dissociated states of 
subjectivity I do not mean a pathological cognitive disorder.30 Rather, I mean the 
constructive and psychically healthy capability of accessing different sets of meanings and 
identifications, which serve different purposes at different stages of one’s life trajectory, 
and which are kept in a fruitful, if often painful, dialogue with each other. From such 
dialogue emerges the “illusion” of the unicity and continuity of the self (a necessary 
illusion). When the access to one or more of such sets of meanings is for any reason 
unconsciously impeded, and barred from the fruitful dialogue between each other, then I 
believe we may detect the dysfunctional use of such dissociated states of subjectivity, and 
eventually the phenomenon of repression.  
In Rohullah’s case, his account of those difficult adolescent years in the village 
shows, in my opinion, how he usefully not only managed to craft an alternative set of 
subjective meanings (an alternative self), better adjusted to the life in the village, but, more 
importantly, how he did not eliminate from the dialogue with his alternative self the self 
that he embodied when he first arrived in the village – the quiet, shy and studious boy. 
Rohullah feels the burning contradiction and incoherence between what he had to become 
for his survival’s sake, and what he had been taught to be by his father and mother in their 
urban environment. These two sets of meanings painfully see each other, they are aware of 
the presence of each other, and he is, if unconsciously, aware of the necessity that one take 
precedence over the other under such contingencies. 
                                                          
30 Dissociative processes have been acknowledged in contemporary psychoanalytic theory to be, 
under certain circumstances, potentially fruitful and positive mechanisms. See, in this regard, the 
works of Philip Bromberg (2003), Peter Goldberg (1995) and Alan Roland (2011). 
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And one did take precedence, imperiously at that. How to interpret the unexpected 
inebriation with power, force and violence that Rohullah reports to have experienced? To 
begin with, I think it is important to bear in mind that Rohullah never bars out from some 
degree of awareness the self with which he had come to the village – the shy boy who 
shuns violence. The use and abuse of power and force that he carries out gives him 
pleasurable feelings, but very bitter aftertaste.  The interconnection between his alternative 
selves (his states of subjectivity) is constantly operating. His words describe “becoming 
addicted” to the new condition of power and popularity he attains among his peers, the 
“pleasure” that he feels at being finally not only accepted by his peers, but unexpectedly 
put on the pedestal as a model for others. There is certainly a degree of narcissistic 
seduction and fulfillment in this dynamics. Yet, in the young Rohullah who goes overboard 
with his new self, I perceive the adolescent, desperate attempt at being recognized, 
validated, and appreciated by his peers, and social environment as a whole. It seems as 
though those many years of rejection and suppression by his social environment had 
created the conditions for an uncontrollable explosion of emotions, the inebriation with a 
commonality and “togetherness” with his peers that he does not want to put a limit to. At 
the same time, it is noticeable that Rohullah does not react with hate or rejection to the 
sadistic treatment reserved for him by the young boys in the village. On the contrary, he 
strongly identifies with the different cultural context he finds there, he wants to move from 
the subordinated masculinity position he was in when he went to the village, to that of 
hegemonic masculinity recognized by his peers, and embarks on a quest to win back those 
who “hate” him. There is no masochistic acceptance of a subjugated positionality. This, I 
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believe, speaks as much of the psychic dynamics of Rohullah as of the power and all-
encompassing nature of socio-cultural arrangements in a Pashtun traditional rural context 
such as Paktia province. The connective selves (Joseph 1999:2-17), or rather, the 
connectivity between the subjectivity of people who live interdependently of one another, 
in a face-to-face environment, operates strongly, as we can see, and still, it does not erase 
the individuality and “individuation” of each one of them.  
 
The effort at re-establishing an internal balance 
 
Rohullah’s life in the village in Paktia continued to sail amidst problems and 
turmoil. The absence of his father meant, among other things, that there was no one 
available to farm the land that had been assigned to him upon the death of his father. After 
a few years of cultivating Asadullah’s plot for themselves, his brothers refused to give it 
back to Asadullah’s family, who in the meantime had saved enough money to pay for hired 
farmers to cultivate it. Tempers flared up in the family, and Rohullah remembers that they 
had to physically fight multiple times against his cousins and uncles in order to “convince” 
them to leave the plot of land to them, which eventually they did. 
 
Nur Mohammed [his oldest brother, born circa 1979] was not inclined to fighting. 
He was the one who had responsibility of the household during all those years that 
my father had to spend away from home. He had to learn to be level-headed and 
wise, and could not afford to be just as a hothead as me and Zair were [Zair is the 
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second oldest son, born circa 1981]. Zair did not have any specific tasks or 
responsibility, and he also showed to be much more naturally [pa khpal] aggressive 
than we were. He used to follow the big guys and the elders in the community, to 
learn from them as to how to behave. When I decided to turn around things for 
myself, and become more assertive, I looked up to him as an example. You know, 
Zair spent a lot of time in the village when he was a child, he knew better than I did 
how to comport himself among aggressive people. But also, he liked to be like that. 
He was more like them than I was. After what happened with the brothers of my 
father, my father decided that Zair and I would be the ones to uphold and defend 
the family’s rights. We were old enough by then. Zair was a powerful guy, he was 
respected. Sometimes he also behaved abusively, though [zalim]. Yet, the 
environment in Paktia is conducive to this, they make you behave like this. He was 
the right guy to do it. There, acting aggressively becomes an obligation [majburiat]. 
If you don’t do so, people won’t respect you.     
 
In the absence of his father, Rohullah chooses his next oldest brother as a paradigm 
to follow (Zair), the one person who at that moment embodies the archetype of the “real” 
Pashtun man that Rohullah strives to become at this point in his life, the man who bears 
the banner of the hegemonic masculinity culturally shared and accepted in the rural, 
traditional context in which he is living. Rohullah in fact continued in high school to be an 
assertive person, and to gather followers, like a sort of gang leader. His father was far away, 
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and could not do much to rein him in. Yet, one day, in one of his fights, Rohullah finally 
came across the wrong person. 
 
I had become a troublemaker [badmash]. One day, when I was in 10th grade, I had 
a bad fight with the son of a kumandan [a militia commander]. We both got injured 
in the fight, and went home to our families after swearing to take badal [revenge] 
against each other. A few days later, my father came back from Peshawar to bring 
the salary home, and he was informed about the incident. He ordered me right away 
to leave for Peshawar with him. I finished the 10th and 11th grade in Peshawar. My 
school there was a very good school. My classmates were smart and studied a lot. 
They were not like my classmates in the village, they did not fight and quarrel all 
the time. I could just think of my study, without worrying about much else. I could 
imitate and emulate my father. He solved problems by talking, not fighting. I felt 
relieved, I saw that I could actually live in a different way. I said to myself, I want 
to be like these guys, not like I was in the village. I never fought even once when I 
was in Peshawar. I did my 12th grade in Kabul. In fact, after graduating from high 
school I went back to the village, and I thought: this is not me, I don’t want to live 
like this. A few weeks later I left to Kabul, where I enrolled in university. 
   
Peshawar, a large, cosmopolitan, intellectual, and then-peaceful city constitutes a 
sharp change in Rohullah’s life. Not only does he join his father again in everyday life, but 
he is catapulted back into an environment in which the state of subjectivity that he forced 
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upon himself in order to adjust to life in the village (his alternative self, that is) is not 
necessary any longer, and may even possibly be maladaptive. The line of communication 
that he managed to keep constantly open between the self and subjectivity with which he 
arrived in the village, and those which he trained himself into during his life there, proves 
now functional to his new readjustment. Not having completely barred out from 
consciousness the subjective state in which he was when he reached the village at first, 
allows him now, in Peshawar, to reconnect stably and positively with it, with his “previous” 
self. A never completely interrupted dialogue gives him the chance to not only fully 
recuperate pieces of his subjectivity/self that he had stored away, but to choose rather 
consciously to endow them with the pre-eminence he had previously denied them. In 
Peshawar, Rohullah finds a multivocal set of hegemonic masculinities (see Demetriou 
2001), which compete shoulder to shoulder within a more open moral landscape. He is not 
forced any longer to (unconsciously) choose between a crippling subordinate masculine 
condition and a socially rewarding hegemonic one. He is now able to align his own way of 
being a respectable Pashtun man to one of the several ideal types of masculinity that in 
Peshawar are equally culturally acceptable, and for this equally hegemonic.    
And yet, although the school experience in Peshawar revitalized these aspects of 
Rohullah’s original self, still it was difficult to completely obliterate the kind of person that 
he had “learned” to be in the village.  
 
One time in Kabul, I was in my last year of high school, when Karzai was president 
for the second year [2003]. I always sat in the front seats, because I was smart, I 
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knew everything the teacher was talking about…The other students were lazy…One 
morning I found one of my classmates, a Hazara guy [one of the ethnic minorities 
of Afghanistan], sitting in my seat. I told him to move, but he refused to move. I 
asked him again, and he did not move. So I punched him in the face, and, without 
saying anything, he got up and left my seat. For a couple of months afterwards I 
was afraid that he would gather his friends and relatives and come to school with 
them to take revenge for what had happened. But nothing happened. Kabul is 
different from my village in Paktia.31  
 
The first months in university, in Kabul, were no different in this regard. During a 
Pashto language exam, he got into a fight with another student, right in the classroom where 
the exam was being held. The friends of both rushed to help, and the scuffle turned into a 
big brawl. Rohullah had to have his father intervene with the Dean of the university in 
order not to be expelled. Other participants in the brawl were expelled. Rohullah 
commented on both events briefly, with a sardonic smile on his face: “Yeah, I was still a 
little bit of a badmash. From time to time I still now end up in trouble with aggressiveness 
and violence. But only when it is really necessary”. While listening to him, I had the 
                                                          
31 In analyzing this incident it is useful to consider also the ethnic component. Pashtuns have 
historically been the dominant ethnicity in Afghanistan, both from the political and social point of 
view. Conversely, Hazaras have been the downtrodden, subject to decades of discrimination and 
persecution because of their Shi’a faith and supposed Mongol ancestry. Only after the demise of 
the Taliban, under the protection of the international military forces, Hazaras have managed to 
win for themselves new political and social opportunities. To this day, however, many Pashtuns 
express (either publicly or privately) contempt, acrimony and resentment towards Hazaras (all the 
more because of their newly-acquired visibility). Such attitude might have been present also in 
Rohullah at the moment of his act of bullying against his Hazara classmate.    
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impression that, in telling me the stories about his fights, particularly the ones happened 
more recently, he was feeling the same narcissistic pleasure that he used to feel when he 
recounted his “heroic” deeds to his friends in the village. He was, if unconsciously, trying 
to gain that same social capital (with me) for being a tough guy as he looked for in the 
village, when he bragged about his accomplishments with his friends. In Kabul, with the 
kind of life that he is conducting there, he does not need any longer to display himself in 
such “hypermasculine” way. Clearly, though, a piece of his “village self” was still firmly 
with him. As a matter of fact, Rohullah does not deny that even now, after all these years, 
the self-inflicted “behavioral training” he went through in the village informs his daily life, 
albeit only to a certain degree. Put in another way, the strong, and somewhat traumatic, 
process of enculturation that he underwent after he moved from Kabul to Paktia, as well as 
the social constraints that he had to suffer there (which forced him to change his demeanor 
for the sake of “survival”), clearly affected a very deep layer of Rohullah’s subjectivity as 
a whole. The line of communication between his states of consciousness, in Bromberg’s 
parlance, or states of subjectivity (selves), as I would rather call them, is still open, although 
now it works with an opposite flow, and with a reversed balance. 
  He gave me an example of this phenomenon, and the meaning for him of concepts 
such as honor (izzat) and determination/courage (ghairat), by describing what had 
happened to him just one day prior to one of our last interviews, in May 2013. We had the 
interview on a Sunday, and one day earlier, on the Saturday, he had had a fight with an in-
law at his wedding. This in-law, Ahmed, had gone to Rohullah's wedding in 2009, four 
years earlier. Rohullah’s wedding party (mrasem) was attended by hundreds of people from 
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both families, who had come to Kabul on purpose from the two Pashtun provinces where 
the families sprang from, Paktia and Logar. Both relatives and friends of repute were 
present, including elders, army officers, political figures, and community leaders. At the 
end of the party, Ahmed, without an apparent reason (which is to be demonstrated), started 
making trouble, yelling and being disrespectful to other guests. Rohullah warned him a 
couple of times to stop it, but he continued. Finally Ahmed and Rohullah started fighting, 
which turned quickly in a general brawl. Both ended up shaken, and Ahmed's side claimed 
to have "won" the contest, to have had the upper-hand in the end. As it happens, Rohullah 
did not forget about it. His honor (izzat) had been compromised in front of a lot of people, 
for two reasons. First, because Ahmed had disrespected Rohullah's guests, and his wedding 
as a whole, causing embarrassment and shame (sharm). Second, because Ahmed walked 
away bragging to have "won" the fight.  Ever since the wedding, there had been a stain on 
Rohullah's and his family's honor, that needed to be washed away. Positionally, Rohullah 
had been since then in a condition of diminished public respectability (because of his 
compromised izzat). Performatively, Rohullah had been ever since expected to 
demonstrate practically the willingness and courage to wash away the stain (i.e., being a 
ghairati man). He had not been considered beghairata (without ghairat) until that Saturday, 
because he had always publicly declared the willingness to redress the wrong suffered, to 
"take revenge" (badal). If, in the beginning, he had said "That's ok, I don't care, just let it 
go", he would have been considered beghairata right from that moment, after the incident. 
Nevertheless, people had been waiting for him to act, to do something about it, to 
demonstrate in practice that he had ghairat. Finally, he was invited to Ahmed's wedding that 
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Saturday, as expected. He went there, after having prepared a course of action with nine of 
his friends beforehand. He had called his older brother Zair, to alert him about what was 
going to happen, and to have some advice. Zair, in spite of his past as the “tough guy” in 
the village in Paktia, and despite having been Rohullah’s role model in situations like this 
one, urged him not to proceed with his plan, and to let go. “Just leave it, let it go”, Zair told 
Rohullah, “We have bigger problems now that we have to solve, as a family. Don’t get 
involved in one more trouble that will last for a long time”. Yet Rohullah disregarded Zair’s 
advice. Taking revenge for Ahmed’s disrespectful conduct, and performing appropriately 
for his audience (i.e., everybody else, including Zair), was too important at this point in his 
life. Right when the bride and Ahmed were about to leave the party in their car, Rohullah 
and his friends surrounded Ahmed, and started beating him. Many other people joined in, 
obviously, and the police had to intervene, arresting three from Rohullah's side (including 
him), and two from Ahmed's side. Incidentally, the police was already present precisely 
because it had been alerted about the possible disturbance by Ahmed himself, who knew 
that Rohullah had not forgotten about what had happened at his wedding. The five men 
were released upon signing a paper wherein they promised that the "feud" would end there. 
In reality, the feud will not likely end so easily, in Rohullah's opinion. This is because 
Rohullah and his friends took care to cause a bigger brawl than Ahmed and his friends had 
at Rohullah's wedding, and, especially, because the bride was inadvertently slapped in the 
face during the fighting, and fell to the ground - which is considered a very injurious thing. 
Yet Rohullah felt that he had to "outdo" Ahmed in creating a disturbance, if he really 
wanted to wash away the dishonor of Ahmed bragging about winning the fight four years 
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earlier at Rohullah's wedding. There were two reasons why Rohullah's honor had been 
compromised, and both had to be taken care of. So, now Rohullah is relieved: he is a 
ghairati man in front of everybody, and his family's honor is restored to its previous 
condition. At least until Ahmed finds a way to outdo Rohullah in return, and so on, and so 
on.  
By presenting to me this insight into his recent daily life, Rohullah was 
communicating to me how much he had internalized and rendered meaningful for himself 
those principles, moral tenets, and ethical behaviors that he had to learn, if unwittingly, in 
order to (socially) survive in the village in Paktia (i.e., the patterns of hegemonic 
masculinity predominating in Paktia). At the end of our interview, he added:  
 
I did what I did at Ahmed’s wedding because I had to. It was an obligation 
[majburiat]. I did not enjoy what I did. But I had to do it. Izzat and ghairat are 
important here, among us. People talk about you, they all give you a hard time. If 
I was living in the US, I would have let it go. I would not have cared. But here, in 
Afghanistan, if I had let it go, my kids one day would have asked me: “Why did you 
not punish Ahmed for what he did to you, dad?”. I am proud that I can show 
everybody that I am a respectable person.  
 
In the same breath, Rohullah says “I did not enjoy what I did” and “I am proud that 
I can show everybody that I am a respectable person”. Yet the contradiction in Rohullah’s 
narrative is only illusory. I argue that the Rohullah that emerged from the village in a new 
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shape was no less a legitimate Rohullah than the original Rohullah, the child who was 
bullied by his peers until he was 12 years-old, who did not want to engage in violence, and 
who continued to feel unhappy after each brawl he got into. He feels the disconcerting 
symptoms, however, of the conflict between these contrasting selves that he alternatively, 
and unconsciously, embraces under different circumstances in his life. The dissociated, yet 
present and engaged in an unconscious communication, state of subjectivity that makes 
Rohullah feel uneasy and uncomfortable when he behaves like an aggressive and vindictive 
person is counterbalanced by the state of subjectivity (his alternative self) that he developed 
while he lived in the village, in order to preserve his psychological balance, his social 
survival, and to ensure the validation by his social environment. The latter prescribes 
certain cultural standards of behavior in order to be considered a socially appropriate 
masculine individual (i.e., patterns of hegemonic masculinity). Such standards have been 
pragmatically endorsed by Rohullah, who has internalized them and legitimized them to 
himself. Under certain circumstances, in certain contingencies, they represent an integral 
(and “true”) part of his subjectivity as much as does the moral abhorrence that he felt as a 
child, and still feels now, at the necessity to use violence in order to (socially) survive. 
Rohullah has managed to navigate successfully enough these seemingly 
contradictory aspects of his subjectivity (these two selves, as it were). He has managed to 
modulate the weight that, within a coherent sense of self, each of these aspects has to hold. 
Indeed, he now has permanently moved to Kabul, started a family there, and has no 
intention of going back to the village, where his brother Nur Mohammed and his family 
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(and, until very recently, Zair and his family) are still living. In a powerful passage of one 
of our previous interviews, he confessed: 
 
I hate when I have to go to the village. I try to go as little as possible, and when I 
go, I stay for just a few days. Everybody is edgy there, everybody is always anxious, 
always ready for something bad to happen. They are aggressive, pushy. It makes 
me uncomfortable. When I go there, I change, I become a different person. I start 
doing things like they do them. I start to talk like them, to act like them. I also 
become more aggressive. I have to adjust to how they do things, because otherwise 
they would consider me a weak person, they would make fun of me. I know the rules, 
I know how to behave, I adjust. Every time I get in the car to go back to Kabul from 
the village, I feel like a weight has been lifted off my shoulders. 
 
Thus, although Rohullah has certainly internalized and incorporated within his 
private sets of meanings the values and ethics of the life in the village, and has to some 
degree brought them back unconsciously with himself to a different life in Kabul, the 
village environment now presents for him a degree of intensity that he feels as 
unacceptable. When he is in the village, the facets of the selves that emerged from our 
conversations are not in harmony anymore. As a symptom of his unconscious processes, 
he perceives a disturbing unbalance in favor of one of them, the one he rationally disavows 
more, but that he feels he needs more to “survive” in the village. To reiterate: the self he 
embodied when he first moved to the village from Kabul, the quiet and shy child who 
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wanted nothing to do with violence, was so maladjusted to life in the village that he rejected 
it after a few years of suffering. Social pressures and cultural incompatibility made the self-
configuration he held upon arriving in the village unsuitable to appropriate social life in 
that context. In that particular life contingency, he disavowed that original self, those states 
of subjectivity, and worked hard towards building “alternative” ones, which would help 
him integrate in the new environment. Yet, although this “alternative” self was born out of 
pragmatism and the need for social adjustment, it has nonetheless become an integral part 
of his being, an aspect of the “authentic” Rohullah, a legitimate Rohullah. He clearly 
perceives this dynamic. All the states of subjectivity that he described to me through the 
narration of his personal vicissitudes have been at times alternatively endorsed and rejected 
by him, fully or partially.  
I will describe a final incident that Rohullah got involved in, in order to corroborate 
the interpretation that I am giving of Rohullah’s inner dynamics. The event took place in 
Kabul a few weeks prior to my final departure from Afghanistan in June 2013. 
Interestingly, but I believe not by coincidence, the incident happened when Zair and his 
family had already moved to the house in Kabul where all the Mangal family lives, 
including Rohullah. The house is located in an eastern neighborhood of Kabul, where the 
vast majority of the population is ethnically Pashtun, mostly from the eastern Pashtun 
provinces of Afghanistan. Unlike the rest of Kabul, which is by and large a “Persian” city, 
this area of town feels like a homogeneous Pashtun urban environment, where language, 
outward appearance, and public behavior seem more akin to, say, Jalalabad or Gardez than 
to Kabul. Rules of comportment follow accordingly. It so happened that the neighbors of 
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Rohullah and his family, also Pashtuns, decided to add two stories to their house, which is 
separated from Rohullah’s house by a wall – as in most houses in urban Afghanistan. The 
wall was high enough to conceal anything happening in each other’s backyards from the 
view of the neighbors. The two stories that Rohullah’s neighbors added to their house, 
however, rose well above the separation wall. Those inside the new addition could easily 
see anything happening in Rohullah’s courtyard from their windows. Given that, mostly, 
women are working during the day in the house and courtyard, this meant that the women’s 
privacy (parda) was intruded into. It meant also that the honor and name of the whole 
family of Rohullah was being put in jeopardy. This is by all means an unacceptable 
situation among Pashtuns, and more generally in Afghanistan at large. Rohullah and Zair 
urged a couple of times the head of the neighbor family to do something with regard to the 
problem, such as applying screens to the windows of the two additional stories, or erecting 
some sort of covered fence on top of the separation wall. The neighbors, however, 
dismissed their requests, claiming that it was Rohullah’s family responsibility to do 
something about the issue. One day, things deteriorated quickly. Rohullah recalls: 
 
My older brother Zair was coming back home from work that day, and met one of 
the sons of our neighbor in front of their house gate.  He started talking to the guy, 
asking him why they were being so difficult and disrespectful about this problem. 
Then, I don’t know exactly what happened, or what they said to each other. I heard 
Zair screaming outside, and the other guy screaming back at him. You know how 
Zair is, he does not have much patience when he thinks that he is being 
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disrespected, he gets upset quickly. By the time I got in the street they were hitting 
each other. I called out Iqbal and my father, and when they arrived there were two 
or three other people from the other family outside. They had sticks with them, and 
when my father tried to separate Zair and the other guy, they intervened and hit my 
father on the head. When I saw my father being hit, I completely lost myself. I got 
back to my courtyard, picked up an ax, and went outside. I started swinging the ax, 
and I think I got someone in the arm. Zair and Iqbal had gotten a hold of a stick 
too, and were fighting with the other guys. Soon after, other people from the 
neighborhood came to the scene and put themselves between us and the other 
family. So we stopped fighting. At least one of them ended up at the hospital, I 
believe. My father later went to the police and denounced what had happened, so 
that we would be on the safe side. We have yet to reach a solution to the problem 
of the wall, and to solve the issue of the enmity [dukhmani] between families that 
has started with this fight. 
Andrea – How do you feel about the fight? 
Rohullah – Well, that was good ghairat. I saw my father being hit, what else could 
I do? And also, these people, they are doing something really wrong…I mean, they 
are not respecting the parda [privacy] of the women of our family. What else could 
have we done? Sooner or later we would have ended up fighting, one way or 
another. I think that it is good when I manage to be aggressive in a situation that 
really requires it. This is good ghairat. I am proud of my ghairat in situations like 
these. It makes me feel like a real Pashtun. 
 
 
 
108 
 
Again, the “cultural training” that he went through during the years of his 
permanence in the village (or rather, the expression of it mediated by a set of meanings that 
Rohullah chooses now to endorse selectively) still shapes him profoundly, if 
unconsciously, and is perceived by him as a “positive” outcome of his previous 
experiences, as well as an integral part of his being. 
Furthermore, while listening to Rohullah recounting this incident, I had the 
impression that the presence of his brother Zair, the very person who played the important 
part of role model for much of Rohullah’s adolescence in the village, had brought 
vigorously the “village self” of Rohullah back to life in Kabul. More than a matter of which 
appropriate performance to display in front of one’s role model, the incident might be seen 
as the overlapping, if temporary, of the multiple states of subjectivity (or selves) of 
Rohullah in a borderline situation where the space is unequivocal (it is certainly Kabul and 
not the village), but the circumstances are blurred by the presence of a strong symbol of 
the village life he previously lived (his brother-cum-role-model Zair). Such symbol may 
have reactivated a certain modus operandi that Rohullah usually reserves for when he is 
physically in the village. In fact, the previous incident that happened at Ahmed’s wedding, 
which I detailed above, also took place at a time when Zair had already moved back to 
Kabul. 
       There is also some even more “positive” use that Rohullah makes, in a conscious way, 
of the self he had to construe in order to survive socially in the village.  When I left 
Afghanistan, Rohullah was working for a private research company that contracted 
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sociological surveys for the country’s Ministry of Education. Due to his background in 
Paktia, he was assigned several projects to be conducted in the province. Rohullah said he 
used his institutional role to awake the “political consciousness [syasi pohawe’] of the 
youth” (in his words). 
 
People know me, remember me, they remember what kind of person I was when I 
lived in the village. They respect me, they listen to what I say. I still have a group 
of friends and supporters [andiwalaan] in the village. Now I use my influence 
[nufuz] for constructive [mufid] purposes now… it makes me feel good.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
Being “different” by negotiatng the private sphere 
 
Rohullah holds a unique position within his family in one respect: he is the only 
one among his siblings (either male or female) who did not go through an arranged 
marriage. He “chose” the woman he eventually married. His parents proposed several other 
girls to him before he met the one he eventually married, but he always refused, and bought 
himself time to find someone else on his own. He saw her at the wedding party of a friend 
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of his. She was a friend of the bride. Their families were not related. In a cultural 
environment in which an arranged marriage between relatives is still the norm in the vast 
majority of the cases, across all social backgrounds, this represented a further point of 
distinction. They could not talk at the wedding, when they first saw each other, but she was 
enrolled in a high school located near his house, and he saw her going back and forth from 
school. He also saw her often going to the madrasa in the same neighborhood, where she 
attended religious classes. Rohullah was already in university at that time, she was younger 
than him. Through friends and relatives, he investigated about her habits, her 
acquaintances, her routines, her reputation among the people she spent time with, and 
whether she had been already “assigned” to anybody else. Rohullah’s younger sister 
happened to know the girl. Unbeknownst to Asadullah, she and Rohullah’s mother went to 
see the girl’s mother (probably unbeknownst to the girl’s father as well). After the positive 
outcome of the meeting, all together with Rohullah’s father went to the girl’s family house.  
In the case of an arranged marriage between relatives, usually the individuals involved are 
familiar to each other, to each family’s history, reputation, and social status. Preliminary 
inquiries, and further negotiations are initiated and carried out by the male members of the 
groom’s family, only to be followed through by more extensive surveys also among the 
female members. In the case of unrelated families, however, a thorough investigation into 
the past and current social standing of both families is required, which may happen in part 
covertly, in part openly. Rohullah confessed that he skipped that part of the “procedure”. 
He was not interested in what kind of family the girl was coming from – he was only 
interested in her, and if she had proven suitable to him, that would have been enough. He 
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let his father, mother and siblings do the “research” for him. As subsequent conversations 
demonstrated, it was important for Rohullah to show himself to me as someone who had 
proven to be more independent-minded and “modern” than his brothers and sisters, and 
many of his peers as a whole, for that matter (“I am an open-minded person…I don’t belong 
in Afghanistan”). He respected the traditional way of doing things (to a certain degree), 
and did not object to it, although he distanced himself ideologically from it. He could accept 
the form, but refused to compromise on the content. After receiving consent from both his 
and the girl’s families, he arranged to meet the girl one-on-one, in a restaurant. He wanted 
to be sure that the girl would be someone who could live up to his expectations. 
 
We met in a restaurant, in the family section, so that we would not be disturbed. My 
brother Zair and one of her brothers were waiting in the general section of the 
restaurant. We talked about ourselves, we asked questions to each other. I wanted 
to know what she liked to do in her free time, what plans she had for the future. I 
told her the same about me. She told me what she would not like in a husband, I 
told her what I expected from a wife. It went well, I liked her. She was intelligent, 
pretty. We had a similar mindset, we had similar ideas about life. I think this is 
important for everybody… to be on the same page with your spouse, I mean. I 
encouraged her to finish school, and she said that she wanted to have a husband 
with a university degree. We decided that it was ok to get engaged. I communicated 
it to my father, who said ok. Then he went to her father and discussed officially the 
matter. After the engagement party [when two future spouses are allowed to meet 
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each other in private], we met multiple times and explained to each other how our 
families worked, and the rules in life that we would like to have. At that time I was 
more conservative than I am now, you know…I was coming straight from the 
village…I told her about the way I wanted her to go around dressed…I wasn’t much 
for women’s rights and all that stuff. She told me that she knew about the problems 
I had had with aggressiveness and fights, and said that she did not like that. She 
still gives me a hard time when I end up in some trouble with other people.   
 
Meantime, life in the family’s house in Kabul was not being easy for Rohullah. 
Relations with his parents were difficult. Since he moved back to Kabul, in 12th grade, he 
had been living with his parents, two younger unmarried sisters, and his younger brother, 
Iqbal. The house, which I visited multiple times, was in all fairness quite small for six adult 
people.  
 
Life in my parents’ house was too tight for me. We were six…too many people. I 
had my own room, but it was not enough. I had always someone around. I wanted 
just to be alone, on my own, with nobody telling me what to do all the time. I wanted 
to have fun, to have my privacy. There was none of that in the house. My father was 
pushing me to continue university, and possibly do research afterwards, like he did. 
But, I must say, he was not overly intrusive. He tried to push me by example, more 
than by words. He showed me the work that he was doing, tried to spark my interest. 
Well, at the moment, the whole thing upset me quite a bit. I was working with a 
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computer design company back then, alongside attending university. I was a lot 
stressed. Yet my father’s pressure  left a mark, and I think I owe it to that if I chose 
to work with the research company that I am with now. I like it where I work and 
what I do now.    
 
So, Rohullah feels himself to be “different” from the other average Pashtun young 
men he knows, not only from the village, but also from Kabul. He stresses this 
“progressive” mindset that he perceives to maintain, which positions him ahead of many 
others, in his view. Although his family (i.e., parents and siblings) is very important for 
him, as well as certain customs and traditional values particular to Pashtun society (as we 
have seen), he very proudly affirms his willingness to be his own person, to have an 
individuality that he protects against excessive encroachments by others, be it his father or 
the community at large. He wants to think that he is choosing how to live his life, that he 
is discerning between aspects of traditional Pashtun-ness that he is actively embracing, and 
others that he is rejecting, unlike many others are capable of doing. The first point of 
reference that he maintains in this regard is his two older brothers. Nur Mohammed and 
Zair (the latter until very recently) have continued to live and work in the village, even 
after Rohullah left for Kabul, and after Zair got his degree in engineering from Kabul 
university. They embody, for Rohullah, a more “traditional” mindset and way of life. They 
are better adjusted to the village life. I had never any close relationship with Nur 
Mohammed, but I had with Zair. Zair certainly thrived in the village in Paktia (he only 
speaks Pashto and Dari), and, from what I gathered during my conversations with him, he 
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never regretted to have chosen to stay. If anything, now he regrets to have been forced to 
move to Kabul, due to threats to his life that the Taliban leveled against him because of his 
work as a civil engineer. Rohullah always attributed this capacity to better adjust to 
traditional life that Zair showed mainly to his temperament, which, in his opinion, helped 
him to fit into a very aggressive, competitive, and often violent environment. Until they 
both lived in the village, his two brothers occupied the same house with their own families, 
and were subject to the same degree of interdependence and lack of privacy that Rohullah 
was suffering in Kabul at his parents’ house. Yet he considered them to be choosing that 
type of life, because supposedly better naturally suited for it, and pitted his own recalcitrant 
attitudes against their acceptance of the communal life they were conducting. He compares 
unfavorably this “choice to be traditional” that his brothers showed to his own feelings of 
independence and uniqueness, that he considers a trait of “modernity” on his part.       
 
In fact, the first years of marriage for Rohullah were turbulent. Before the birth of 
their daughter, as well as for a while after that, Rohullah’s wife had problems in adjusting 
to life with her in-laws. She did not take very easily the fact of being the young bride, 
subject to the authority of her mother-in-law, the matriarch. In a fashion that is very 
common in Pashtun families around Afghanistan, the mother of the groom usually exerts 
a strong power upon the daughter-in-law. Relationships sometimes may get strained, but 
the daughter-in-law is expected to silently bow to her in-laws’ authority, and wait for things 
to get somehow smoother. Apparently, from the accounts that I received in those years 
from Rohullah and his father, Asadullah, the new bride was rebellious, and ended up often 
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quarreling vociferously with her mother-in-law. To that followed a period of so-called 
“depression”, during which Rohullah’s wife seemed resigned to a life she did not like. 
Asadullah blamed his daughter-in-law for it, saying that she was “not well in the head”, 
and that she was causing problems for no reason. Over time, things got better, and Rohullah 
and his father reported improvements and an apparent normalization of the relationships. 
Rohullah never blamed the disturbances on his wife, however. He always maintained that 
his wife, like himself, was too “progressive” for such a “traditional” daily life arrangement, 
that he empathized with her feelings, and that he was covertly working on changing the 
situation. Rohullah used the example of his wife’s reaction to traditional family life to 
emphasize the point he was at the same time making about himself: I am a modern man, I 
have chosen a modern woman as a wife, and we are both subject to a lifestyle that we (at 
least in part) reject. As it happened with all the many Pashtun friends (with the exception 
of only one) that I made during the years, I have never met or even seen Rohullah’s wife 
(although I have met his mother, due to a principle in Pashtun morals whereby the rules of 
parda may not apply any longer to an old woman, without any shame or dishonor attached).    
 
Conclusion 
 
After a few years of unsuccessful struggle and suffering in the context of the village, 
Rohullah worked on himself in order to “learn” those principles, and behaviors, following 
which he could ameliorate his social life there. Of course, part of those moral values and 
ethical rules he already was aware of – he was after all raised in a Pashtun family. Yet, the 
 
 
 
116 
degree to which he would have to take and implement those values and ethics in order to 
adjust to life in the village felt probably completely alien to him. His childhood 
enculturation into peacefulness and mild-manners, his consequent abhorrence for violence 
and abusiveness, had to clash with the reality of the life in the village. Out of pragmatism, 
and the instinct for (social) survival, he re-enculturated himself, and re-socialized himself 
in the new reality. I interpret the fact that he managed rather successfully to do so as a 
demonstration of the (unconscious, mainly) plasticity of one’s self. As I argued above, this 
“alternative” self, better suited to the village, that Rohullah shaped over time, has become 
a legitimate and “authentic” aspect of Rohullah as much as the self he brought to the village 
from Kabul at first. Far from considering this phenomenon as a pathogenic split in 
Rohullah’s original self, or the proof of the pathologic fragmentation of a previously 
coherent self, I consider this emerged multiplicity of selves as the demonstration of how 
our psychological organization and configurations may be fruitfully malleable and 
adaptable. The multiplicity of selves that Rohullah gave rise to actually may be seen as the 
adaptive response of a well-functioning psychic system to the changed and challenging 
pragmatic circumstances of life. The integration of the “alternative” self into Rohullah’s 
full being, and the constructive tapping into it that he carries out when required by the 
contingencies (like when he goes to Gardez to work on social research), represents in my 
view a positive strategy that renders past life experiences, both painful and pleasurable, 
available to be used as building material for a self that as a whole will be more adjustable 
and resilient across different and unpredictable occurrences in life.   
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At 26 years of age, now Rohullah has reached a degree of internal stability (though 
not devoid of conflicts and hesitations) that allows him to navigate better than in the past 
the management of these conflicting aspects of his personality (whether consciously or 
unconsciously).   
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CHAPTER 3 – UMAR: THE MAKING, AND UN-MAKING,  
OF A RELIGIOUS MILITANT 
 
Prologue 
 
Umar Arman is a 35-year old (approximately) veterinarian from Jalalabad, the 
capital of Nangarhar province. Like many in Afghanistan who gained a degree in medicine 
or veterinary science, he has never practiced the profession related to his degree. We first 
met in summer 2010 through my wife, who, also a doctoral candidate in anthropology, was 
conducting research about carpet weaving and embroidery making among Pashtun women. 
Umar was at the time the executive director of a local NGO in Jalalabad which worked in 
the districts with both farmers and rural women to enhance agricultural production and 
female traditional activities, such as the weaving of carpets. The NGO was funded by 
international private donors. Due to the strict limitations in movement that women are 
subject to in a Pashtun rural area such as Nangarhar province, I used to accompany my 
wife (clad in the traditional blue-colored burqa, or chadowry) to all the meetings and 
interviews she conducted. It was so that I luckily met Umar, and started a fruitful 
relationship with him that went well beyond the necessities of my wife’s research, and 
which has continued in earnest to this day.  
At that time, Umar had under his responsibility approximately seven men and two 
women. The men would be divided in groups and would go to the rural districts to 
coordinate activities with the farmers receiving the funds, while the women (in reality, two 
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girls in their late teenage years) would appropriately interact with village women who were 
to receive material and training in carpet weaving and embroidery.  The atmosphere in the 
headquarters of the NGO was always extremely welcoming and relaxed. The two girl 
employees worked in an office separate from those where the men worked, and ate their 
lunch on their own as well. Great attention was paid to the character of the relationship that 
men and women had to maintain in the workplace. By definition of “traditional” Pashtun 
social arrangements, men and women unrelated by blood should never mingle together, let 
alone when away from the direct control of a close male relative of the women. However, 
nine years after the demise of the Taliban regime, things were already quickly changing in 
Pashtun Afghan society, at least in dynamic places such as the provincial capital of an 
important province such as Nangarhar. “Amendments” to the rule of the segregation of 
sexes in the workplace started to be occasionally tolerated among more open-minded and 
better educated families, or, alternatively, among families whose economic situation had 
become so dire that a pragmatic exception to the norm became the only alternative to 
complete destitution. The case of the two girls working for Umar fell in both categories. 
They were both finishing high school (a rare feature among girls in Nangarhar), and lived 
in families which had lost most of their male breadwinners to the war(s). The relationship 
between the men and the girls in the headquarters was premised on the tacit 
acknowledgement that certain rules of Pashtun social etiquette were being broken, and on 
limiting the interaction between the two sexes to the minimum indispensable for 
professional purposes. When interacting with each other, men and girls were mutually 
respectful and detached, and I have never detected, during the many visits that I paid to 
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their headquarters, any sort of flirtatious behavior on the part of either side.  Against this 
background, Umar constituted somewhat an exception. The two girls interacted with him 
on a regular basis, much more than they did with the other men in the NGO. They had to 
report directly to him, and he had to instruct them on what to do. They frequently visited 
his personal office, and discussed extensively their activities. His attitude towards them 
was playful and funny, and they responded positively in the same way. I did not perceive 
any change in such attitude between the times when I visited his office with my wife and 
those when I visited him alone. He, more than once, explained to us that the reasons why 
he was taking so many liberties with the girls in his office, was that he was playing the part 
of an older brother with them. There was nothing malicious or flirtatious in the way he 
conducted himself with the girls, he explained: he only wanted to spur their responsiveness 
and ambition to improve in their work and, ultimately, life. I must say that nothing in his 
behavior then, and in what I came to know of him later, ever brought me to doubt his words 
in this regard.32 
Umar was clearly a well-educated man, who spoke very good English, and insisted 
in doing so with me, rejecting my attempts to speak Pashto with him. The first impression 
of him that I recall is that he seemed the most “western-minded” and open-to-the-“outside” 
                                                          
32 My wife and I often noticed that a way to rationalize, and render culturally legitimate, a 
relationship which otherwise would stand out as socially inappropriate (like that which Umar was 
having with the two girls who worked for him), was to create a relation of fictive kinship. The 
practice of considering the two girls as his younger sisters construed them in fact as muharram (i.e., 
blood relatives, and hence not susceptible of engaging in any sexual relationship with him), and put 
them de facto under his responsibility, as to their propriety of behavior and personal safety. Umar 
represented a guarantor vis-à-vis the girls’ family members (with whom he met upon hiring them), 
and the other co-workers in the NGO.  
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Pashtun man I had met until then. While this was in some regards true, I would later 
discover that there was much more to it, a more conflictive side of the story.  
I kept going back often to the headquarters of the NGO, where I made many other 
friends, some of whom later became as well good informants for the full duration of my 
fieldwork. The NGO itself, however, despite the successfulness of its activities (it was one 
of the few foreign-funded local NGOs that actually managed to create some sort of well-
trained workers and self-sustainable business, such as the production of cooking oil and 
plastic containers for it), lost its funding in mid-2011, and all its personnel had to find 
themselves a new occupation, including Umar. Part of the problem, I was informed, lied in 
the fact that the NGO started to be targeted by threats on the part of the “Taliban”, who 
accused the locals working for it of conducting un-Islamic activities, such as spreading 
Christianity and promoting intermingling of the sexes in the workplace. In late summer 
2010, after one of several threatening letters they received from the militant movement (of 
which I still have a copy), and in order to defuse the tension, the whole crew transferred 
for a couple of weeks to the Hazara-majority province of Bamyan, to follow more closely 
the projects they were managing there with potato farmers. My wife and I accompanied 
them to Bamyan, where we witnessed the tense atmosphere within the group, torn between 
the necessity to continue working for the NGO and the dangers entailed by it. Sure enough, 
a couple of weeks after coming back to Jalalabad from Bamyan, the compound where the 
headquarters of the NGO were located suffered a nighttime attack by the Taliban, which 
injured nobody, yet shook the personnel to the core. I guess that was the last nail in the 
NGO’s coffin, and funds stopped flowing by May 2011. 
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With Umar I have met numerous times over the years. During my fieldwork he 
lived in Jalalabad, and I used to see him on a regular basis, in his office, despite my being 
forced to adjust to his full, businessman-like daily schedule. When he moved to Kabul, 
after losing his job at the NGO in Jalalabad, I met him every time I would pass by the 
capital. We usually had lunch together during the break at his new job post, where he was 
subject to an even more hectic daily schedule.  Our conversations ran in a less “official” 
and canonic fashion than the interviews I had with other informants in a “person-centered” 
way. Thus, in the end, I am not able to say exactly how many hours I have sat with him, 
one-on-one, talking about his personal life and private issues (many, at any rate). As it 
happened with Rohullah, he chose to talk to me in English, which I often asked him to 
integrate with the Pashto rendition of some most interesting passages of what he recounted.  
 
 
The power of identification, the seduction of power 
 
Umar Arman was born circa 1978, in Herat, a major city in western Afghanistan, 
to a Jalalabad-born Pashtun man, who at the time was an officer in the Afghan Air Force. 
His mother was a close relative of his father, and was illiterate. When Umar was 
approximately six years-old, his father was transferred to Jalalabad, where he finished his 
military career a few years later. Umar attended school and university in Jalalabad. The 
school years, however, were turbulent, to say the least. From 1989 until 1992 Jalalabad 
saw furious battles between president Najibullah’s government forces and the mujaheddin 
fighters. Najibullah managed to hold on to Jalalabad long beyond the Soviet troops’ retreat 
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in 1989, and Moscow’s eventual cut to all financial and military support to his government 
(in 1992, after an agreement to this effect with the US – the Soviet Union had just 
collapsed). Yet, in the end, Najibullah had to relinquish his post, and Jalalabad fell into the 
hands of the mujaheddin fighters (more precisely, to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-
Islami party). When the fighting started in Jalalabad, Umar was approximately eleven years 
old, and he was fourteen when the mujaheddin took control of Jalalabad. He reports the 
memories he has of those years in Jalalabad as traumatic. Until the dissolution of the 
communist state, in 1992, his father worked for the Air Force, and was mostly absent from 
home. He would see him rarely, mainly at night. When the rockets started to rain on 
Jalalabad, in 1989, civilian life was hit to the greatest. Umar remembers that streets were 
deserted, most shops were closed, and only military vehicles were visible in town. Supplies 
quickly disappeared from the few shops that were kept open, and his family experienced 
complete lack of food several times for two or three days in a row. His father, with the help 
of friends, built an underground shelter for his family below their house. Sometimes, Umar 
remembers, they spent entire days inside the shelter while bombs were exploding around 
the house. Despite the dangers and the fighting, the fact that Jalalabad continued to be 
firmly in the hands of the government meant that the most basic services kept on running. 
Among these was education. Umar’s father had put him into a public school, although 
madrasas (religious schools) were also available, and well attended. His father was a 
secular and mild-mannered man, who was absolutely opposed to religious education. 
Attendance in school was erratic, because of the vicissitudes of the war in the area. The 
state, however, guaranteed the passage to the next class each year to those who attended, 
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regardless of how much of the curriculum had been covered in class. After the takeover of 
Jalalabad by the mujaheddin, in 1992, public schools were kept running, but their 
curriculum was shaped after that of the religious schools. After some time into the 
mujaheddin’s rule, the public school system failed altogether, and Umar stopped attending, 
although he is not sure when exactly. Students who were enrolled in public schools were 
required to start attending madrasas, which he did.    
At this point, the first element of an important personal transformation, that will 
mark Umar’s whole life, materialized. He started to do very well in the religious subjects 
that the madrasa he was attending focused on. He was good at the Arabic language, at 
memorizing the Qur’an, and in the discussions that took place in and outside the classroom 
about the religious texts they had to read. Umar says: 
 
I was doing well in school, at the madrasa. I was smarter than the other guys, I 
excelled at studying. I was starting to take pleasure in studying those religious 
subjects… it made me feel accomplished. 
Andrea – Did you feel like you had found a faith that you previously did not 
perceive? Did you “believe” in what you were studying? 
Umar - Well, I don’t know, honestly. I don’t remember whether I was really, 
sincerely taken by that stuff back then. I think I did not ask myself this question. It 
was a strange feeling. If I did good, I would receive a lot of praise and respect. It 
was like doing something that made me important in the community, among the 
people I lived with, my friends, my teachers, also the elders. Being a good Muslim 
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was something that was taken for granted…I mean, it was taken for granted that 
being a good Muslim was something that everybody should want to accomplish. I 
was showing myself to be a good Muslim, at my young age, and they treated me 
like an important person. I remember I was proud of it, and happy too.   
Andrea – What do you mean by “important”? Did they make you feel “special”? 
Umar – Yeah, special, I guess so…for example, back then there were a lot of 
mullahs that were coming to Jalalabad from Pakistan and some Arab countries. 
They were treated with a lot of respect because we thought they had much more 
religious knowledge and education than we had. They would stay in Jalalabad, and 
teach classes in several madrasas. My teachers would introduce me to them, would 
tell them that I should speak with them directly, because I was a good student. 
Another example: the leading mullah of the madrasa that I attended one day 
summoned my father and told him that, in his opinion, I should be sent to Pakistan 
or India to continue religious education. I was smart, he said, and I needed a higher 
level of education. Those madrasas were the Deoband- and Salafi-type madrasas 
[fundamentalist religious schools]. My father knew that, and forbade me to go. He 
wanted me to go to university as soon as I would finish with school education. Also, 
I would go often to mosque, and sometimes I would be allowed to lead prayer there. 
This was a great honor for a young guy like me, and my relatives, my neighbors, 
everybody was really proud of me. It all made me feel good.  
Andrea – So, it was more about the benefits that you gained from your good 
performances… 
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Umar – Bah, I don’t know, it is difficult to say. You know, we lived in a very one-
sided world. When everything around you is in one way, it is difficult just to step 
back and do something different. We were completely immersed in that world, we 
did not see anything else…I was very young…  
 
Thus, Umar got caught very early in the religious radicalization that the civil war 
brought about in Afghanistan after the collapse of the communist regime. The mujaheddin, 
as we heard above from my friend Rohullah as well, were not much different from what 
came later in the guise of the Taliban regime. What is interesting in the case of Umar, 
however, is the path that he chose to become a “respectable” Pashtun. Unlike Rohullah, 
who lived in a much harsher and traditionalist environment, and who, perhaps for this 
reason, perceived that the way to rise to social distinction was that of playing actively the 
culturally relevant role of the tough bully, to Umar, who lived in the much more 
“sophisticated” Jalalabad context, a different avenue of expression and realization became 
available – that of religious knowledge and performative excellence. In a dynamic and 
“intellectual” environment such as Jalalabad (which hosts the second oldest university in 
Afghanistan), the role of the tough and aggressive man was clearly not the only path to 
affirm one’s masculinity and manly worth. As past ethnographic research has indicated 
(Edwards 2002, Ahmed 1991, Lindholm 1986, 1993), religious charisma has been 
historically a source of prestige and status among Pashtuns on both sides of the Durand 
Line (that is, current Afghanistan and Pakistan). The most striking examples of such 
phenomena may be found during very specific historical moments of upheaval and revolt 
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against a constituted authority which was perceived as inimical in religious terms (like the 
British Raj, or even a different, but politically dominant, Pashtun group, see Ahmed 1991). 
In a context of relative socio-political “equilibrium”, on the other hand, it has been likewise 
noted that the social standing of the religious leaders was traditionally less relevant, with 
“secular” local leaders holding more authority than the religious ones.33 In the context of 
post-1978 communist Afghanistan, the rhetoric that had catapulted, in particular historical 
moments, the religious leaders to the forefront of the social and political unrest (i.e., the 
narrative of the jihad, or holy war) was quickly and successfully resuscitated by internal 
actors through the instigation and support of external forces, both in ideological and 
material forms (the US, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf States, and Pakistan). Through this lens we 
can better interpret the reference that Umar makes to the Pakistani and Arab Islamic 
scholars who flocked to Nangarhar during his childhood and adolescence, and the revived 
social status and authoritativeness that they, and their local acolytes, enjoyed. The same 
trend, incidentally, has not been inverted yet, and, if anything, it has deepened, thanks to 
the continuing profound influence of the past Taliban regime in the lives of today’s Pashtun 
Afghans, the protracted state of foreign occupation which the country is still subject to, and 
                                                          
33 Akbar Ahmed (1980), and Charles Lindholm (1996) have in fact taken issue with the portrait that 
Fredrik Barth (1959) paints of the role and influence of the category (or “caste”, as he puts it) of 
saintly men in Pashtun society. Ahmed and Lindholm pointed out that the degree of political and 
social clout that individuals with a religious “pedigree” held, showed to be in fact very limited in 
their experience, and that Barth might have misunderstood this specific aspect of socio-political 
relations within his context of research. As the account that Umar gave me shows, however, this 
state of facts might have radically changed due to the wars, and the massive influx of ideologies, 
and religiously-minded charismatic individuals who flocked to Afghanistan during and after the 
struggle against the Soviet occupation. Corroborating this hypothesis, the middle-aged informants 
I spoke to, who grew up before the Soviet invasion, did reminisce about a pre-war period in which 
the “untrustworthy mullahs” were kept “in their place” by the more powerful community elders, 
on the premises of customary practices (rawaj).    
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the consequent, persistent interference of external actors into Afghan political dynamics 
(mainly Pakistan and wealthy Arab states).      
Umar’s father, whom he used to see rarely, was apparently unaware of the steady 
religious radicalization that his son was experiencing. In this regard, Umar says: 
 
My father did not fully understand what was happening in me. We did not talk very 
much. He did not know what we used to talk about with my friends [i.e., religious 
issues]. He saw I was very pious, very observant of religious practices, and he knew 
about the good reputation that these things gave me within the community. He was 
not very concerned about it, I guess he thought it was just like…doing things…you 
know…things people do to be considered good Muslims. You know, this is also a 
problem that we have here…people judge you from what you do in public. If you 
go five times a day to the mosque, or they see you pray five times a day…if you fast, 
if you have a beard, if you wear a skull cap, in other words if your outward behavior 
is in line with the rules, they will think you are a good Muslim, they will talk well 
about you, they will respect you more…but it’s only the outside…people don’t 
worry about the inside. If you don’t keep this outward appropriate behavior, they 
will talk badly about you, even if you are a good Muslim [inside]. 
 
The last remark (“even if you are a good Muslim”) already anticipates one major 
realization, and crucial change in personal beliefs, that Umar experienced after the fall of 
the Taliban, and which mark him to this day. We will come back to this point. 
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Approximately one year after the fall of Kabul to the Taliban in September 1996, Umar 
started attending university in Jalalabad, in the veterinarian medicine school. The Taliban 
kept the university working, and he became an active part of the movement.  
 
In university, I became more active as a Talib [a member of the Taliban]. They were 
controlling all activities, and I joined them, I accepted their way of interpreting 
Islam. I know now that it was a very narrow way [tang] of interpreting religion, but 
that’s what we were given at that time, and I embraced it [ma da manalo]. I 
remember it made me feel fulfilled, it made feel a good person, at peace. I was 
continuing to do well at the Islamic subjects. They told me that I should become a 
tablighi  [proselytizer, missionary], and for that reason they told me I should learn 
English. I liked the idea, so I started studying English. It wasn’t difficult…we could 
get books from Pakistan very easily, and there were many Pakistanis among us who 
knew good English. That’s how I started with English… I guess it was a fortunate 
coincidence [khosh bakhtana]. The plan was that I would learn good English, and 
then go outside Afghanistan to preach the ideas of the Taliban. In the meantime I 
had also become a preacher inside the university. They liked that I was good at 
arguing things, so they made me talk to people to convince them of the good ideas 
of the Taliban.       
Andrea – Were you ok with these activities? 
Umar – Yes, I guess yes, I was very much into it. I felt that everything was in its 
place for me. 
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During our conversations, Umar showed me old photographs of himself as a Talib, 
with a black turban, a long beard, and a Kalashnikov rifle on his shoulder, intent in his 
militant activities. It was quite difficult to believe that the same person that I was looking 
at in those pictures was the same one that I had in front of me, so seemingly “progressive” 
and open-minded.  
Umar’s younger brother made a similar choice in life, but of a different kind. He also joined 
the Taliban movement, but as a fighter, rather than an “intellectual”. The avenue for 
expressing his sense of masculine valor and worth was alternative to Umar’s, and still 
culturally relevant within the Pashtun Afghan context. After the fall of Kabul, his brother 
continued the struggle against the Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban coalition led by 
Ahmed Shah Massoud that held the north-eastern corner of the country. His brother was 
two years younger than Umar was, and this might have influenced his decision. He set off 
to the north, where the Taliban were battling Massoud’s forces. One day, after months that 
his brother had been away, some Taliban comrades brought him back in a state of shock, 
after having been involved in an explosion, which did not injure him physically, but shook 
him psychologically. He was kept in the family house, and was regularly subject to 
“psychotic” incidents, in which he became extremely violent, destroyed furniture and 
things in the house, tore apart his clothes, and had to be restrained by force. Sedation solved 
only in part his predicament. Over time, his brother slowly recovered, and returned to be 
able to participate in social life. His brother experience, and his trajectory after his 
recovery, affected Umar profoundly. 
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At that moment, however, his brother’s trauma did not lead Umar to a rethinking of his 
personal path. He says: 
 
I continued to be extremely involved with the movement [the Taliban]. I endorsed 
their way of seeing religion and politics. I was brought to hate foreigners, who for 
me became only kafirs [infidels], without difference among them. If I had gotten a 
hold of a foreigner back then, I think I would have killed him on the spot. Foreigners 
for me meant practically Christians and Jews, who I was told had fought against 
Muslims for a long time, and, especially in Afghanistan, had worked to control the 
country, and prevent its people from deciding what to do with their lives.  
 
However, small cracks began to open into this seemingly unshakeable faith that he was 
harboring.  
 
One time, during my university years, I decided to trim my beard shorter than I 
usually kept it. With this shorter beard I went to campus, as I did every day. There, 
I met a friend of mine, who was a mullah, and also worked for the intelligence in 
the Taliban movement. He was extremely surprised and aggravated by the fact that 
I had trimmed my beard. We started a heated argument about whether a good 
Muslim should be allowed to keep a short beard, or should let his beard grow at 
least one fist-long. I said that I had read the scriptures, and there was nothing in 
them which prescribed exactly the length of a beard. He did not want to reason with 
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me at all, started calling me a kafir [infidel], and said he would get me arrested. I 
got worried, and contacted a friend of mine, who was a hafez [someone who has 
memorized the whole Qur’an], and was very much respected for that. Through his 
intercession, I avoided being arrested, but since then I lost any faith in mullahs and 
people who preach for work. 
 
Umar, nonetheless, continued to be a part of the Taliban movement, and to prepare 
for his proselytizing task. In November, 2001, at the beginning of the Northern Alliance’s 
offensive, supported by the US military apparatus, he was in Torkham, a border village in 
Nangarhar between Pakistan and Afghanistan. When the bombs started raining on the Tora 
Bora area, near Torkham, and on the village itself, he found himself stranded, confused, 
and not sure about what he had to do. Despite my insistence, Umar has never wanted to 
give me the details of what happened to him after the beginning of the assault on Tora 
Bora. He only said that after a few days he headed back to Jalalabad, some 75 kilometers 
away, and went home. My impression has always been that it all took place rather quickly.  
Notwithstanding this apparent “retreat” on his part, he admitted: 
 
I was in Torkham with my Taliban comrades. We were all there to fight for the 
cause, to die for it. I was ready to blow myself up for what we had been taught to 
believe in. To me, at that point, committing suicide for the jihad was the only sense 
in life. I was still in this state of mind when I went back to Jalalabad. Yet I did not 
know what to do, the whole thing collapsed, I found myself alone and did not know 
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what to do. I just went home. After a few days I went to the Spin Ghar hotel  [the 
only state-owned hotel in Jalalabad, which was also used sometimes as a rally-point 
by people] to see if I could find someone I knew there, and I found it was already 
full with foreigners. They were mainly journalists. I befriended one of them, and 
started working for him as a translator. 
Andrea – But you told me that you hated foreigners, and if you had met one you 
would have killed him. How could you decide to help a foreigner now? 
Umar – Yes, I know, but I was left with nothing, I had nothing left in me…I had to 
start everything from scratch…the whole system had collapsed, and I had to do 
something for myself…I did it for practical reasons. 
Andrea – Can you tell me about your work with this journalist? 
Umar – Well, he was from Britain, I think. He wanted to go to Tora Bora, to see 
where the Taliban were hiding, after the end of the bombardment. I knew the area, 
and I accompanied him. We went all around that place, we talked to people in the 
villages, but there were no Taliban there anymore, they had already left. They went 
all to Pakistan. I knew that…some of my friends did so. 
Andrea – What were your feelings while working for this foreigner? 
Umar – I had never met a foreigner before. I had only heard what our Taliban 
leaders told us about foreigners. I believed in what they said, I thought I did not 
like them…but I was also curious…I wanted to know what one of those kafirs was 
like. All in all, he was a nice guy, he treated me well, he paid me for the time I spent 
with him going around the districts. It was only for a couple of weeks, but it was 
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interesting. It was good money too. At that time, nobody had any idea of how to 
keep going on, how to find money for our families. It was fortunate for me to find 
him in that moment. Then, through him, at the Spin Ghar hotel, I was introduced to 
a foreign NGO that had just started working in Nangarhar for humanitarian 
purposes [insani ‘araf]. The journalist was happy with the work I did for him, so he 
recommended me with this NGO, and they hired me as a translator. They needed 
people who spoke Pashto…nobody could speak Pashto among the foreigners.  
Andrea – So, you changed your attitude towards foreigners? 
Umar – Well, at that time I felt really very depressed. I still thought that the only 
meaning in life was fighting the jihad, and sacrificing [qurban kawal] yourself for 
it…and that thing was gone, it was not possible anymore…I was confused, I did not 
see any other reason for living…but I had to keep going on, I had my family, I had 
to help them…I started working in the office of this NGO, and there were many 
women that worked there with me…I had never interacted with a woman before 
[other than his close blood relatives, that is]. The relationship I had with these 
women was very respectful, they told me about themselves, and I told them about 
myself…there was this one girl, I think from Sweden, or the Netherlands, I had a 
closer relationship with her than with the others. I told her that I felt depressed, 
that I felt that there was no reason left for me to live, and she talked a lot with me 
about it…she told me that I had a lot of skills, that I had still a lot of opportunities 
in life, that I should not throw my life away like that…she convinced me that my life 
was not over, that I could live for something…it was very good for me to meet this 
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girl…she changed the way I looked at things. I kept working for that NGO for 
months, and then for UNAMA [a United Nations organization], also in Jalalabad. 
Over time I realized certain things about my past, and the environment I was raised 
in. I thought about all the things that they [the Taliban leadership] had told us in 
school and university…that kind of Islam was not really religion, it was politics…it 
was political Islam. They distorted [badal kawalo] Islam to fit their political goals, 
and took advantage [faida akhestale wa] of the discontent of the people to turn their 
political goals into religious ones. The people thought they were doing a religious 
jihad, but it was only in the political interest of these leaders. Now I understand 
what they were doing. 
 
 
A closer look 
 
The personal trajectory that Umar described so far lends itself to more than one 
interpretation. The oldest child of a military father, albeit apparently devoid of an 
authoritarian personality, he was confronted very soon in his adolescence with radical 
religious propaganda. He seems to have embraced with conviction such rhetoric, and to 
have construed around it a coherent self-image (though not completely in line with the 
personal representational world that his father would have probably liked him to construe 
for himself, namely, that of a respectful, but almost “secular”, Muslim man (see details in 
the next chapter about the concepts of self-image and representational world). The 
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mujaheddin took Jalalabad when Umar was still about fourteen years-old. Raised in an 
environment filled with uncertainty and violence, and deprived of a strong and present 
father figure, the mujaheddin years and the Taliban regime that followed may have brought 
for Umar a modicum of consistency and coherence that he felt necessary at that point in 
his life. Not having had any other life experience, other than in Jalalabad within his familial 
context, his horizon towards the “outer” world must have been necessarily limited. Under 
these circumstances, it may come as no surprise that he promptly endorsed what the 
mujaheddin, first, and the Taliban, later, provided him in terms of ideological propaganda. 
Additionally, Umar discovered very soon that his accomplishments in school at religious 
subjects brought social status and distinction. In other words, he acquired a solid and 
increasing social capital from actively embracing the new, and successful, apparatus. As 
we have seen above in the case of Rohullah, power, influence and respect go together hand 
in hand, and in a competitive and unstable social context in which these features bring a 
better and safer life (both at the personal and familial level), it would be comprehensible 
that, once he found a way to attain these advantages for himself, Umar chose, if 
unconsciously, to cling to them and their source (i.e., his accomplishments in religious 
training). Yet the process of personal identification with a religio-political movement and 
its “just cause” (i.e., the construction of a new self-image, imbued accordingly with novel, 
subjective meaning) , on the one hand, and the narcissistic seduction that the social capital 
deriving from his choice brought along, on the other, are not necessarily exclusive and 
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contrasting phenomena.34 Umar, due to his young age, and the turbulence of the historical 
period in which he was being brought up, might have experienced both phenomena at the 
same time. The combination of the two “explanations” may make sense of the sudden 
“switching of sides” that he carried out as soon as it became clear that the Taliban cause 
was lost. He went from wanting to kill foreigners for the sake of jihad, to helping one (the 
British journalist), and taking his money in return. At a moment when many of his Taliban 
friends in Torkham took to the mountains in Tora Bora and fought against their enemies, 
he faltered, and decided not to participate. His friends must have been as aware as he was 
that the situation was desperate, and probably outright lost. Were they more ideologically 
committed than he was? Was he more opportunistic than they were?   
Such morally-laden terms (commitment, opportunism) in my opinion obfuscate, 
more than illuminate, the phenomena that we are trying to explain with regards to Umar’s 
life choices, especially from a psychodynamic standpoint. The main fil rouge that I see in 
Umar’s story is evidenced precisely by his choices to embark in a “career” of thinking 
instead of fighting among the Taliban, as well as to renounce his cause when it came time 
to pick up a weapon and shoot. As I mentioned above, in the historical contingencies of 
Afghanistan in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, as it had happened in past circumstances, an 
avenue open for the Pashtun man who wanted to affirm his masculine worth in a culturally 
                                                          
34 I intend the concept of narcissism much in the way Heinz Kohut proposed, namely, as an 
omnipresent, functional feature of human personality structure and dynamic. In this reading, 
narcissism is something “normal”, so to speak, which all humans are subject to in different degrees, 
and which may present ramifications for psychic disturbance only in certain cases. Such kind of 
interpretation of narcissism is far removed from the classical one that Freud proposed, which 
interprets narcissism as a (mostly) negative distortion of the “normal” psychic functioning.   
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accepted manner was that of becoming a religious leader, which he chose for himself. The 
“alternative” self-image, and set of subjective meanings, that he created for himself (i.e., 
the Talib preacher), and to which he stuck with in order to serve his deep-seated need of 
belonging to a superordinate cause, as well as, perhaps, to satisfy a narcissistic pull to 
emerge from the crowd, worked well for him until it became too costly to maintain it.35 
Yet, just like in Rohullah’s case, this does not mean that such alternative self, construed to 
better adjust to the circumstances of a specific stage in life, should be considered as a 
“false” self (in a Winnicottian sense. Winnicott 1960), and dismissed as preposterous. In 
the Umar who wears a black turban, sports a long beard, and goes around preaching radical 
Islam to his friends, there is a degree of the “legitimate” Umar, which he has retained to 
this day. Stating that during those years he was “faking” a true religious conviction is to 
reduce his inner trajectory to post-factum moralistic judgments, which do not help a full 
understanding of his personal path. He has indeed remained to this day a pious, but open-
minded, Muslim. The interesting phenomenon that seems to be emerging here is the way 
in which past and current life experiences, and consequent meaning-creation processes, are 
managed and elaborated. Through the construction and truthful inhabitation of multiple 
versions of the self (or multiple selves altogether), they are alternatively either “stored 
away” in the unconscious, or pulled back from it and actualized, in relation to the pragmatic 
necessities of self-interest, (social) survival and cultural contingencies. Wilfred Bion 
(1962) has described powerfully the psychic dynamics that undergird the unconscious 
                                                          
35 And in this we can, I believe, clearly perceive the strength of unconscious “pulls” towards self-
interest and survival, almost in an evolutionary perspective (see Slavin and Kriegman 1992). A 
“life-instinct”, it would seem, in lieu of the classic Freudian/Kleinian death-instinct. 
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processing of “raw” emotional and cognitive material, while contemporary psychoanalysts 
have elaborated on the pragmatic use of such unconsciously “stored-away” material (see 
Bromberg 1996, Slavin and Kriegman 1992, Stolorow, Brandschaft and Atwood 1987:29-
46, Stolorow and Atwood 1992:29-40). Not that such processes will happen necessarily in 
a seamless way and without inner conflicts. We have seen what degree of disorientation 
and confusion followed the choice of going back from Torkham to Jalalabad instead of 
fighting alongside his friends in Tora Bora, which were slowly overcome only through the 
help of insightful external “counseling” (the Western woman at the NGO).  
 
The craft of keeping truthful to oneself 
 
Umar is now the financial manager of a prestigious international economic 
organization, based in Kabul. After working for one and half years for the Afghan Ministry 
of Agriculture, he was hired in late 2012 by this organization, thanks to his long experience 
in managing funds and his outstanding record. He married in 2006, and has two daughters. 
In spite of his “modern” outlook and demeanor, Umar has a surprisingly traditional 
marriage history. He married one of his cousins from Jalalabad, an illiterate woman who 
was forced upon him by his mother. His mother is also illiterate, and apparently, from 
Umar’s account of her, a strong-willed woman, with very “traditional” views about family 
life. Umar did not want to marry his future wife, and tried all he could to convince his 
mother to accept that he choose someone else for himself. Yet there was nothing he could 
do about it, and his father just went along with Umar’s mother’s wishes. Umar says: 
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I tried for a long time to suggest to them [his mother and father] another solution. 
Me and my brother, we did find a few other girls that might have been better for 
me. They were better educated, they had gone to school, and I wanted someone who 
was at least a little bit educated. I did not want to have an illiterate wife. But my 
mother imposed herself. She did not accept any of the girls that I proposed, and 
chose one of my cousins for me. I could not change her mind.  
Andrea – Why did you just let her choose for you, in the end? 
Umar – Well, you know, she’s my mother, that’s my family, I did not want to create 
a bad relationship between us. I could not go against her wishes. I would have 
created a fight between us, I would have been left on my own, they would have 
refused to help me. That’s how it goes here in Afghanistan, you are expected to 
respect your family’s choices in these cases. 
Andrea – But why do you think your mother wanted you to marry just this one girl, 
someone who had no education, and not another one? You are a veterinarian, many 
other girls would have married you. 
Umar – I know why…my mother is a powerful person, she is strong…she wanted 
someone whom she would have control over, after the wedding…she wanted 
someone who would do whatever she told her to do, without making problems. 
That’s how it goes here…your wife becomes the servant [gholam] of your mother, 
she takes orders from her…she does not have to make problems. My mother knew 
 
 
 
141 
that if I had married someone with an education, she would not have accepted to 
live under her control.  
Andrea – So, that is how it worked between your wife and your mother? 
Umar – Yes, in the beginning. Then we had kids, and the situation became a little 
better for my wife…but my mother is still very strong with her. Thankfully, now we 
live in Kabul… 
Andrea – How is your relationship with your wife? 
Umar – It’s ok, it goes well, we don’t have any problems. She stays home, she looks 
after the kids, I stay most of the time outside the house… 
Andrea – Are you satisfied with your wife as a partner? 
Umar – Well, I can’t talk with her about much…she is uneducated, I can’t talk with 
her about things that I would like to discuss with a wife. I would like to have a more 
interesting person with me. But that’s how it goes, what can you do… 
Andrea – So, you are not happy? 
Umar – No, I am happy, I am…You see, after some time, you just accept what you 
have, and try to make the best of it. This is how I dealt with the problem. If you 
continue thinking about how better it could have gone for you, and all the better 
opportunities you could have had, you live a horrible life. In the beginning, I was 
unhappy, because I was always thinking about what I really wanted, what I could 
have had [i.e., the wife he could have had]. I was unhappy, I was not living a good 
life. But then, after a while, I said to myself: hey, you can’t change this, this is what 
you have, and you will have to stick with it. You better adjust. I knew I could not 
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change this situation, it was useless to complain. So I just resigned myself to it, and 
started looking at the good things that I had, like the kids, a good job, the chance 
of going abroad every once in a while [because of his job]. I stopped looking back, 
and only looked ahead, trying to live well. It got better, now I am happy. 
Andrea – Well, you could have divorced your wife… 
Umar – No, no, are you joking? No, I could not have divorced my wife! No…that 
would have been terrible for the honor and reputation of my family…no, there is 
no divorce: once you are married, you stay married [divorce is allowed by law, in 
Afghanistan, for both for men and women, but socially frowned upon]. 
Andrea – Do you go out with your wife? Do you have any outside activities with 
her? 
Umar – No, I don’t. I would like to, but she is uneducated, she is not used to be 
around other people [outside the circle of close relatives]…she would embarrass 
me, she would do something wrong…[i.e., she would behave inappropriately with 
strangers, and compromise the family’s name and honor]. 
 
Umar ended up doing what most men, and virtually all women, do in a Pashtun 
social environment still today: he delegated the decision about his marriage to his parents. 
This phenomenon, of course, is not peculiar only to Pashtun society. Cross-cultural 
psychoanalysts and psychoanalytically-inclined anthropologists have described and 
analyzed cases of this sort from other socio-cultural backgrounds (Frie 2008b, Roland 
1988, 2011, Ewing 1990, Stern 2001 [1985]). Individuals live and rationalize such state of 
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facts in different ways, idiosyncratic to each of them. The fact that individuals let this 
happen to them, all the more because the event is often accompanied by a varying degree 
of internal suffering, has been interpreted alternatively as the symptom of a lack of 
individuality and autonomous will due to a “sociocentric” enculturation (Markus and 
Kitayama 1991), as a proof of an “unbounded” self, in opposition to the Western 
supposedly “bounded” self (Geertz 1984:126), or even, from an ego-psychological point 
of view, as a pathogenic merging of selves between the individual and his socially 
significant others (Ewing 1991). All these interpretations, on the one hand, imply that the 
self may be so strongly and profoundly shaped by the cultural environment to the point of 
having  structurally diverse configurations in relation to different cultural environments, 
and, on the other, imply in a veiled way also that the “individuated”, bounded Western self 
will provide the individual with healthier psychological dynamics. I believe that the inner 
dynamics that my informants have displayed through their conversations with me, 
including Umar, tell a slightly different story. It is true that the socio-cultural context in 
which Umar, for example, has been raised and lived, has impacted him so powerfully to 
lead him to put the interests of a socially crucial group for his life (the family) ahead of 
what he perceived to be his own personal interests (i.e., to have a wife who would match 
better his personality). However, the wishes of his family members have acquired a pivotal 
importance also for his own set of meanings – it is crucial for him to maintain the love and 
consideration of his mother and father, and to respect their decisions also when they regard 
his own personal matters. The positive linkage to his parents has become an important 
aspect of in his life, and has become a legitimate, “authentic”, aspect of his subjectivity (it 
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has become, in other words, part of his broader personal representational world (see 
Sandler and Rosenblatt 1962, on the overlap between personal and cultural representational 
worlds, as well as next chapter for a full discussion on the issue, and for my understanding 
of “authenticity”). This is a choice that he seems to make in an unconscious way. Its roots, 
which lie in the meaning-creating power of cultural and social constraints and patterns, 
seem to remain out of awareness. What comes to the surface are the emotional and 
psychological consequences of the conflict: frustration, anguish, unfulfillable fantasies.  It 
is also true, however, that Umar never loses track of his very private, deep-seated wishes 
and preferences. He maintains a contact with his emotions and feelings, with a “private” 
self (Modell 1993) that would lead him towards a different direction had he not developed, 
through enculturation, a parallel set of personal meanings (a different self-image, another 
version of the self), to satisfy which he gives in to the wishes of his mother and father. 
Umar “feels” his private self, his individuality, and nevertheless chooses to pursue a 
different path because it appears to him better suited to the pragmatic social and cultural 
circumstances he has to live in. As a young man living in a traditional Pashtun environment, 
with all that it entails, it is more advantageous for him to assuage the wishes of his parents 
than rebel and turn them into enemies. If the latter scenario had ensued, his personal and 
social life would have been destroyed. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Umar is 
aware of this delicate balance, and acts accordingly to his primary interest. In the specific 
case of Umar, I believe that his capability at introspection was good enough to have 
rendered him at least partly conscious of these processes. So much so that, after a period 
of disorientation and rejection of the situation (“I was unhappy, I was not living a good 
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life”), he shows to be strong enough to put himself back together, rationalize what had just 
happened, and work constructively to extract the better possible life from the predicament 
he found himself in (“I stopped looking back, and only looked ahead, trying to live well. It 
got better, now I am happy”). His adjustment is remarkable. There is nothing intrinsically 
pathogenic in how he conducted his actions to this point, and there is nothing that should 
make us believe that the impossibility of realizing what he really wanted for himself from 
a marriage is the symptom of a lack of an “enough-individuated” self.36 And from all of 
the above certainly does not obtain that the possibility to actualize at any given time the 
imperatives of a “private” self is a necessary condition in order to attain a healthy 
psychological life. As we have seen also with Rohullah previously, enculturation prompts 
the creation of specific sets of meanings for each individual which become legitimately 
and positively “his own”, and that may require a culturally appropriate pragmatic 
fulfillment. As long as the parallel, complementary sets of subjective meanings created by 
the individual in response to both private and environmental cues (i.e., one’s self-images, 
or selves), manage to remain, if only partially and unconsciously, in contact, and in a 
condition of mutual exchange, I argue that the individual will enjoy psychological growth 
and psychic functionality (on this, and on the positive process of “healthy” dissociation 
which underlies the “exchange” I am referring to, see Bromberg 2003). It is in this sense, 
I argue, that cultural and social training impacts profoundly the self of each individual. As 
Japanese psychoanalyst Takeo Doi convincingly indicated (Doi 1981, 1986), it is precisely, 
                                                          
36 I am referring here to the concept of “separation-individuation” introduced by Margaret Mahler 
in the 1960s (See Mahler 1979).  
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if paradoxically, in societies that display a very strict set of social norms and rules to be 
followed, in order for an individual to be validated by one’s community, that the “private” 
self of the individual and its wishes emerge to awareness more strongly, notwithstanding 
(or because of) the fact that they might become subordinated to socially-driven priorities 
(see also Lindholm 1997, Roland 2011).   
Sometimes, during our conversations in his NGO office in Jalalabad, Umar would 
receive phone calls from women, with whom he engaged in lengthy conversation. I asked 
him about it. He explained that usually these were Afghan women who worked in other 
NGOs or government institutions, and with whom he liked to maintain a friendly 
relationship by phone. They would never meet, he assured me, but they would talk often 
and at length, about various issues – mainly topics that he was unable to talk about with 
his wife. He explained: 
 
Talking to these women gives me some satisfaction, and pleasure. You know, there 
is nothing sexual about it, I do nothing wrong, but talking about interesting stuff 
with these women gives me some intellectual pleasure [zihni khoshaltob]. I like to 
have some sort of interesting relationship with a woman, like I cannot do with my 
wife. You know, things are changing in Afghanistan, talking on the phone with a 
work colleague of yours, a woman, is possible today, people don’t see it as a bad 
thing necessarily. Well, I can’t do it at home, this is true, because my wife gets 
jealous and gets upset about it…but that’s because she is uneducated, she does not 
understand…  
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Andrea – Are the women you talk to married? 
Umar – Some are. 
Andrea – And their husbands are ok with you talking to their wives on the phone? 
Umar – Yes, generally they are, they hear that it is stuff concerning their wives’ 
job, they understand. 
Andrea – Do you ever think that you would like to be married with one of these 
women, instead of your wife? 
Umar – Well, yes, I know that I would be better off with someone like them. But, I 
told you, I am over that thing now: it can’t happen, it will not happen, so why get 
sad about it? I am happy with the relationship that I have with these women as it is 
now.  
 
The frustration that Umar feels with regards to his wife and marital life in general 
is partially eased by maintaining some degree of relationship with other women, if only 
intellectually. The fact that he now professes to be “happy” with his wife must be still 
viewed through the lens of the pragmatic choice that he made, in order not to continue 
living a miserable life, vis-a-vis his inability to change his situation. He realizes the sense 
of fulfillment that interacting with these women gives him, and yet this pleasurable feeling 
does not manage anymore to challenge the status quo that he has attained in his personal 
life; he has cut the competitive link between the two realities. In cultural and social terms, 
having female “phone-friends” is not at all uncommon in Afghanistan among Pashtuns. 
Several married men that I know have this kind of relationship, often with more than one 
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woman. They might meet these women (secretly) or not, they might engage in sexual 
relationships with them (even more secretly) or not. In an urban center like Jalalabad this 
is easier to accomplish than in a rural village, for obvious reasons. Also, which is less 
obvious, the consequences of being caught in a rural village might be more serious than in 
the urban center (that is, deadly).  To know the truth about these kinds of relationships is 
hard, because men like to brag about it, and acquire social status among their peers through 
sporting their Don Juan-like stories like trophies. I have been warned about the disputable 
veracity of some of these stories. On the other hand, however, I have been present several 
times when friends of mine were speaking on the phone with their female “phone-friends”, 
and have witnessed the flirtatious nature of the conversations. Their wives usually do not 
know about such schemes (although sometimes the women they engage in conversations 
with are in turn married themselves, which means that the trick is played mutually by both 
sexes). Flirtation and outright courtship is often an element in these relationships, whether 
sex is involved or not (in many cases it is not). Nevertheless, in a social environment like 
the Pashtun one, where relations between men and women, even if friendly and innocent, 
are extremely limited (often restricted to one’s close relatives), the mere act of talking to a 
strange woman on the phone may provide an exciting, sensual, even perhaps erotic pleasure 
to the man involved (and probably to the woman as well). This realization was brought 
home for me when it became clear that some of the male informants that I had had the habit 
of calling my wife on the phone, instead of directly me, when they wanted to talk to me 
(and when my wife was present in Jalalabad, of course). They called my wife to have the 
chance to exchange a few words with her before talking to me. They tried to know more 
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about her, and generally chat.  Had they done that with a Pashtun friend of theirs, that fact 
alone would have given sufficient grounds for a bloody reaction, against both the wife and 
the friend. But a foreign woman brings with her no social strings attached: no dangerous 
gossip, no likely retaliation, no deadly feuds. The ritual of the courtship, which most men 
do not really experience (being married off by their parents to practically strangers - 
although technically relatives), is also an aspect of the relationship that men and women 
painfully know they lack, and which may be pursued through these illicit stratagems. 
Maintaining phone relationships with his female work colleagues was therefore for 
Umar a means to somehow attain the goals I just sketched above, although he was playing 
on the safe side, because he had a “legitimate” reason to spend time talking to them – 
common job-related issues. It was for him, as it is for many others, I believe, a way to cope 
with the inner conflict deriving from being aware of the deficiency in one’s life (being 
married to the “wrong” person), no matter how much pragmatically and rationally Umar, 
in this case, might have managed to overcome the initial burning dissatisfaction and 
frustration.  
 
The deep reach of enculturation 
 
Being married to the “wrong” person brings about other related issues. One of the 
cornerstones in the idioms of masculinity among Pashtuns in Afghanistan, as it happens 
also in other Mediterranean and Middle Eastern contexts (albeit to a different degree), 
concerns the control that male family members must exert on the family’s women. Since 
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much of the namus and izzat (honor, name) of the family depends on its women’s behavior, 
their possibility for autonomous action in the public sphere is strongly curtailed (if not 
altogether obliterated). This phenomenon is taken to the extreme, when, for example, two 
men who have been, say, best friends since childhood and spend most of their time together 
still in their adult years, will never see each other’s wives, despite the fact that they both 
visit each other at their respective homes very often. I discussed this matter with Umar 
extensively in one of our interviews. 
 
Andrea – Do your friends come often to see you at your house? 
Umar – Yes, pretty often. 
Andrea – Do they come with their wives? 
Umar – No, only my friends come to visit. 
Andrea – So, you never have dinner all together with your friends and their spouses. 
Umar – No, it never happens. 
Andrea – Not even with your best friend? 
Umar – No. 
Andrea – Why is it so? 
Umar – Well, it is not appropriate [munasib], we do not do that…people would 
know about it, they would start talking…it would give us a bad name… 
Andrea – What would they say? 
Umar – Well, they would probably say that I am beghairata [without honor, without 
manly attributes], because I let my wife be seen by others [i.e., not close relatives]. 
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Andrea – OK, I get it…Imagine that you can make sure that nobody will ever know 
that your best friend has seen your wife at dinner… imagine, right?…would you 
allow him to sit with your wife and eat with you two? 
Umar – Ummmh…[long pause] No, I don’t think so. 
Andrea – Why not? Nobody knows, nobody is going to call you beghairata! 
Umar – Well, it’s not only that…maybe we sit down, all together, and we start 
talking, and my friend starts flirting with my wife… 
Andrea – Your best friend, flirting with your wife?! I don’t think it would 
happen…don’t you trust your best friend? 
Umar – I don’t know, anything can happen, maybe they start looking at each other 
in a strange way…Maybe my wife likes him, and then something starts from there, 
and I am in a lot of trouble… 
Andrea – Do you think that an illicit relationship may start from that? 
Umar – Yes, you never know…you never know what can happen. 
Andrea – Do you think that this has to do with the fact that the marriage was 
arranged? I mean, you did not know each other, you did not choose each other. 
Umar – Maybe, I don’t know… 
 
The fear that his wife could get interested in someone else is at the root of a 
sentiment, and its related controlling behaviors, that in the West would be commonly called 
jealousy. Such extremely pervasive and strong feeling of insecurity, precariousness, and 
imminent loss of a value (his wife) is so terrifying that strict measures are enforced to make 
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sure that the catastrophe will never happen (if she should misbehave, or if he should be 
forced to divorce her, it would be a great shame for the whole family, as we have seen. 
Having a family is a social “obligation”. In this sense one has to protect the union of wife 
and husband). A wife will never have to meet anyone other than those whom she cannot 
marry, as defined by the tenets of the shari’a  (i.e., the muharram, or close blood relatives) 
lest you invite disaster (in the guise of public shame).  And yet, in spite of all the 
precautions taken, the sense of insecurity persists, and, if anything, seems to worsen, in a 
vicious circle. Upon discussing this issue with many other friends, my impression is that 
the fact of having no choice as to whom one will marry, and having often a complete 
stranger assigned to oneself as a wife, opens the way to the unconscious acknowledgment 
that there will certainly be somewhere, “out there”, someone that your wife will be better 
matched with. Therefore, the more chances she will have to interact with other people, the 
more chances she will have to find this better match, which is to be avoided at all costs. 
Even though Umar was not able to fully articulate this concept, the latter has nonetheless 
been suggested to me by many others, who behave in the same way with their wives as 
Umar does, so that I think it may be proper to Umar’s psychic functioning as well. There 
are several processes in action here, I believe. On the one hand, there is the conscious 
realization that one has been forced to marry someone that one did not choose, and much 
probably did not like, and consequently, there exists the longing for someone else better 
suited for oneself. On the other, there is the unconscious projection of this very same 
feeling onto the actual spouse, whom one imagines being certainly animated by the same 
feelings (which may not be necessarily true). The projective mechanism in this case is 
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rendered more powerful by the socio-cultural arrangements of Pashtun society: men not 
only long secretly for someone else to be with (as women as well likely do), but are in fact 
“unofficially” allowed, without much public scandal, to pursue the search for someone 
more intimately satisfying than their official wife, with whom to engage in extramarital 
affairs. Certainly, religious principles forbid such course of action, but, as many have told 
me, “what can you do, so many do it, we don’t make a big deal of it anymore”. In addition 
to this, men can always marry legally multiple women (up to four), so that it often happens 
that those who can afford it economically, marry “for love” a second wife (or more). So, 
desire, for men, has an outlet for expression (official or unofficial), and desire is a feeling 
that men recognize very well, and nurture extensively. Women are not allowed any of these 
outlets for the expression and fulfillment of desire. They are assigned a man, and will have 
to be content with him. The actualization and satisfaction in men of a powerful affect such 
as desire makes them aware of the potential subversive nature of such feeling. The 
unconscious projection of the same affect onto the subjectivity of their wives (whether with 
good reasons or not), therefore, has devastating consequences, that are partially responsible 
for  the plethora of extreme controlling measures, on the part of the male family members, 
that characterize the life of a Pashtun woman. Such practices of strict control over women’s 
behaviors and participation in public life, may be interpreted as a “culturally constituted 
defense mechanism”, in the terms defined by Melford Spiro (Spiro 1952, 1965), upon the 
suggestions first advanced by Irving Hallowell (Hallowell 1955). The painful and 
uncontrollable sentiments of fear, insecurity and precariousness that the socio-cultural 
arrangements concerning marriage among Pashtuns give rise to, are tentatively kept in 
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check, or under control, by these practices, that are precisely engineered to defuse and 
neutralize these feelings. Umar, notwithstanding his “progressive” and open-minded 
approach to life, is not immune from these dynamics. The position in which Umar stands 
is not only testimony to the power of enculturation upon the individual. It also seems that 
Umar acts a reluctant victim of such culturally constituted defense mechanism. He 
pragmatically accepted, and rationalized to himself the fate that he was assigned (that is, 
to have a wife whom he does not appreciate). Once put in the condition of many others, 
however unwittingly, he is prey to the same psychological mechanisms that derive from 
the objective contingencies, and acts accordingly (i.e., embracing a culturally constituted 
defense mechanism that results in “obsessively” controlling practices upon his wife’s 
behavior). His masculinity finds expression, in this case, along culturally “traditional” 
lines.  
I cannot know for sure whether Umar has ever engaged in any illicit sexual 
relationship with any woman in Afghanistan. Based on my knowledge of him, and my 
experiences with him over the years, I have no reason to doubt what he said to me, that is, 
that he has never done so. However, when he was still amidst the disorientation and the 
inner turmoil immediately subsequent to his unhappy wedding, he did take advantage of 
an occasion he had in order to “revolt” against the fate he had been condemned to, and to 
relieve his marital discomfort.   Soon after his wedding, he took a couple of job-related 
trips to Europe, in the Netherlands and Germany. He confessed to me that in the 
Netherlands he did have a sexual relationship with a girl he knew there. How he reconciled 
this with his religious piousness, and with the knowledge that his action would have not 
 
 
 
155 
been condoned by the letter of the Qur’an, he has never explained. However, such 
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance is so common, and goes so much unnoticed (or rather, 
ignored) among many Pashtun men (the quintessence of a pious Muslim man, in their own 
opinion), that it has never really surprised me to find the same happening to Umar. 
Umar has emerged from all the vicissitudes in his life as a self-described renovated 
man, vis-à-vis the young adolescent who not only got seduced by the rhetoric of a radical 
religio-political movement such as the Taliban, but actively took part in it. His piety is now 
lived by him in a very “private” way, a way that he finds more “sincere” than the way in 
which most of his peers inhabit religion: less audience-oriented, empty performance, and 
more deep-felt meaning. He has now found the real meaning of life, he told me in one of 
our last interviews. 
 
I live for my children now, and I am happy when I go back home from work. This 
is what Allah has created us for, not for sacrificing ourselves for the sake of 
religion. Religion must be lived in a different, positive way.   
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In Umar’s inner trajectory from early adolescence to adulthood, I believe we can 
see how he construed for himself an “alternative”, yet at the same time complementary, 
self (the Talib preacher), which was probably born out of the (unconscious) need for a 
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superordinate cause with which to identify and participate in, as well as a (equally 
unconscious) narcissistic urge to stand out from the crowd of his peers, in order to gain 
broader validation and acknowledgment from his community leaders and family members. 
The secular familial context in which he had lived up to that moment, characterized by a 
father who never pushed religiosity upon his children beyond the standard fulfillment of 
practices that would sanction an “average” Muslim individual, was therefore recused by 
the young Umar, who embarked into a self-propelled work at radicalization, which took 
advantage of the cultural and political influences that were filling the social landscape in 
Nangarhar at that time (beginning of the mujaheddin’s rule, and subsequent Taliban 
regime). Umar, however, who could have decided to engage in a militantly violent course 
of action, like his younger brother did, engaged instead in a lifestyle that was better fitting 
a broader inclination to intellectual speculation and emotional balance (hence the religious 
preacher), which he felt from the beginning, and maintained until the present. In other 
words, while the cultural and political environment in which he spent his adolescence 
“cooperated” with unconscious urges to build a strong self that would provide him with 
both the transcendent meanings and the social capital that he was striving for, certain 
crucial aspects of his “antecedent” self-image were retained and incorporated in the “new”, 
alternative/competing/complementary one (e.g., reflexivity, lack of aggressive impulses).  
Such crucial aspects returned to the forefront of his matured subjectivity after he abandoned 
the robes of the Talib preacher, at the end of the Taliban regime. During the painful and 
long work at reconstituting a representational world that would feel coherent and attuned 
to a changed reality of personal life and socio-cultural environment, Umar revitalized those 
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subjective meanings that he had “stored away” during the previous years spent as a 
religious militant, while at the same time he also retained a part of the self-image he shaped 
as a Talib (that which he deemed more positive and helpful for the new reality he was 
immersed into after the fall of the Taliban). In fact, the religious training he underwent 
during the years under the mujaheddin and the Taliban did indeed profoundly shape him, 
and his mindset. The need for piety and transcendental meaning that he sought during his 
adolescence, and which was fulfilled through radical religious rhetoric, was given room 
and a new form after the demise of the Taliban. A different religiosity pervades Umar 
today, one that he finds more attuned to his current being, and his goals in life. Upon my 
experiences with him, I have no reason to doubt the “sincerity” of Umar’s profession of 
faith. The open-minded and “progressive” Muslim man that I have met since the beginning 
of our relationship is the coherent product, if apparently unexpected, of the trajectory we 
have seen develop.  
The details that Umar gave me about his marital and sentimental life add some 
interesting elements to this picture. The story of his marriage, and the way he managed the 
frustrations deriving from it, speak to the power and reach of enculturation and social 
constraints. Umar cannot escape the force of customs, and bows to the imposition by his 
mother to accept as a wife a woman whom he does not want. Thus, he does resign diligently 
to his fate, though not as a symptom of a “pathological” merger (in ego-psychological 
terms) of subjectivities with his (bad) self-object (as Heinz Kohut think of it - in this case, 
it would be his mother), but instead as the product of an unconscious “choice” that 
undergirds the importance that familial harmony and parental love maintain for Umar, 
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within a socio-cultural environment in which these values acquire a pivotal role for the 
psychological balance of the individual. In this sense, Umar is very much the product of 
his cultural and social context. However, he remains conscious of his dissatisfaction (and 
the manifest reasons for it), and of his longing for something different. There are no 
grounds in this regard to postulate a “merger” of subjectivities. To these elements of a 
“traditional” self, derived from the work of enculturation, Umar nevertheless is able to 
oppose elements of a more “progressive” self (as he puts it), that he has struggled to gather 
after the dramatic and conflicting experiences in his life. His detachment from religious 
radicalism, his new interpretation of religion as a private endeavor, based on tolerance and 
mutual understanding (almost in “secular”, Western terms), his opening to a more 
“modern” lifestyle (in his opinion), are the product of the interplay between the external 
inspirations that he was exposed to while working with foreigners after the demise of the 
Taliban, and his own personal re-elaboration of the unsettling experiences he went through 
during his adolescence and early adulthood. The emergence of elements of what he 
considers a “modern” subjectivity are thus the result of a constructive and healthy psychic 
process, in my opinion: he “learned from experience”, to paraphrase Wilfred Bion. It is 
constructive and healthy not because “modern” per se, but because apparently functional 
to his current psychological equilibrium.  
 
  
 
 
 
159 
CHAPTER 4 – BARYALAY: BETWEEN CULTURAL AND PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIONAL WORLDS 
 
 
Prologue 
 
Baryalay Saidy is a 29-year-old man (born around 1985) from a remote village in a rural 
and (at the moment of this writing, in 2014) very volatile district in Nangarhar province. 
His name (Saidy) shows his belonging to a “saintly” family of pachas, i.e., of people that 
claim to be descendants of the Prophet Mohammed (see below for details). Located 
approximately one and half hour drive south of Jalalabad, towards the towering Spin Ghar 
mountain and the border with Pakistan, the area where Baryalay was born and grew up has 
become over the recent years more and more fertile ground for the development of a fierce 
anti-government and anti-occupation sentiment, which produced an extensive support base 
for the Taliban movement and its many local offshoots. State control is virtually absent in 
the district. Ideological influence from radical religious centers in Pakistan is strong, and 
material support flows freely across a porous border. This state of affairs heavily influenced 
my relationship with Baryalay: he is the only informant that I was able to meet exclusively 
in the “safe” environment of my residence in Jalalabad and whose friends and relatives I 
was never able to meet. Baryalay was one of my most recent encounters in Afghanistan, 
yet he is also the informant with whom I eventually held the most numerous interview 
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sessions (thirty-seven) in Afghanistan, between 2012 and 2013 – he was my language 
teacher. 
 When I arrived in Afghanistan in August 2012, I looked for someone with whom 
I could have Pashto conversation classes, so that I could improve my language proficiency. 
A friend of mine in Kabul, Jalaluddin, a bright young man who had recently received a 
Master’s degree in communication in the United States, referred me to Baryalay, as a 
person that would be suited for my necessities. I later discovered that Jalaluddin’s wife was 
the sister of Baryalay’s wife.  What started as a simple language practice relationship turned 
soon into much more. Baryalay showed immediately as much genuinely interested in 
speaking with me, and finding out things about me, as I was about him. Our sessions 
proceeded in a much more engaged and “reciprocal” way than I would have anticipated in 
the beginning. Topics for discussion were never lacking, and particularly Baryalay’s 
willingness to speak freely never faltered. I informed Baryalay of my goals for fieldwork, 
and my research interests, and he gladly accepted to become a part of my study, while 
keeping always as a first priority the improvement of my language capabilities. Our 
sessions were all held in Pashto, although we interspersed our conversations with some 
English, when needed to better explain a specific term, or a grammatical construction. In 
fact, Baryalay was able to speak a decent English, which he, however, diligently (and 
“professionally”, given his main role as language instructor) refrained from using with me 
as much as possible. He is a well-educated man, who received a BA in agronomy from 
Khost University, an area of south-east Afghanistan adjacent to the border with the Tribal 
Areas of Pakistan (FATA). When we met, he was working for a Western-funded NGO, 
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which supported agricultural development in Nangarhar province. He was a field officer, 
that is, a staff member who works most of his time outside, touring the different sites that 
the NGO manages. He liked his job, which put him in direct contact with farmers and 
community members, and limited to the minimum the time spent behind a desk in an office. 
His tasks took him far and wide across the province, from the few remaining pine forests 
(pinus Wallichiana) in the whole south-east Afghanistan, on the mountains at the border 
with Pakistan, to the artificially irrigated fields in the hot valleys of the Kabul and Kunar 
rivers. I always thought that his demeanor and posture would help him in dealing with 
farmers and land owners, the recipients of the funds whose best utilization he had to 
oversee. His slender and tall figure, coupled with a soft-spoken and ever-respectful attitude, 
as well as a professional competence that I discovered over time, made him a person well-
suited for dealing “diplomatically” and tactfully (hence successfully) with all those 
problems and inconveniences that might arise when big amounts of money are handed out 
to individuals and communities that have very little and need very much.   
The development of our sessions was interesting. We would meet in the house that 
I rented for myself in Jalalabad, and talk for an amount of time that varied considerably, 
from half hour (very rarely) to roughly two hours (more often). At first, I approached the 
sessions simply as a conversation practice in Pashto, as it was supposed to be. I paid him a 
“flat rate” for each time he came, regardless of how long he would stay. I had to insist and 
impose myself in this regard, because in the beginning he refused to be paid at all. I had 
anticipated this because it would be disrespectful to receive money for a service done out 
of a sentiment of hospitality, and in honor of a guest. I therefore explained to him that, in 
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my culture, it would have been shameful for me to receive a service such as the one we 
were planning without rewarding the counterpart with anything at all. He remained 
convinced of my explanation, and agreed to be paid.  After a few sessions of general talk, 
noticing the positive responsiveness that Baryalay displayed, and his good disposition at 
talking to me, I tried to touch more explicitly on issues that were of interest for my research. 
My attempt surely did not go unnoticed to Baryalay, who was happy to play along. We 
spoke more and more often about his vicissitudes in life, past and present, and once the 
conversation took off around a specific issue, I tried to keep my interference to the 
minimum. In the end, the Pashto conversation class became little more than an excuse to 
meet and talk about topics that were relevant both for me and for Baryalay (although we 
did continue to speak only Pashto, and diligently take notice of all those linguistic features 
that I was not familiar with. Indeed, the constant practice done with Baryalay proved 
crucial for my acquired proficiency in Pashto). He talked as much about himself, his social 
life and his personal history, as he asked about me and social relationships in “the West”. 
His curiosity and interest for the “outside” world was a characteristic that Baryalay himself 
felt very important for his own development as a human being. To this he often contrasted 
the “ignorance” of many of his fellow villagers, who, in his words, had never left their 
small world, and had no cognizance of how to live in a dignified and civilized manner. We 
will see that this attitude reflects an important aspect of Baryalay’s self-representation. 
 
Among all the informants who worked with me, my sessions with Baryalay are the 
ones that resemble more closely a psychoanalytic/psychotherapeutic setting,. We always 
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met in the same place, at a pre-arranged time, and for length of time we would set prior to 
each session. The continuity and frequency of our meetings were such that after a while I 
did not have to ask questions any longer at the beginning of each session. Baryalay would 
come to our meetings and just start talking about things that were popping up in his mind 
at the moment. He knew that the main scope of the deal was to have a conversation in 
Pashto, and he understood that I was genuinely interested in anything concerning his life 
history, his personal current vicissitudes, and their attendant psychological ramifications. 
So he just talked, without worrying much about the specific subject. Such situation was 
best suited for the work on free associative thinking that is central to any psychodynamic 
analysis. I would of course ask questions every now and then, either when I did not 
understand some passages of his narration, or when I wanted to have more details about 
aspects of it. Undoubtedly, between a psychotherapeutic relationship and the relationship 
that I had with Baryalay, as well as with all my other informants, there is the important 
difference that I was the one who needed to talk to them, the one who “went” to them for 
information, and not vice versa. There was no pretense on my part of holding any “healing” 
goal in our sessions, nor were my informants explicitly speaking to me in order to gain any 
amelioration in their psychological condition. Also, the flow of the material reward (the 
money) for what was being done, in the case of Baryalay, was going in the opposite 
direction from the one it usually goes in a psychotherapeutic dyad (there was no money 
involved with any other informant). In spite of all the differences, however, several of the 
mechanisms that are usually triggered in a psychodynamic encounter did present 
themselves during my sessions with my informants, particularly with Baryalay. Free 
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association took often place, clues of transferential material emerged from our 
conversations, as surely did countertransferential material on my part. Likewise, despite 
the fact that no “healing” goal was intended in the work with my informants, nevertheless 
I did detect a very clear sense of relief on their part while talking to me about their private 
issues and predicaments. While I certainly embodied the odd and nosy stranger, the 
outsider that had no part in their private (and social) lives, for the very same reason I 
represented a safe repository for the content of whatever their conversations with me would 
ever disclose. In a socio-cultural environment where privacy is a very hard feature to attain 
and maintain, and where even your best friend or your closest brother will not (very often) 
keep to themselves details of your personal life that would better not become public, the 
possibility to open up to someone who will not be able (even if he wanted to) to pass your 
private information to anybody related to you, certainly must have been perceived as an 
asset in my role which played to my advantage. And indeed, I did feel that there was 
sometimes much relief in the way my informants told me about their problems or private 
emotions. More than once I was told that a certain detail was being recounted to me for the 
first time in their lives, which happened with a sense of “liberation” in my informants, very 
clear to my eyes. 
 
 
 
A family portrait 
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When our interview sessions began, Baryalay had been married for about three years and 
had a little daughter who was almost two years old. He was obviously very happy about 
his daughter, and must have been an affectionate father, from what I could gather during 
our meetings and the many phone conversations he had with his wife while I was present.  
He was born in the village where he is still living. He lived in the village until he started 
elementary school, at which point he moved to Peshawar (around 1989). He finished first 
grade there, then returned with his family to the village, where he completed elementary 
school. Subsequently, his family moved again to Peshawar (circa 1995), but they remained 
there only one year. Upon returning to the village with his family, Baryalay was enrolled 
in Nangarhar High School in Jalalabad (the main state-run school in the city), from which 
he graduated. In 2003 he enrolled in Khost University.  Living in Peshawar during his 
childhood and early adolescence, albeit intermittently, and going there sporadically to see 
family members in later years, must have been in itself an experience that marked him 
deeply. The moral exceptionalism that he attributes to himself and his family (with the 
exception of his father, as we will see), vis-à-vis the rest of the village community, pivots 
also – albeit not exclusively -around the “cosmopolitan” experiences that the family 
enjoyed in Peshawar. During one of our sessions, the very mention of his years of 
childhood and adolescence came as an associative thought while talking about 
interpersonal conflicts among villagers. In explaining the reasons why village life is so rife 
with jealousies and interpersonal frictions, Baryalay made a point of distancing himself 
from the rest of his fellow villagers.   
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I am not like these people [the inhabitants of his village]. I have seen other places, 
I have lived in a different way. I have gone to university far from home, and met 
people from all over. Many of these people have never left their village, they don’t 
know how to live properly. They are ignorant and uneducated. That’s why they are 
constantly fighting against each other, backbiting…they don’t have trust in each 
other, in anyone…I don’t like this kind of life, to me it doesn’t make sense. 
 
Baryalay chose not to talk very much about his natal family, and I did not push him to do 
so. From the few details that he gave me about it, I perceived a degree of embarrassment 
and, perhaps, shame at what had happened in his family because of his father’s lifestyle 
(about which, see below). He has two older brothers and one younger brother. His mother 
died when he was approximately 5 years-old. He vaguely remembers someone coming to 
him, while he was in bed, to tell him that his mother had passed away. His attitude toward 
these memories is detached and almost indifferent. At that time, his father was 
approximately 50 years-old, and decided immediately to find another wife for himself. He 
chose a 20-year-old non-pacha girl from the outskirts of Jalalabad, whom he married one 
year later.  
 
The family of the girl was happy to give her to my father. You know, at that time we 
were in a good economic situation. My father had his carpentry business, and his 
small construction company as well. It looked like a good investment to give their 
daughter to an old man who had money. My family, however, did not like the idea. 
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My brothers [his two older brothers, at that time 22- and 25-years-old] tried to 
convince my father not to marry again, and not to have other children. They said 
that it was irresponsible of him to have more children, because if he had suddenly 
died, while the children were still small, it would have been up to them to take care 
of their step-brothers. But my father responded with arrogance [ghoror] and 
insolence…he said that he would decide himself what to do with his life, and that 
nobody could tell him what to do…so after a while he did start to have children 
with the new wife. In the end he had three girls and three boys…and he is still alive.  
Andrea – How is your relationship with your father now? 
Baryalay - People in my family are afraid of my father. He is illiterate, he is violent 
[zurawaar], he lives like the other people in the village, he lives by the same rules. 
He went to live with his new wife and his children in another house in the village. 
We don’t meet very often, we live separate lives now. We see each other only for 
ghamuna and khoshaluna [the joyful and sorrowful occasions in the life of a family, 
mostly weddings and funerals, when relatives from the same lineage gather 
together].  
Andrea – Are you angry at your father? 
Baryalay – No, I guess not…I don’t care anymore, I just don’t consider him…I have 
no interest in having a relationship with him at this point. 
 
Baryalay takes much pride in his role of sayed, or pacha. It is an important component of 
his self-representation. He believes that he is part of a genealogy that can be traced back to 
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the Prophet Mohammed (albeit not in literal terms: he would not be able to name all his 
predecessors up to the Prophet, of course), and he feels deeply the responsibilities that 
come with such role. For this reason, I perceived that he considers the behavior that his 
father displayed throughout his life as being shamefully not adherent to the values that his 
family should embody: piety, wisdom, detachment from what he considers the average 
Pashtun man’s ethical flaws – such as proneness to violence and disregard of Qur’anic 
principles to the advantage of customary norms (rawaj). All virtues that, in Baryalay’s 
opinion, his father did not possess. Yet the disdain that Baryalay feels towards his father, 
which surfaced in our conversations, is also tinged by the deep sense of respect and 
deference to the paternal authority that, in Pashtun culture, inescapably informs the 
relationship between father and sons. To this, we must add also fear, about which Baryalay 
talks in collective terms (“People in my family are afraid of my father”), but to which he 
himself is also obviously subject. The inner conflict that Baryalay perceives between the 
culturally required respect and deference that he is supposed to grant his father, and the 
private revulsion that he feels towards the way his father behaves and publicly presents 
himself, is, in my opinion, reflected in the scarcity of occasions in which he mentions his 
father at all. In one of the other few conversations wherein this happened, Baryalay was 
explaining to me why he prefers not to participate in, and get carried away by, the many 
instances of interpersonal and interfamilial conflict that often arise in the village (which 
we will detail better below). He associated interestingly at the end of the following passage: 
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My family members and I do not fight in the village. We don’t do these things. We 
try always to solve problems through talking, and, if necessary, with a Jirga [the 
council of elders that customarily may be summoned to avoid violent conflict and 
solve a dispute]. The uneducated and ignorant people in the village call us 
beghairata [unmanly, in this context similarly to the Western colloquial expression 
“without balls”], because to them we cannot fight to defend our rights and what 
belongs to us. But others in the village, those who are more civilized and educated, 
they understand that we are doing the right thing, they consider us well because we 
try to solve things peacefully…[long pause] The only person in my family who fights 
and uses violence is my father…He calls us beghairata as well, like the others do. 
He says we are beghairata and shameful [besharm]... 
 
The rejection and disgust that his father openly expresses at Baryalay’s life choices, as well 
as at the public persona that he has elected to embody, clearly hurt Baryalay, as I interpret 
this last passage to indicate. Nevertheless, the moral role that his position as a pacha 
culturally enjoins upon him remains crucial for the construction of a meaningful self. 
Baryalay seems to suffer no hesitation in this regard. Notwithstanding the pain of being 
rejected by his father, Baryalay’s condemnation of the latter’s lifestyle and public behavior 
seems to leave no room for rethinking. Indeed, his two older brothers appear to have chosen 
the same path of interaction towards their father (the youngest brother is attending 
university in Jalalabad). His next oldest brother is 47 years-old and lives in Peshawar. He 
is a mullah, and works for a local mosque in the city. Baryalay has always remarked about 
 
 
 
170 
him that he is an “open-minded” mullah, who left the village (and Afghanistan altogether, 
as a matter of fact) in order to free himself from a lifestyle he did not approve of, nor 
enjoyed. Baryalay’s oldest brother is 50 years-old and lives in the village with him, in the 
house that Baryalay occupies with his wife and daughter. He is only partially educated, and 
owns a shop in the bazaar of the village. He is married, but cannot have children. Their 
mullah brother allowed one of his two children to be adopted by his shopkeeper brother in 
the village. Baryalay recounted that the latter and his wife were desperate after realizing 
they could not have children, and the adoption of their nephew was teceived with relief by 
the whole family. The relationship between Baryalay and his three brothers is close and 
cooperative. Baryalay visits his mullah brother in Peshawar on a regular basis, and he 
comes to visit Baryalay to the village as well. They both support financially their 
shopkeeper brother in the village, who apparently often does not manage to make ends 
meet. All the three are keeping the youngest brother in university, while also preparing for 
the big expenses that his future wedding ceremony and interfamilial economic 
arrangements will require.  
 
My father has spent most of his life in the village, together with the other villagers. 
He has learned from them…he does not behave like a pacha, he behaves like one 
of them. My brothers, sisters and I have lived in other places too, we have lived 
with other relatives who have taught us what it means to be a pacha, and how it is 
appropriate that a pacha behave. When I was in Peshawar with my brother [the 
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mullah], he took care of my education. In the village, my brother-in-law [husband 
of his older sister], showed me how to behave like a pacha.  
Andrea – What about your mother? Did she educate you in the pacha tradition? 
Baryalay – No, my mother was not a pacha, she did not know anything about these 
things. She was a simple woman…  
 
 
Finding an alternative role 
 
Thus, while Baryalay’s father was present throughout his childhood and adolescence, the 
example and role model that he offered to Baryalay and his brothers were rejected by them 
as negative, undesirable, and morally unacceptable. Other surrogate father-figures proved 
more valuable for Baryalay: his older mullah brother, other male members of his extended 
family, as well as members of the in-law lineages that joined his familial environment. The 
rejection that Baryalay and his brothers have demonstrated  against their father seems to 
rely mainly on cultural bases. The context wherein Baryalay and his relatives grew up was 
strongly informed by the sentiment of moral exceptionalism that is peculiar to the pacha 
environment. As a social group that claims direct descent from the Prophet Mohammed, 
certain diacritica in ethical behavior and moral values are considered to be crucial to one’s 
public persona, as well as private self-representation. The open disregard for such ethics 
and values on the part of Baryalay’s father put him outside the boundaries of the social 
group to which he belonged by ascription (see Barth 1969). The self-inflicted social 
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ostracism (from his own pacha group) that Baryalay’s father chose to subject himself to, 
operated evidently with a greater force than the emotional and primary ties that his sons 
must have nevertheless had with him. In other words, the gravity of the cultural breach that 
the father carried out publicly must have overcome the sentiments of filial piety that his 
sons surely must have privately harbored and perceived. The construction of a self that 
would fully reflect the requirements of a culturally appropriate pacha man turned out to be 
more important for Baryalay and his brothers. This has certainly something to do with the 
social narrative that the pachaiaan (pl. of pacha) have construed for themselves, as a sort 
of “special” sub-ethnic group with an ambiguous relationship with the broader ethnic group 
to which they also proudly belong – the Pashtuns. Baryalay is adamant about the elitist 
sentiment that the pachaiaan hold for themselves as opposed to the “average”, the “other” 
Pashtuns. From a utilitarian, if unconscious, viewpoint, it pays a relevant dividend to 
maintain one’s identity as pacha well defined and even ahead of being Pashtuns.   
 
Baryalay - We are pachaiaan, we descend from the Prophet… 
Andrea – But you are Pashtuns… 
Baryalay – Yes, we are Pashtuns and pachaiaan… 
Andrea – Do the other people in the village consider you Pashtuns as well? 
Baryalay – Yes, they too think that we are both Pashtun and pachaiaan. 
Andrea – Do you know where your family roots are in the Middle East? 
Baryalay – No, I do not know.  
Andrea – So, what does being a pacha mean to you? 
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Baryalay – We know that we descend from the Prophet, and being good Muslims 
for us is more important than being good Pashtuns. We are educated in considering 
the Qur’an more important than anything else, for instance rawaj [customs]. We 
know the Qur’an, we read it and we study it. I know that there are many parts of 
pukhto that are not in line with what the Qur’an says. We do not follow those 
customs that are in conflict with the Qur’an. The other villagers [i.e., the “average” 
Pashtuns] do not care. They are ignorant, they do not know the Qur’an, and for 
them rawaj is the same thing as the Qur’an. But we know better, and refuse to do 
certain things that are against the Qur’an.  
Andrea – Like what? 
Baryalay – Well, for example walwar [brideprice]: we do not ask for walwar from 
the family of the groom. We only pay mahar [i.e., a quantity in gold to the bride, 
which in theory belongs directly to the bride, and not to her father, like the walwar 
would]…mahar is in the Qur’an, so we pay mahar…walwar is against Islam. 
People here go bankrupt because of the walwar, also poor people have to pay a lot 
of money if they want to get married…this is not right. Also, we keep our weddings 
modest, so that people do not waste too much money on something that is only for 
show. People here [the “other” Pashtuns] have a lot of jealousy [bakhiltob] when it 
comes to weddings…they have to show they are better than their neighbors, and so 
for arrogance [ghoror] they waste a lot of money that should be spent doing 
something better for their families. This is not right. We do not do these 
things…[long pause] We do not like to fight like the others do. We try to solve 
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problems in a peaceful way. We do not like violence. This kind of life that they live, 
always fighting, and quarreling, and being jealous of each other, this is against 
Islam. 
 
Although Baryalay does not say it explicitly, it is apparent that he considers pachaiaan to 
be “better” than their “average” Pashtun co-villagers. The preeminence that pachaiaan 
accord to the tenets of the Qur’an, to the disadvantage of the principles of pukhto, clearly 
makes the pachaiaan morally superior to the other Pashtuns, in Baryalay’s opinion. The 
relationship that pachaiaan in his village (and elsewhere in Pashtun areas) have with the 
rest of the Pashtuns living alongside them is ambivalent, to say the least. Baryalay claims 
that his co-villagers (who belong mainly to two other Pashtun groups: Mohmand and 
Mangal, the latter immigrated from Paktia province) consider them to be Pashtun, like 
everybody else. In different rural settings throughout the province, however, I found that 
often the pacahiaan (or saydaan, as they are also known in Nangarhar province) are viewed 
in a slightly different light, vis-à-vis their co-villagers. In one specific case, among the 
Shinwari group, close to the border with Pakistan, one family was clearly described to me 
as having come to the area about 150 years earlier from Iraq. They were believed to be 
descendants of the Prophet and Pashtuns at the same time, as the pachaiaan of Baryalay’s 
family are, and yet the memory of their Middle Eastern provenance was firmly kept by 
their Pashtun Shinwaris co-villagers, who sometimes used their “non-pure” Pashtun-ness 
to justify resentments and rancors that owed more to economic reasons than ethnic ones. 
In fact, pachaiaan and saydaan have always been respected and revered as individuals who 
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may have a closer connection to Allah, in light of their presumed descent from the Prophet. 
Paying homage to a pacha or sayed is still believed by many to bring about rewards in the 
afterlife. Such acts of deference often take the shape of donations, usually in kind. Not 
infrequently, pachaiaan are bequeathed pieces of property or land by deceased individuals 
in their wills. Whereas these acts are felt by many as necessary to improve the chances of 
a better standing after death, others (and even sometimes the same who perform these very 
acts, in an almost contradictory manner) resent bitterly the pachaiaan’s accumulation of 
properties and riches accomplished without the supposedly appropriate labor and risk-
taking that would be required of a non-pacha Pashtun in order to reach the same degree of 
affluence. Baryalay’s family, by his own admission, is no exception in this regard, and is 
in fact the most affluent in the village. In an ecological environment where land is scarce, 
and each family (when owning any land at all) possesses an average of about 1 to 2 jiribs 
(two and half jiribs are equivalent to one acre), a property of about 15 jiribs, as Baryalay’s 
family has, means faring well above the average. As it often happens, Baryalay’s family’s 
land is farmed by hired laborers, who do not possess any land of their own, because 
landowners generally see as socially demeaning working the land themselves. 37 
                                                          
37 In their classic case studies of Swat, Pakistan, both Fredrik Barth and Charles Lindholm (Barth 
1959, Lindholm 1982) described the sayyeds within the Pashtun environment they studied as 
definitely “non-Pashtun”. In other words, it was assumed, and accepted, by the locals and the 
sayyeds themselves, that they did not belong to the Pashtun “aristocracy” that was politically and 
economically dominant in Swat. By being external to any Pashtun lineage, the sayyeds managed to 
gain for themselves a role as mediators/peacemakers during intracommunity conflicts. In eastern 
Afghanistan, where scarcity of resources and paucity of available land has impeded the deep social 
stratification that is found in Swat (and southern Afghanistan), the neat ethnic differentiation 
between sayyeds and Pashtuns is absent, and the boundaries between the two categories are often 
blurred, when not altogether non-existent. We will see in this and the following chapter that often 
sayyeds become seamlessly incorporated in the Pashtun community, although they might still 
benefit from the common awareness of their being the “descendants of the Prophet”. Baryalay’s 
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They do not kiss our hands any longer [as a sign of respect]…this happened in my 
grandfather’s time, but now nobody does it anymore. They do respect us for what 
we are, however. They know we are pachaiaan, they know what it means. We do 
things differently from them…we always keep in mind the Qur’an and we behave 
accordingly…we are expected to behave in a different way…[long pause] I do not 
like the people from the village, they are ignorant, uneducated, and do things that 
are against the Qur’an…we try to stay away from them as much as possible, we do 
not have many relationship with them…I, for example, pray at home, on my own, I 
never go to the village mosque, and so do my relatives… 
Andrea – What do the other villagers think about it? 
Baryalay – They criticize us for this [peghor warkawi], they think we should go to 
the public mosque like everybody else. We also keep our family’s women more at 
home than the other families do…they have less relationships with other women 
than the other villagers have…It’s a matter of modesty, of being closer to the 
Qur’an…However, when they go out, our women are dressed in a different 
way…they do not wear the burqa as the other women do, they wear a hejab or a 
niqab…the burqa is not in the Qur’an, it does not exist in Islam…they also criticize 
us for this, they say we are not doing pukhto the right way…Also the fights 
[lanjay]…we stay away from those. There are some villagers who understand that 
                                                          
family chose to emphasize and stand by this aspect of their family history, while his father chose 
to reject it.   
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we behave differently because we want to follow the Qur’an, and they respect that. 
But others, they think that doing pukhto is like following the Qur’an, and they 
criticize us for that…like my father. They say we do not stand up for our rights as 
a Pashtun should do… 
 
Baryalay’s family (with the exception of his father) is caught in an awkward paradox: as a 
pacha Pashtun family they are largely expected to uphold a distinctive conduct and 
behavior, more “Islamic” and pious, as it were. At the same time, however, when this very 
same pious demeanor diverges from what most consider being an appropriate and required 
behavioral choice for a “real Pashtun”, Baryalay’s family members meet the reproach and 
contempt of many from their village. In other words, precisely those ethical diacritica that 
define them as pacha (as opposed to “average” Pashtuns), and to which they owe their 
respected social standing in the community, are at times the source of a loss of social 
capital. The elitist aspect of this dynamic should not be underestimated, however, and 
certainly does not go unnoticed by Baryalay’s co-villagers. There exists just as much 
contempt on the part of the villagers against Baryalay’s family, as there is on the part of 
Baryalay’s family against the villagers because of their inability to conform to those 
Islamic norms that Baryalay and his family see as patently contravened by Pashtun 
traditional customs, which the villagers abide by. Baryalay and his family have decided to 
remove themselves from the social context of the village, except for the basic and necessary 
relationships. Baryalay admits that the villagers would like his family to participate in the 
religious rituals of the village alongside its inhabitants. Yet they abstain, in a fashion that 
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is probably seen by the villagers as offensive and “snobby”.  Furthermore, it must be kept 
in mind that, customarily, pacha families intermarry with no other group than pachaiaan, 
which likely increases the perception of a voluntary, presumptuous isolation that the 
pachaiaan want to pursue vis-à-vis the “average” Pashtun people. Such kind of quasi-
aristocratic attitude that the pachaiaan maintain is all the more problematic because it is 
based on a religious premise, which would be impossible to contest. The direct 
genealogical connection to the Prophet, albeit located in a distant past, is accepted as a fact 
by most (or is at least not questioned by anybody), and it would be unthinkable to refuse 
(overtly) a higher degree of respect and reverence to someone holding such “pedigree”. 
Disrespecting openly a recognized pacha or sayed would equate to disrespecting the 
Prophet himself.  At the same time, however,  within a social environment where personal 
honor and in-group cohesiveness and loyalty are considered crucial features of any Pashtun 
individual (both male and female), the defiant self-exclusion that Baryalay’s family seems 
to have pursued on the basis of their perceived moral superiority attracts nonetheless the 
resentment of the rest of the villagers. The latter likely perceive as “unfair” the use of 
religious prerogatives that Baryalay’s family makes in order to underscore a moral 
superiority vis-à-vis the rest of the villagers.  
Baryalay is certainly aware of the ambivalence of the position of himself and his 
family in the context of village social dynamics, and claims to have been proactive in the 
past towards his co-villagers. He recounted how in three different occasions he tried to spur 
the village notables to get together in the mosque to discuss the status of social relationships 
in the village, and to find the means to improve a way of life that he deemed too conflictive 
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and acrimonious, and too removed from an Islamic ideal.  Only few of the villagers, 
Baryalay told me with an aggravated tone of voice, showed interest in his proposal, while 
most of them dismissed the idea as useless and presumptuous. 
 
They told me that they were perfectly ok with the life they were living, that there 
were no problems in the village. They told me that they did not think that there was 
too much quarreling and fighting in the village, and that they were good Muslims 
too, like I was, and that they were as respectful of Islam as I was. They told me that 
meeting together in the mosque to discuss these things would be a waste of time.   
 The frustration of his act of “good faith” only damaged further the opinion that Baryalay 
held of his co-villagers, and probably sealed the fate of his relationships with them. A 
complete isolation from the affairs of the village followed the debacle.  The ambiguity of 
the social position that Baryalay maintains among his peers in the village, by virtue of his 
ascriptive belonging to a lineage connected by blood to the Prophet, is evident in the way 
he describes the responses of the villagers to his proposal. After all, he is not formally 
trained in religious studies, and technically he holds no higher qualification in religious 
matters than any other villager. The fact that he is the village’s only university graduate 
(and in agronomy, at that) does not win him enough clout in this case.  Whether they really 
liked their lives as they were or not, the villagers were evidently piqued by Baryalay’s not-
so-veiled suggestion that not only their conduct, which they considered in line with doing 
pukhto, was disruptive of social harmony, but also, and worse, that their social behavior 
fell short of what was morally enjoined on them by the Qur’an. In Baryalay’s village, it is 
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apparent that pachaiaan have to walk a socially thin line, and administer wisely the 
prerogatives that their status provides them with.38 They have to manage with attention 
their identities as both Pashtuns and putative descendants from the Prophet. 
The father of Baryalay, in this regard, chose a radically univocal position for 
himself. He embraced vocally his being first and foremost a Pashtun and, to the dismay of 
his family members, aligned himself with those who Baryalay considers ignorant and 
violent individuals, although their behavior meets the ethical requirements expected in a 
“real Pashtun”. According to Baryalay his father, therefore, has no problems of adjustment 
to the village life, and does not suffer the criticism of his co-villagers. The price his father 
paid was the loss of consideration and respect by his own group that no longer considers 
him a pacha. We do not know whether, in the eyes of the villagers, it might be just 
Baryalay’s father who embodies the perfect features of a “legitimate” Pashtun-cum-pacha, 
holding full membership in both groups. At any rate, the fact that Baryalay keeps 
associating the image of his father with that of the contemptuous villagers speaks to the 
deep discomfort that his strained relations with his father must cause in him, albeit only 
seldom verbally articulated.    
 
Shaping one’s own masculinity 
 
                                                          
38 Such prerogatives, as we have partially seen, revolve generally around the “respect” that others 
are forced to grant them on the basis of their saintly lineage. This can materialize in, among other 
things, stronger political ascendant among state bureaucrats, “gifts” in land or other kinds of goods 
from co-villagers or acquaintances, or being considered as a particularly influent and capable 
individual during the negotiations to solve an intracommunity conflict.    
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During our sessions, Baryalay elaborated often on his life in the village, and the personal 
frustration that it entails.  
 
There is a lot of enmity [dukhmani] and jealousy [bakhiltob] in the village, among 
the inhabitants. They are always talking bad about each other behind each other’s 
back, they are jealous of what the others have. There is a lot of aggressiveness…you 
have to behave in a certain way, because otherwise the others will consider you 
weak [kamzur] and unmanly [beghairata], and will take advantage of you. I can’t 
stand it [za na sham kawalay che ye wmanam]…I hate it [zma bad ye razi].  
Andrea – Are you the only one with these feelings about life in the village?   
Baryalay – No, certainly not. There are other people who do not like it. It is not 
easy to live like that. There are people who are not cut out for it, who are not made 
for it. But they have to behave like that anyway…it’s a matter of survival…you have 
to be arrogant [mughoror] and stand up to the others, or else they will be all over 
you. You have to defend yourself. I know people in the village who are not happy 
with their lives… Some of them have left the village, they have moved to the city. 
But not everybody can…some have to stay… 
Andrea – What about you? Would you like to leave? 
Baryalay – Yes, of course, I dream of going to live in Jalalabad with my wife and 
daughter, but I can’t right now. My brother [the shopkeeper, his oldest brother] 
cannot go on without me, I have to help him…and I do not have yet money enough 
to live on my own in the city, it’s expensive…[long pause]…Nobody has friends in 
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the village…they are always very respectful of each other, they treat each other 
well, but it’s only the outside, they all have black hearts [tor zra, meaning that they 
are insincere in their outward expressions]. 
 
All things considered, it seems that Baryalay’s personal situation in the village is probably 
less dramatic than that of some others. As a member of the pacha social group, Baryalay 
finds himself less shackled by the norms and rules of customary Pashtun life in comparison 
to his non-pacha co-villagers. His social position as pacha allows him to pursue a slightly 
different kind of life, and legitimately reject some of the constraints that a non-pacha would 
be helplessly subject to. He can take advantage of the expectations that his social group has 
to fulfill (in terms of social conduct) in order to shy away from the most odious (to him) 
aspects of what is generally considered appropriate Pashtun behavior, such as 
aggressiveness and proneness to violence in achieving ambitions of self-aggrandizement. 
A culturally accepted alternative avenue for comportment and demeanor is thus available 
for a pacha like Baryalay. We have already seen that this does not spare him the criticism 
(peghor) of some of his co-villagers, and that he must for this reason navigate the ambiguity 
and paradox that his position puts him through. Nevertheless, as opposed to the more rigid 
and uncompromising situation that many co-villagers find themselves trapped into, 
Baryalay possesses a broader latitude for expressing and materializing his temperamental 
inclinations, his emotions and attending behavioral choices. For all the frustration and 
discomfort that he undoubtedly suffers, Baryalay still has a culturally allowed way out from 
the worst of the village life, a way to legitimately “rebel” against the most unacceptable 
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aspects of it, which he enacts by removing himself from much of the social life of the 
village.39 He pays this choice with the reproach of some of his co-villagers. Yet it is also 
evident that his position as pacha mitigates the detrimental social consequences of such 
attitude. Those non-pacha villagers who, like Baryalay, feel that the lifestyle of the village 
strongly contrasts with how they would in fact like to conduct their lives, cannot afford the 
luxury to make the same “isolationist” and non-conformist choice that Baryalay and his 
family have made. If they did, they would condemn themselves to a dishonorable status 
and a consequent unsustainable social position. They have necessarily to do violence to 
themselves and adjust their behavior to what they are expected to publicly show. This is 
obviously the source of deep anxiety, frustration and exasperation, which often find an 
outlet in overcompensating behaviors (to use the concept that Edward Sapir introduced 
upon the suggestion of Alfred Adler. Sapir 2002), in a sort of self-reinforcing vicious circle. 
Baryalay manages to partially avoid these dynamics. He says:  
 
                                                          
39 This is not what his ancestors did (his father being in a particular position within this picture). It 
emerged clearly during my conversations with Baryalay, that his grandfather, and great-grandfather 
(about whom he heard stories when he was growing up) were immersed in their role as pachaiaan 
in full. They were active in making amulets (mostly pieces of paper with Qur’anic verses written 
on them, which people would wear as bracelets or necklaces, or keep with themselves), advising 
people on personal matters, acting as mediators in feuds or conflicts. For these services they 
received “gifts” in return. Most of Baryalay’s family’s landed properties were acquired in such 
way. They apparently did not eschew social relationships in the village, as Baryalay’s family 
members do now. According to Baryalay, his family’s choice of cutting relationships with the co-
villagers is a direct outcome of the deterioration that public mores and behaviors were subject to 
over the three decades of war. As a family who still feels strongly its role as repository of a saintly 
heritage, revulsion at the current situation was too strong to allow any compromise. Baryalay’s 
father, on the other hand, has apparently endorsed the shift towards the new ethical standards and 
disavowed his pacha background. There is not much left for Baryalay and his family members to 
perform as pachaiaan, as their ancestors did within the village previously.     
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There are people who behave like they would not want to…they have to do certain 
things, but they are not happy with that. So what happens sometimes is that they 
exaggerate things, they do worse things than others because they know that 
everyone is looking at them, they want to show everybody that they are good 
Pashtuns…I know people who do not like dukhmani and lanjay [enmity and fights],  
but who pick up fights more often than others…it’s crazy [da liwantob de]…they 
feel more pressure [preshaar, an English loan-word] and exaggerate everything…    
Andrea – Does this happen to you as well? 
Baryalay – No, I don’t do that, I stay away from fights and jealousies. I told you 
already, my family does not behave like that, this is not what a good Muslim should 
do… 
Andrea – But don’t you feel uncomfortable [marahata] living like this? 
Baryalay – Well, yes, I am under a lot of pressure too…it’s not nice when you know 
that people call you beghairata behind your back, I don’t like it. I get nervous, 
tense, and sometimes I become upset with my wife or daughter for nothing…I don’t 
like being in the village, and sometimes I react badly with my wife and daughter…I 
have less patience [sabar] with them sometimes…I know it’s wrong, I feel bad about 
it. But I am not ok in the village, I feel as if I was in jail, I cannot live the life that I 
would like…and there is also a lot of pressure for the security problems…I am 
worried, scared, always thinking that something might happen to me or my family 
[because of his job – see details below]…it’s bad…[long pause] Also the people 
who live in the village, they too are in this situation of constant tension because of 
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the security problems in the district…that is also why they behave like that, so 
suspicious of each other, not being able to make friends, always quarreling with 
each other…everybody is under pressure…Your life is always in doubt [shak], there 
is nothing certain [mutmaian]. Today you are rich, tomorrow you are poor. This 
evening you are alive, tomorrow morning you die. Nobody is certain about 
anything, they feel that they have to take all that they can right now, because 
tomorrow who knows what can happen…they want to get ahead of all the others 
[de tolo na makhke larshi]… 
 
Baryalay manages to escape a psychological dynamics such as behavioral 
overcompensation thanks to the leeway accorded to him by his particular social position as 
pacha (and an educated and well-to-do pacha, at that). Nevertheless, he recognizes this 
dynamics in some of his co-villagers, whom he evidently knows well after all, in spite of 
his self-inflicted ostracism from the social life of the village. This phenomenon must be so 
conspicuous to catch his eye.  
It is interesting that Baryalay is able to detect as one of the causes for the toxicity 
of village life the constant situation of tension, danger and uncertainty that the war and 
foreign occupation entail at the moment in Afghanistan. On the one hand, he is finding a 
legitimate justification, based on environmental factors, to explain some of the 
reproachable (in his opinion) aspects of his fellow villagers’ social behavior, redeeming 
them from a simplistic, sweeping moralistic judgment (e.g., “they are intrinsically and 
hopelessly bad people”, as some members of other ethnic groups in Afghanistan often 
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characterize Pashtuns).  On the other, he is building one of the few common grounds that 
he may possibly share with his co-villagers: the common, profound discomfort and 
pernicious psychological ramifications that the thirty-plus year-long conflict has had on the 
lives and social fabric of Afghans. Such common ground, and the feeling of sharing with 
them an unfortunate fate allow him (if unconsciously) to relieve himself at least in small 
part from the otherwise crippling antithesis between his lifestyle and that of the villagers.  
Certainly his reactions to the difficulties and pressures of everyday life in the village (and 
in the province as a whole) are different from those that the villagers display – and in that 
lies the sense of “moral exceptionalism” that he maintains for himself and his family.  Yet, 
he undoubtedly suffers from those feelings and emotions of despair and precariousness that 
he attributes openly only to his co-villagers, just as much as they do. Paradoxically, 
however, some of his co-villagers represent just the most proximate cause for part of his 
problems with security in the village and Jalalabad. His job as employee of a foreign-
funded agricultural NGO puts him in an uncomfortable and dangerous condition in the 
context of his home district, which, in the years prior to my work in Nangarhar province, 
and increasingly during my fieldwork research there, became a hotbed for anti-government 
activities and insurgency. In a volatile and overall “anxious” environment such as that of 
rural Pashtun Afghanistan in 2012-2013, it takes very little for anybody (including one’s 
close relatives) to be branded as a kafir (infidel), a jusus (spy) or an enemy in general 
(dukhmaan), with all the attending negative consequences (often deadly). Baryalay 
explains:  
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Half of the people in my village are ok with me. They are the farmers. They roughly 
know what I do for a living, I help them with their fields, and they are happy with 
the support I give them. Not that I can bring the projects of the NGO to the village 
– that would expose me too much – but I help them nonetheless with advice and 
know-how. The others, the ones who don’t like me, are those who either work in 
other areas than agriculture, or are unemployed. They don’t know for sure where 
I work [he keeps the details of his occupation to himself], but they know I work in 
Jalalabad, with projects in agriculture…they imagine that I probably work either 
for the government or for a foreign NGO. They look at me with suspicion. They 
hate whoever works for the government or for the angrez [foreigners]. I know that 
someone knows what I do for work…nothing is really a secret [raaz] in the village. 
That’s why I try to go outside of the house as little as possible when I am in the 
village. As soon as the sun goes down, I get inside and don’t go out until morning. 
[long pause] These jobless young men…they don’t go to school, they look for a job, 
don’t find it, end up with having nothing to do all day, and they get picked up by 
the Wahhabis, the preachers…These young men are angry [khapa], because they 
are jobless, they think it is because of the state, because of the foreigners who run 
the country for the Afghan people …they swallow all the propaganda that these 
Wahhabi preachers feed them…for them [the preachers] everybody is a 
kafir…government workers, NGO workers, all the foreigners, everybody. [The 
preachers think that] kafirs who are in Afghanistan have to be expelled from the 
country or killed…they don’t make compromises…they are crazy. These preachers 
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come from Pakistan when the snow melts in the mountains, bringing money and 
propaganda, then they go back before the winter, but they leave new [Afghan] 
followers here…those jobless kids are angry, hopeless, they listen to them [the 
preachers], they follow them…they don’t understand. The preachers give them 
money, they help their families…But nobody knows for sure who is working for the 
insurgents [yaghiaan, literally “rebels”] or the Taliban. They have a normal life, 
with whatever they do during the day. If there is an operation, they participate, then 
they go back to their normal occupations. Nobody knows for sure who they are. 
Even when you see the Taliban on the roads or in the fields, they have their faces 
covered, you don’t know who they are…it could be your neighbor. It’s dangerous 
to talk to anybody…if you say to somebody that you think the Taliban are not right, 
and that person works for them, you’re in trouble. If you admit to the wrong person 
to fearing for your life, that will be taken as a proof that you have something to 
hide, and you’re in trouble. If somebody tells you that he is a member of the Taliban, 
and you ask why he chose to become one, you are in trouble. It’s horrible, you can 
trust no one, you cannot speak to anybody. Every day is like this…I can’t stand it 
anymore [nur na sham kawalay che da wmanam]…  
 
Thus, notwithstanding the (socially) “shielded” condition that Baryalay and his family 
enjoy in the village, the general situation of daily life that everyone is subject to there, with 
its stresses, anxieties and uncertainties, affects Baryalay heavily nonetheless. He feels 
cornered and constantly in danger. The atmosphere in the village seems toxic for several 
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reasons. “Nothing is really a secret in the village”, Baryalay previously stated: as in most 
small communities, regardless of the cultural context, villagers talk about each other, and 
take pleasure at the others’ missteps. We have encountered this situation also in the 
accounts given by Rohullah and Umar, whereby no one, not even one’s own brother or best 
friend, can be fully trusted in keeping personal or sensitive information away from the gaze 
of others. Baryalay’s job puts him at risk with the many (increasing day by day) who 
consider anybody working for the government or the foreigners as an enemy. The reality 
that anti-government elements maintain in many areas of the country is often based on an 
uncompromising us-them dichotomy, the good against the evil, the Islamic against the un-
Islamic. There are few subtleties in such narrative, very few nuances that a man can count 
on. The slightest doubt or suspicion is immediately turned into a reality that requires 
retribution. Those who, like Baryalay, do not buy into the rhetoric of the radical Islamic 
preachers, and, by necessity or conviction, work for government or foreign institutions, 
live in terror of possible negative consequences. During the first months of our relationship, 
Baryalay arranged to come to Jalalabad on purpose to have class with me (his job as a field 
officer required him to work in the districts, and he did not have to join his colleagues in 
the Jalalabad office very often). He used to ride a motorcycle with a friend of his from 
Jalalabad to the village, and always took care to cover his face with a scarf during the trip, 
in order to avoid anybody recognizing him. When the situation in the district he went 
through on the way to Jalalabad worsened over time, he decided to start making the trip 
back and forth by shared taxi, which, in his opinion, ensured a better anonymity along the 
way. Even so, the cars he travelled in were stopped several times and searched by Taliban 
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members at improvised illegal checkpoints. He never had on himself any piece of 
documentation that could betray his collaboration with a foreign NGO, and never really 
got in danger. Yet the line is extremely thin, and disaster could happen any time. Mid-way 
through our classes, he was reassigned to a desk job at the NGO headquarters in Jalalabad. 
He had to rent a room in the city, which was problematic with his salary, and started to go 
home only for the weekend. Whereas the new arrangement allowed him for more peace of 
mind, the forced separation from his wife and daughter felt painful to him.  He had no 
alternative, however. He was the only real provider for his family and that of his 
shopkeeper brother, who could not make ends meet (the revenues from the fields his family 
owned went entirely still to his father, who retained exclusive ownership over them).40 
Thus, although there was a good share of villagers who did not dislike him, due to the 
technical help that he managed to give them in the fields, the many others who did not 
profit from his know-how or professional position saw no reason for not applying to his 
case the principles and ideological prejudices that the radical preachers had successfully 
                                                          
40 As usual among Pashtun families, there is no subdivision of property until the father dies. Only 
then the sons will receive a portion of the inheritance (daughters receive nothing of the inheritance). 
All that is legally owned by the family is usually in the name of the father, who is not bound to 
divide his property in equal parts among his sons in a written will. The ramifications of this state 
of facts are numerous. The father obviously remains in a strong position (a sort of modern pater 
familias), and continues to exert his authority until the end. This situation is sometimes the source 
of resentment among the sons towards the father, and certainly of competition among the brothers. 
More importantly, in the case the father should die unexpectedly (which is common) without 
writing a will, the household might fall into chaos, due to the lack of instructions on what to do 
with the family property. State law does not hold much weight in these circumstances. It is in these 
cases that some of the worst intrafamily feuds take place, as I was told. In Baryalay’s case, his 
father is still alive, and owns all the family land. However, due to his resentment towards his father, 
or his revulsion at the village situation, Baryalay told me more than once that he does not want 
anything to do with the family landed properties. “Land brings only problems and fights” he once 
told me, “I don’t want any land, let somebody else have it”.  
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propagated among the community members. In their eyes, Baryalay as well constituted a 
potential enemy, a kafir, and could be treated as such (i.e., killed, in today’s Afghanistan).  
Baryalay walked every day a very thin line, trying to control the damage and risks at his 
best. The confinement to his house, and the truncated relationships with many among the 
villagers that he resorted to, are due both to his personal impatience with his co-villagers 
lifestyle, and to pragmatic choices related to personal security. In this light, the “lenient” 
and understanding attitude that Baryalay shows towards the “wrong” behavior and political 
choices of his co-villagers is all the more remarkable (“that is also why they behave like 
that, so suspicious of each other, not being able to make friends, always quarreling with 
each other…everybody is under pressure...”). 
Baryalay traces his frustration also to something beyond mere personal security: “I 
am under a lot of pressure too…it’s not nice when you know that people call you beghairata 
behind your back, I don’t like it. I get nervous, tense…”.  He has elected not to care 
excessively about the fact that he is considered by some a beghairata. He goes ahead with 
his personal choices and his lifestyle as a whole because he deems them appropriate to his 
social status and position as a pacha.  However, he is also a Pashtun, and as a Pashtun he 
has been raised – albeit as a Pashtun-cum-pacha. Baryalay’s ideal of nartob (manliness, 
masculinity) reflects an ideal that many share, but that few see implemented in reality 
among today’s Afghan Pashtuns. As Baryalay also suggested, the blame is placed often 
onto the social devastation and disruption that the war(s) have caused to Pashtun 
communities. Nar is not just a generic man (for which meaning the term saray is used). 
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Nar is a manly man, a man with specific attributes peculiar to true respectable Pashtun 
men. Baryalay explains: 
 
He who does pukhto [pukhto paali] is a nar. In my district there lives a big 
landowner, a khan. He is not the richest of all, but he is wealthy. He is never stingy, 
he always helps others who may be in economic difficulty, always offers more than 
his due for communal necessities, shows hospitality [melmastia], he behaves with 
wisdom and restraint. For example, some time ago the villagers decided that it was 
necessary to build a new bridge over the river that flows near the village. Every 
villager had to give a determined amount of money so that the company building 
the bridge could be paid. Some of the villagers could not pay their quota because 
they were too poor, others only faked being poor and did not pay. The khan gave 
himself more quotas than he should have to cover those who could not or did not 
pay. That’s nartob, he is a nar.   
 
Masculinity, nartob, as intended in the ideal model of a Pashtun man, is evidently still 
relevant for Baryalay, and he does not reject its cultural schema. From the story of the rich 
khan and the bridge, we can realize how much the idea of generosity, of self-sacrifice for 
the good of the community, is also an integral part of the idea of masculinity that Baryalay 
endorses. What he wholeheartedly rejects is the current interpretation of nartob that he sees 
common among many of his peers. Violence, abuse, arrogance, illegitimate appropriation, 
is what Baryalay sees nartob as having been turned into by the thirty-plus years of war. He 
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is well aware that, in order to comprehend fully the roots and the current aspect of Pashtun 
cultural models and people’s public behaviors, the perspective has to go beyond the 
present, and reach back in time to understand crucial historical contingencies. As Eleanor 
Leacock has convincingly suggested in the case of many post-colonial and semi-colonial 
socio-cultural environments, also for Afghan Pashtun culture (albeit lacking a true colonial 
history) ignoring the impact of dramatic past events, and keeping one’s analysis tied to a 
short-sighted ethnographic present, would be “unscientific and unethical” (Leacock, 
1983:272). So, as it happened with many of my informants, Baryalay remains strongly 
attached to an ideal of nartob that, most likely, has been lost to many Afghan Pashtuns 
amidst the decades-long conditions of social destabilization. The enculturation he 
underwent, and the general environment in which he grew up, had (not surprisingly) a 
powerful impact on the construction of his self. His mellow personality traits, as well as 
the education into the pacha “Weltanschauung” and core values he received during 
childhood and adolescence, had to find a way to coexist with the imposing presence of 
pukhto in the community he lived in. As a man who recognizes himself as a pacha and as 
a Pashtun alike, the ideal narrative about the “true Pashtun man” (pukhto) must have 
resonated forcefully in Baryalay, and must have served as an important source for self-
identification. Albeit purged of its aspects which seem incompatible with the main 
guidelines of pacha ethics (interestingly enough, embodied by the figure of Baryalay’s 
father), nevertheless pukhto is irrefutably a component of Baryalay’s self-representation, 
as well as the scaffold around which one of his competing (or complementary) selves 
revolves. Baryalay showed such plurality of selves in recounting one event that took place 
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a few months before our conversation, in the midst of discussing extramarital affairs in his 
community. 
 
In reality, for both men and women, if they want to, it is possible to have 
extramarital relations. For example, in a village near my village lives a farmer who 
has a sexual relationship with a 40-year-old married woman. This woman lives in 
a different village, also near to my village, and is married to a very old man. They 
had children in the past, but now he cannot have sex with her anymore, so she found 
a lover in the farmer. The old man knows about this, but he is too old to do anything 
himself about it, and their children are still too small to take action [i.e., to punish 
the woman and her lover for dishonoring the family, presumably by killing both]. 
The farmer, the lover of this woman, is also married. He does not want to have sex 
with his wife anymore, and his wife has found herself a lover in her village. You 
know, she is still young, certain impulses are natural, and cannot go unsatisfied for 
long. The farmer knows that his wife has a lover, but he does not care. To be honest, 
everybody in the area knows what is going on in those houses. In my village, we 
don’t like this situation at all. It is bad, it is sinful, it is against Islam and against 
rawaj [Pashtun custom]. We don’t want something like this happening where we 
live. With some others in my village we have planned to get a hold of the farmer 
and beat him up, so that he learns his lesson and stops doing these things. If the 
family of the old man [i.e., his male small children] cannot protect his honor and 
respectability, we will do it for him. What is happening is not acceptable [de manalo 
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na de]. If the farmer starts having sex with his wife again, also his wife will stop 
having a lover. We have yet to carry out the plan, because we are worried about 
the consequences for us…we don’t want big problems…You see, it is not too 
difficult to have an illicit sexual affair in the countryside…you can meet in many 
places, in the fields, in a tractor along a small road…people do it, but it’s wrong, I 
don’t like it… 
Andrea – Well, many of my [male] friends have confessed to having extramarital 
relationships…it seems a pretty common thing… 
Baryalay – Yes, actually for men it is…but it’s really wrong…I made a promise to 
my wife, and I will keep it. It is important to me, and it is against Islam to do 
otherwise. 
Andrea – So, you know that you will never cheat on your wife. 
Baryalay – No, I don’t want to cheat on my wife, no…only if I have to stay away 
from her for a very long time…say one or two years, without ever seeing her, then 
I think that I would do it, because certain natural things cannot be kept down for 
too long… 
Andrea – I understand…however, even in that case, your wife, being at home with 
someone from your family, will be controlled and will not be able to satisfy her own 
natural impulses… 
Baryalay – Yes I know, you are right, it is not fair…women here live like in a prison, 
they cannot escape easily…but they too have their own natural impulses…        
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In his account of the intricate story of multiple adulteries, and his reaction to them, 
we can neatly detect the overlapping of the pacha and Pashtun selves that Baryalay 
maintains within himself. His religious upbringing makes him consider as unacceptable the 
sexually improper conduct of the protagonists of this story. Their behavior is un-Islamic 
and contrary to the main tenets of the Qur’an. As a pacha he cannot gloss over it. As a 
Pashtun, however, Baryalay believes not only that such behavior brings dishonor to the 
community at large in which he lives (note that the people involved are not living in his 
village), but that, more importantly, the compromised honor of the old man and the whole 
community must be restored through some sort of retributive (violent) action. In pukhto, 
the Pashtuns’ customs, it is men who take responsibility for redressing wrongs that involve 
the honor of a family or an individual. Masculinity revolves around the willingness to take 
action in cases such as this one (that is, it becomes a matter of ghairat). Against the 
practical impossibility for the old man’s family to take things into their own hands (the 
children of the man are too young to do so), dishonor falls upon the community which 
implicitly allows such state of facts to continue. This is an interesting case wherein the 
concept of honor, and its dynamics, are taken to an extreme. By this I mean that the 
symbolism surrounding honor here does not apply only to the individuals directly involved 
in the case (i.e., the extended families of the protagonists), but extends also to those who 
would technically be not involved, and yet are considered to be so by way of “analogy” – 
metonymically, as it were. The morally reprehensible state in which the individuals directly 
concerned are living, if not acted upon, will be considered as spreading, like a “contagion”, 
onto the whole community that hosts them. Inaction is considered to be connivance, and 
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responsibility becomes shared, bringing about shame for all. Sure enough, the method that 
Baryalay and his friends intended to use against the adulterer and/or adulteress, in order to 
preserve the moral integrity of the community (and discourage the repetition of similar 
behaviors), falls short of being a capital punishment, which is usually the case when sexual 
misconduct is involved. In this case, the degree of violence (planned or executed) seems to 
be inversely proportional to the distance in kin-relationships. If the sons of the old man and 
the adulteress had been able to bear arms, they would have been expected to kill either the 
adulterer, or their own mother (the adulteress), or preferably both.      
Yet such mechanism of metaphorical “contagion” is at work also in other 
circumstances, that are beyond local preoccupations with community honorability.  We 
have seen it working in the previous informants’ stories, particularly when related to the 
loss of social respectability for individuals associating with supposed disreputable people, 
such as foreigners or government officials. In 2012-2013, in the midst of a popular revolt 
against a military occupation and a government that is seen as a lackey of the “infidels”, it 
takes very little to fall from grace within a Pashtun rural community. We will see that the 
suspicion of having been “infected” (to remain within the medical metaphor) by the wrong 
ideas or moral values is susceptible to be leveled against anybody (including close kin 
members) for even seemingly trivial “missteps”, such as speaking with a foreign person or 
spending too much time in the city away from the controlling gaze of one’s fellow villagers. 
Once the suspicion has been unleashed, any repercussion is potentially expectable, from 
simple social ostracism to violent retribution. Yet punishment, in these cases of politically-
tinged moral misconduct (let us not forget that “jihad” is just as much a religious endeavor 
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as it is a political one, especially in the 21st century) comes often from apparatuses external 
to family and kin. In contemporary, post-9/11 Afghanistan, the politico-religious policing 
of the community has been taken over by those who claim to be the representative of the 
“true” Islam and to be fighting for it on occupied soil – the so-called Taliban and their 
satellite groups. Countless individuals, suspected or accused of (improbable) connivance 
with Western powers or the Afghan government have been kidnapped and/or killed during 
my stay in Afghanistan for precisely these reasons.  Baryalay himself is the victim of the 
mechanism of “contagion” because of his job for a foreign NGO. Regardless of what his 
ideas, moral values or behavior really reflect, the possibility that he might be “infected” by 
an un-Islamic mind-set is already open. As we have previously seen, his fears and anxieties 
spring partly from this situation.41 Such phenomenon is slightly different, I believe, from 
the usual dynamics that obtain in similar cases of occupation by external military forces, 
wherein usually the “collaborators” are subject to retribution by the community members 
who manage to uncover their participation in the occupier’s policies. Their actions, 
however, must generally be in material support of the occupier. In today’s Afghan Pashtun 
context, however, material help to the NATO forces in the country, or the Afghan 
                                                          
41 About eight months after my final departure from Afghanistan (June 2013), Baryalay updated 
me by phone about a disturbing event that took place a few days earlier. His youngest brother (the 
university student in Jalalabad) was kidnapped by unknown masked men from a shared taxi on his 
way back to the village. They stopped the car at an illegal check-point, screened the ID cards of all 
the passengers, and extracted Baryalay’s brother from the car. They accused him of working for 
the NGO for which Baryalay is working. His brother protested that he was just a university student, 
and called Baryalay on his cell phone. The militants were told by Baryalay that most likely they 
were looking for him, and that his brother had nothing to do with his job. The militants released 
Baryalay’s brother, warning Baryalay that they would soon find him and punish him for his 
collaboration with the foreign NGO. Following the incident, Baryalay relocated his wife and 
daughter to Jalalabad, where they all now live together in the small room he had rented for himself 
some time before. Baryalay now goes back to his village only on rare occasions. 
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government, is not an indispensable requisite to be considered a “collaborator”, and be 
punished accordingly. Something more impalpable and “invisible” becomes the catalyst 
for such a phenomenon in (particularly) rural Pashtun Afghanistan. For this reason the 
metaphor of the “contagion” seems to me especially apt. There is no way to demonstrate 
that one has not been “infected”. The “disease” does not show, as the providing of material 
support for the enemy would upon investigation. There is no way in which the individual 
who is accused of having become “un-Islamic” or a “bad Muslim” because of his (even 
loose) association with non-Pashtun, non-Afghan individuals, may restore his good name. 
Such condition is so ineffable, so “unfalsifiable” (to paraphrase Karl Popper’s terms) that, 
once attached, it stays on almost indefinitely. The psychological mechanism undergirding 
this phenomenon has its roots certainly in fear, uncertainty, and the premise of superiority 
(vis-à-vis all other Afghans) that Pashtuns nurture for themselves. Amidst a national 
narrative, wide-spread down to the smallest communities in Pashtun areas of the country, 
that has historically exalted the position of moral privilege and consequent political power 
that the Pashtun ethnic group held within the multiethnic composition of the Afghan state, 
every single Pashtun (male) individual  is today in a precarious position. Pashtuns have 
much to lose from a new unfolding political arrangement in the country, heralded by the 
current Western-backed government. Any change or modification to the state of facts 
which, until the demise of the Taliban regime, had legitimized the prerogatives of Pashtuns 
in Afghanistan to the detriment of all other ethnicities, will endanger the maintenance of 
such prerogatives, and cause the consequent diminution of the intrinsic “value” of the 
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personal identification with the Pashtun ethnic group.42 This broad socio-political 
dynamics has therefore a repercussion onto the psychological dynamics of individual 
Pashtuns. A diminution of the social and political importance of Pashtuns as an ethnic 
group in Afghanistan (although often couched in moral terms) may possibly cause a loss 
of self-esteem and a damaged self-representation in single Pashtun individuals. The mere 
possibility of this to happen induces fear and anger, interpretable as the result of a perceived 
narcissistic injury (albeit unconsciously). The bigger the fear of the loss of one’s privileged 
position, the more “obsessive” become the means used to prevent this from happening (i.e., 
to prevent the narcissistic injury from materializing). Seen through this lens, the 
phenomenon seems akin to what psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut defined as “narcissistic rage” 
(Kohut 1972:360-400. Kohut mentions explicitly what he calls “shame-prone societies”). 
The reaction to the specter of a diminished personal value is as uncompromising and 
violent as it is disproportionate to the threat. Fear becomes omnipresent and pervasive (if 
unconscious), and any small detail is poised to (almost irrationally) be interpreted as a 
threat, reinforcing the feeling of uncertainty and fear. Narcissistic rage is publicly enacted 
through the radical excommunication of any individual who might even remotely be 
                                                          
42 Paradoxically, in discussing this issue some of my Pashtun informants spoke of their group 
explicitely in terms of “persecution”. The perception of the situation was that other ethnic groups 
in Afghanistan were consciously trying to put down Pashtuns, in order to take revenge and gain 
control over them. They felt disenfranchised by the unfolding political situation in the country. 
Such interpretation is particularly interesting because of the dominance that Pashtuns have 
maintained over the political and social spheres in Afghanistan since the 18th century. The fear for 
the loss of such dominant position (enacted by the rise in power of other ethnic groups) gives 
birth to a paradoxical sense of victimization. Particularly Hazaras were seen as viciously intent at 
attacking Pashtun socio-political positions. In this regard, however, a few among my informants 
managed to express a more “introspective” opinion when they admitted that their fear stemmed 
from a slightly different realization: “If they get too much power, they will do to us what we did 
to them”.  
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thought to be implicated with those whom people mainly believe to be the sources of the 
perceived threat (foreigners, and Afghans who work alongside the foreigners, in any 
capacity). At the same time, in order to minimize the potential damage, the boundaries of 
the safe and secure in-group shrink more and more, condemning an increasing number of 
community members to be ostracized from the in-group and “othered”, for seemingly 
irrelevant missteps (see Campbell and LeVine 1961, LeVine and Campbell 1971, LeVine 
2001. More recently, from a political perspective, cf. Kinder and Kam 2009). In the case 
of Baryalay, for example, his activities with the foreign agricultural NGO have in reality 
nothing to do with any political or educational propaganda. His position involves technical 
assistance to farmers, and the foreign money that the NGO utilizes goes only towards the 
enhancement of agricultural productivity for local farmers. Nevertheless, the mechanism 
of “contagion” makes him to the eyes of some community members an “infected” 
individual, who is by definition influenced by morally corrupt ideas and values. For this 
reason susceptible to paying the price of the narcissistic rage that erupts in the people, who 
see him as the incarnation of the threat that they most fear: the loss of social capital and 
individual self-esteem that derives from Baryalay’s status. As another example, some 
among my informants had to interrupt any relationship with me mid-way through my 
fieldwork, after rumors spread in their villages that they were frequenting a foreigner, 
which was interpreted as a potential proof to their disloyalty to the group, or, worse, of 
their possible incompatibility with Pashtun morals and political objectives.  The fear of 
violent retribution made them stop meeting me in any way, either in their village or in 
Jalalabad. 
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However much Baryalay rejects this kind of mind-set and psychological response 
to a (recent) socio-political dynamics unfolding in Afghanistan, he is nevertheless caught 
by the same phenomenon when it comes to intra-community matters that threaten the 
supposed moral perfection and Islamic purity of a Pashtun community. Personal 
misconduct endangered the self-esteem and sense of religious exceptionalism of all those 
who deeply identified themselves with the community as a whole (see the case of multiple 
adultery). The response that followed, in terms of narcissistic rage, is similar to that which 
follows in the previous cases mentioned in relation to the changing socio-political Afghan 
scene. A violent retribution was planned, although it was not yet carried out. These two 
faces of the same coin seem to be very much peculiar to Pashtun Afghans, at least in the 
radicalism and uncompromising fashion in which they are enacted. In this sense, Baryalay 
is still just as much a pacha as he is a Pashtun man. In longing to express his sense of the 
purity of the in-group, as well as to display his masculinity in protecting it, he demonstrates 
the depth of his Pashtun enculturation, and the relevance for himself of his “Pashtun self”, 
alongside his pious and peaceful “pacha self”. The appropriate norms of comportment for 
a “true and respectable” Pashtun man still inform and constrain his behavior to a 
remarkable degree. Not only his pious Muslim self was outraged at what he knew was 
happening in the villages nearby, but his appropriately Pashtun masculine self saw as the 
necessary solution to the situation a retaliatory action, which, in line with rawaj in cases of 
compromised honor, was required to both clear the reputation of the community, and affirm 
the masculine worth of the men who would be eventually involved in the punitive 
expedition.  
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What interestingly emerges from the last passage is also Baryalay’s attitude towards 
women’s condition and sexual vicissitudes in a Pashtun environment. It is difficult to gauge 
at the roots of such interpretation of women’s problematic situation, which is by no means 
a mainstream interpretation among the many Pashtun male individuals that I encountered 
(of all social strata, and from diverse educational backgrounds). To begin with, Baryalay’s 
understanding of his “promise” to his wife not to engage in extra-marital relationships is 
noticeable in and of itself. As he also remarks, in passing, it is very common (upon my 
experience as well) for married men to have illicit relationships with other women, whether 
married or unmarried (outside cases of plain prostitution, which are also found). The moral 
double standard, whereby it is not considered shameful for a man to engage in such 
relationships, while for a woman it is deemed to bring shame and dishonor upon the whole 
family, is hardly ever articulated and reflected upon, and usually it is explained away with 
a simple “that’s the way it goes, and how it should be”. In one particular occasion, a young 
unmarried friend of mine from Jalalabad, while discussing with me our own respective 
sexual lives, reacted with astonishment at the fact that I did not have any sexual 
relationships with other women since I got into the relationship with my wife. He asked 
me: “Why did you do that? Are you stupid? It’s like eating only Kabuli palaw [a common 
dish of rice and meat] every day for the rest of your life...don’t you want to eat something 
else?”. In his opinion, it was clearly a foolish mistake, on my part, not to have taken 
advantage of the prerogatives that my position as the man in the relationship would have 
provided me with. He went on by describing a recent sexual experience he had had in Kabul 
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with a young married woman whom he casually met at a job interview. It is well possible 
that some of the “adventures” described by my informants may have not in fact happened, 
and I was indeed told by some of my informants that sometimes (and not surprisingly) men 
make up stories to enhance their masculine reputation among their friends. Nevertheless, 
the recurrence of these “confessions” is such that, even controlling for possible fake 
accounts, statistically such phenomenon must be quite common among men. Thus, the 
attitude that Baryalay has towards marriage, and his wife in particular, is rather remarkable. 
One more element worth noticing is what Baryalay says about “natural impulses” towards 
sexual satisfaction, even for women. He is adamant in acknowledging that women, as much 
as men, are subject to sexual urges that would be “unnatural”   to frustrate. He seems to 
justify, after all, the behavior of the young wife of the farmer (who in turn has a relationship 
with a 40-year-old woman). She is young, Baryalay says, and certain impulses are difficult 
to repress indefinitely. The responsibility for her adulterous actions seems to fall upon the 
reproachable behavior of her husband, the farmer, who wrongly chose to start a relationship 
with the 40-year-old woman in the first place. Baryalay is also ready to acknowledge the 
unfairness of the fact that the liberty he could take for himself in sexual matters, in the case 
of a protracted absence from home, would never be conceded to his wife. She would be 
confined to her house under the constant surveillance of Baryalay’s male family members. 
Although he would not allow the situation to develop in any different way, due to the dire 
social consequences, Baryalay at least seems conscious and aware of the moral double 
standard that would condemn his wife to a repressed and frustrated sexual life. She lives in 
a prison, he admits, from which she cannot escape. Such standpoint is definitely not 
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common among men in Pashtun contexts. Baryalay’s empathy and egalitarian attitude 
towards the opposite sex represents a rarity, as far as my experience goes. I am not able to 
speculate about the source of such peculiarity in Baryalay’s views. Is it the outcome of the 
penetration of Western-oriented ideas and socio-political ideologies into the midst of well-
educated, if peripheral, Afghan men? Is it an aspect of Baryalay’s pious and inclusive 
Islamic upbringing as a pacha? Certainly the answer will be overdetermined, and these 
elements will surely be part of it.  
 
As we have seen above, enmities (dukhmani) and interpersonal conflicts (lanja) are what 
renders Baryalay’s life in the village least bearable. The incompatibility of this aspect of 
Pashtun life (very common across all Pashtun rural areas, at this point in time in 
Afghanistan) with Baryalay’s personality traits and inclinations was extensively elaborated 
during our conversations. He described a few incidents that took place in his village to 
explain more vividly the situation.  
 
I told you, the people in the village fight all the time…it’s like they enjoy fighting. 
For example, four or five months ago, the farmer who is my neighbor, and who has 
a field which borders one of our fields, started cultivating a field which had been 
left abandoned for many years, and which borders both our fields. We don’t know 
who owns it, it has been left to itself for a long time. Anyway, in order to reach 
other fields that we own, we had to pass through this abandoned field. It’s a 
common thing, there is often a right of passage into the fields of other people [very 
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often cultivated fields are intersected by narrow strips of elevated, non-cultivated 
ground, in order to give the possibility to others to pass through one’s fields freely]. 
One day, this neighbor of ours started working the land of the abandoned field, and 
did not allow us anymore to pass through. We had to go a long way to get to the 
other fields we owned, beyond the abandoned field. We went several times to this 
farmer to ask why he was appropriating something that was not his, and to try to 
make him change his behavior. He did not care, he just said that he wanted to 
cultivate that field, and that he did not give us the right to pass through. He was 
arrogant [mughoror], and acted like a bully [zurawaar]. At that point many other 
families would have gathered their men and would have ended up fighting with the 
men of the other family to solve the thing. Our neighbor was disrespecting us 
[ihtiram na kawalo], and our honor [izzat] was at stake. But we chose not to fight. 
We went to some elders in the village, and we called up a Jirga to solve the problem 
without fighting. The guy accepted the Jirga, and now we are in negotiations. The 
family of this neighbor is a powerful family…this is why he thought that he could 
do this abuse [zulm] without problems. But we have influence too [nufuz]…people 
in the office of the district governor know us, they know we are pachaiaan and that 
we are good Muslims…the guy had to accept the Jirga…The elders have already 
told him that the right of passage is something that he must give to other people, he 
can’t just do as he pleases…We have yet to reach an agreement.  
Andrea – So, he accepted the Jirga just because you were also an influential family 
[ghat famil way]? 
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Baryalay – Yes, I am sure that if we had been a weak family [zaif], he would have 
not accepted the Jirga. You see, abusive people [zurawaraan], if they are powerful, 
they can do whatever they want, they can even not accept a Jirga. Who is going to 
force them? The elders do not have the power to implement their decisions 
[faisala]…And even when a powerful person accepts the Jirga, after he has taken 
away a piece of land that did not belong to him from a weak family, a Jirga will 
only be able to settle things by leaving half of the stolen land to the zurawaar…the 
legitimate owner will lose half of his land anyway…it’s not fair…it’s really 
wrong… 
Andrea – Does it happen often? 
Baryalay – Yes, at least more than it did before. Old people say that it got worse in 
the past years…It’s crazy…one day you go to your field and you might find 
somebody that is working your land…they start working a little bit of your land 
across the boundary. You confront them, and they might say “Oh, I am sorry, I did 
not realize”, or even “I don’t care, I work this land as mine now”…What can you 
do?...It’s bad [da kharab de]…There are a lot of zurawaraan now… 
 
The conflict between the different cultural schemata within Baryalay (and the different 
subjectivities that build upon them) is evident here. He knows the rules of the game in the 
village, and his subjectivity (his self-image that is premised on pukhto) is shaped by them. 
Hence, he is aware that letting someone take advantage of his rights and properties 
jeopardizes the honor of the family (beyond being simply unfair in terms of “common 
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sense”). Such schema, developed according to the usual Pashtun cultural narrative, 
resonates strongly with Baryalay, and indexes the relevance of the Pashtun self in him. 
However, unlike many others in the village, he and his family members (except his father, 
of course) manage to refuse to conform to the custom that would have self-help (i.e., 
violence) as the primary resource to tap in cases of compromised honor. The pacha 
upbringing, and its attending cultural schemata (which have shaped a concomitant 
subjectivity, self-image), call for a different resolution of the problem. Crucial for the 
coherence of his complementary “pacha self”, these moral and ethical principles overcome 
those derived from the Pashtun cultural narrative, and affirm themselves as the main 
element behind Baryalay behavior in this case. Again, the two selves, the two sets of 
“meaning-making”, that Baryalay is carrying forward are complementary, not mutually 
exclusive. There is no apparent fragmentation in the overall self-perception (his self-
representation) that Baryalay experiences. Where the “pacha self” overrules the “Pashtun 
self” (or rather, the current, widespread interpretation of the Pashtun cultural norms that 
Baryalay partly rejects), it is in order to embody a “better” Pashtun, closer to the ideal 
model of it (or what Baryalay believes it to be). Even more, we have previously seen how 
the two sets of subjectivities, one based on religious sensitivity, the other on cultural 
propriety in displaying manliness, managed to interact complementarily in the account he 
gave of the planned punitive expedition against the adulterous villagers living in his area. 
Though utilitarian and self-legitimizing as it might seem, Baryalay’s management of his 
multiple selves is positively functional to his psychic balance (notwithstanding the daily 
suffering and frustrations), and is perceived as providing coherence for that illusion of the 
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unity and univocality of the self that is so necessary to human psychological equilibrium 
(Modell 2008, Frie 2008a, Bromberg 1996, Stolorow and Atwood 1994). 
 
The legacy of three decades of violent conflict  
 
It would appear that incidents involving abuse and violence, like the one just sketched 
above, seemingly happen to many on a regular basis. In order to elucidate the chaotic and 
anxious “everybody-for-himself” village dynamics, Baryalay recounted another incident 
that had happened a short time prior to one of our conversations. While the three decades 
of continuous conflict might be at the root of these problematic behaviors, we will see that 
the last decade in particular has added a peculiar spin to the issue.   
 
Some twenty years ago, an old villager who had been left without offspring and 
wives, made a will before dying, in which he donated a big piece of land to the 
village mosque as waqf [a religious endowment]. This piece of land became the 
graveyard of the village. Six months ago, more or less, the descendants of this man 
started forbidding people to bury their dead in the graveyard. They claimed that 
the field was their property, and cut all the mulberry trees that were growing on 
the lot. They used the trees to make firewood. The villagers became very angry, and 
I was angry too. It was not fair for them to claim the land as theirs and cut the old 
trees. We went to the woliswal [the district governor] and with him we chose a few 
elders who would set up a Jirga to discuss the issue. The Jirga decided that the 
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descendants of the old man did not have the right to claim for themselves the 
graveyard, and that they had to allow people to bury their dead in the field as 
previously. In the beginning, the descendants of the old man accepted the decision. 
Then, a few weeks later, they again started to prevent people from using the 
graveyard. We villagers complained, and waited to decide what to do. One day, 
unexpectedly, the Taliban arrived in the village. Somebody had alerted them of the 
problem. I don’t know who it was. The Taliban took control of the situation. They 
had their faces covered, I don’t think they were people from the area…but they 
were not from Pakistan, they were from here…They ordered both parties [the 
descendants of the old man, and the villagers] to appoint two religious scholars 
who would discuss the matter among themselves, and then reach a verdict.  Here, 
in the district, we have some preachers who have gone to school in Pakistan, and 
got some real degrees from religious schools, so we appointed two of them we knew, 
and they did the same. Our two mullahs went to one Haqqania madrasa in Pakistan 
[a Wahhabi-oriented madrasa]. The Taliban acknowledged that we found our 
jirgamaraan [the Jirga members], and told us: ”Now you have a Jirga. Let the 
jirgamaraan take a decision, and then respect it. It is based on shari’a. If you will 
not respect it, we will come back and punish you”. In the end, the Jirga decided 
that the family of the old man would have to leave the field to the community, as it 
was in the past. Nobody went to the woliswal, as we did the first time, or to the 
police. The Taliban said that anybody who would go for help to the woliswal would 
be killed. Recently, the family of the old man has requested the opinion of a fifth 
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mullah, to see if the decision taken by the other four was really fair. So far the issue 
is stopped at that. The Taliban have not come back yet, but I am sure that somebody 
will call them up again. You see how it goes today, the mullahs have much more 
importance than in the past. Religion has become more important than rawaj 
[custom] in many cases. When I was a kid, I remember jirgas were made up of only 
elders…the mullah came later, only to make a ritual at the end of the Jirga, so that 
everybody could say that the decision had been taken according to shari’a. Now 
the Taliban make you have a mullah as a jirgamaar. But their ideas are wrong, this 
is not Islam, what they are imposing…it’s politics…They want to look like they are 
respecting rawaj and the Jirga, but in fact they are forcing their ideas of religion 
on the people.     
 
While Baryalay participates in the indignation of the villagers at the usurpation of the waqf 
communal property by the family of the previous owner, for the sake of their own personal 
interests, the development of the facts still leaves him extremely frustrated, for several 
reasons. The abuse that the family of the old man perpetrated against a religious property 
for communal use is one more clue for Baryalay to the unbearable situation of everyday 
life in the village, as well as to the deterioration of the moral fabric of the average Pashtun 
man. He sees that his ideal model of the righteous man who follows pukhto, embodied by 
the khan who pays the quotas of other villagers in order to build the bridge for the 
enjoyment of the whole village, is drifting away from the current social landscape. 
Likewise, the more recent “religious” bend that social relationships have taken, does not 
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leave him comfortable either. It represents a religious fervor that is dependent on, and 
subservient to, the influx of Islamic radicalism brewing in Pakistan since the late 1970s. It 
dramatically migrated to Afghanistan during the anti-Soviet war, and, especially, after  the 
various waves of returnees came back from the refugee camps in Pakistan after the Soviets’ 
retreat. The Taliban, as Baryalay knows too well, were but one product of such dynamics, 
and today’s “Neo-Taliban” (see Giustozzi 2007) are the updated version of the same 
phenomenon. The insurgents who now carry out military operations against the Afghan 
government and the foreign troops are also mostly imbued with (among other things)  a 
religious fundamentalism that reminds Baryalay of the radicalism springing from the 
Pakistani Wahhabi madrasas, once promoted by the Taliban state apparatus of the late ‘90s. 
It does not certainly represent the kind of Islam that Baryalay was educated into as a pacha. 
Thus, this incident indexes two main thorns that Baryalay feels in his side, and that poison 
his life in the village: the unacceptable way of expressing one’s masculinity, based on 
violence and abuse, and the “distorted” interpretation of Islam that is gaining the upper 
hand in the minds of his fellow villagers.  
The increased frequency of violent anti-government activities by groups that 
loosely self-identify as “Taliban”, or that operate without affiliation with broader-based 
insurgency movements, is revivng a situation of widespread social insecurity and violent 
deviant behaviors that many people associate with the civil war of the mid-‘90s. 
Ruthlessness and zulm (cruelty) are coming back to being a part of the daily moral 
landscape in both urban and (especially) rural areas. Those responsible for such violence 
seem to behave in accord to a new “state of exception” (in Giorgio Agamben’s terms 
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[Agamben 2005]) justified by the occupation of the country by thousands of foreign troops. 
A novel “holy war” authorizes a new suspension of the moral and ethical guarantees that 
ideally would belong only to a “normal” historical contingency. The same process that in 
the ‘80s started the shift in behavioral patterns, and authenticated new standards for moral 
values, which still hold valid in today’s Pashtun masculine environment (Fredrik Barth’s 
feedback effect [see Barth 1966]), is developing in the current situation of fierce opposition 
to the ongoing multinational military effort in Afghanistan. Expectations for the expression 
of manliness and valor are once again being renegotiated, exacerbating the already 
harshened standards shaped by the three decades of previous conflicts. 
The rural district where Baryalay lives, Pachir-wa-Agam, is one of the epicenters of such 
process. Removed from the influence of the administrative provincial center, Jalalabad, 
and far from the main arteries of communication, the district has never experienced a stable 
and firm government control since 2001. Between 2010 and 2011 Pachir-wa-Agam 
experienced a severe deterioration in its general security situation that included a steady 
encroachment on its territory by elements that pursued a violent opposition to the Afghan 
government and the multinational military contingent. Baryalay often started our sessions 
with a chronicle of his trip from or to his village by car. He would give me details of the 
events that had taken place during the latest trip. The picture he portrayed of the general 
situation in the rural areas where he lived and drove through was bleak. Police stayed holed 
up in their compounds along the main road from Jalalabad to Pachir-wa-Agam, appearing 
at the site of an incident only after the fact, only after all the insurgents had fled the scene. 
Illegal checkpoints by anti-government forces were growing more frequent, and more 
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ruthless. The Afghan army had no presence in the whole area. Between 4pm and 8am all 
roads, and the countryside as a whole, were in total control of the insurgents. He often 
repeated a saying that apparently was becoming rather popular among locals: pa wraz ke, 
de hukumat dawlat de, pa shpe ke, de Talebanu dawlat de (during the day it’s the 
government’s country, during the night it’s the Taliban’s country). And this still seemed to 
me an understatement, given that reports of insurgents’ activity in broad daylight were 
pretty common (as I was unfortunately able to confirm first-hand more than once).  Indeed, 
I witnessed the multiplication of episodes that demonstrated the heightened level of 
violence and how the moral yardstick was changing, against which values like social 
respectability and qualities such as manliness became measured. Baryalay, like many 
among his peers, was heavily affected by the perceived change in the general atmosphere. 
In one of our sessions, he recounted one of the most troubling among these incidents. 
 
Last week, while in a taxi [often a private car that carries people for money] going 
back to my village from Jalalabad, people were talking about an incident that had 
taken place on the same road just a few days earlier. They were telling how a fuel 
tanker was attacked by the Taliban on the way to Pachir-wa-Agam, near the border 
with Chaprihar [the neighboring district]. They hit the tanker with an RPG-7 [a 
rocket propelled grenade], and it went up in flames. The driver jumped down from 
the vehicle to save himself. The Taliban caught the driver right there on the road. 
They told him to follow them, but he refused. He said that he would rather die there. 
So they put him on his knees and shot him in the back of the head with a rifle. Then 
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they left. The other day, while coming to Jalalabad, we stopped to get something to 
drink and eat at the place where this incident happened. There were food stalls and 
a small restaurant. I spoke with one of the owners of the stalls, who witnessed the 
fact, and asked him what had happened. He confirmed the story, and told me that 
the truck driver looked like a young men, little more than a boy. He could have been 
17 or 18, he said. They shot him on the road, in front of everybody, without mercy 
[rahmat], without shame [sharm]. The owner of the stall was angry at the people 
who did this. He said it was not humane to do so [insanyat na de], that this was 
against Islam. A lot of people feel the same way. They are upset at this incident, 
and many others. People who do these things [i.e., the insurgents] are not human, 
and are not Muslim. They are crazy. I hate them [zma bad ye razi]. If I was a little 
more powerful, and if I had friends who would follow me, I would find these people 
and kill them. I would punish them for what they have done to that boy.  
Andrea – But if so many people are against the actions of the Taliban, why don’t 
they do something against them? 
Baryalay -  In the past, some villages tried to rebel, to do something against these 
people. But they have been punished, the insurgents [yaghyaan] have gone to those 
villages and killed the people that had organized action against them [arbakay, or 
groups of self-help]. People now are scared, and do not dare to do anything 
anymore.  
Andrea – Are these insurgents [yaghyaan] local people, or are they from 
somewhere else? 
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Baryalay – No, usually they are from the area…we can tell from the way they 
speak…we can’t see their faces when they stop our cars, or make checkpoints, 
because they cover them with a scarf [zaader], but we can hear the way they 
speak…they are mostly from these areas. There might be someone from outside 
sometimes, maybe people who bring them money, supplies, weapons, but those who 
do things on the ground, they mostly are from here. You know, they are normal 
people…I mean, they have normal jobs in the bazaar, or in the fields, or are jobless. 
When the order comes, they leave their occupation, carry out the attack, and then 
come back to whatever they do for a living. That’s why they cover their faces when 
they operate…they know that there are people that could recognize them, and it 
could be dangerous for them…you know, maybe someone reports them secretly to 
the Afghan army, or to the foreigners, and then there is a drone attack, or an army 
attack, or whatever…they keep their identity secret [pat]…There is a lot of zulm 
[cruelty, abuse] these days, much more than in the past, as far as I can 
remember…it’s a horrible situation, you hear of things happening almost every 
day…a few weeks ago, on the border between Pachir-wa-Agam and Chaprihar the 
body of a man was found beheaded. It had been half eaten by wild animals, those 
who killed him cared to bury him only in part…it was found by some people walking 
down the road…  
 
Baryalay paused for about half a minute after recounting this story, and I did not interrupt 
his thoughts. Then he addressed me again with a different topic. 
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Baryalay – You know, one time, when I was in university in Khost…I used to go 
often back and forth to Peshawar to see my brother who lived there…one time I 
was going back to Khost from Peshawar, and in my taxi there was a friend of mine, 
with whom I was making the trip back to university, and a man with his sister. He 
must have been around 30 years old, and his sister I could not see, because she was 
covered by her burka. They were kuchyaan [nomadic Pashtuns], they were very 
poor. I was sitting in the back seat of the car, beside the man, who was between me 
and his sister, and my friend was in the front seat. The woman was clearly sick, she 
was coughing from time to time, and she was mumbling something to his brother’s 
ear often. At times she would stop coughing or talking to his brother, at which point 
he would shake her, as if he was trying to wake her up or ensure that she was still 
alive. We had to change car a couple of times during the trip, because there was 
no car that went from Peshawar straight to Khost. At the first change, the woman 
was sitting on the side of the road, with her head down, without moving, and his 
brother was beside her. I asked him if there was something wrong, and if they 
needed help. He said that his sister had tuberculosis, and that they had gone to 
Peshawar to see a doctor, but it was too complicated and expensive, so they decided 
to go back to Khost and have her see a local doctor. I felt very bad for them, and I 
talked to my friend. We offered them some money to help them with the medical 
expenses, and told them that they should go back to Peshawar. The man refused, 
and did not take our money. We continued the trip, but the woman was getting 
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worse. She moved and talked less and less. During another change of car, finally 
she stopped moving, and her brother told us that she was dead. They remained 
there, and my friend convinced me to keep on with our trip, because he was scared 
of the place we were in…it was Waziristan, and he was afraid of the people there. 
He said they were savages, dangerous, and they should not be trusted. So we drove 
back to Khost that day…I felt bad afterwards, very bad…I became ill, and had to 
go to Peshawar to a hospital…I stayed about a month in the hospital, and then I 
got better… 
Andrea – What happened to you? Why were you sick? 
Baryalay – I don’t know, I felt very bad, I could not sleep, I could not eat…I don’t 
know what happened to me… 
Andrea – Did you feel responsible [masul] for what had happened to the woman? 
Baryalay – I don’t know, maybe, but I felt that it was wrong that she died…she 
shouldn’t have died… 
Andrea – Why are you telling me this story now? 
Baryalay – I don’t know, it just came up to my mind… 
 
I interpreted the association that Baryalay spontaneously made between what he had just 
told me about the security situation in his district (i.e., the attack on the gas tanker, and the 
beheaded man), and the story about the death of this woman on the way to Khost, as 
Baryalay’s way of unconsciously communicating to me the sense of deep discomfort, 
claustrophobic anxiety, and moral disgust that he perceived about his social life in the 
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village, as well as his personal condition of being virtually trapped in that state. We did not 
discuss the deep roots of his otherwise inexplicable, depressive reaction after the disturbing 
death of the woman during his trip to Khost (i.e., his hospitalization). Rather, my attention 
was directed to the meaning of the associative link that he had expressed by spontaneously 
coupling the story of the killing of the truck driver with the death of the woman. The point 
was not in the reasons for his hospitalization at that time, but in the reasons for his thought 
association during the session with me. The association itself had a meta-meaning that went 
beyond the motives for what had happened to him during and after the trip to Khost. 
Baryalay was trying to tell me something about himself in the here-and-now through 
linking together two episodes in his life that apparently had little to do with each other. 
What these episodes had in common was that their juxtaposition was used by Baryalay to 
convey information to me about his state of mind and emotions in the present. I could not 
help but feel the sense of helplessness and impotence that Baryalay must have felt 
overwhelmed by, every day, because of the kind of life he was forced to conduct in his 
native village. In his associative thought process, being crammed in a small car with 
strangers, without the possibility to move or “escape”, having to witness the agony of the 
last hours of a woman’s life, without the possibility of doing anything to help her, running 
the risk of remaining stranded in a strange place among “dangerous” people, were all 
images that I believe Baryalay unconsciously used as metaphors for his own suffering and 
despair in the village (and in Afghanistan as a whole). The latter were epitomized by the 
dramatic description of the public execution of the young truck driver. It conveyed to me 
the oppressive state of mind of a villager like Baryalay who is every day surrounded by 
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possible enemies who hide their faces while inflicting violence, only to come back to their 
homes, perhaps as close as the compund next door. The juxtaposition, or association, of 
the two stories speaks to the profound feelings of hopelessness that Baryalay confronts as 
a moral being (culturally expressed in terms of his religious pacha upbringing), as well as 
a masculine being (culturally expressed in terms of his “Pashtun-ness”). Within a quickly 
changing landscape of religious morality and performative masculinity, Baryalay finds no 
easy avenues to publicly express himself simultaneously in a moral and masculine way. 
Indeed the seeming impossibility to find such an avenue leaves him in a state of painful 
impotence, as conveyed to me in his unconscious associations during our conversations.    
 
Perceiving oneself: “authenticity” and intimacy           
 
Baryalay’s sense of powerlessness (and, likely, masculine inadequacy) is no doubt 
increased by the fact that also his wife is apparently unhappy with her life in the village. 
She would like to leave just as much as he does. Baryalay cannot do much to mitigate his 
wife’s discomfort. The two had an arranged marriage, as is customary, some three years 
prior to the start of our sessions, and have a daughter who at the time was about two years 
old.  Baryalay’s wife is an illiterate young woman of 23, also from a pacha background 
like himself (pachaiaan tend to be an endogamous group), yet from a different district in 
the province. The two families are not related by kinship, but rather came to know each 
other through the close network of acquaintances that all Pashtun pachaiaan maintain 
throughout Afghanistan. While Baryalay always acknowledged the many downsides of 
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arranged marriages, he consistently declared that he was lucky, because his marriage was 
proceeding satisfactorily and he and his wife did not have problems or frictions. In his 
opinion, they adjusted well to each other and cared sincerely for each other, which 
apparently does not happen very often. Both kept as a priority the good functioning of the 
marital relationship, Baryalay explained, and he considered himself and his wife a happy 
couple. On my part, I can say that during our sessions I had the opportunity to witness 
countless phone calls between Baryalay and his wife, initiated by either one. In fact, in 
comparison with the frequency with which I witnessed intra-couple phone calls among 
other informants in similar circumstances, I can certainly consider that Baryalay kept 
himself in contact with his wife much more often than average. Often the calls represented 
just a quick check on how the other was doing, and, especially on Baryalay’s wife’s part, 
on whether he had had any problems on the road to Jalalabad, which was to her – and 
rightly so – a very concerning matter. At other times the conversations would center on an 
update on issues that the household might be going through, fresh news from the village 
life or simply the need to keep in touch with each other. The conversations’ tone, especially 
on the part of Baryalay, was always very soft and respectful, lacking a domineering mode 
that I had heard often in other informants. In one of our sessions he said: 
 
My wife and I have been lucky, because we like each other, we get along together 
well…many others are not so lucky…Relations between our families are good, she 
can go back to her parents’ house any time she wants [for visiting, that is, which is 
sometimes not a given, and mostly depends on the husband’s attitudes towards his 
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wife and her family]. We take decisions together in the house, I listen to what she 
says, and she listens to me, and then we take a decision together.   
Andrea – Do you think she is ok in your family’s village? [as is usual in Pashtun 
society, also pacha families are patrilocal]. 
Baryalay – Well, I think she is ok, she adjusts well…I mean, we are pachaiaan, and 
she is as well, and she understands that pachaiaan do things a little bit differently 
from other Pashtuns, I explained this to you…she understands the importance of 
our traditions. 
Andrea – What do you mean? 
Baryalay – Well, you see, for pachaiaan it is customary [rawaji] to keep a stricter 
purdah [female segregation] than other Pashtuns…pacha women do not run 
errands in the village, they stay in the house, go out less often than other women 
do…and when they go out, they are never alone and wear a burqa also inside the 
village, while other women moving inside the village usually wear only a hejab [a 
head scarf].    
Andrea – Does she ever talk to you about her feelings, what she feels about living 
in the village? 
Baryalay – Yes, sometimes, when we are alone, she complains a little about our 
life. She says that she is tired of all the risks, the problems, that she would like to 
leave Afghanistan, go somewhere she could be more free [khoshi]… 
Andrea – Did she ever go anywhere else, like Peshawar, or Kabul? 
Baryalay – No, she only lived in her village, and my village. 
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Andrea – So, how does she know that other places are more “free”, that she would 
feel better living somewhere else? 
Baryalay – Well, several members of her family left Afghanistan a long time ago, 
and now they live in Australia, and I think also Canada. They call her on the phone 
from time to time, and every once in a while they come back to Afghanistan to visit. 
So she talks to them a lot, they tell her about their lives, what they do, their 
jobs…she listens as if she was listening to a tale [nukkal]. She also tells them about 
her own life, they discuss about it, I guess that she realizes the difference…so she 
dreams of going away from here…  
Andrea – So your wife is not exactly happy… 
Baryalay – Well, she adjusts well to our situation, but she would like to live 
differently, I guess… 
Andrea – How does this make you feel? How do you feel about your wife being 
unhappy [khapa] in Afghanistan? 
Baryalay – I feel bad for her…I understand why she does not like it here, I too wish 
we could live somewhere else…I wish I could do something for her…but what could 
I do? It’s not my fault if we cannot leave, right? I have a job, but that’s not enough 
to give us the money to leave…and then I have responsibilities with my family… 
Andrea – But imagine you could leave, go to Canada, imagine, right? [fars kra, ka 
na?]. You know that in the West certain rules of behavior [barkhord] are different 
than in Afghanistan, no? For instance, women can leave the house as they please, 
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and they often can find themselves a job. What would you do if your wife told you 
that she wanted to live like that? 
Baryalay – No, I know that in the West things are different…I have no problems 
with my wife going out of the house, and even finding a job…the issue would be 
with my family back in Afghanistan. If they knew that my wife was working out of 
the house, among strange men, without me to check on her, they would make 
problems for us, they would give us peghor [the act of vociferously complaining 
with someone for contravening moral norms]…that would make me and my family 
dishonorable [beghairata]…    
 
The relationship that Baryalay has with his wife is certainly the most intimate and 
tender among all the informants that I worked with in Afghanistan. During the many hours 
I spent with other friends, very rarely I have witnessed phone conversations between 
husband and wife, and when I did, the general tone was always less “equal” (for lack of a 
better term) than the one I found in Baryalay. That they “take decision together”, as 
Baryalay stated, was more than rhetoric geared towards the Western listener, whose 
mindset and expectations are widely known and anticipated among Afghans, especially in 
the delicate realm of gender relations. I actually heard Baryalay more than once discuss 
with his wife by phone the best course of action to take about various issues – from what 
to do when their daughter fell sick, to how to organize a certain family celebration, or 
whether he should cut short his stay in Jalalabad to go back home to the village and give 
help to his wife with the household management. It is such intimacy, and emotional 
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closeness, that makes me believe that Baryalay suffers the frustration of not being able to 
fulfill some of his wife’s wishes, which he deems legitimate and understandable – for 
example, longing for a different place where to spend their lives. Against the background 
of a culturally shaped masculinity requiring that he be the pulling force within the nuclear 
family, it is precisely the attention that Baryalay seems to sincerely devote to his wife’s 
well-being that renders his incapability to “deliver” most hurting and humiliating. If, on 
the one hand, he feels the responsibility for being the “provider” (in this case, of a better 
life for his wife), on the other he feels trapped by his more traditional role as a productive 
member of his original paternal family. His father has acrimoniously estranged the rest of 
his family from his purview, and two of Baryalay’s brothers (the shopkeeper in the village, 
and the younger university student in Jalalabad) need financial support. Adding to this, 
Baryalay cannot help but imagine his family members’ gaze following him to the place he 
would eventually move if he had the chance to do so.  One of the main concerns in any 
Pashtun man’s life (that of social censorship and public reprobation), haunts Baryalay even 
before anything has the chance to happen – and has the power to cripple blooming desires 
and future plans. What would they think if they knew?, he imagines of his family members 
and his fellow villagers at the news that Baryalay’s wife now works in an office in the 
West, surrounded by strange men, without even the “supervision” of her husband. During 
the conversation in which Baryalay expressed these doubts, fears and hesitations about the 
future, his facial expressions and his tone of voice made me feel a sense of helplessness, 
and almost desperation. This emotional countertransferential reaction on my part was, I 
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believe, an empathic and attuned consequence of the evident, intense frustration that was 
exuding from Baryalay’s personal account. 
It is somewhat ironic that Pashtun men’s life is in fact lived in a sort of social 
panopticon, where everyone is at the mercy of everyone’s else’s gaze (as well as 
unconscious feelings and projective identifications), and yet (or, rather, because of this) at 
the same time each person’s private life is replete with interstices that they strive to keep 
hidden (and hence safe) from anyone’s knowledge. Such interstices are both the source of 
continuous frustration and dissatisfaction (for they no doubt contain conscious and 
unconscious unfulfilled wishes), but also the locus for the “detection”, and the discovery 
of personal agency and autonomous emotionality. In the case of Baryalay, for example, his 
longing for a radically different change in lifestyle, and even in physical place of 
settlement, is kept secret from anybody in his community. If he told anyone about his actual 
dreams and wishes for his and his wife’s future, he likely would get himself into trouble. 
You cannot say anything anymore to anybody in the village. You don’t know whom 
you are talking to any longer…It could be someone who does not like you and is 
connected to the Taliban…You say the wrong thing, like ‘I think this is not the right 
way of doing Islam’, or ‘I wish I could live somewhere else’,  and you risk to be 
called a bad Muslim, or a spy, or a Christian…you cannot trust anybody, there are 
no friends anymore. It only takes a wrong word to the wrong person… 
 
Such condition of constant uncertainty and insecurity has deleterious effects on everyone’s 
psychological equilibrium, as Baryalay underscored several times with me. He is 
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apparently balanced enough, and strongly enough enculturated into his “quietist” pacha 
religious background to evade the worst consequences of this continuous state of tension 
and uncertainty. Others are not, and there lie the roots, in Baryalay’s opinion, of many 
negative reactive behaviors that he highlighted in our conversations, such as interpersonal 
aggressiveness, and domestic violence. On the other hand, though, precisely the persistent 
inability to publicly express and pragmatically pursue certain private strivings and wishes 
puts Baryalay in clear contact with such private longings. Precisely because so vehemently 
curtailed and hindered by a strict and self-policing social environment, such private wishes 
emerge and surface to Baryalay’s awareness and consciousness (as shown by his bitter 
resentment, sense of helplessness, and longing for a different fate). This phenomenon, I 
believe, may represent what psychoanalyst Wilfred Bion has termed “truthfulness” (to 
oneself. For a discussion of Bion’s interpretation of what the patient (or informant) might 
experience as “true”, see Ogden, 2004:293-298), and what I would rather call 
“authenticity”. In this sense, authenticity is not to be intended in its cultural connotation 
(for the many aspects of which, see Lindholm 2008), but rather as the outcome of a positive, 
functional psychological dynamic, which brings the individual to a clearer 
acknowledgement of his/her deeper feelings and desires in relation to a specific life 
contingency (i.e., the here-and-now). Knowledge starts with sensing, Bion argues, with an 
emotional elaboration that remains “raw”, unprocessed, until unconsciously “cooked” (to 
use an apt term by Italian analyst Antonino Ferro. See Ferro 2005, 2006) by the mind, and 
stored in an unconscious form, only to tapped into when necessary to the individual’s 
psychic equilibrium. The capacity of each individual to “recall” stored emotional 
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elaborations (which is not a given by any means) is what renders life experiences 
meaningful and functional to one’s inner dynamics. In this sense, being able to “feel”, to 
perceive one’s own deepest wishes and desires, in the face of environmental adverse cues, 
means to be truthful to oneself, to be “authentic” to oneself in the here-and-now.  Thus 
authenticity, from this standpoint, is not an ontological, absolute category, but rather an 
experiential and contingent subjective state. Not always, and not everybody at any given 
time, in Bion’s view, manages to complete such process of personal growth (Bion 1962). 
Failing to do so leads to inner suffering and deleterious psychic ramifications. Upon my 
conversations with Baryalay, and following Bion’s suggestive proposition, it seems to me 
that he was able, to a certain degree, to tap from the “cooked”, processed emotional material 
he had stored in his unconscious, to come into contact with the deeply frustrating feelings 
about his life conditions, and his conflictive desires for the future. In these terms, Baryalay 
was showing to be “authentic” to himself at that very conjuncture in his lifetime.       
  
 
Conclusion 
 
From the detailed analysis of my conversations with Baryalay several issues, I 
believe, emerge, which had been already adumbrated by the discussion of Umar’s and 
Rohullah’s life histories. 
Firstly, the fast-paced metamorphosis of cultural idioms of masculinity among 
Afghan Pashtuns in the area where I worked. Baryalay quite clearly expressed the view, 
advanced also by Umar and Rohullah, that the three decades of war have taken a harsh toll 
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on the way Pashtun men interpret, live, and perform their sense of masculinity. Cultural 
idioms, within this purview, are, and have been for a long time, shifting away from pre-
conflict standards. The long period of relative peace that followed the demise of Amanullah 
Khan from the throne in 1929 was abruptly interrupted by the Communist Saur Revolution 
first, in 1978, and later the Soviet occupation of the country  (1979–1989), which 
culminated in the civil war (1992–1996), and creation of the Taliban regime (1996–2001). 
All the informants whose life histories I have so far analyzed perceived that the moral and 
ethical standards on which pukhto (the Pashtun customs) had been premised for the past 
three generations were impacted strongly and perhaps irreversibly by the traumas and the 
high degree of violence produced  by these continuous conflicts. The idea of nartob 
(manliness), which is so much a crucial aspect of pukhto for any Pashtun male individual, 
was in my informants’ opinion accordingly affected. I have underlined the feedback 
process through which, in my opinion, aberrant, violent behaviors, were justified by a “state 
of exception” instituted by the conflict environment, and then became routinized and 
institutionalized, giving rise to a new set of expected moral standards and models for 
personal and collective action – at least in the eyes of those Pashtuns born and raised in the 
midst of those wars.43 I have tried to highlight the psychological dynamics to which single 
individuals are subjected when confronted with such state of facts. The individuals I chose 
                                                          
43 “Morally legitimate” is preceded, chronologically and hence historically, by “pragmatically 
necessary”. It is precisely the subtle and imperceptible passage from the second to the first condition 
that I am arguing happened within Pashtun society over the decades of conflict. It is a corollary to 
Pierre Bourdieu’s articulation of practice theory that I believe Fredrik Barth has ante-litteram 
acutely perceived (Barth 1966). In Charles Lindholm’s words: “Men may well know that rule by 
pure force is wrong, but must proceed according to the demands of force or else submit to others 
who are less squeamish” (Lindholm, personal communication, October 2014). 
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to present so far are men who confront a reality that they do not completely accept, and 
which they have lived, or still live, at least partially in opposition to their deepest wishes 
for the future and self-representation in the present. The shift in meaning that idioms of 
masculinity have undergone since the beginning of the “state of exception” (1978) are 
talking a heavy toll on the inner processes and subjective states of men like my informants.   
 
To such dynamics is tied a second issue that I think emerges from the analysis of 
the material I presented. The private conflicts my informants verbally articulated during 
their conversations with me revealed interesting ways in which they managed the 
contrasting inputs they received from cultural cues and social constraints, and “private” 
wishes, emotions and strivings. I have interpreted the accounts they gave me of such 
conflicts as showing the presence of multiple layers of subjectivity, or selves, which were 
coexisting and complementary, although at times also in competition with each other. Each 
layer of subjectivity, or self, is constructed by the individual, I argue, to respond to 
contingent real life conditions, on the basis of one’s own enculturation process (i.e., cultural 
schemata), as well as one’s idiosyncratic elaboration of, and reaction to, environmental 
cues.  
Using a concept borrowed from psychoanalysts Joseph Sandler and Bernard 
Rosenblatt (1962), I would argue that the representational world of each of my informants 
remains surprisingly coherent, and is perceived by them as imbued with characteristics that 
support the necessary “illusion” of a unity of the self (in spite of the many episodes of 
disorientation, anguish, and internal conflict that they suffered, and which they were able 
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to convey to me in conscious or unconscious manners). This seems to happen because, as 
suggested by Sandler and Rosenblatt, it is the “self-images” which each individual 
construes of himself that change and shift in order to respond to the stresses and challenges 
of lived life. The underlying, broader self-representation of oneself, on the contrary, takes 
advantage of these shifts among self-images which produce psychological balance, and for 
this reason manages to be perceived by the individual as coherent and “unified”. The 
shifting self-images, in turn, may be interpreted, following Wilfred Bion’s suggestions, as 
the result of the unconscious tapping into “cooked” experiential baggage (i.e., the 
transformation of raw, inchoate, sensual, emotional experience, into an unconscious pool 
of knowledge), which serves for the individual the purpose of facing and overcoming the 
pragmatic, embodied contingencies of daily life (in an ideal, “healthy” scenario, of course).  
Furthermore, as Robert LeVine has suggested (LeVine, pers. comm., May 2014), a 
representational world is not peculiar exclusively to single individuals. Culture as well 
consists of representations. Different cultures produce different representational worlds. 
We might define these cultural representational worlds as composed by “idioms”, 
“schemata”, or “narratives” (as I have so far done). Moral standards and ethical injunctions, 
that among Pashtuns define “how to be good at being a man” (in Michael Herzfeld’s words. 
Herzfeld 1985:16), are part of the Pashtun cultural representational world. By the same 
token, the interpretation and negotiation of, reaction to, strategizing behaviors upon, 
adjustments to, this portion of the Pashtun cultural representational world on the part of my 
informants define their own shifting personal self-images (subjectivities, or selves), as well 
as their own broader, coherent self-representation as a whole (i.e., the coherent coexistence 
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of their self-images). It is easy, at this point, to see how the cultural and the personal 
representational worlds are not only constantly interacting with each other, but also 
partially overlapping (albeit to different, idiosyncratic degrees). In fact, cultural 
representations become motivating and meaningful precisely because they have the power 
to create emotional responses in individuals, while in turn individuals necessarily formulate 
their own representational world and self-images in cultural terms (though, again, 
idiosyncratically. See also Hollan 2000).44     
A final issue that emerges from the analysis I have developed so far concerns the 
idea of personal agency and autonomy. Few anthropologists and cross-cultural 
psychoanalysts in the past have repeatedly underscored the fact that, contrary to what many 
others had suggested, it is just within those socio-cultural environment where strict rules 
and norms of comportment are in place, and where social self-policing and public control 
are strongest, that individuals manage to “detect” more clearly their private wishes and 
strivings, and somehow act upon them (Doi 1981, 1986, Lindholm 1997, Roland 1988). I 
would elaborate further by saying that against the background of strict intra-community 
social surveillance, individuals appear most able to remain “in contact” with their inner 
subjective states (or those self-images that at that moment in time are most relevant for the 
coherence of their representational world as a whole). More recently, Bambi Chapin has 
presented ethnographic material arguing for the same principles (Chapin 2013: 152-158). 
                                                          
44 I wish to thank Professor Robert LeVine for suggesting and discussing with me these ideas, as 
well as the article by Sandler and Rosenblatt that I mentioned. 
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 The three informants that I presented so far showed their idiosyncratic strategies 
(whether conscious or unconscious) for coping with their alternative and complementary 
(and at times conflictive) subjectivities. To varying degrees, they expressed in conversation 
with me (and seemed to have perceived in the past, upon the retrospective recollection of 
their experiences), an extent of personal agency and autonomous self-awareness that would 
have escaped detection by the outsider observer faced simply with their outward behavior.  
Particularly Rohullah seems to have managed to remain “in contact” with the 
“authenticity” of his self, that is, with the overall meaning of his self-representation as a 
whole (not necessarily unchanging) at particular stages in his life, in spite of the shifting 
self-images that he construed for himself in order to adjust to the progression of his life 
contingencies, and in order to maintain a “healthy” psychological balance in the face of 
existential hardships. We have seen, on the other hand, how the representational world of 
Baryalay seems to have been constantly characterized by the pre-eminence of cultural 
idioms derived from his enculturation into the pacha religious environment. Whereas this 
seems to have been a fil rouge that held together his overall self-representation, he shows 
to be nonetheless strongly shaped by the alternative and shifting self-images that different 
cultural cues have imprinted onto him, such as the norms and injunctions on how to live 
according to Pashtun’s nartob (manliness), and the crucial values related to ideas of honor 
(izzat, ghairat), and shame (sharm).  
Such dynamics in Rohullah and Baryalay have highlighted how both individuals 
gained (or, better, won for themselves) a heightened awareness of alternative avenues for 
behavior and being that they felt more syntonic with their self-representation, even though 
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(or rather, because) they were not allowed to endorse those behaviors publicly, due to social 
and cultural constraints. In other words, I am arguing that precisely the impossibility of 
publicly expressing and displaying certain preferences, wishes, and behaviors sharpened 
my informants’ awareness of the underlying shape and form of their current 
representational world, rendering them able to, if often subversively or covertly, maintain 
and give voice to a personal agency and autonomous being that would seem at first glance 
unlikely, given the socio-cultural environment they are living. It is this capacity, on the part 
of my informants, that I call “authenticity”. 
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CHAPTER 5 – RAHMAT: THE DILEMMAS OF A “PERFECT” PASHTUN 
 
 
Prologue 
 
Sama Khel is the rural village where I have worked more often during my fieldwork 
in Afghanistan. It is located in an area of Nangarhar province which is mostly inhabited by 
Shinwari Pashtuns, a particular sub-group of the broader Pashtun ethnic group. Shinwaris, 
as it often happens in segmentary lineage systems, are in theory all related through an apical 
ancestor, in turn related horizontally to the other apical ancestors of different Pashtun sub-
groups. In reality, as has been shown in ethnographic literature (see, for example, Kuper 
1982, Hammoudi 1996, Barth 1969), the boundaries of ethnic entities tend to be more 
permeable than their members portray them to be in ideal terms. Although almost all those 
who inhabit the area claim to members of the Shinwari sub-group, the membership is often 
contested and subject to disputes. 
 Sama Khel lies some twenty kilometers west of the Afghan-Pakistani border, fifty 
kilometers east of Jalalabad, and about five kilometers south of the main throughway that 
connects Peshawar, Pakistan, to Jalalabad. As a result of historical circumstances (among 
which the most relevant was the creation of the Durand Line in 1893), the Shinwaris now 
live on both sides of the border in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Afghan Shinwari families 
often have relatives and private dwellings in Pakistan, and regularly visit Peshawar when 
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in need of serious medical assistance, or specific goods that cannot be found in 
Afghanistan. I discovered with surprise that it is extremely common for a rural villager of 
the Sama Khel area to have been several times to Peshawar (or even have lived there for a 
period of time), but to have never visited Kabul or any other major city in Afghanistan.  
Baked in the spring and summer by a scorching sun, but blessed in the (late) fall 
and winter by a pleasantly mild climate, Sama Khel and its surroundings take advantage of 
the dense network of artificial canals (karez) that the Soviet-funded government built in 
the late 1970s and 1980s to channel the waters of the close-by Kabul river. Irrigation makes 
the fields adjoining the canals lush with orchards and various field crops. Away from the 
canals, however, the land is barren and dry as far as the eye can see. Precipitation is 
extremely low all year round, and the intense heat quickly evaporates the little rain water 
that leaches through the first layer of soil. By way of comparison, Jalalabad receives ca. 7 
inches of rainfall per year, while Phoenix, Arizona, receives ca. 8 inches, and Ryadh, Saudi 
Arabia, almost 4 inches. Sama Khel is slightly drier and hotter than Jalalabad.  
People living in Sama Khel, and its district capital, Angur Bagh, are primarily 
employed in farming (whether as landless individuals laboring others people’s lands, or as 
landowners, reaping the fruits of the fields they do not personally farm), in commercial 
activities in the district’s bazaar, in the local public administration, or they are jobless (of 
whom, at the time of my fieldwork, there was a considerable number). Pastoralism is done 
on a small scale, and often for reasons of subsistence only. The average extension of private 
land that an individual owns is not large, usually a few jiribs, although there are some 
families who own, collectively, a fair amount of land. Ascertaining precisely the extent of 
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land holdings my main informants possessed was nearly impossible, given that all of them 
proved extremely reluctant to discuss with me the real facts about their wealth (or lack 
thereof), and, more importantly, because the fields they possessed were in most cases 
scattered around the countryside surrounding the village, where the little security that the 
village offered vanished completely. I was therefore never allowed to accompany them to 
their fields – it would have been dangerous (or, at least, not advisable) for them to be seen 
surveying the territory in the company of a stranger, whom some in Angur Bagh even knew 
was a foreigner. 
Sama Khel is a village-fortress, typical of Pashtun areas (see Szabo and Barfield 
1991). Its population, about 450 people, is composed entirely of people from the Waraki 
khel (lineage). They are all related by blood to various degrees – the exception being the 
occasional brides from different lineages in the district, who come to live in the village 
with their husbands’ families. Different family houses cluster together, giving rise to an 
uninterrupted outer wall. On the inside there are open courtyards, alleys, separation walls 
for each house, communal wells, and other features proper to a common village structure. 
All is insulated from the outside world, however. Since the segregation of the sexes is 
strictly enforced for those who are not closely related by blood, and hence allowed in theory 
to marry each other, I was never allowed to visit more than the male guests’ quarters (hujra) 
of each house, and the courtyard around them. I have never seen any of the women living 
in the village of Sama Khel.  
Most of my time I spent in the main, large 70-year-old village hujra, where all the 
major male figures congregated in the morning, and after working hours in the afternoon. 
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I also slept in the same main hujra when I stayed overnight in the village, together with 
some other occasional guests, and a few local villagers who wished to keep me company 
until bedtime. My mobility around the area was limited by the overall security situation of 
the surroundings. My hosts could only accept to take so much risk for the sake of my 
academic research. The performance of the proverbially unconditional Pashtun hospitality 
– melmastia – is in fact much more conditional than is often portrayed in past ethnographic 
accounts.45 Because people wandering alongside me through Angur Bagh’s bazaar or even 
the dusty roads around the villages would only incite gossiping and rumors from 
malevolent neighbors and fellow villagers, my hosts increasingly chose less exposed 
secondary streets and alleys to move with me through Angur Bagh, instead of the main 
bazaar road that we had used so many times. Over the years, between 2010 and 2013, I was 
introduced to fewer and fewer friends and relatives in the shops and gathering spots of the 
village. Associating with a stranger – worse, a non-Muslim foreigner – was considered by 
many with suspicion, and frowned upon, bringing possibly negative social consequences 
for the hosts. With the overall situation of the ongoing insurgency against the Afghan 
government and the foreign troops deteriorating, the possibility to participate more actively 
in the life of the household and the village that hosted me became more and more 
problematic. Over time I witnessed the growing uneasiness and even discomfort of my 
                                                          
45 In all fairness, I will say that the current limits in the display of melmastia, which I have 
personally experienced, was one of the aspects of social and cultural change that many among my 
informants regretted, as a by-product (among many others, as we have so far seen) of the long 
decades of continuous conflict. Many elders complained that the present deteriorating security 
situation, in conjunction with years of social chaos and impending danger, achieved the result of 
“pragmatizing” the choices that a family, or a lineage, would make, severely curtailing the 
performance of what had erstwhile been a pivotal feature of Pashtun society and culture 
(hospitality).   
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hosts for my being in the village. Nor did I fail to notice the increasing number of times 
when my request to join them in the village was refused with shaky and embarrassed 
excuses, that continued for several weeks. I could not visit the village any more after the 
killing of a US Army sergeant in Angur Bagh in late March 2013 at the hands of a local 
sixteen year-old boy who stabbed the soldier in the neck, before disappearing on a 
motorcycle, which allegedly was waiting to whisk him away from the area. The incident 
had a strong emotional impact on the villagers and ended my visits to Sama Khel and Angur 
Bagh altogether. When I met friends from the village after the killing of the Army sergeant, 
I had to do so in a concealed, almost secret fashion, away from the village, in a bazaar town 
along the Peshawar-Jalalabad road several kilometers removed from Sama Khel. There, 
very few people would be able to easily recognize my friends, but even so we chose an out 
of sight compound away from the gaze of passers-by. 
I went to Sama Khel for the first time in summer 2010 thanks to an improbable 
encounter with unexpected ramifications. An Afghan friend of mine in Jalalabad, a sharp 
young man who was studying English at Nangarhar University, put me in contact with an 
American man, working for a foreign NGO in town. He was living in Jalalabad with his 
wife and his two toddlers, after having moved from Kandahar for security reasons. We met, 
together with my wife, in his NGO office, and then one more time at his house in Jalalabad. 
After listening to the description of our research he said he knew somebody who might be 
interested in talking to us, and showing us his village. He made a quick phone call in Pashto 
to give the person our names and general information. He thenreturned to his conversation 
with us. I did not think much of the whole matter until two days later when someone 
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knocked on our hotel door in Jalalabad at 7am. Quickly putting on some clothes, I opened 
the door and walked out, carefully obstructing the view onto the interior of the room where 
my wife was still half asleep. Three men introduced themselves to me in Pashto, very 
warmly, as Hajji Zia, the man with whom our American NGO worker friend had talked on 
the phone about us, and two friends of his. Zia told me quite curtly that we should 
immediately follow him to his village, where we would be his guests for the day. In such 
an unexpected way began my long frequentation of the village of Sama Khel, which lasted 
until I left Afghanistan in June 2013.  
Hajji Zia was a man of about 30 years of age in 2010 and the grandchild of a brother 
of the leader of the Waraki lineage, Hajji Wahidullah. After spending time in Hajji Zia’s 
private hujra in Sama Khel, during my first visit to the village I was also brought to see 
Hajji Wahidullah, in the old village hujra. Alongside him I met for the first time many of 
the male members of the lineage, whom I was to meet often in the subsequent months and 
years. A man in his mid-70s, Hajji Wahidullah was a soft-spoken, slender, and meditative 
personage, who measured his words yet often expressed curiosity about me and my 
personal story. He was obviously well aware of his social position, and wore it with 
gravitas. I was informed by a relative that there had always been two gunduna (two sides) 
among the Shinwaris in the area: the ones loyal to Hajji Wahidullah and his khel, the others 
loyal to another elder, from a different khel. At the moment, the other figure proved more 
powerful than Hajji Wahidullah had been elected to the Afghan Wolesi Jirga (the lower h 
ouse of the Afghan parliament) as the national representative for the Shinwari qawm. 
“Things change”, this relative told me, “next time it will be Hajji Wahidullah’s turn to go 
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the Wolesi Jirga”, ostensibly not much worried by the political victory scored by the 
opposite side.   
 
The “perfect” Pashtun 
 
One of the grandchildren of a brother of Hajji Wahidullah was a man called 
Rahmat, of about 32 years of age in 2013. He represents, as we will see, a radically different 
figure from the ones I have discussed so far. While Rohullah, Umar and Baryalay all, in 
their own way, protested and rejected at least some aspect of Pashtun idioms of 
masculinity, as well as ways of displaying their “Pashtun-ness”, Rahmat presented himself 
as perfectly adjusted to his socio-cultural milieu. This at least was the public image that he 
conveyed to others (including me), as well as those close to him on a daily basis. Indeed 
Rahmat seemed to live a seamlessly well-adjusted life in his own paternal village, and to 
enjoy the customs and the routines of his village life. But Rahmat’s was in reality far from 
being so clear-cut and idyllic.  
Rahmat was one of the people that I met first in Sama Khel’s main hujra. I used to 
see him there only late in the afternoons, because he worked for an Afghan company that 
subcontracted the supply of flour to the US Army’s Forward Operating Base that lay near 
the village, and he had to work long hours. After the sun set, and everybody had moved 
from the outside dera (a shaded area with traditional kat to sit and lie down on) to the 
indoor hujra proper, Rahmat would show up at the end of his shift at the Army base. 
Sometimes he would have night shifts, and would not participate in the hujra evening 
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meetings for two or three days, going back to sleep at his family’s house (which I have 
never visited). Nevertheless, anytime he joined the others, he showed and maintained a 
very dignified and distinguished appearance. His shalwar kamiz (the traditional dress) was 
always spotlessly clean, his beard well-trimmed, and his Charsaddi chaplay (a type of 
elegant leather sandals from Peshawar) were always clean and free from dust. He often 
wore a cologne, that spread through the room when he entered, and he checked the state of 
his beard and moustaches on a regular basis through the small mirror incorporated in the 
round metal container that held his naswar (the slightly intoxicating powder that most men 
put between their teeth and gums, as in the US is common to do with chewing tobacco). 
He was also one of only two villagers able to speak English, which he used to 
communicate with me. The other one being one of his young cousins, a seventeen year-old 
boy called Baryalay, with whom I also developed a good relationship. The fact that Rahmat 
had a good command of the language facilitated his being hired at the Army base, where 
he managed to befriend several US servicemen and officers. According to the various 
letters of recommendation that his US military employers and supervisors wrote for him, 
he was a hardworking, serious, reliable individual, who impressed his co-workers with his 
work ethic. Rahmat was understandably quite proud of his recommendation letters, which 
he showed and copied for me. He also declared the intention to use them to get some sort 
of authorization to move to the United States, or somewhere else, in a near future. His 
dream has yet to materialize.  
Rahmat struck me quite soon as a mild-tempered person, very much aware of, and 
compliant with the unwritten norms of etiquette that govern Pashtun male gatherings. 
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Accordingly, he never showed himself too vocal, or overwhelming in his participation in 
communal conversations. He was, as opposed to many who regularly attended the evening 
meetings in the main hujra, still considered young, and as such he had to maintain a 
composure and respectfulness towards the older family members that prevented him from 
appearing too daring or vociferous. His words seemed to be always well-chosen and 
pondered, for which, it seemed to me, he received in return attention and consideration 
from his relatives. His younger cousins (among whom was Baryalay) held him in great 
esteem, as an upstanding, honest and hardworking Pashtun nar (a manly man). His 
proficiency in English made him spontaneously gravitate towards me more than others did 
in the beginning. His acquaintance with many other Americans, at the base where he 
worked, made me perhaps appear in his eyes less of an exotic and suspect individual, to be 
kept possibly at arm’s length rather than approached and befriended. This latter attitude 
was shared by some among the people who frequented the hujra. However, because Hajji 
Wahidullah, the living leader of the whole lineage, had always been much more accepting 
and friendly, this was sufficient to override all other considerations and opinions. Still, 
Rahmat’s approach to me in the presence of others remained circumspect and cautious.  
But he wanted to know about my life in the West, and was ready to answer questions about 
his own life in the village.  
The first conversations I had with him were in summer 2010, during the evenings 
spent in the village hujra. These were casual, and part of public discussions. It was only 
during my last stint of fieldwork in Afghanistan, in 2012–2013, that I asked him if he would 
sit with me, in a private place, and talk about his own life, without external interference. 
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He agreed, and we eventually managed four sessions alone together in the house I was 
renting in Jalalabad. I guess his inquisitive and curious mind saw in my proposal also a 
good opportunity to answer some of his questions about the Western world (of which I was 
obviously seen as a prototypical specimen, as often happened during my fieldwork, without 
much discrimination being made between Europe and the United States). I also thought I 
would represent one more possibility he would have in the future to hopefully receive some 
help in trying to leave Afghanistan - illegally, or on a special visa, for which purpose he 
would need a Western “sponsor”, or at least a guarantor.  
Rahmat’s sharpness first struck me. Our first conversations in the family hujra 
revolved around issues that would emerge as a corollary to the more poignant discussions 
taking place around us. For example, a few days before one of my visits to Sama Khel in 
2010, two shops that Rahmat’s father owned in the Angur Bagh bazaar were burned down. 
Blame was assigned to the members of the so-called “24 families” (see below), who hoped 
to take a valuable piece of land that belonged to Rahmat’s father. As the eldest son of his 
father, Rahmat was responsible to deal with the potentially explosive situation.  He 
explained to me what happened, by translating the discussion in the hujra (we spoke 
English, as at that time my Pashto was not good enough to understand the heated hujra 
conversations): 
 
You see, we Waraki [the name of his paternal lineage] are Shinwaris, we have been 
here for a long time, we came from a district near the mountains. The village down 
the bazar of Angur Bagh, which is called Shergar, is inhabited by those people that 
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we call the “24 families”. They came from outside the area some time ago, maybe 
two or three generations ago, at different times. They are not Shinwaris, some of 
them were not even Pashtuns, they were Farsiwaan [those who speak Persian]. Now 
they call themselves Shinwaris, and some people start to forget that they came from 
outside…but we don’t forget…they were people who abandoned the place where 
they were born, and moved somewhere else…what kind of person abandons the 
place of their birth? Why would you ever abandon the place where you were born? 
You do so if you are not respectable, if you are greedy, if you want more than you 
will ever have in your home village…no one should trust somebody who abandons 
the place where they were born. And in fact, these 24 families, as we call these 
people, are not to be trusted. They are after land, they are after money, they make 
problems and cannot be trusted…  
Andrea – They are all bad people? 
Rahmat – Well, no, I mean…obviously there are some good people among them, 
but in general you’d better not trust them…when you deal with them you have to 
remember they are from the 24 families…For example, some among them decided 
they needed this plot of land in the bazaar that my father owns, even though we are 
not using the shops that are there at the moment. They want the land, so they started 
with burning down the shops. There was a confrontation in the bazaar the other 
day between some from my family and some from those people. Fortunately nothing 
happened.  
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Andrea – So, now what is going to happen? Are you planning to take revenge 
against those who burned down the shops?   
Rahmat – No, I don’t want revenge now. It’s not wise to start any big problem for 
us now. We have the right documentation to show to the authorities, and with that 
we went to the district governor. We showed him that the piece of land belongs 
rightfully to my family. Now we will see what happens. Hopefully the police will 
help us, so that this thing does not happen again. 
Andrea – Nobody in your family is telling you that you should take revenge? 
Nobody is giving you peghor about it? [peghor is the moral condemnation one 
receives for failing to defend with ghairat one’s compromised honor]. 
Rahmat – Yes, some have come to me in private and told me that the honor of our 
family has been insulted by this attack, and that we should respond in the same 
way, to demonstrate that we can defend our rights, and what is ours. But I believe 
that it would not be smart at this time to do so, and that we can start with other 
ways. There is always time for revenge. The elders of the family have agreed with 
me, and we are going by steps. First we have gone to the district governor…we’ll 
see what happens. 
 
During this conversation, Rahmat appeared extremely sure of himself, calm and 
convinced of the rightfulness of his choice of action. While showing himself as a person 
deeply immersed in, and cognizant of the way in which certain things are dealt with 
traditionally, he equally proved to be pragmatic and level-headed enough to avoid getting 
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sucked in by the most visceral and sanguinary aspect of pukhto (the Pashtun customs): 
revenge. Rash reactions, although in theory in line with a strict understanding of pukhto, 
have the power of starting vicious circles, lasting for generations of bloody retaliations. We 
have seen in my previous informants’ life histories how easily incidents like these can get 
out of hand and snowball uncontrollably. Rahmat gave me, and presumably his older 
family members, the impression of being a wise and mature person in control of a delicate 
situation, with a reasonable plan of action for the future. And he also presented an image 
of himself as a man firmly rooted in his traditional social environment, and cultural 
background.  
Nonetheless, his tirade against the members of what he calls the “24 families” was 
unexpected. At least to me, it sounded extremely passionate in its moral reproach. The ties 
to one’s own family and place of birth and belonging have always been known to be a 
crucial aspect of Pashtuns’ Weltanschauung. The (somewhat inherently nostalgic) public 
narrative of the importance and emotional power of one’s own heimat (the motherland) 
had always seemed to me to be the ideal, utopian scenario against which reality would 
necessarily clash, and force people to (supposedly unwittingly) adjust and make virtue out 
of necessity. Indeed, in spite of the stereotypical image of living in a rural and static world, 
most Pashtun historically families produced at least one migrant laborer, who stayed abroad 
for many years, and often came back a changed, although more affluent man. Historian 
Robert Nichols meticulously documented 230 years of Pashtun migration routes and their 
vicissitudes, from what today is Afghanistan and Pakistan to India, the Persian Gulf states, 
East Africa, and even beyond. In some cases, entire villages relocated to India, and their 
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inhabitants became an accepted element of the Indian social landscape (Nichols 2007). 
Likewise, during my own fieldwork research, I rarely encountered individuals who had not 
experienced internal or external displacement, labor migration, or some other sort of 
disruptive event that had forced them to leave their home village or town, at least 
temporarily. So I had never encountered before anyone among my informants who 
expressed so indignantly their moral reproach at those who had to leave, or relocate 
themselves. Thus, Rahmat’s highly emotional words surprised me, although he himself 
proved later far from applying such values to himself.   
An additional element of Rahmat’s “traditional” thinking was brought home to me 
during a different visit to his village in 2011, when he disparaged the status of one of his 
acquired relatives, the sayyed Imran Pacha. Imran was a member of a pacha family, living 
in a village close to Sama Khel, and his sister had recently married one of Rahmat’s 
cousins. Although Rahmat praised Imran for being an honest and respectable man, he 
harbored a barely disguised resentment towards Imran’s family, and its social position as 
pacha. Discussing the recent marriage of his cousin with Imran’s sister, he said: 
They used to be very well respected. His father and grandfather used to make 
amulets for the people of the area, and help people with solving disputes that would 
arise among them. Imran does not make amulets any more, he has become more a 
political figure here. He still gives opinions and works as a jirgamaar when asked 
to [the jirgamaar is one of the members of the Jirga, the council of elders appointed 
by two parties in order to solve their ongoing conflict]. But his brothers have started 
to take advantage of the wealth that their father and grandfather acquired. You see, 
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people would reward their amulets, counseling and opinions with gifts, sometimes 
even land. They have accumulated a good deal of property, and now Imran’s 
brothers have become politically more influential.  
Andrea – But people consider them Pashtuns, like any other, right? 
Rahmat – Yes, they generally do, but the truth is that they came from Iraq, at the 
time of Abdurrahman [end of the 19th Century]. They are Arabs, really, I consider 
them Arabs. They are one of the 24 families who came from outside. They became 
powerful and respected because they were pacha, but a lot of what they have now 
comes from gifts of the Pashtuns who live here, they did not have to work and sweat 
for what they have now. One of Imran’s brothers is among those who burned down 
the shops we had in the bazaar…he is with them. 
Andrea – Is there any difference between the lifestyle they conduct, and yours [as 
Pashtuns]? 
Rahmat – No, in reality you cannot tell the difference now between one of us and 
one of them. The only difference maybe is that, when you have to start getting 
information about the possibility of a marriage, they begin by sending out the 
women, while we begin by sending out the men. Our women come later in giving 
their opinion…[long pause] What about you, in the West? I know that women do a 
lot of things in the West, they get political positions, they have a lot of freedom in 
daily life…what do you think about it? 
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At this point of the conversation, it seemed to me appropriate to embark in a lengthy 
and tactful monologue about the reasons why in “the West” we had (in theory, that is) 
parity and equality of treatment and opportunities between men and women, trying to 
explain that, while I did consider that state of facts right for our cultural environment, I 
also did not consider Pashtuns’ social arrangements necessarily “wrong” tout court, but 
rather as the inevitable outcome of different historical and cultural developments… My 
politically correct and very diplomatic sermon, however, did not seem to convince Rahmat 
very much. He interrupted me at a certain point, and declared: 
 
I don’t know…to me women are just weak, both physically and mentally…I mean, 
it’s obvious, you can see it every day, they cannot perform all the duties and cannot 
sustain all the stresses that men have to bear…that’s why they have to stay in the 
house…what would they do without men, outside? They would be unable to function 
without men… 
Andrea – But what about all those women who do men’s jobs in the West? If women 
were really so much weaker, how could they do all those things they do in the West, 
and be successful? There are women in the government, in the schools, in the 
military, in private companies…And what about giving birth? Don’t you think that 
giving birth is a very stressful and difficult thing? 
Rahmat – I think in the West there is too much freedom…everybody can do 
whatever they want, there are no rules, no order…look what happened with AIDS: 
everybody is free to have sex with anybody else, there are no moral rules, and big 
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problems like AIDS, divorce and other things become huge problems…I think it’s 
a wrong way to live…  
 
The narrative about group purity (metonymically embodied by the concept of 
heimat), and the supposedly unique virtues of the in-group (in this case, shrinking 
considerably to the closer boundaries of the sub-group Shinwari), are idioms that we have 
encountered before. Rahmat, however, expressed these concerns and beliefs in a very 
matter-of-fact way, without inducing me to think that he might have been staging a 
performance for the sake of capturing the interest of the nosy, and naïve, foreign 
anthropologist. Rahmat did not attempt to present a sanitized view of Pashtun reality for 
“Western” consumption. The sense of “embarrassment” and uneasiness that I perceived in 
some other informants about what they thought were the “bad things” about their society, 
to be kept away from the understanding of a Western observer, was apparently absent in 
Rahmat’s self-presentation to me. Speaking to me in the hujra in English, he was not 
subject to the others’ criticism (being the only one who could speak and understand 
English). That rendered our conversations de facto private exchanges, presumably 
reflective of his “authentic” dispositions and his own feelings.  He was at the same time 
curious about my world (which in his mind was “the West”), and did not share the belief 
of other informants that “the West” was in some way socially and culturally superior.   
This impression on my part I believe was corroborated by the uncompromising 
stance that he expressed about women. He knew that his views on women would most 
likely not gain much sympathy from a Western interlocutor. He had had, as we will see, 
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enough experience with foreigners and outsiders to realize that. Yet he did not want to 
impress me, or to sound more “correct” to my ears, and simply stated and defended what 
to him seemed not only obvious, but even undeniable facts. His take on women is certainly 
not isolated among Pashtuns in Afghanistan, and as such does not represent either a 
surprise, or great news per se. It was the firmness and openness with which he asserted his 
convictions that left me somewhat surprised. I was used to more “diplomacy”, so to speak, 
from many of my informants, stemming from the underlying concern that they would in 
the end give a bad “image” of themselves, and of Pashtuns in general, to a Western 
interlocutor. Not that their deep beliefs and convictions would not emerge, sooner or later, 
in other, indirect ways – through open behavior, overheard comments, seemingly innocent 
jokes, and moral judgments on other people’s vicissitudes. Yet I always took into 
consideration this degree of formal “diplomatic talk” when approaching someone I did not 
know well enough, and corrected for it accordingly. With Rahmat it seemed that I could 
skip the diplomatic talk stage, and take what he reported to me about himself as a more 
direct reflection of his thoughts and feelings. We will see that this peculiarity in him, and 
in our relationship, became permeated by interesting meanings, in relation to the kind of 
person he seemed to be – or at least, that he presented to me. The “traditional” shape that 
his character started to take in my eyes, and the fact that he chose to remain tied to a village 
life and environment, proved to be aspects that strictly related to each other. 
These stimulating occasional contacts with Rahmat, which I had several times in 
2010 and 2011, brought me to the decision of asking him, in 2012, whether he would sit 
with me and talk more in depth about himself, his life’s trajectory, and future plans. He 
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accepted, and we managed to arrange the first session (we had four in total, of about two 
hours each) during the last section of my fieldwork, in 2013. By then, the situation in the 
district where Sama Khel was located had already deteriorated so much that he did not 
want me to go to his village, and offered to come to my house in Jalalabad. Though I had 
hoped to talk to him in his own natural environment, still meeting in Jalalabad had its 
advantages, ensuring that there would not be any external interference, or pressure, during 
our conversations.  
 
 
 
Complicating the portrait 
 
Rahmat Khan Waraki was born in Sama Khel around 1980, and moved to Pakistan 
with all his family when he was about 4 years old.  
 
We all moved to Peshawar a few years after the war against the Russians started. 
We did not go to a camp though [a refugee camp]. We went to live with a relative 
of ours who lived outside Peshawar, in Jamrud. Back in the time of Abdur Rahman 
[1880-1902], one man from the Waraki family married into an Afridi family on the 
other side of the border [Afridi is a different sub-group of the Pashtun people, 
mostly based in Pakistan], and they started a family there. They still live in the same 
place, and we have always had friendly relationships with these people over the 
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years. They agreed to give us a house in which to live in the area where they too 
were living. I was put in a school for refugees, and studied there until third grade. 
Then we moved to Khyber Agency [one of the seven Tribal Agencies of Pakistan], 
where we bought land and built a house. I went to school there until eighth grade. 
I was playing cricket at that time, and I was really good at it…I was a promising 
player…I stopped going to school, and started working in a factory to pay for 
cricket expenses. I did that for about three years. The coach of my team told me 
that I should try for the junior Pakistani national team, but I refused, because I 
would have to get Pakistani citizenship, and I did not want to do that. That’s where 
I learned English…you know, we were going around other provinces to play, and 
everybody would speak English…I learned good English because I thought that I 
could do something with cricket, and English was necessary… it did not go through, 
maybe it was my fault…I was a good player though… 
Andrea – Why did you not continue with cricket? 
Rahmat – Well, there was this cousin of mine living with us in Khyber Agency, we 
were thinking of how to make some money…I was not happy there, I wanted to 
change and get something for myself…[long pause] Also, I was the eldest son on 
my family, I had two younger brothers, five and eight years younger than I was, I 
felt that I had responsibilities towards them…Me and this cousin of mine, we saw 
that some easy money could be done with opium. We decided that we would go back 
to Sama Khel and start cultivating opium poppy. We did not need much, we had 
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only one jirib available for us, and we used it all for poppy. I sent the money back 
to Pakistan to my family. 
Andrea – Did you go with anybody else back to Sama Khel? 
Rahmat – No, I was the only one from my close family, I was the only one who went 
back, with this far cousin of mine. We did that for several years, until maybe the 
third year of Karzai’s government [2004]. There was still somebody from my 
extended family in Sama Khel, so I lived with them. We were making good money 
with the opium poppies. We were able to develop from there, and started 
collaborating with people that managed a laboratory that produced heroin from 
opium. We would work inside the laboratory making that stuff…[long pause]  It was 
not a good period…a lot of people coming back from Pakistan, they brought back 
here bad habits, bad behaviors…bad things started happening, violent stuff, the 
situation got worse… money changes a lot of things, you know, and also people 
changed how they behaved…there was the war, you know, people were affected by 
the war, even though they did not fight personally. Some did fight, some did not, 
but the environment had a lot of violence in it…and then there were the people who 
came back from Pakistan, they brought back different values, different ideas… 
Andrea – You as well were among those who came back from Pakistan… 
Rahmat – Yes, I know, but for me it was a little different…I had lived in a house 
with my family, away from the city [Peshawar], and away from the camps, for me it 
was like living in Afghanistan somehow, so I did not get influenced very much by 
certain things… 
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Andrea – Certain things like what? 
Rahmat – Well, you know, the life of the city, buying things, wanting always more 
things, more money, never being happy with what you have in your home 
place…those people were not happy anymore with the qala [the mud-brick house], 
they wanted a bigger house, made of bricks and cement, a nice car…and also, I 
could see the people I worked with in the laboratory [for heroin], they would behave 
badly, there was a lot of violence involved with the job…[long pause] you know, 
when someone starts doing something wrong, and then others follow them, in the 
beginning people notice, and say something, but if the behavior continues, and 
more people behave like that, well, then in the end it becomes normal, you know, 
people do not notice anymore, they think it is normal to do that…that’s how things 
get bad.  
Andrea – Well, there are a lot of people who came back from Pakistan…are they 
all so bad? 
Rahmat – No, of course not, there were also good ideas that they brought back, like 
education…in Pakistan it is very important, you know, people know that it is 
important to send your children to school…here in Afghanistan it was not like this, 
but now, with all the Afghans that were born in Pakistan and went to school there, 
now also in Afghanistan we understand that it is important to send children to 
school…also girls…maybe until 5th or 6th grade… 
Andrea – What about the heroin laboratory? 
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Rahmat – Well, after my parents and close family came back from Pakistan I 
stopped working there. I found some jobs in Jalalabad and Kabul…it did not last 
long, I did not like the city, I came back here to Sama Khel. 
Andrea – Why didn’t you like the city? 
Rahmat – I was alone, I had strange jobs, only for short periods of time, like 
construction…I had nobody in the city, I had to share a room with other people I 
did not know, they were strangers, I did not know where they were coming from 
[meaning that he did not know their background and family history]…[long pause] 
Here it’s different, you know…when I worked for the flour company at the Army 
base [he had lost his job a few months earlier, in late 2012], it was hard, we worked 
long hours, seven days a week, sometimes in the evening or at night, but it was ok, 
I like to work…after work I would come back home, there was the hujra, there was 
Hajji Wahidullah [the current leader of the lineage, brother of his grandfather], 
there were all my relatives here, we would spend the evening together, talking, 
drinking tea, listening to the news on the radio [from Voice of America Pashto]…I 
liked it, it was where I wanted to be. And even now that I don’t have a job, I can go 
down the bazaar where we have a few shops, I stay with my friends…we go to 
Marko bazaar [a few kilometers away], we meet other friends…I wish I had a job, 
but now at least I am with people I know, that I am happy with… 
 
Rahmat had a comparably quiet childhood and early adolescence. While he had to 
leave his home village because of the war, he was presumably spared the worst of it and 
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the fate of many other Afghans, such as life growing up in a refugee camp. By his own 
admission, he managed to recreate the familial village environment in Pakistan, or at least 
he felt the sojourn in Pakistan was not overly dissimilar from what he had previously 
experienced in Afghanistan. Yet something was not completely right. He did not finish 
school in Pakistan, in spite of the fact that by then his family had acquired their own land 
and built a legitimate house. An interesting aspect of his narrative is the fact that he speaks 
of the impact of the war and the atmosphere of increased violence it created, but as affecting 
others, and without putting himself in the same category. As previous psychological 
research has indicated (Lindholm, unpublished data), it is often easier for respondents to 
attribute certain feelings, actions, or pragmatic choices, culturally considered culturally 
negative or reproachable, to others within one’s own community, rather than to oneself. I 
had the impression that Rahmat was doing this. He did not give me any specific reason for 
his choice of leaving the Pakistani home to go cultivate opium poppy in Afghanistan with 
his cousin, while he underscored those “bad behaviors” that he perceived other Afghan 
refugees returning from Pakistan were bringing back with them as “social remittances” 
(Levitt 1998, Levitt and Lamba-Nieves 2011). When I pointed out that he was also a 
returnee, he dismissed the comparison by saying that his living environment in Pakistan 
had not produced such detrimental social consequences. However, he was clearly not 
particularly proud of his involvement in activities that he knew were both illegal, and 
condemned as immoral by Islam.  
The trope of having lived in a familial, friendlier environment during his childhood 
in Pakistan, however, is used by him to corroborate a different interpretation of the 
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situation. He was the eldest son, and like any other Pashtun young man in his position, he 
was the one expected to sacrifice his private strivings and ambitions (like playing cricket 
professionally) for the sake of his younger brothers’ wellbeing. In taking up the role of the 
responsible provider he was fulfilling a cultural norm, but in a way that violated more 
fundamental principles, causing a moral conflict. The opportunity to engage in drug 
production and trade was provided by the social and economic disruption brought about by 
the war in the first place. Rahmat never wanted to delve into the details of the period 
wherein he worked for the laboratory that processed heroin from opium. He mentioned the 
”bad behaviors” and the pervasive violence that were associated with such occupation, 
leaving to the imagination what these were. Again, he speaks in the third person (plural) 
when referring to the criminal activities that the laboratory and its staff were engaged in. 
He distances himself from what went on in and around the laboratory, attributing whatever 
responsibility to the “others” who worked with him.  
However, his detailed and insightful description of how a deviant behavior becomes 
slowly routinized and institutionalized within a small community is remarkable. It felt to 
me that he could have only acquired that intimate understanding of such a crucial social 
phenomenon by active participation in it. I believe Rahmat did not want me to associate 
him with practices that he knew I would have probably not considered favorably, and 
which, more importantly, he himself judged “wrong” at the moment of our conversation.  
And in fact, his past spent working with opium and heroin appeared alien to the man I knew 
in 2010, who was a family member respected for integrity, piety, and rectitude. His virtues 
of tolerance, alongside firmness and resoluteness were praised to me by his younger 
 
 
 
260 
nephews. The person that I saw interacting in Sama Khel with family members and friends 
did certainly adhere to this public image. Yet the events that took place during the years in 
Sama Khel, spent between opium and heroin, did not. They did not fall into place with the 
self-presentation he was displaying publicly, and, above all, with the self-image that he 
seemed to maintain of himself while talking to me.  
Referring again to the model suggested by Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962), we might 
say that his overarching self-representation, seemingly coherent and not fragmented during 
the time I knew him, managed to accommodate differing self-images (or states of 
subjectivity, selves) that had to serve different psychological purposes, and provide a 
psychically functional adjustment to life contingencies that were certainly not ideal. The 
moral standards that he verbally expressed and behaviorally displayed with me would not 
condone his past achievements as a heroin processer. The self-image and subjective states 
that allowed him to engage in such activities must have been disavowed over time (at least 
partially), and replaced with different ones, more congruous with a changed environment, 
as well as shifted private wishes, hopes, and social opportunities. On the one hand, 
contradictions between the two self-images and subjectivities (one past, the other present) 
did indeed emerge during his recounting of the events, and in the choice of not fully 
disclosing his real degree of participation in those activities. On the other hand, the 
overarching coherence in his broader self-representation was, I believe, indicated by the 
very fact that he was able to articulate verbally, and hence acknowledge, the existence of 
these same contradictory self-images (and in so doing, bringing to awareness the conflict 
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between existing self-images, or states of subjectivity, which turns the dissociation between 
them into the ground for psychological functionality and growth. See Bromberg 1996).          
That, at the time when our conversations took place, Rahmat inhabited a different 
self-image than the one he had during his stint in the heroin laboratory (that, in other words, 
a different state of subjectivity was predominant in him), more adherent to a culturally 
normative set of moral standards proper to a respectable and honorable Pashtun man, 
illustrated his specific discourse about ghairat and honor: 
 
Ghairat is based on honesty [ghairat de diyanat pure ara lari]. Ghairat is that thing 
that makes you take action when you see injustice [zulm, also cruelty, abuse], when 
you see someone doing something that is not in accordance with religion, customs, 
and the people’s values [arzakhtuna]. A ghairatman [a person with ghairat] will 
never ask for money to do what he thinks is best to protect these values. He will 
never complain about the hardships that he has to suffer in order to do something 
honorable. He will not go behind the back of somebody to talk badly of him, he will 
tell him to his face what he thinks [peghor]. 
Andrea – Is this how you behave with other people? 
Rahmat – Well, you know me, you saw me in the village, don’t I do this? You saw 
that this is what I do in my life…This is what I believe right to do…There are fewer 
and fewer people like this today, as opposed to the past…I told you, I think this has 
to do with the war, and the people who came back from Pakistan. I think the best 
thing for a man is when he comes back from work at night and he can sit in his 
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hujra with his family members. I was happy when I did this in Sama Khel after 
work. 
Andrea – There are many people who do not like the life in the village, this life you 
are talking about…they say there are too many problems in the village, too much 
fighting, too much conflict… 
Rahmat – Yes, I know, this is true, there are many fights and conflicts [lanjay] in 
the village…but you have to adjust, you have to take what comes, and not 
complain…You have to be honest… if you are honest [spin, literally “white”, a 
white, pure heart, in this case] you can survive anything. I know there are problems 
in the village, but it is still better than life elsewhere, like in the city. 
 
While this narrative might seem too ideally coterminous with the culturally shared 
and accepted prototypical character of an honorable Pashtun man, Rahmat’s family and 
friends regularly used to describe him in this way. Furthermore, my personal experience 
with him was consistent with it. It was not uncommon, during my fieldwork, to hear an 
informant praise and support the culturally normative version of how a man should act, but 
not see him live up to it. By contrast, Rahmat was the only person that I knew well who 
never asked me for any “gift” or favor, who never expressed or complained about his state 
of need with me, and never raised suspicions of being motivated by some underlying 
ulterior motive. His “heart”, as far as my experience went, looked indeed “white”. At the 
time of our conversations, he had apparently chosen to identify positively with the ideal 
prototype of an honorable Pashtun man, the embodiment of a Weberian ideal type of 
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Pashtun “hegemonic masculinity” (Connell 1987, 1995; Demetriou, 2001, Inhorn, 2012). 
In this sense, Rahmat seems to present a case where the cultural representational world and 
personal self-image sre strongly congruent.  
The representational world produced by a cultural milieu interplays and may 
profoundly inform the modalities of functioning and the symbolic contents of the private 
representational world that individuals maintain for themselves. Rahmat seems to have  
significantly strayed away from a behavioral conformity with the culturally accepted moral 
standards for a respectable and pious Pashtun man when he was involved in criminal 
activities, but later returned to a model example of a nar (a self-reassuring, and possibly 
socially legitimizing position).  Rahmat embraced this culturally hegemonic representation 
of masculinity almost with enthusiasm. Such overlapping between the cultural 
representational world, and the private representational world in Rahmat must be 
considered, I believe, functional to the maintenance of his psychic equilibrium in this life 
conjuncture (an example, I would argue, of how pragmatically the individual is able to tap 
from unconscious emotional processed material, and render it meaningful in a given life 
conjuncture – what Wilfred Bion calls “learning from experience”. Bion 1962).  
It must be added here, that, as it had happened to Rohullah in his own Paktia village, 
R.W. Connell’s paradigm for “hegemonic masculinity” adapts well to the socio-cultural 
environment of Rahmat’s village. In a very traditional and “conservative” area of 
Nangarhar province, such as Angur Bagh district, there can certainly be detected, by and 
large, a univocal model for a dominant (and appropriate) performance of masculine 
behavior, that rests squarely on the attribute of ghairat, and on values such as izzat, sharm, 
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and parda (the segregation of the sexes). A set of diverse, and equally hegemonic 
masculinities (see Demetriou 2001) - the “luxury” that Rohullah found in Peshawar during 
his last two years of high school, and that Baryalay was able to take advantage of in his 
village, given his “saintly” genealogical background – was for Rahmat unavailable in his 
home village Sama Khel. Rahmat would not settle for a subordinate, painful type of 
masculinity, of the kind that the young Rohullah had to embody in the first years of his life 
in the Paktia province village. 
 
   
The strength of interconnectivity 
     
 The overlap between the two representational worlds, between these two aspects 
of his subjectivity, certainly did not take place without difficulties.  
 
A short time before going back to Afghanistan with the rest of the family, my father 
told me that I had to get married. I think he was getting worried for the things that 
I was doing in Afghanistan. I was still in Sama Khel at that time, working on opium 
with my cousin. I did not want to get married, I was not thinking about it. My father 
and my uncle told me that I should marry this cousin of mine, that they had already 
decided. I did not know this girl. She was living in Pakistan, close to my family, but 
I had never seen her, I did not know her. I told them that I did not want to do it. My 
father insisted that he had already promised my uncle that I would marry his 
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daughter, and that it would be a great dishonor and shame if I did not do so. He 
said that he needed to have a good relation with this uncle of mine…he was not his 
own brother, he was an uncle of his really…  
Andrea – So, you accepted what your father told you… 
Rahmat – Well, actually, no, I don’t know if I would have done it if my mother had 
not been so sad… 
Andrea – What do you mean? 
Rahmat – Yes, it was not my father that convinced me, it was my mother…it was 
my mother’s words that convinced me that I should do as my father was telling me 
to do. My mother’s words were stronger than my father’s authority [waak]. She 
was extremely sad, and she was always crying and lamenting with me that I would 
destroy the reputation of the family by not marrying the girl…She was very sad…I 
could not see my mother like that, so I said to my father that I would do it. Before I 
said yes, he also tried to convince me by saying that after marrying this girl, he 
would give me permission to sell a piece of our land to pay for a second marriage 
with a girl I like…he said that’s how it went for him, and he did not regret it… 
Andrea – Is that what you are going to do? 
Rahmat – No, no second wife, it’s too many problems…I don’t care, I am fine with 
my life like it is now. My wife and I have a god relationship. You know, that does 
not happen very often…I mean, it is common for a husband and a wife to have a 
bad relationship when the marriage is arranged…They will have hard feelings 
against each other, they will try to get revenge on the other… 
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Andrea – Wait, why do you say revenge? [badal] 
Rahmat – Yes, revenge, because both are angry, both are upset because they have 
to stay with a person they don’t like, and cannot have their own life, they could not 
choose a person that they liked…sometimes, you know, people have somebody they 
would like to marry, but they can’t…so husband and wife fight all the time, they are 
always angry, and the sweetest time of their lives is wasted this way. Then you see 
that they calm down when they get old, and they stop fighting because they are too 
tired to keep fighting…but at that point it’s too late, their young years are gone, 
and they become old people… 
Andrea – This is not happening with your marriage? 
 Rahmat – No, I told you, my wife and I have a good relationship. I don’t want any 
revenge on my wife. I don’t feel that way. I try to be kind and respectful with people 
that do not deserve to be treated with violence…My wife’s feeling are important to 
me, I do not want to hurt them…I mean, how could you hurt someone who loves 
your children more than you do? 
Andrea – Well, someone does, you said that it often happens here… 
Rahmat – Yes, I know, I know, I see them…I don’t know where this aggressiveness 
[ta’aruz] comes from…I guess from bad experiences, or from natural dispositions, 
and then I told you, arranged marriages bring bad blood between spouses…[long 
pause] I don’t want to hurt a weak person, I am afraid of that, it would not be 
honorable…but when some rights are in danger and must be defended, like your 
family’s rights, or your family’s honor, I am not scared even of the most dangerous 
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actions…When I see violence done to the powerful and the rich, I have no problem 
with that… 
Andrea – Wait, why is that so? 
Rahmat – People who are very powerful and very rich around here, they did not 
make what they have with honesty and honor, they stole and committed zulm 
against those who were less powerful…I don’t care if someone does violence to a 
kumandan [a militia leader], many others have suffered because of him…For 
example, let me tell you what happened about six months ago. The grandson of 
Hajji Wahidullah was kidnapped by a group of powerful people that had a problem 
with us about some land… they wanted to convince us into some deal…They kept 
the boy for three days, then they released him. A few weeks later, me and a friend 
of mine, we were in his shop in Marko bazaar, and we saw two of the group who 
kidnapped the boy. We dropped everything, and we ran after them, we caught them, 
and we beat them right there, in the middle of the street. Some people stopped us 
after a while, and then the police arrived, but they did not do anything. They  knew 
me, and they knew what had happened to the boy. We all went home. That’s how it 
should work, you know, I did not do that for showing off, I did it because it was the 
right thing to do…    
 
The fact that Rahmat was forced by his close family members to accept an arranged 
marriage with a girl he had never met, is of course nothing exceptional in Afghanistan. We 
have seen already that Umar was able to describe with remarkable introspectiveness the 
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feelings and emotions he went through while consenting to his family’s wishes and 
adjusting his personal life in order to accept the inevitable. Rahmat was subject to same 
process and likewise adjusted to the role he was assigned by his family. One interesting 
commonality between the two cases, all the more so due to the marked difference in social 
and educational backgrounds between the two informants’ families, as well as between 
Rahmat’s and Umar’s personal profiles, was the prominent role of the mothers. Umar’s 
mother was a strong and willful woman, who imposed herself on her son in order 
(according to Umar’s perceptions) to be able to exert a strong authority over her future 
daughter-in-law. Rahmat’s mother induced his cooperation by playing the “compassion 
card” to elicit feelings of guilt into his son Rahmat, and push him into accepting the 
family’s decision. Psychologist Marwan Dwairy and his colleagues (Dwairy et al., 2013) 
detected a cross-cultural pattern of behavior in a recent study of several Muslim 
environments in the Middle East. Here too family “discipline” was enforced through a 
strategy they termed “compassion evoking” in a sample of Arab Israeli, Sunni Muslim 
Lebanese and Arab Algerian families. Some of Dwairy’s informants reported that their 
mothers “often tells me how much she and the family are suffering because of me”. 
Whereas fathers, as Rahmat’s father did, take often an authoritarian stance in the matter by 
demanding that their sons do something, mothers play on their son’s feelings and sense of 
obigation. Whether this is done consciously and surreptitiously, or unconsciously, we 
cannot tell either from Dwairy’s study, or from Umar’s and Rahmat’s accounts, and it 
surely varies in relation to the personal idiosyncrasies of the protagonists  – although in 
Umar’s case, his own impression of his mother’s behavior clearly hinted at a consciously 
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orchestrated plan on her part, in order to receive as a daughter-in-law an easily controllable 
and malleable girl. 
Rahmat’s mother’s behavior, and Rahmat’s acquiescent response to it, seem to 
replicate a cultural pattern seemingly found across the large geographical belt that stretches 
from North Africa and the Mediterranean, to the Middle East, up to South Asia (not only 
among Muslim social milieus). Now, how do we interpret, at a psychodynamic level, 
Rahmat’s acquiescence and subsequent adjustment? It certainly represents a clue to his 
profound interrelatedness, or “connectivity” (Joseph 1999:1–17) with his socially and 
emotionally “significant others” (his extended family), and to his interpersonal dependency 
on his social milieu. Such condition, I believe, is not necessarily a sign of what Katherine 
Ewing calls “intrapsychic enmeshment”, hinting at a negative and pernicious blurring of 
ego boundaries (Ewing 1990). I think that both Joseph and Ewing are correct in considering 
the culturally shaped interpersonal relatedness, and the profound consequences that it has 
on the individual’s psychological dynamics, as a feature of certain cultural milieus (such 
as the Pashtun one) that should not be seen as either pathogenic per se, or indicating a lack 
of sense of individuation, personal autonomy, and agentic power (as is argued by many 
psychologists and some anthropologists [see, for instance, Markus and Kitayama 1991, 
Sharabi 1988, Minces 1982]).  
However, Ewing also maintains that “family members [who] fail to perceive each 
other in terms of their own unique attributes and needs, but instead fuse their perceptions 
with their own intrapsychic representation of conflictive internalized objects (projective 
transference distortion)” display a dangerous lack of intrapsychic differentiation between 
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self and other (Ewing 1990:138). This viewpoint, in my opinion, fails to accord the due 
weight to deep-reaching cultural idioms and patterns for emotional engagement between 
members of an extended family (or even friends). It also does not take into account the 
conscious and unconscious calculations towards the protection and enhancement of self-
interest and personal gains, which are reached through conforming to those culturally 
enjoined patterns of behavior and feeling that are a significant part of any interaction 
between individuals. As cross-cultural psychoanalyst Alan Roland suggested, cultural 
models and constraints affect the deepest layers of the human psyche (A. Roland, personal 
communication, March 2011). In cultural environments wherein interpersonal relatedness 
is at the center of the moral and emotional landscape of each individual, cases of supposed 
“intrapsychic enmeshment” might be otherwise explained, without recourse to 
pathologizing analytical categories and processes.  
Rahmat, for example, I believe never failed to sense where his personal priorities 
were, even when he chose to accommodate his parents’ wishes. He was clear in his mind 
where his personal choice, as if abstracted from a socio-cultural context, would rest (i.e., 
in not getting married then, and in waiting to find another suitable girl). Yet, no personal 
choice can really be fully abstracted from the surrounding context, and Rahmat seems to 
have perceived that as well. Rahmat somehow realized that the happiness and wellbeing of 
his mother (and of his family at large) was more important for him than the fulfillment of 
his own personal fantasy of marrying a more suitable girl, a fantasy that could not truly 
materialize in a real world made of social connections and cultural models (his contingent 
“social figuration”, in the words of Norbert Elias. Elias 1994 [1968]:211–215). The 
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happiness of his mother meant for Rahmat his own happiness as well. In the context of his 
Pashtun cultural environment, Rahmat’s own self-interest lies together with his family’s 
interest. Emotions, “authentic” feelings, and hence the sense of autonomy and 
individuality, follow accordingly. There is no “psychic enmeshment” at the root of 
Rahmat’s decision, I argue. Personal, private wishes get adjusted to, and become openly 
shaped by the cultural and social schemata of one’s environment. The new shape these 
wishes adopt becomes felt as one’s own, and “authentically” so, just as much as one’s 
disconnected-from-reality-fantasies had been prior to the necessary reality-check (these 
two apparently conflicting registers of subjectivity, I would argue, belong to two different 
self-images, which the individual is able to construct and manage coherently, when in 
possession of a healthy psychic equilibrium). It appears clear in this sense how the notion 
of a bounded ego (or self, see Geertz 1984:126), isolated and insulated from social and 
“cultural figurations” (paraphrasing Elias) should be revised. 
  And in fact, while talking to Rahmat, as it happened while talking with Umar about 
the same issues, I felt that they had never abdicated to their own “individuality”, never 
“compromised” their ego boundaries by fully identifying with their mother’s wishes (i.e., 
the conflictive internalized object). It was not with his mother’s wishes that Rahmat 
identified (renouncing to his own ones - in other terms, suppressing his own self-objects, 
as Heinz Kohut would put it), but with the socio-cultural idioms of his own environment. 
In so doing, his own self-interest became coterminous with complying with those 
injunctions. Such apparently contradictory conflation between socio-cultural expectations 
and self-interest was resolved successfully by Rahmat through developing a set of 
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emotional inclinations and attachment priorities that he perceived positively as his own, 
“authentic” to his own deep needs. In other words, Rahmat felt somehow that he 
“authentically” cared more for his mother’s wellbeing and peace of mind, than for his own 
fantasies and wishes, which he deemed unrealistic within a real-life social context. This I 
take to be a successful adaptation of one’s emotional creative production, rather than the 
clue to any pathogenic instance of “intrapsychic enmeshment”. I believe that this process 
is a testimony to the powerful role that socio-cultural patterns and norms acquire in shaping 
the individual’s emotional engagement, and attachment dynamics.  
Likewise, I had the impression that probably Rahmat’s and Umar’s mothers had 
possibly acted not by “fusing the perceptions of their sons with their own intrapsychic 
representation of conflictive internalized objects”, but by trying to push (if unconsciously) 
their sons into a choice that would be more advantageous for themselves within the cultural 
and social setting wherein they were living (though this must remain a speculation on my 
part, not being able to interact with Rahmat’s or Umar’s mothers). To reiterate, I think that 
in these cases what might be mistaken for intrapsychic enmeshment could perhaps be better 
interpreted as the demonstration of the profound inroads that cultural schemata and social 
arrangements make into one’s psychic dynamics.46 The pathological character of what ego-
                                                          
46 I am not denying here that a pathological form of loss of self-acknowledgment and “self-sensing”, 
with a consequent and persistent conflation on one’s own reality with the realities of what is “not-
me”, may happen in some cases (a “not-me” identification, as posited by Harry Stack Sullivan. 
Sullivan 1953:158–164). What I believe, however, is that these cases should probably considered 
as extreme cases of psychotic or borderline psychotic instances, as Wilfred Bion analyzed in great 
details, and which should not be taken into consideration for the explanation of psychological 
dynamics in socially functioning and relatively well-adjusted individuals within a non-Western 
cultural milieu. With regard to the necessity to differentiate between “pathological” (for lack of a 
better term) fusions, or mergers, and the functional and adaptive (i.e., “non-pathological”) 
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psychologists, and some anthropologists, see in intrapsychic enmeshment, I believe is 
absent in this kind of culturally-induced shaping of individual subjectivity.  
Such form of subjectively experiencing one’s own representational world as in line 
with the cultural representational world inherent in their socio-cultural environment, 
should not be seen as a pathogenic loss of boundaries in an otherwise well-defined and 
bounded ego. Indeed it seems that the stress on intrapsychic autonomy or enmeshment 
should also be considered within the framework of a Western-oriented psychoanalytic 
thought, which preoccupies itself exceedingly with ego boundaries and defined 
individuality, following Western cultural schemata that traditionally reward the expression 
of personal features like autonomy and independence. The analysis of cases of family 
conflicts, like Umar’s and Rahmat’s, in the context of non-Western milieus, where cultural 
idioms of interrelatedness and connectivity may call for different expectations as to how 
one should behave (and feel) towards oneself and the family members, I believe might be 
important in order to radically revise the crucial place that in Western psychological 
thought has been given to concepts like “individual psychic autonomy”.  
As psychoanalysts like Malcolm Owen Slavin, Daniel Kriegman, and Alan Roland, 
as well as anthropologists like Charles Lindholm, Robert LeVine, and Suad Joseph have 
remarked in the past, it might be more useful (and in line with cross-cultural empirical 
evidence) to assume that the individual self (or ego) may be in fact constitutionally 
composed at least in part by the “selves” of other people (i.e., those individuals who have 
                                                          
interpersonal encounters of subjectivities and perceptions,  the psychoanalyst and developmental 
psychologist Daniel Stern has written powerful pages (see Stern 2001 [1985]:104–111) 
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had, and have, the most relevant impact on our emotional,  social and cultural lives), instead 
of maintaining as a working hypothesis that the self (or ego) is bounded and “isolated”.  
Incidentally, this view may be reconciled also with part of the ego-psychological literature, 
for example with the model of the representational world that Sandler and Rosenblatt 
proposed in the 1960s, which I have sketched above.47    
 
The context of masculinity: between fantasy and reality 
 
How does masculinity fit into the picture that we have so far painted? It is clear that 
Rahmat seeks to embody and represent in the most complete manner the ideal image that 
Pashtun culture has created for a respectable, honorable and virile man – a hegemonic 
masculinity. Or, in other words, Rahmat manages to perceive himself in line with the 
requirements and expectations of his socio-cultural milieu, which, as I have noted, does 
not leave much room for alternative, and competing, “hegemonic masculinities”. The 
relationship with his mother that emerged from his narrative helps us understand better 
what this ideal may imply. While Rahmat’s discourse about how “to be good at being a 
man” touches on the many aspects that we have seen so far both preached and practiced by 
other informants (ghairat, aggressiveness, restoring a tainted honor, etc.), Rahmat’s life 
events corroborated one more aspect that we have seen already emerging in Umar’s 
                                                          
47 See, in this regard, the powerful views expressed on the issue of attachment in cross-cultural 
perspective, and the dynamics of emotion-creation, in a recent collection of essays co-edited by 
Hiltrud Otto and Heidi Keller (Otto and Keller 2014). The chapter authored by Birgitt Roettger-
Roessler is particularly pertinent to the analysis I propose in the section above. 
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narrative: the powerful and influential role of the mother. There is clearly, for Rahmat, no 
contradiction between his self-representation as a tough, frugal and “independent” man (in 
the sense that he does not want to depend on anybody else, and refrains from asking support 
in times of need, unless in extreme cases), and the fact that he quietly and timidly 
acquiesced to his mother’s request to marry the girl his father wanted him to marry – all 
the more remarkable because of the ideas about women that he openly expressed with me, 
as being weaker individuals both physically and psychologically.  
Yet the contradiction seems to be quite obvious to a non-Pashtun, like me, listening 
to the accounts of Rahmat’s life’s emotional engagements. And Rahmat is not alone among 
my informants to have expressed such feelings of admiration and esteem towards their 
mothers. Both Rohullah and Umar spoke about their mothers as strong-willed persons, to 
whose decisions they, one way or another, did submit at some crucial point in their adult 
lives. Baryalay lost his mother too early for him to have been able to construe such type of 
narrative about her, yet the respect he devotes to his wife (of which I was personally witness 
multiple times) might be an interesting clue to his potential attitudes towards motherhood. 
So, if the hardships of motherhood are somehow morally “rewarding” in the eyes of a 
respectable Pashtun man, where does the apparent cognitive dissonance come from, which 
allows Rahmat (and many others like him) to think of “average” women as “weaker”, 
almost “inferior” beings, but of his mother as an eminently influent and implicitly powerful 
person, so much so that her wishes must be fulfilled by him? Is it perhaps the self-serving 
illusion according to which “my mother is not like any other woman”? This seems hardly 
to be the case, given that all my informants were very much aware that their mothers, as 
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illiterate and uneducated women, excluded from the public sphere, did not in fact represent 
any exception to the profile of the average Pashtun woman.  A special attachment to one’s 
own mother should probably not constitute a surprise in any cultural environment, 
including Pashtuns, nor should a culturally shared representation of women as deficient in 
some way vis-à-vis men. However, in the case of a cultural environment such as Pashtuns, 
which expresses clearly its heavily androcentric character (even “hypermasculine”, from a 
Western standpoint, with a consistent predominance of a specific type of “hegemonic 
masculinity”), and the consequently secondary social position held by women, the 
recurrent “unofficial” recognition of women’s personal power and strength, if only in the 
figure of one’s own mother, seems note-worthy. It would obviously take a detailed analysis 
of several cases of relationship between sons and mothers to start to understand how such 
phenomenon is played out at a personal level, and how much the cultural idiom of 
masculinity and general social arrangements proper to Pashtun society influence the private 
negotiations of these intra-family processes.  
One general conclusion that we can take out of all this, however, even in the 
absence of detailed mother-son relations case studies, is that men’s subordination to 
mother’s wishes and expectations is not considered to be a point of weakness, or a 
“feminizing” aspect of one’s personality traits. It rather appears to be a well entrenched 
feature of Pashtun masculinity that makes a nar of a simple man (saray).   
Rahmat, during our conversations, did not make a secret of those main 
requirements, moral and ethical, that a nar, in his eyes, should display.  
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Honor [izzat] and land go together. Land is a symbol of your honor. Selling land is 
a disgrace…nobody should sell their land. You see, the more land you have, the 
more honor…land is better than money: money comes and goes, land stays. A big 
family, with a lot of land, they are respected. Money is not as important…only 
stupid people respect money more than land.  
Andrea – I see a lot of people who are very interested in money, and think that 
respect comes from money… 
Rahmat – Yes, there are now, there are these people now around…it’s because of 
the war, before things were different…now people are scared, they are afraid of 
what will happen, they changed their way of thinking…you don’t know if tomorrow 
you will be dead or alive…people want and respect money today because they want 
things now, right away…tomorrow who knows what happens…They think yes, I 
have this piece of land, and I will keep it, so that people respect me…but maybe 
another war comes, and I die next month…so, then? What did the land serve me 
for? I am dead anyway…But respect should not come only from money…many 
people still respect wisdom… 
Andrea – What about you? Do you have land? 
Rahmat – Yes, you know about the land we have in the bazaar…that’s valuable, it’s 
not easy to find land in the bazaar, it’s very expensive now…that’s why the 24 
families wanted to take it away from us…then we have another big piece of land, 
about 80 jiribs, outside of the village, towards the mountains…that is also valuable, 
maybe 30,000 dollars per jirib, but it’s contested, there is another family which 
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says that a piece of it is theirs…I don’t know how it is going to go…with my share 
I could send one of my brothers to live in America or Europe and go to university 
there… 
Andrea – But you told me that only stupid people sell their land, and that it would 
be a disgrace… 
Rahmat – I know what I told you…sometimes the situation is so bad that one has 
no other alternative…I want my brothers to have a good life, to get educated. 
Andrea – So, you are going to leave your village too? 
Rahmat – No, not leave! Why leave, anyway? I know there are problems, fighting, 
conflicts, but it’s nothing serious…you have to be a man, you know? A man faces 
his problems and does not run away, if the problems are within your 
possibilities…here in the district, there are more than 400 Waraki, but only a few 
of them are ready to confront a problem, like men, when it happens. In Afghanistan, 
people tread on your rights every day, and the fact that there is no government 
forces you to defend your rights with your own hands…When I was young, me and 
my friends would all help each other…we would come in support of each other 
when one of us needed help, we would fight for each other. Now most of them have 
found good jobs, they have left the village, they have gone to the city, or somewhere 
else, they have a good life now. They don’t call anymore, we don’t see each other 
anymore…but I don’t like to ask for favors,  a man does not beg, I am not a beggar, 
I don’t want to put pressure on people… 
Andrea – So, you are planning to sell… 
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Rahmat – Maybe, I don’t know, we’ll see…I want at least one of my brothers to go 
away, to go somewhere where he can study, and have a normal life. Maybe 
Europe…[long pause] certainly not a Muslim country, where there is no respect for 
people’s rights. No, he has to live where people respect him and his rights…A friend 
of mine from the US, he is now in Costa Rica, he has a business there, he told me 
that if I can go there we can work together… 
 
It is remarkable that this last exchange opened with Rahmat saying that there is no 
honor without land and that selling one’s land is a despicable act, but closed with him 
pondering on selling his own share of land to send his brothers abroad (and himself to 
Costa Rica). Rahmat did not realize the incongruence when we spoke. His thoughts were 
flowing, and that’s where they took him. From the idealized realm of the cultural idiom 
and his heart-felt pragmatic and performative adherence to it (“you have to be a 
man…stand up for your rights…a man does not beg…”), he shifted to the realm of 
fantasizing, a purview of wishes that he barely manages to justify through some rhetorical 
gymnastics (“sometimes the situation is so bad that one has no other alternative…”). After 
all, it seems, his self-representation is not confined only to self-images and subjective states 
that are in a direct relation to those cultural idioms about “how to be good at being a man” 
that he otherwise, and authentically, cherishes dearly. Or is it really so?  
He holds a “fantastic” self-image that seems to entail rebellion and liberation from 
a harsh socio-cultural environment and its constraining norms - in Costa Rica, of all places, 
a country about which he probably knows nothing, but that he construes as a repository of 
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that degree of personal realization and fulfillment that he feels somewhat curtailed at home. 
Perhaps Costa Rica represents that place where paradoxically he could be, at last, the true 
Pashtun man that he feels he cannot be any longer in his own Afghanistan, a country 
plagued by a war that, he said multiple times, changed the minds of its people, betraying 
his own expectations. If so, it would be the triumph of precisely that self-image of the 
quintessential Pashtun man, adherent to the cultural idiom of it, that he built for himself 
over the years and that he feels he cannot fully embody in Afghanistan. The situation, he 
says, sometimes forces you to come to extreme measures. He would not become like those 
who sell their land only for money, and self-aggrandizement, in a shameful way – his case 
is “different”. In the end then, the interdependence between the socio-cultural realm, and 
the individual’s psychic realm seems inescapable and complete. The psychic processes that 
make him fantasize of a new beginning far away from home are still fully dependent on, 
and shaped by, the cultural material to which he was exposed d uring his own life (the 
cultural representational world of his social environment, as we have termed it above). 
Such is the language with which his psychological dynamics speak. Their patterns of 
functioning need not be peculiar per se, yet the content is culture-specific. As Edward Sapir 
understood long ago, “the individual in isolation from society is a psychological fiction” 
(Sapir 2002:233). 
  And yet Costa Rica is a fantasy. These diverse subjective states clearly coexist with 
each other, even compete with each other. These self-images represent the outcome of the 
interplay between cultural narratives (which he has absorbed and elaborated over time), 
and the painful real-life situation that he is obliged to confront every day in his rural district. 
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The cultural norms and rules about how “to be good at being a man” give him a moral 
compass that he has positively endorsed and made his own. The disruption brought about 
by the conflict inspires in him wishes and strivings that such morality may hardly 
accommodate. 
Again, for Rahmat, like for Umar, Rohullah and Baryalay, there is multiplicity, 
shifting subjectivities that still manage to constitute, in spite of inner conflicts and 
ambiguities, a coherent and psychically functional self-representation. In an influential 
article, psychologists Hazel Markus and Paula Nurius wrote about the importance of what 
they called “possible selves”: “Possible selves represent individuals’ ideas of what they 
might become, what they would like to become, and what they are afraid of becoming” 
(Markus and Nurius 1986:954, emphasis in original). The same applies for those subjective 
states (or selves, in the authors’ parlance) that one endorsed in the past, and/or still endorses 
in the present. Rahmat was expressing to me the existence, or rather, co-existence, of such 
“possible selves”, in the form of fantasies, and in the language of his own cultural 
representational world.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The vicissitudes of Rahmat’s life shed some light on a different type of personal 
profile from the ones that we have so far encountered. Rohullah, Umar and Baryalay all, 
for different reasons, and in different ways, clashed with and rejected at least part of the 
cultural representational world they received from their social environment – particularly 
 
 
 
282 
in the purview of idioms of masculinity. They struggled and adjusted to their social milieus. 
With Rahmat, we have witnessed a radically different plot. Both during our sessions and 
in the glimpses of his real life that I could experience personally, Rahmat by conyrast 
appeared to embody perfectly the ideal of the “real” Pashtun man. Those who know him 
well shared this impression. Rahmat never bragged about this aspect of himself, or tried to 
show me how much he was in line with the “correct” model of Pashtun man. All his 
accounts about himself and the milieu were presented in a rather unassuming, matter-of-
fact fashion. This struck me as peculiar. Although his life trajectory was far from being 
smooth and even, still I had hardly ever met a man who appeared, and reported himself to 
be, so well-adjusted to, and in tune with his socio-cultural environment – especially when 
it came to matters of “being good at being a man”.  
Was it a macroscopic instance of self-deception (as evolutionary psychologists 
would call it), a case in which the subject is not able to relate certain open symptoms of 
malaise to the probable underlying, unconscious causes? I was not inclined to give a 
positive answer, given that Rahmat had showed multiple times to be a very sharp and 
introspective individual, in spite of his deficiency in formal education. And yet, the fantasy 
that Rahmat constructed, to leave Afghanistan and go to Costa Rica, constituted in my view 
a red flag for the existence of a deep sense of frustration and maladjustment, in spite of the 
apparent positive acceptance of, and adaptation to, his own socio-cultural environment, 
which Rahmat showed publicly. He shaped this frustration in terms of an act of betrayal 
that the environment itself had “carried out” against his dreams and wishes of a culturally 
appropriate “manly” life at home. It is possible that the identification between the cultural 
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and the personal representational worlds in Rahmat became so strong and “authenticated” 
by deep emotional engagement to foreclose for him the possibility to remain in his own 
life at home.  
From this standpoint, in comparison with Rohullah, Umar and Baryalay, Rahmat 
constitutes a different embodiment of the rejection of a cultural status quo that he feels 
does not represent his subjectivity any longer. If Rohullah, Umar and Baryalay rejected 
altogether that part of the Pashtun cultural idioms of masculinity, and social dynamics, that 
the decades of war had bequeathed to them as a dire legacy, and became somehow hostile 
to what they interpreted as a “traditional” Pashtun idea of manliness tout court, Rahmat 
seems entrenched in the cultural idioms of what he feels to be a more “authentic” Pashtun 
manliness, a more “original” nartob, in the way many of my middle-aged informants 
recalled it while reminiscing about the pre-conflict years. Rahmat dreams of a village 
which still works socially and culturally along the lines that he got enculturated into by his 
father and grandfather, and which he saw operating as such during his childhood years in 
the family enclosure in Pakistan. Rohullah, Umar and Baryalay have absorbed and reacted 
to their cultural milieus in very idiosyncratic ways, and their private, personal negotiation 
of that cultural representational world is testimony in them to the profound interplay 
between the cultural and the individual realms. They participate in the societal feedback 
process, and in the personally-induced, almost imperceptible yet constant contribution to 
socio-cultural change through their public behavior and social interaction.  
Rahmat does not escape this process, but his contribution probably moves towards 
a different direction. He has privately discriminated rather clearly between a cultural idiom 
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of masculinity that belongs, in his view, to a “respectable”, almost heroic Pashtun past, and 
one that he considers morally bankrupt. His entrenched rigidity in upholding by example 
this idealized “respectable” set of values and qualities that supposedly make up a nar, 
contributes just the same to socio-cultural change through a feedback effect, yet in a 
direction that points to the “restoration” of an idealized pre-conflict Pashtun past. Militia 
commanders, their moral and ethical bankruptcy, the ever-increasing tide of free-wheeling 
violent behaviors in rural Pashtun areas, have no place in Rahmat’s prototypical world, and 
those around him are aware of it. In spite of his own underlying sense of hopelessness and 
disillusionment, which leads him to fantasize about a new life in Costa Rica, Rahmat’s role 
as an individual bearer of socio-cultural change within his daily life milieu (if 
imperceptibly and unconsciously) is not forfeited.   
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CHAPTER 6: BETWEEN WHAT “WAS” AND WHAT “IS”:  
FOUR TALES OF DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH 
 
Introduction 
 
The present chapter will be devoted to four informants whom I have known for a 
long time, but with whom I did not have the regular series of one-on-one interview sessions, 
as I had with the preceding four informants. Kamran, Inayat, Wahid, Nasim Khan (and his 
father Niamatullah, to a lesser extent) are among the friends that I know best in 
Afghanistan. I have met them on a regular basis since 2009 (in the case of Nasim and his 
father), or 2010 (in the case of the other three), and I had the opportunity of knowing many 
of their (male) relatives, siblings and friends. Nevertheless, they showed themselves 
disinclined to embark in the sort of commitment that my “person-centered” project would 
have required. They simply did not seem interested in subjecting themselves to the 
admittedly rather intrusive, and possibly anxiety-engendering, practice of sitting down for 
hours with me talking about their intimate lives, fears, conflicts, and wishes. Yet we spent 
a good deal of time together, holding our conversations at each other’s places, in 
restaurants, during leisure trips, at weddings, playing soccer, or maybe just while taking a 
walk together in their respective town or village.  From the time spent together I feel that I 
gained a good insight into their private lives, as well as into their public ones.  
Inayat and Kamran come from a small rural village near the border with Pakistan 
(Sama Khel), while Wahid and Nasim Khan were born and raised in Jalalabad. Though all 
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of them are Pashtun young men, they hail from specific socio-cultural backgrounds. This 
puts them in differentn analytica categories. Claiming that Jalalabad represents a 
cosmopolitan and “liberal” milieu would be certainly an exaggeration. The social fabric of 
the city, especially due to the flight of much of the educated and (relatively) secular middle 
class during the decades of conflict, has become almost undistinguishable from that of a 
rural district (“Because of the war, the village has conquered the city”, one of my 
informants told me once, with visible regret). Yet the “social ecology” of the city life does 
impact its inhabitants, and creates an environment that in turn attracts a self-selected 
section of the rural population. In the midst of the high number and high density of city 
dwellers, between those who permanently live in the city and those who use it only as a 
temporary hub for working and trading opportunities, one’s original rural social networks 
may loosen their grip. The control villages normally exert on the individual may over time 
start to fade away. Surrounded by strangers, one can quickly slide into anonymity. While 
this can bring about feelings of estrangement and alienation, it also takes the individual 
away from the ubiquitous and inquisitive gaze of the “other” – an “other” who, in the 
village, knows everything about your life, your family, your lineage past vicissitudes, and 
eagerly awaits your next social misstep. Thus, the panopticon to which a Pashtun man is 
tied, disintegrates somewhat in the city. With less social policing by the community, an 
individual finds he has leeway to enact certain behaviors that in the village context would 
be frowned upon. Social activities (like schooling for girls, civil society organizations 
which promote political consciousness or women’s civil rights, for example) can be started 
and supported by the most entrepreneurial members of the urban community. Those who 
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cannot stand the harsh and demanding life of a rural village often find some respite and 
personal realization by moving to Jalalabad.  
At the same time, however, the observer must remain careful not to overestimate 
the latitude for “deviant” actions among the city dwellers. Whereas the cleavage between 
rural and urban milieus is certainly present in a province like Nangarhar, the two are closer 
after thirty-five years of war. The complaint “the village has conquered the city” is not an 
isolated cry, but the confirmed perception of many middle-aged Pashtuns in Jalalabad.   
Against this background, Nasim, Wahid, Inayat and Kamran certainly have a lot in 
common. They are the representatives of a young and “upcoming” generation of Pashtun 
young men, who grew up in the context of the post-Taliban Afghanistan, and in the wake 
of the powerful ideological inputs and influences brought along by the occupation of the 
country at the hands of Western apparatuses and personnel (both military and civilian). 
They all show, each in their own idiosyncratic way, how pre-existing cultural narratives 
are being invested with new meanings, creating new avenues for social, and culturally 
legitimate, self-fulfillment.  
With the possible exception of Nasim Khan, the protagonists of this chapter are 
much younger than the individuals I presented previously. Even more importantly, all four 
of them never left the social environment they were born into. This continuity in personal 
life experiences and the contiguity of the type of socio-cultural milieu in which they were 
all raised makes for a better understanding of similar patterns in their life trajectory and 
personal choices. More than just complementing the more detailed profiles I presented in 
the previous chapters, the discussion of these young men’s lives represents a clearer 
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example of how the “new” and the “old” get incorporated into each other, and how the 
individual manages to shape a different and alternative subjectivity, which transcends both 
what “was” and what “is”.  
 
Inayat and Kamran 
 
When I met Inayat and Kamran for the first time, in the summer of 2010 in their 
village of Sama Khel, they were just sixteen and seventeen years old, respectively. Neither 
of them knew for sure their exact age, but, judging from the fact that they were in their 10th 
and 11th grade in school, they reckoned they should probably be approaching adulthood 
(Kamran was slightly older than Inayat). They were among those whom I met visiting the 
hujra of Hajji Wahidullah, the elder of the Waraki family to which Rahmat also belonged. 
Inayat and Kamran were the younger cousins of Rahmat, while Rahmat and Kamran are 
grandchildren of different brothers of Hajji Wahidullah. Inayat is the direct grandson of 
Hajji Wahidullah himself. Brought to the village by Hajji Zia (another grandchild of one 
of Hajji Wahidullah’s brothers), my wife and I were quickly introduced to Inayat and 
Kamran. The two were drawn to us because of their ability to speak English. In fact, 
Kamran even taught English to children in the village who wanted to start with the 
language, and his classes also attracted students from the neighboring villages. He had 
taken English courses in Angur Bagh, the district capital, and now had started an 
independent “practice”, which was well rewarded economically. His English was quite 
good, although it obviously lacked the features granted by practicing with mother tongue 
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speakers, which he had never done. Given the circumstances, his proficiency was rather 
remarkable. Inayat, on the contrary, was in the beginning stages of learning the language 
and was at that time one of Kamran’s students. This put Inayat in a curious relational 
position with Kamran. Inayat clearly acted with deference and timidity toward his older 
cousin (and teacher), but it was Inayat who would hold a higher rank in the family politics, 
when the time comes. He is the direct grandson of Hajji Wahidullah. As such he is one of 
the most likely candidates for replacing Hajji Wahidullah as elder of the family, in due 
course.  
I had to wait to understand this, though, until Inayat himself told me one day, 
without much fanfare, and in a very unassuming way. Kamran was the older cousin of the 
two, and also the most “aggressive”, to whom Inayat naturally deferred. Inayat acted as a 
very shy and respectful adolescent (toward us as well), with a discretion that was proper of 
older individuals. The two were obviously two very different characters. Kamran was 
daring, outspoken, even bragging sometimes, more “attentive” to the shared cultural idioms 
about the hegemonic masculinity that his milieu upheld. Inayat, on the contrary, was more 
introvert, soft-spoken, less outwardly sure of himself, and less “performative” in the ways 
he would be supposed to behave as a future lineage leader. Perhaps part of this might be 
attributable to the necessity that Kamran possibly felt to “prove” himself to his familial 
context (in his capacity as a member of a secondary branch of the lineage), while Inayat 
could feel more “reassured” in the light of his ascriptive position as a direct descendant of 
the current leading elder. I could not gather enough information about the family 
environment in which both boys were raised, which surely had a big role in their adolescent 
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development. What was evident though, was that Inayat had internalized more the values 
of hierarchy and submission to authority that are integral part of Pashtun social 
relationships, while Kamran had “chosen” (unconsciously) to privilege those values of 
individualism and personal competition that are equally, if contradictorily, a crucial aspect 
of Pashtun masculine culture.    
In the quiet summer of 2010, the seventeen year-old Kamran was the boy Hajji 
Wahidullah “assigned” to me, in order to spend time with me, to make sure that I would 
not lack anything as a guest. He accompanied me for walks in the bazaar of Angur Bagh 
and introduced me to some of his friends who either worked in shops there or hung out 
with other friends along the bazaar stalls. He was happy he could practice his English with 
someone he considered a “native speaker” – I was for sure the closest to a native speaker 
whom he had had any relationship with.  Sometimes Inayat would come along with us, 
although it took some time to convince him to speak out and not be shy about his less-than-
perfect English. While Kamran was happy to show me around the village and the bazaar, 
as well as to show off to his friends his acquaintance with a foreign person (which clearly 
scored him a lot of points among his peers), he was equally careful of not exposing himself 
too much, and kept my presence somehow quiet. He was cognizant enough, in spite of his 
age, of the way the village worked, and of the hostile attitude that many adults had towards 
foreigners, and outsiders in general. So I was introduced to his friends who worked in 
bazaar shops, but our conversations took place inside the shops, sometimes even in the 
backroom, where passers-by or customers could not see us and ill-meaning eyes would not 
pick up on my presence. He instructed me to speak to him only in Pashto when we were in 
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the streets of the bazaar, or, better, not to speak at all.  Over time, the frequency of our 
excursions to the bazaar, and around the village, decreased steadily with the increasing 
deterioration of the security situation in the area. Kamran started avoiding the main bazaar 
road, and entered his friends’ shops only from the back doors. By the summer of 2013, 
both Inayat and Kamran wanted to meet me only in Jalalabad, at my place, where there 
would be no danger for either of them to be seen in my company. And even in Jalalabad, 
one thing that Kamran and Inayat always asked of me, was not to accompany them up to 
the taxi stand from which the cars to the village would leave. They wanted to avoid the 
remote chance that someone from the village, or from Angur Bagh district in general, going 
back from Jalalabad, could identify them in the company of a stranger, possibly a foreigner. 
I would usually pay for their taxi ride back and forth from the village, but would walk them 
only half way between my home and the taxi stand in the city center.     
Kamran was bold. From the first, he was asking me and my wife whether we could 
buy him and bring him things from abroad. It started with books for learning English (“with 
a CD for the pronunciation!”, he made clear) right the first time we met, and proceeded 
with a computer (“to show my students some DVDs in good English”, he explained), and 
later in our relationship, even more directly, money (“you should give me some money if 
I graduate from 12th grade with good marks!”). In this regard, he definitely strayed from 
the ideal model that a respectable Pashtun man should embody, as described aptly by his 
older cousin Rahmat: never ask for anything, never ask for help, do not beg, and try to get 
by through your own means. It seemed that “begging” was not a problem for Kamran, 
provided that I did not tell anything about it to anyone (“Don’t tell anyone I asked you for 
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these things, make it as if you were giving me a gift”). His boldness was even more evident 
because, despite his young age, he had an income as English teacher from students who 
paid a small “tuition” to attend his class. Nevertheless, Kamran could boast that he earned 
money for himself. How much of this money he kept I could not ascertain, but I am sure 
his “craftiness” helped him to keep some of it for himself. I played along, and procured 
him an English textbook, a second-hand computer from Kabul, and later even gave him a 
money-gift after he showed me the certification from his high school attesting that he had 
in fact passed 12th grade with good marks.  
In exchange for these “gifts”, I was able to participate in three of his teaching 
sessions in the bazaar classroom (during which I was put under fire by the students’ 
questions about myself and my work), and, more generally, to keep him wanting to see me 
on a regular basis. It was clear, in fact, that for Kamran our relationship was based on a 
premise of reciprocity, which did not disturb me a bit. I could well understand that he had 
picked up on the common myth, very popular in Afghanistan, according to which every 
Western foreigner is a rich man. “He is a rich person”, Kamran probably reasoned, “and 
he needs my help. So, I will get something in return for my help. That’s only fair, he’s got 
more money than I will ever have, I am not hurting him”.  
Though I perfectly understood this line of reasoning, and was not surprised by it, at 
the same time it ran counter to the expected behavior of a respectable Pashtun man, as 
Rahmat explained. Moreover, I represented the guest, a traditionally sacred figure in 
Pashtun culture, from whom a host should not ask anything in return for hospitality. Yet, 
as I would learn during my fieldwork, sometimes, and in someone’s view, the foreigner 
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falls outside the purview and the boundaries of appropriate cultural behavior. Bound by 
strict cultural norms in the relationship with their peers, some of my informants seemed to 
enjoy the possibility of “violating” the norm with me, particularly when the violation could 
bring them some sort of benefit – a benefit they could not reap in the standard peer-to-peer 
relationships. Not that in Pashtun society individuals will be expected to do things only out 
of the goodness of their hearts, of course. Rewards and compensations are expected, and 
people exchange favors also in view of some future benefit. Yet this usually happens in a 
subtle, very diplomatic, and almost unspoken way, far from the brazen fashion in which 
Kamran asked me to buy him books or computers, not to mention the handing over of 
money itself.  
This aspect of my relationship with my informants took an interesting shape. The 
existence of, and abidance by, the norms and tenets of good Pashtun etiquette and ethical 
behavior clearly did not stifle or hinder the existence of wishes, desires, emotions, and 
fantasies that would be considered socially and culturally inappropriate. Kamran would 
have never asked for gifts, the way he did with me, of an adult Pashtun man. In the presence 
of his elders he was always very deferential, obedient and respectful, never speaking if not 
addressed to. He would never ask his older cousin Rahmat, or the brother of his father, or 
a friend of his father, for a computer despite the fact that they probably could have afforded 
it. He could do so with me because, I believe, he deemed that I was unable to judge his 
actions (and so himself) in a culturally competent way. In Pierre Bourdieu’s terms, he 
thought I was not “fluent” in the cultural language that gave or denied him social capital. 
From a certain standpoint, he was taking advantage of what he supposed to be my 
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ignorance. What most interests me in this case, is the realization that his rigorous training 
in proper etiquette and ethics did not prevent him from “feeling” in a certain way, from 
having certain wishes that he knew were socially inappropriate, and which he could satisfy 
with me – asking me for gifts and money, displaying a daring and “impudent” attitude that 
perhaps will serve him later in life as well among his peers, if he ever reaches a 
distinguished enough position in the lineage.  
Kamran was a “naturally” entrepreneurial boy. The effort he put into learning 
English, as a way out from the village in a near future, and as a means for income in the 
present, were remarkable and successful. Inayat confessed to me that, among their friends, 
Kamran acted in a domineering and aggressive way. He was “stronger” than the others. In 
this sense he was fulfilling the other half of Pashtuns’ classical equation for proper 
masculinity, at least in a rural context:  boldness, courage and daring (the first half being 
respect for authority and capacity for self-effacement). As I said above, I always had the 
impression that he felt he had to overdo things, in order to gain a social position of repute 
that by ascription would go to somebody else (in this case, probably Inayat, as the grandson 
of Hajji Wahidullah). When asked directly about certain cultural precepts and social 
customs, his opinion was often very strong, as if looking to assert a strong and 
uncompromising ideological or identity stance. Once, in 2010, we were standing in the area 
outside the in-door village hujra, against a hot August sunset, and I asked him whether 
there were any of the women living in Sama Khel who had a job outside the village. He 
replied: 
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No, of course not, women should not work! A woman who should go to an office to 
work, or somewhere else to work alone, away from the village, she should be shot! 
Andrea – Shot? You mean that you would kill her? 
Kamran – Yes, that’s the only thing you can do in this case…she dishonored the 
family, she had relations with other men…that’s what should happen, she should 
be shot! 
Andrea – What do your father and uncles think about this? Would they agree with 
your opinion? 
Kamran – Well, I don’t know, sometimes they tell me that I should not say certain 
things, that I don’t know what I am talking about… I think they would not support 
me on this… 
Andrea – So, where did you take these ideas from? 
Kamran – But this is pukhto! This is Islam! A woman should stay at home, and not 
have any relationship with any non-muharram [non-close relatives]. There are 
many people who say that the punishment for a woman who dishonors her family 
can only be to kill her.  
Andrea – What happens if her family members don’t kill her? 
Kamran – Then they are beghairata [without honor, unmanly], they are all 
beghairata, especially the husband…and the woman is behaya, she is also 
dishonored [behaya means literally impudent, without the proper moral education, 
which may apply also to men].  
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This was Kamran at seventeen years of age – a smart and quick-thinking (and 
quick-acting) boy with a lot of ambition and a lot he wanted to demonstrate to his peers 
and social milieu in terms of cultural appropriateness – even against, apparently, his own 
elders’ best judgment. The bold and uncompromising profile that he chose for his public 
self, possibly after the example of the more radical figures among his acquaintances, is in 
contrast with the example that Hajji Wahidullah sets within the family. A soft-spoken, 
quiet, reflective, and balanced character, the main elder of the Waraki lineage clearly 
incarnates an “old guard” within Pashtun society, to whom some young, upcoming men 
like Rahmat still look to for inspiration. And it should not come as a surprise, although it 
might seem counterintuitive. It has happened multiple times to me to encounter 60, 70, and 
even 80 year-old lineage leaders, from troubled rural areas of Paktia and Nangarhar 
provinces, displaying an open-mindedness, sophistication and bluntness in their social and 
cultural ideas that many of the following generations, raised during the conflicts, failed to 
show. “Women are those with whom our children spend more time. An uneducated woman 
will raise only ignorant and foolish children”, I was told by an illiterate 75 year-old man 
who hailed from a faraway district of Ghazni province, at that time completely under the 
control of so-called Taliban insurgents, who forbade girls from attending any kind of 
schooling activities. “I sent my daughters to school…”, he continued, “then came the war, 
and the Taliban…my granddaughters did not go to school…this is wrong in Islam”, he 
added.  
The generation of Kamran and Inayat (but not necessarily each, as individuals) was 
exposed to a shifting set of cultural and religious idioms about the proper policing of social 
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arrangements, and the display of appropriate masculine personality traits, that had its roots 
in the deviant violent behaviors institutionalized by the war, together with the irruption of 
radical religious ideologies which came along with it from outside Afghanistan. The 
competition between these two threads in current Pashtun society is evident today in the 
different profiles we can find in the very same family, such as Rahmat’s and Kamran’s. 
Although Kamran was at that time too young to have done more than express in words his 
desire to appear publicly in a certain way, still his tirades are somewhat indicative of an 
effort at self-representation that owes more to a recent, war-impacted moral landscape, than 
to a more “traditional” Pashtun cultural milieu (as evidenced by my older informants, and 
those adult ones who identify more strongly with them, like Rahmat).  
Over the years I have seen Kamran change, as well as Inayat. The shift from late 
adolescence to early adulthood was noticeable in both, particularly in Inayat. In the summer 
of 2013, Kamran and I had one of our last meetings, in Jalalabad, over a good Friday lunch 
in a restaurant downtown, after Kamran had attended midday prayers in a mosque near my 
house. 
 
Andrea – Do you remember what you told me one of the first times we met, three 
years ago, in the dera outside Hajji Wahidullah’s hujra? You said that a woman 
who works outside of the house should be shot, that women should not work away 
from their husbands, remember? 
Kamran – Yes, I remember…why? 
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Andrea – Were you just telling me the official version of the story, how things 
should work, or did you really believe that women who work should be shot? 
Kamran – It’s my conviction, I would not respect a woman who works outside of 
her home, without her husband… 
Andrea – Are there no women in Angur Bagh who do that? 
Kamran – In Angur Bagh there are some, but they work in Jalalabad, where nobody 
sees them…in Sama Khel no woman works, they would be behaya… 
Andrea – Are the women of Sama Khel literate [baasawada]? Did they go to school? 
Kamran - No, none of the women in Sama Khel went to school…In Angur Bagh 
there are some who went to school up to 4th or 5th grade, and if there are female 
teachers available they can go to school up to 12th grade, but schools are too far 
from Sama Khel, it would not be appropriate for girls to go to school alone… 
Andrea – What about you? Are you ok in the village? 
Kamran – Well, so far I am ok…you know, I just finished school, I teach English, I 
spend time with my friends…but after this, when I won’t go to school anymore, 
when maybe I will not want to teach English anymore, then…then life in the village 
will become hard…I mean, what will I do? I will have to spend all my time in the 
hujra, in the village, I will hate it, I will get bored… 
Andrea – Your family has land: could you not start farming the land of your family? 
Kamran – No, our land is far from the village, I could not do that every day…my 
father and uncles don’t farm the land…no, I want to go to university, maybe in 
Pakistan, where education is better and cheaper…I want to leave the village… 
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Andrea – But you know that in Pakistan life is different from what it is in the 
village…you know that in Peshawar women can work outside of their home, and 
can have friendly relationships with non-muharram as well…you know that in 
Peshawar University there are many girls as well who go to class…They have a 
different mind-set [nazariat] in Peshawar, you know that, right? 
Kamran – Yes, I know, I know Peshawar…but it’s ok, I would still judge them badly, 
and I would still want my wife to behave like she should behave in the village, but 
I am tolerant of other people’s different behaviors, I understand that they have 
another mind-set, I don’t have a problem with that… 
 
So, three years after our first encounter, now in his early twenties, Kamran still 
professes to be in line with the moral and ethical tenets that his cultural milieu passed onto 
him. He believes in what the cultural idiom (schema) proposes for a socially appropriate 
life, he says. The self-image he holds of himself is still firmly rooted in his cultural 
background – in the cultural representational world that exists around him in the village. 
Yet, something seems markedly different from the stance that Rahmat, for example, 
displayed with me. Kamran does not like the village life per se, he does not feel that strong 
emotional bond that, for example, gathering in the hujra together with the other male family 
members creates for Rahmat. Likewise, land, if not irrelevant in Kamran’s life’s equation, 
certainly does not represent either that pillar for one’s own culturally appropriate self-
image as respectable Pashtun man as it does in Rahmat’s case. Rahmat came back to the 
village from Pakistan, remained there, and considers leaving the village as a last resort 
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option only, in case of overwhelming circumstances. He believes that all those who leave 
their ancestral place because of other than overwhelming circumstances are morally 
ambiguous individuals, not to be trusted. Kamran wants to leave the village and go to 
Pakistan, and build a different life for himself. Kamran, as we will see even more clearly 
with Inayat, and as we have somehow seen also with my previous informants, seems to be 
representative of a new generation of Pashtun men from rural areas, who, albeit still firmly 
rooted in their own cultural milieu, feel the latter to be somewhat too narrow, too limiting.  
In Umar and Rohullah, certainly the social and cultural inputs received from 
experiencing different lifestyles and mindsets throughout their lives had a role in such 
development. Kamran, however, as Inayat, knew only his own village, and, only cursorily, 
Jalalabad and Peshawar. He never crossed his provincial borders towards Kabul, or any 
other Afghan city, for that matter. And yet, in this boy, mainly grown up after September 
11, 2001, something of the sweeping changes that Afghanistan underwent since 9/11 has 
apparently worked through, and left its mark. The “traditional” background that his family 
maintained and perpetuated, particularly through the figure of its main elder Hajji 
Wahidullah, probably shielded him, as well as Inayat, from the most noticeable aspects of 
that shift in moral values and ethical behaviors towards increased violence and abusiveness 
that the thirty-five years of war effected more clearly in other Pashtun environments and 
social realities. An outsider, however, as I was, would notice the slight contradiction, or, 
rather, apparent naiveté, that Kamran showed in claiming to be a tolerant person, while at 
the same time admitting to despising just the same those women (and men) that in Peshawar 
he would coexist with, who should not follow his ideal model for a socially appropriate 
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Pashtun comportment (which he still derives straight from his village enculturation process 
and cultural representational world).  
Yet I take this as a clue to the quickly developing inner world of Kamran’s, a young 
man, barely into his early twenties, who feels the pull towards a radical change from his 
family’s traditional life trajectory and locale (he would be the first one in the lineage to 
attend university), acknowledges the perils that this might entail for his self-image of a 
respectable rural Pashtun man, and yet is convinced that he will be able to maintain a 
steadfast adherence to the kind of person he is now  - his current self-image, culturally 
appropriate to the village life. I consider Kamran’s most recent personal developments, at 
the time of my departure from Afghanistan (mid-2013), as an interesting snapshot of a 
potentially turbulent dynamic in its first stages. Barely out of adolescence, Kamran is 
quickly changing, yet he consciously wishes he could remain the same individual in a 
different environment and context nonetheless (which is possibly one of the most 
intractable conundrums that late adolescence may present cross-culturally). 
When I knew Inayat, in mid-2010, he was everywhere where his older cousin, 
Kamran, was. By the time I was about to leave my fieldsite, in mid-2013, Inayat had left 
the village, moved to Kabul, found a job, finished high school in Kabul while working, and 
was on the verge of applying for evening classes in business administration at one of the 
many private universities of the Afghan capital (thanks to a scholarship his Turkish-Afghan 
employer provided). Quite a leap for the shy sixteen year-old boy that I first met in 2010. 
Inayat never displayed the boldness and self-confidence that Kamran sported publicly. He 
seldom spoke spontaneously, and mainly observed the lengthy discussions between me and 
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Kamran. Sometimes, when the topics became more facetious, or when I addressed him 
directly, he showed himself more talkative. Unlike Kamran, he never approached me for 
gifts, or with brazen requests (“When you go back to the US, will you pay for my tuition 
in college in Pakistan?”, was Kamran’s final demand before I left Afghanistan). He showed 
himself as dignified and modest as his cousin Rahmat and his grandfather Hajji 
Wahidullah, the lineage leader, showed themselves to me. In this regard, he seemed to have 
internalized appropriately the social meaning of his position within the lineage, as one of 
the probable successors of Hajji Wahidullah in the leadership of the family – never beg, 
never complain, be dignified, always try to get by with your own means.  
In 2012, when I came back to Afghanistan for my last, long-term research stint in 
the country, I found he had relocated in Kabul, after finding a job as an accountant for a 
construction company led by a wealthy Afghan expatriate in Turkey. I visited him at his 
workplace, where he showed me his compound, and proudly introduced me to the site 
leader – the son of the company owner. He worked de facto without pay, but his employer 
guaranteed him accommodation in a shared apartment, three meals per day, and a small 
per diem for daily expenses. The employer also promised him to pay for college classes if 
he managed to graduate from high school – a promise that he later kept.  
I found Inayat happy to be on his own, as an adult before his real adulthood started. 
I also visited his apartment, which he shared with six more people working for the same 
company, in a newly-built high rise in the northern outskirts of Kabul. The living 
conditions appeared crowded to a western eye, to say the least, with three and four people 
crammed in two small bedrooms, sleeping on mattresses lain down on the floor.  Yet they 
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were not dissimilar from the communal style of living, and sleeping, that I had myself to 
experience many times when hosted in a village hujra, where relatives and friends enjoyed 
each other’s company overnight (in my own apartment in Jalalabad, I too indeed slept every 
night on the floor over a toshak, a thick mat for sitting down, usually while drinking tea 
and entertaining guests). It was precisely this that made Rahmat’s day a happy one - the 
proximity of one’s own family members and closest friends in the hujra.  
Inayat had no complaints about his accommodation. He and his colleagues had 
electricity (though not 24 hours a day, but certainly better than no electricity at all, as in 
Sama Khel), and running water in the bathroom and kitchen (also completely absent in the 
village). The only reservations Inayat had about his accommodation did not stem from 
logistics per se, but from the social aspect of it. “I mean, they seem normal people, they 
are ok… but I don’t know them, I sleep in the same room with strangers, it is weird for me, 
I don’t know what to expect, I am alone here…”, he said to me when I visited the apartment. 
His reservations replicated basically those that his older cousin Rahmat expressed about 
the period in which he worked on his own in Jalalabad and Kabul, and which was the main 
reason that he left those positions, and came back to the village. The issue was not the lack 
of any privacy or being constantly crammed with other three or four people in one room. 
It was who those people were that constituted an issue. It’s not even that he had something 
bad to say about any of them. It’s just that they were not family or close friends. The feeling 
of familial connectivity that anthropologist Suad Joseph elucidated so well through her 
ethnographic material, this feeling of one’s own privacy being created and inhabited also 
through participating in the privacy of other people (what Katherine Ewing called 
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“interpersonal engagement”, not to be confused with “intrapsychic enmeshment”): this was 
what Inayat was missing, something that he had been strongly socialized into and that 
pervaded his self-perception, as well as the inner emotional framework that he developed 
over the years.  
From his situation I gained a perception of both his “individualized” self (a late 
teen-aged boy who is “individuated” enough, to find the strength to choose to leave home, 
live alone away from it, be left to his own devices through work and school, in order to 
chase his own dreams in life), and his “interconnected” self (the village kind of person who 
is ok with sleeping every night with four people in a small room, but wishes they were his 
relatives). The unease and anxiety that he perceives at his logistical situation does not stem 
from any “intrapsychic enmeshment”, I believe, which he would have acquired from a 
peculiar socially interconnected village upbringing (as it might come easy to conclude), 
but was rather the symptom of his interpersonal engagement, into which he had been 
socialized within his familial context.  
After my visit to his workplace, and his apartment, he visited me one day in my 
house in Jalalabad. He had come back to the village from Kabul for a few days, in order to 
see his family and friends. He took a taxi from Sama Khel to Jalalabad to meet me. I was 
quite sure he had something he wanted to ask of me, something I might do for him, but I 
was mistaken. We only had a good talk and some tea.  
 
Inayat- I am staying for a few days at the village. You know, I wanted to see my 
parents, relatives, and friends…I miss them in Kabul, I am alone there… 
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Andrea – Is your father happy that you went to Kabul? 
Inayat – Yes, he is…you know, a couple of days ago he told me ‘we spent all our 
lives here [in the village], and look what we have gained: nothing. You have to stay 
there [in Kabul]’. He is right, you know…Some of his brothers went to Kabul when 
there was Zahir Shah [in the 1960s, probably]…they went to school, one of them 
became an officer in the army, they had a good life…still now they have a better 
life than us…look at us… 
Andrea – You did not like the life in the village?… 
Inayat – No,  I don’t want to live in the village, it’s a difficult life, it’s all about 
fighting [lanjay], having enmities [dukhmani] with other families…you always have 
to live on the watch, controlling everything that is happening around you…I don’t 
like that…two years ago [2011], for example, when you were in America, we had a 
fight with another family near Gulahi [a close-by village, now a center for anti-
government insurgency], I did not tell you about this. Another family, the Sali Khel, 
took a piece of land that belonged to us…you know how these things work here, we 
talked about it…they just go and take your land…anyway, Hajji Wahidullah 
warned them not to farm our land, and many from my family went there to protect 
the land from the Sali Khel. I was told to stay home with the women, I was too 
young to fight. The Sali Khel tried to go back to the piece of land anyway, and there 
was a firefight…four of the Sali Khel were wounded, and had to go to Jalalabad, 
to the hospital. So, after that, Hajji Wahidullah asked for a Jirga, and he offered to 
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go nanawatay [the public ritual through which one asks for forgiveness, after which 
all fighting has to cease definitively], so the thing now is finished… 
Andrea – Wait, does not nanawatay bring dishonor to the family which does it? 
Inayat – No, not always, it depends…you see, Hajji Wahidullah was smart, he did 
not want a feud [dukhmani] to start, you know, when people go on with revenge 
forever…he wanted the problem to end… and we had won, we had kept the land…in 
this case he asked for nanawatay, and after nanawatay the Sali Khel could not 
continue the fight to get revenge for their four members wounded by us…so, the 
Sali Khel now are beghairata two times, once for having lost the fight, and twice 
for not being able to take revenge against us…and we kept the land…this is how 
you do things in the village… 
Andrea – But you did not go to the fight… 
Inayat – No, I did not… 
Andrea – Were you upset that you could not participate? 
Inayat – No, actually I was happy, I did not want to go…I don’t like to fight…but if 
they had asked me, well, then I would have had to go…you don’t have a choice in 
those cases…that’s also why I don’t like life in the village…sometimes you have to 
do things you don’t like…bad things…there is always someone who is against you, 
always someone you have to defend yourself from…it’s not an easy life… 
 
Inayat’s family has land but do not farm it directly. Farming is considered a 
demeaning occupation, which is usually delegated to landless Pashtun peasants. Most of 
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the Waraki family members are now jobless, like many other families’ members, because 
of the depressed economic situation of the area. They once held jobs in shopkeeping, 
transportation, and construction, but now economic transactions are slow and there is no 
way of working for a living. Even Rahmat lost his job at the US Army base. Yet the Waraki 
have land and its revenues keep the family going. They are not the only family in this 
situation. Certainly, this unwelcome state of idleness does not help maintain a peaceful 
coexistence in the community. Scarcity of resources coupled with time to kill makes for an 
explosive combination. Hajji Wahidullah’s lineage and he himself did not look like the 
ones who would recklessly take advantage of such a situation, but others might. Indeed, 
the long-term consequences of the “state of exception” (now virtually permanent) created 
by three decades of conflict, have taken a toll on the moral and ethical standards that now 
many Pashtuns have accepted as appropriate for a respectable public display and 
understanding of masculinity. During the period in which I have been acquainted with Hajji 
Wahidullah’s family, three inter-family violent disputes over their property were brought 
to my attention. I have good reason to believe that those were probably not the only ones.  
Amidst all such social turmoil Inayat does not feel comfortable with this state of 
affairs. He decided to leave. His father, apparently out of concern for his son’s personal 
achievements in life (including economic ones), approved of his decision to leave the 
village and seek better fortune in Kabul. His father’s blessing, a pre-requisite necessary for 
the validity and feasibility of any young Pashtun man’s decision, likely emboldened him 
and made him more resolute. Inayat does not feel cut out for the kind of life that he would 
have in the village. A particular aspect of his temperament might have a role in his feelings. 
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The many external influences that, if with difficulty, reached his faraway village in a 
tumultuous post-9/11 Afghanistan must have certainly had a role in his rejection of the 
village lifestyle that his cousin Rahmat so wholeheartedly embraced. Sure enough, as in 
the case of Kamran, Inayat knew only his village, Jalalabad, and Peshawar before being 
catapulted in the cosmopolitanism of Kabul. He was not even able to speak Persian, which 
is the lingua franca of the Afghan capital, and without which he would not be able to 
socially function there. He told me life is not easy in Kabul for him. His colleagues at work 
often tease him for his peasant-like appearance, language, and “etiquette”. In their eyes, he 
regretted to say, he is little more than a “savage” Pashtun. Indeed, “traditional” Pashtun 
values and ethics, especially in the realm of masculine virtues, are still very much 
represented and upheld within his family - not only by the “old guard” of Hajji Wahidullah 
but also by middle-aged individuals like his father and some of his older cousins like 
Rahmat. Inayat was taught the rules of the game and knows how to play it. Yet he has also 
come into contact with alternative ways of expression and self-representation and different 
ways of shaping his own self-image. The cultural representational world of his Pashtun 
milieu is being infiltrated by new elements (like television, outside acquaintances, the 
Internet, Facebook, the observation of the socio-political situation unfolding in his 
country), after which he might choose to reshape his own self-image. Although he is little 
more than an adolescent, his own self-representational world has vast latitude for expansion 
and a strong capacity for incorporating new inspirations. It possesses perhaps more 
elasticity and plasticity than Rahmat’s, and he may play a role in the development of a 
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shifting Pashtun cultural representational world  that will hold a meaning also for those 
who were left behind in the village.   
 
 
Nasim Khan (and Niamatullah) 
 
Nasim Khan is the only child of Niamatullah, a man in his mid-fifties. Both Nasim 
and Niamatullah were among the first people I knew in Jalalabad when I first arrived in the 
city in 2009. We remained good friends until the end of my fieldwork in 2013. Born in 
Kama, a rich rural district adjoining Jalalabad, into a local family with long-standing ties 
with the area, Niamatullah relocated soon to the city together with his six brothers, his 
father and mother. Nasim was born in Jalalabad around 1985. The family retained all the 
fertile land they owned in Kama, and apparently is still harmoniously handling its 
management and the revenues that come from it. Because Niamatullah’s father is still alive, 
the property has not yet been divided among his seven sons, which will happen probably 
only after his death. This is usually a delicate moment when a Pashtun families experiences 
frictions and enmities between brothers. According to Nasim, currently things seem to go 
well among the seven brothers.  
Niamatullah finished high school in Jalalabad, and thereafter spent two years in 
college in Tashkent, then part of the Soviet Union (now Uzbekistan), studying for a two-
year degree in Political Science. He then worked for many years for KhAD, the KGB-like 
agency for internal security that the Afghan state organized during the years of the 
Communist regime. He lost his job after the demise of the last Communist president of 
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Afghanistan, Mohammed Najibullah in 1992, and thereafter spent almost three years in a 
prison run by the anti-Soviet mujaheddins. Niamatullah himself always told me he worked 
as a shopkeeper in Jalalabad during the Communist regime. Nasim, however, confided in 
private that his father was indeed a KhAD officer. This was a well-known fact to the family 
members and the reason for his imprisonment after the fall of Najibullah. Niamatullah only 
started working as a shopkeeper after his jail time was over. Nasim recalled almost jokingly 
the times when, during the struggle between mujaheddin and Afghan state, his father would 
disappear from the house for weeks on end. Then one day he would appear again on their 
front door with a long beard and scruffy hair, all tired and wearing worn out military fatigue 
clothes, to the amusement and surprise of a young Nasim who realized only years later 
what it all was about. Niamatullah, at the moment of my fieldwork, was heading, as he had 
been doing for several years, the Nangarhar province branch of a civil society organization. 
It promoted political and civic awareness among both men and women in Jalalabad and 
some rural districts of Nangarhar province. The organization was headquartered in Kabul 
and funded by international donors. Niamatullah managed to give temporary employment 
to many men and women who were recruited to implement the various projects for which 
the organization found money. Through his position and latitude for decision-making, 
Niamatullah garnered a stable following for himself among many educated individuals in 
Jalalabad who were desperate for any employment possibility. Jobs (even temporary ones) 
had already become a very scarce and valuable resource. Niamatullah’s family itself could 
rely on the revenues of the roughly 65 jiribs of highly fertile land (about 26 acres) they 
owned in the Kama district.  
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Nasim’s memories of the conflict are dramatic and not dissimilar from Umar’s, who 
also lived in Jalalabad at the time. Until 1992, when Najibullah’s government collapsed 
they suffered the brunt of the fighting in Jalalabad between mujaheddin and state forces. 
Like Umar, Nasim’s family sometimes lived for days inside an underground bunker they 
had built underneath their home to take shelter from the continuous shelling of the city. 
The presence of his father was intermittent due to his job. After his father’s imprisonment 
sometime in 1992, Nasim continued to live in Jalalabad with his grandfather 
(Niamatullah’s father), who took charge of Nasim and his mother. Niamatullah had three 
brothers already living abroad (in Russia and Germany), and three more living in Jalalabad. 
Niamatullah, the third son, was living together with his father, which made the 
rearrangement of the familial situation less traumatic. Jalalabad suffered less heavily 
during the civil war (1992-1996) than during the anti-Soviet struggle.  After the Taliban 
consolidated their power in eastern Afghanistan in 1996, Nasim managed to attend classes 
in the state-owned high-school of the city. It was reshaped by the new regime but still 
working. By the time I first met Nasim in 2009, he was attending classes at the faculty of 
law at Nangarhar University in Jalalabad, but his future expectations seemed to him already 
bleak. In 2009, over a lunch of fried fish at an outdoors restaurant for families in the 
outskirts of Jalalabad, he once told me he had no hopes for the future of his country. The 
incessant wars had taken too heavy a toll on the social fabric of Afghanistan. “They will 
start fighting again as soon as the foreign soldiers leave”, he said in good English, “All the 
good people of Afghanistan have left during the last thirty years, only the criminals and 
warlords have remained”. The very fact that he and his family never left Afghanistan 
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undermined his claim. People throughout had made the difficult decision to remain over 
the years, so his view on the future might have been too grim. Even after that, more 
recently, his personal situation improved considerably, nevertheless he never abandoned 
this somber, reflective way of looking at things. Given such state of mind, his steadfast 
resolution never to leave the country, even when he would have had the chance to do so, 
speaks to a family inclination towards “stoicism” that he clearly inherited from his father 
and grandfather. In Nasim, as in his father Niamatullah, resilience is strangely coupled with 
resignation to a seemingly punishing but inevitable condition. To my inquiry as to why he 
would not consider college programs abroad, like those in India, he replied that he would 
not leave the land and the heritage that his family possessed and eventually would bequeath 
to him. In the summer of 2010, we had the following exchange: 
 
Nasim – Pride is what we have here among Pashtuns. It is what makes us Pashtuns.  
Andrea – Do you mean ghairat? 
Nasim – Yes, ghairat, ghairat and nang [he is referring to nang and ghairat as 
synonymous here] is what we have here. You don’t see it openly, in the people, like 
a piece of clothing that they wear. You see it when they have to defend their rights, 
their property. Other people who live around here don’t have ghairat, like 
us…Panjabis, Bengalis, Pakistanis, they don’t really have ghairat. They tolerate 
more things than we do, when it comes to their rights. They say “OK, it’s not 
important, who cares…”…that’s not ghairat. They don’t care about land as we do. 
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Land is what makes you respectable, without land you will be considered weak. 
That’s how it works here.  
Andrea – It doesn’t change? 
Nasim – No, of course it changes, it’s always changing. Look at the situation here. 
Certain things that should be strong, like respect for your elders and for your 
parents, sacrificing for your friends, not acting like a zurawar, there are not so 
many people anymore who do these things now…maybe in the villages it is more 
like this, I don’t know… 
Andrea – Is it different in the city? 
Nasim – Yes, of course it is different. Life in the city is different, but it is also 
because of the war…people have mental problems, many people do not behave 
normally anymore because of the war. There is much more violence, there is much 
more aggressiveness when it comes to protect your rights. People fight a lot now, 
it’s become like a normal thing. I think it is because of the war, because of all the 
violence that there has been for a long time here…[long pause] If there will be 
peace things will change… 
Andrea – What do you mean? 
Nasim – Yes, with peace things will change, people will change their behavior, 
there will be less violence, less aggressiveness…You see, now if you do not respond 
to an insult, if you do not react with violence to someone who has offended you, in 
the city they probably will say “Oh, he is a good man, he is an educated person, he 
does not want problems for something like that”. But if you do the same in a village, 
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they will surely call you beghairata. You see, things change all the time, if a better 
life will come for those in the villages, like it has happened to us in Jalalabad a 
little bit, things will change also in the villages. I have no problems with 
that…everything changes, it’s life…people see that there are other ways of living, 
they watch TV, now they go on Internet, I have no problems with that, that’s life, 
that’s how the world works. Educated people also in terrible places like Khogiany 
[a troubled, volatile and very “conservative” district of Nangarhar province] think 
the same way. You have to give people peace…things will change. 
This conversation struck me because it opened with rather conventional statements 
on cultural idioms of masculinity and how Pashtun society was supposed to work in 
Nasim’s opinion (which I do not doubt he genuinely believed). It closed with an increasing 
“coming out” of Nasim’s more private views on the actual situation and possible future 
developments that somewhat contradicted the “official” version he had given me just a few 
moments before. Ghairat, nang, pride, defense of one’s legitimate rights are all aspects of 
being Pashtun that Nasim claims as his own. In line with the shared, accepted view of 
Pashtun masculine ethos and social order as a whole, Nasim has always portrayed himseld 
as a “believer” in this form of cultural idioms. Yet he seems equally aware and accepting 
of the reality that society is in a constant state of change, and that it is pointless to try to 
stop the tide. More importantly, he views such change not only as an inevitable “natural” 
occurrence, but also as a welcome development within a historical conjuncture that, in his 
opinion, has gathered more negative than positive momentum in the past decades.  Nasim 
knows that those same “natural” attributes of Pashtuns like ghairat and nang will undergo 
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radical rethinking in a society which will be at peace and subject to the inputs of external 
influences. TV, radio, the Internet will change Pashtuns’ view of the world, and their 
society, but this does not appear to threaten Nasim’s own sense of personal value, cultural 
identity and social positioning.  
This might have to do partly with the (non-)religious background in which Nasim 
grew up. His father Niamatullah is certainly not an overtly religious person. During the 
many afternoons we spent together at my house, enjoying conversation with some of his 
friends, or with him alone, he never paused to pray even when all others did so. In fact I 
never saw Niamatullah pray at all, in all the years I have known him. We never discussed 
religion together and he kept well away from the subject. During my fieldwork I have seen 
a few people who I knew did not care very much for religious matters, nevertheless comply 
with social norms and publicly display their piety by going to mosque at least once a day, 
and performing the five standard prayers when in the presence of their peers. In rural areas 
of Pashtun Afghanistan (and the city of Jalalabad maintains still a strong rural character), 
the public performance of religious appropriateness is crucial for social validation and 
acceptance. The vast majority of the people I met would perform their five daily prayers, 
no matter where they were or what they were doing, and no matter what they thought about 
religion in general. I indeed once sat in a room in Jalalabad, talking to an acquaintance who 
was sipping wine while chatting with me, when suddenly he remembered it was time for 
the first afternoon prayer. He quickly left the room, went to the nearby mosque alongside 
his neighbors, and then came back to the room to continue talking to me sipping wine. He 
had to maintain his public image of a good Muslim. Against such background of intense 
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concern for social validation and religious appropriateness, Niamatullah’s behavior always 
stood out as peculiar. He simply seemed not to care. His own friends, when talking to me 
away from him, told me they believed he was a “bad Muslim”. Yet they continued to hover 
around him (particularly those without a job), likely because of his wealth and political 
connections. I always figured it made sense that the Communist-trained and -educated 
former KhAD officer would not pay much attention to religious etiquette and would 
defiantly display his convictions publicly. He could afford to do so, though, coming as he 
did from a big land-owning family. Others may not have been able to afford the same 
luxury – like, for example, those who remained around him hoping for a position or a 
temporary job in his civil society organization. 
 Nasim seemed to have followed in his father’s steps. I have never seen him pray, 
either publicly at a mosque or with friends, or in private with me. Like his father, he never 
discussed religious matters with me, and particularly refrained from asking me anything 
about my own faith, or the reasons why I would not become a Muslim, as many others did. 
The contiguity and personal identification that Nasim felt with the cultural representational 
world of his socio-cultural environment (its cultural idioms, particularly with regards to 
individual masculine attributes) became inflected in a peculiar way by their relation to 
sentiments towards religion. I felt that the quasi-“secular” (in Western terms) fashion in 
which Nasim looked at, and interacted with, his socio-cultural milieu made his Pashtun-
ness more amenable to absorb and tolerate change, with the inevitable sense of uncertainty 
that accompanies it. Apparently disentangled from the traditional identity between a 
quintessential Muslim-ness and Pashtun-ness, the cultural idioms with which Nasim 
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claimed to strongly identify seemed to acquire a degree of malleability, of elasticity, that 
allowed Nasim to reconcile his self-image as a “good Pashtun” with the challenges and 
insecurities stemming from the quickly metamorphosing social and political situation of 
Afghanistan. 
 Indeed, Nasim has no problems in asserting his Pashtun-ness, while at the same 
time welcoming what he sees to be the inevitable changes that the future will bring to his 
social milieu. If anything, he himself longs for something different, a different way of 
“being Pashtun” that he would embrace as a necessary adjustment to a changing global 
environment.  In this regard, in late 2011 we had another interesting conversation. He had 
just resigned from his job with a Bengali NGO, which he liked very much, because of death 
threats from a self-defined Taliban-affiliated group. The NGO was asking for a 20% yearly 
interest rate on micro-finance loans that it provided to poor families in the province. Interest 
is forbidden by shari’a law, and the NGO’s Afghan employees were all threatened that 
unless they left their jobs they would be killed. Ironically, the person who called him twice 
on the phone to threaten him was a classmate of Nasim’s from high school, a young man 
that he knew well and whom he did not know had started a militant activity. He reasoned 
with his old classmate, but after the second call and becoming aware that many other 
employees had been threatened in the same way by different interlocutors, he decided to 
quit his position alongside everyone else. He was therefore extremely frustrated when we 
had the following conversation in Jalalabad:      
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I feel like I have been unhappy all my life here, since I was little…the years in the 
bunker, under the bombs, my father in jail, the civil war…thank God we at least 
kept the land in Kama…you know, that’s important to us, my grandfather did a 
good job to keep it with us…we never left this place, also when everybody else was 
escaping to Pakistan…we stayed here…it was not easy, but we had too much to 
lose…the land, you know…you can’t lose the land…now we still have it…that 
makes me proud. 
Andrea – But you still feel unhappy… 
Nasim – I don’t know, it’s a feeling…it’s like I wish I had something different 
sometimes from my life…for instance, my wife: I would like to have a more open 
relationship with her, you know…I mean, I would like to go out with her, to take 
her to restaurants, to walk around with her, to do something together, also with our 
daughter…but I can’t, she has to stay home. There is not much I can do…if I took 
her out people here would give me peghor [they would criticize him on moral 
grounds, accusing him of being beghairata], they would start gossiping, they would 
talk badly of my family and my father…I don’t want that…It makes me feel like a 
prisoner, sometimes very angry… 
Andrea – But this is how Pashtuns do things, right? This is Pashtun custom… 
Nasim – Yes, I know, but if people were a little more educated, less ignorant, things 
would change…I am a Pashtun, and I am proud of it, but I do not think that I 
become a bad Pashtun if I take my wife with me to the park…this is stupid, this is 
ignorant…things can change, you know…I feel more free in Kabul…when we go to 
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Kabul, me and my wife, I can go around with her, people don’t always stare at 
you…I feel free… 
 
To be sure, his recent disappointment at having to leave his job because of of 
religio-political radicalism plunged him in a condition of despair that contributed to make 
all his life appear “unhappy”, even against evidence to the contrary. His wife and daughter, 
for example, were certainly a source of support and joy for him, as was having overcome 
the worst of the conflicts with his family’s properties intact. Nevertheless, our conversation 
pointed again to Nasim’s capacity to privately interpret, and rework, the cultural idioms 
about Pashtun-ness, and masculinity in particular, that he had been enculturated into. 
Nasim is not only a passive element within his own cultural representational world, but 
acts as well as an agentic subject within it. He speaks from the standpoint of an individual 
who feels entitled to express and represent a different understanding of certain cultural 
idioms, and yet to maintain the cultural legitimacy to be called and considered a Pashtun – 
that is to say, to maintain within his own public image those diacritica that make him a 
Pashtun in the eyes of others, as well as his own (cf. Fredrik Barth (1969) on cultural 
diacritica). In other words, Nasim seemed to me not only to be shaped by the cultural 
representational world in which he is immersed, but also to maintain a degree of agency 
which makes him believe that his own self-image as the “good Pashtun”, albeit different 
from the one many others endorse, has the legitimacy to be considered socially valid 
nonetheless, to be “good enough”. In this way, Nasim holds the potential to shape his own 
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cultural idioms, as much he is shaped by them. Yet, he vacillates between a sense of 
helplessness, and one of empowerment.  
In 2012 and 2013, Nasim’s life went through some considerable changes. He 
recovered from the loss of his NGO position, and decided he would pass the bar exam as a 
defense lawyer. He succeeded, and in 2012 started representing inmates incarcerated in 
Nangarhar’s provincial jails without legal guarantees.48 Although the job did not pay much, 
and was fraught with problems stemming from difficult relations with the state authorities, 
he told me that he was enjoying his new activity and was doing better than in the past. He 
also started to move his wife and daughter from Jalalabad to Kabul during the summer 
months along with his grandfather. Shifting residence to cooler places during the harsh 
summer months of Nangarhar province is not an uncommon custom among residents of 
Jalalabad and the rural districts who can afford to do so. However, in the light of our 
                                                          
48 Nasim explained that a high number among those who are incarcerated in Afghanistan come 
from the poorest and most disenfranchised sectors of Afghan society (“The rich and powerful, if 
they ever get arrested, don’t stay in jail for too long, whatever their crime”, he said to me). These 
men (and women as well) have hardly any idea of how the state legal system works. They are 
often not provided with a state defense lawyer, and are not made clearly aware of the reason and 
evidence for their incarceration. Many remain in prison for indefinite amounts of time, without 
ever going to trial. Instead of reclaiming their relatives’ rights under Afghan law (which they 
ignore), the families of these inmates usually look for alternative methods to get them out of jail 
(like bribes, personal connections, etc.). The task of Nasim was to tour the jails of Nangarhar 
province and check on the status of those who were held there without any legal representation, 
or whose cases had not been processed fairly. He would then offer to represent them for a low 
fee. 
As an interesting sidenote, Nasim explained also that those who end up in the provincial jails 
have often already spent time in the jail managed by the NDS in Jalalabad (National Directorate 
of Security, the successor of KhAD, the intelligence agency of the Afghan Communist 
governments). The NDS screens for terrorist links and activities. Those who are released and 
transit into the provincial jails are implicitely considered to be low-profile criminal offenders. 
However, those who are kept in the NDS jail are completely off-limits to anyone, and are under 
the sole authority of the NDS interrogators and guards.It is not difficult to imagine the type of 
treatment they receive while in custody of the NDS.   
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conversations during the previous years, I could not help but consider his choice as 
motivated also by the need to satisfy some of his most compelling desires, as he expressed 
them to me over the years. At least during the summer months, he could join his wife and 
daughter in Kabul almost on a weekly basis, and live for a few days “more free”, as he put 
it so often. I deemed it part of Nasim’s tenacious inner working at constructing, and 
claiming for himself a self-image as a “good Pashtun” which could resonate as legitimate 
within the context of the cultural representational world of his environment, in spite of the 
unorthodoxy of his approach to it. Although still in part powerless to affirm his 
interpretation on how “to be good at being a Pashtun” at home in Jalalabad (to paraphrase 
Michael Herzfeld. Herzfeld 1985:16), Nasim I believe started a process of self-
acknowledgment that would necessarily, in due time, spill over in his home socio-cultural 
milieu.  
Shortly before I left the field in mid-2013, Nasim settled down with a new, 
permanent position as a legal advisor to an important Afghan government oversight 
agency. The shift, and the new responsibilities, made him visibly happy. He was glad, he 
told me, that he could actually make a difference to people’s lives in Afghanistan. His ever-
present pragmatism and inclination to a disillusioned realism made him add that he was 
still rather sure that after the pull out of the foreign troops the situation in the country would 
spiral for the worse. Yet, his new position, whose existence was guaranteed by the 
organization’s close ties to the United Nations, made him sure that he could have a 
constructive role even in the case of a catastrophic, war-like scenario. Nasim’s hiring by 
the Commission was facilitated by relentless activity on the part of his father, Niamatullah, 
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who pulled all the strings he could in order to get his son the job. Nasim still had to go 
through a selection process, he told me, yet the many phone calls and meetings his father 
had on his behalf certainly served him well. It is also true that all the other candidates, most 
likely, had to pull their own strings as best as they could in order to maximize the chances 
to get hired. Yet these are the (accepted) rules of the game in Afghanistan both in private 
and state sectors. It is considered standard, even necessary, to proceed this way. Andiwalay, 
or the art of networking, and getting recommended by someone powerful enough (literally, 
in Pashto, “friendship”, in a euphemistic and almost romantic form, along the lines 
elaborated by Charles Lindholm [1982:240–273]), is a crucial aspect of social life.  
I was never surprised at the way Nasim’s profile developed under my eyes, in the 
four years we were in personal contact with each other. The more I knew his father, the 
more I could appreciate the influence he had had on Nasim. Niamatullah had been a Khalqi, 
Nasim told me, that is to say a member of the Khalq faction within the PDPA (the Afghan 
Communist Party), opposed to their rivals, the Parcham faction. Khalq in the end lost to 
Parcham, which ruled the country with Moscow’s blessing for most of the 1980s until the 
fall of the regime in 1992. Khalq, however, maintained its strongholds within the military, 
and in rural areas (Arnold 1983:37-51). It was a strongly Pashtun-based faction, and as 
such represented a Pashtun-nationalistic wing of leftist-minded intellectuals and activists. 
Their loosely Marxist-oriented beliefs were associated with a strong ethnocentric mindset. 
Such an unusual cocktail allowed the Khalqis to reject religion as a basis for social planning 
and public representation, but they maintained the co nviction that Pashtun political and 
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intellectual elites should continue to lead Afghanistan and its state apparatuses, as they had 
since the inception of the modern Afghan state in the late 19th century.  
By the time I met him Niamatullah was not any longer the old-fashioned Khalqi he 
might have been in the 1980s (if at all). The lectures given by him in Pashto to his 
collaborators, whom he trained to go to the rural districts and implement the projects his 
civil society organization had won for itself, were all about the pros and advantages of 
democracy, free elections, decentralized administration, citizens’ rights, in line with the 
general principles that the Western international donors wanted to propagate among the 
Afghan population. Certainly, he seemed very passionate and genuinely convinced of the 
narrative he presented to his collaborators. I cannot say whether he was really so, or was 
simply executing the task given to him. To me, in private, he railed against tyranny, 
dictatorship, the powerlessness of the people in the face of their political masters, declaring 
that the Soviet Union itself had turned into a dictatorship, and that Communism was not a 
democratic system. At the same time, though, he remained convinced that the period of the 
presidency of Mohammed Najibullah, the last Communist president (albeit Parchami), 
remained a golden age in Afghan history. There was very little corruption, he said often, 
state officials worked for the good of the community, keeping in mind the wellbeing of the 
population. Najibullah himself possessed nothing of his own when he died, other than a 
modest house in Kabul, and so did most of the other state officials, he recalled, who would 
have spent the rest of their life in jail if they had been caught stealing from the public 
coffers.  
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Whatever his current ideas on Marxism, socialism and the socio-political structure 
these ideologies advocated, Niamatullah always seemed to me to have retained at least the 
Pashtun ethnocentric inspiration from his years in the state apparatus and the party. He 
never said anything, or commented in any ethnically-inclined way, on figures of non-
Pashtun ethnicity who appeared on the political stage during the years I spent in 
Afghanistan. However, and this did not escape my attention, he never proffered a single 
word in Persian when talking to people who spoke Persian as their first language. This 
might seem a trivial detail, yet in Afghanistan language politics have a great importance. 
Niamatullah knew Persian well, as all the educated Pashtuns generally do in Afghanistan. 
In fact, most ethnic Pashtuns who led the country in the past were, for historical reasons, 
Persian-speaking, and speaking good Persian was a requisite for working in the state 
administration then, as it is now. Niamatullah could understand everything a Persian-
speaker would tell him. I found out this, to my surprise, during the few times he had to 
meet in his office with people who legitimately could not speak Pashto. He would listen to 
them speaking Persian, and then he would reply in Pashto addressing someone else in their 
group who could understand him and translate. I finally discovered he could also speak 
fluent Persian when he once had to speak on the phone to someone in Kabul who was not 
a Pashto speaker. Among his close collaborators there were young men who were born and 
raised in Jalalabad, but were of non-Pashtun ethnic descent, whose family language was 
Persian. He never spoke to them in Persian, and mostly they made the effort of speaking to 
him in Pashto. Sometimes, though, in the heat of a conversation, they would inadvertently 
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revert to their first language (Persian) which Niamatullah understood, but stubbornly 
replied in Pashto.   
It is very likely that the importance of Pashtun cultural values for Nasim, especially 
in the realm of masculinity and social respectability, have to do in good measure with 
Niamatullah’s own formation, and the type of education he gave his only child Nasim. 
Nasim identifies with certain idioms of Pashtun masculinity (ghairat, land owning, the 
protection of one’s “natural” rights), and disavows those that traditionally link pukhto with 
Islam. This may explain why Nasim manages to interpret his Pashtun-ness in a more 
malleable, “elastic”, and inclusive fashion. A “secular” understanding of pukhto, as it were, 
which he might have inherited from his father’s life trajectory, allows Nasim to construe a 
self-image as a “good Pashtun” that diverges from the standard idiom that his cultural 
representational world has passed onto him. Nasim considers this self-image as a legitimate 
one both socially and culturally. Hence we saw, on the one hand, his resilience in choosing 
to stay and live in the place where he was born, taking care of his family’s possessions, as 
any “good Pashtun” should do (recall what Rahmat Waraki thought about this), and on the 
other, his confidence in thinking that he can remain a “good Pashtun” even when he treats 
his wife in an unconventional way, or when he hopes for a change in the much too harsh 
and violent implementation of pukhto in the everyday life.    
Nasim is the representative of a new generation of urban, educated Pashtuns, who 
are however still deeply immersed in the ethno-cultural realities of their milieu, and do not 
reject them.  Paradoxically, he might appear like an updated version of the (now rare) 
ethnically proud Pashtun who harbors “progressive” sentiments and expresses them 
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through the language of an idealistic political philosophy, such as the Marxism-Leninism 
of the ‘70s and ‘80s. Whereas his father found his language through his partial Soviet 
education and the contemporary political Afghan narrative, Nasim today finds his own in 
the massive inputs that come to Afghanistan from Western political, developmental, and 
intellectual sources. The socialist propaganda that Niamatullah endorsed in order to give 
shape to his worldview in the ‘80s, has been replaced for Nasim by a contemporary one 
based on “Western” principles of democracy, gender equality, civil liberties, and political 
representation. Nasim’s persistent self-image of Pashtun-ness, of representing the “good 
Pashtun”, can be adjusted to these contemporary ideological inputs and be rendered 
“modern”, just as his father’s Pashtun-ness could proclaim its “modernity” through 
aligning itself with a socialist movement that claimed to embody the modernity of the 
Afghan people. 
 
 
Wahid 
 
Wahid is one of the most remarkable characters that I interacted with during my 
fieldwork research. Unfortunately, I never had the possibility of working with him in the 
deep and thorough way I did with others (although I would have much liked to do so), 
because he was a highly focused, tenacious, and goal-oriented young man. He realized 
fairly soon that I could not provide the help that he was looking for, which resulted in him 
losing any interest in spending too much time with me. After the first months, in 2010, I 
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only could meet him occasionally, although we stayed in touch until the end of my 
fieldwork. His goal was to leave Afghanistan as soon as possible and to gain a foothold in 
the United States. Wahid’s profile was remarkable in that he was the only one Pashtun man 
I met who uncompromisingly, vocally, and unapologetically rejected his Pashtun-ness, his 
religion and religion in general. His “ideological” positions were so extreme from an 
Afghan standpoint that he could have been called a “revolutionary”, if he had cared for 
political activism. A student in the English department of Nangarhar University, in 
Jalalabad, Wahid spoke spectacular English with a strong American accent. He was born 
and raised in Jalalabad, but both his parents came from Khogany, a mountainous district in 
Nangarhar province notorious for its traditional and conservative culture (and its combative 
inhabitants), which was often used in everyday conversations by other Pashtuns in the 
province as the stereotype of backward and “wild” people. A probably apochrifal belief 
was that Daoud Khan, the last president of Afghanistan before the Communist takeover, 
had readied a plan to literally fence off the entire district, so to keep the “savages” away 
from the rest of the “civilized” people. In 2010, when I first met Wahid, he was in his last 
year of college. In August 2012, when I started my last research stint in Afghanistan, he 
had graduated, and was going through the selection for a Fulbright Scholarship in the US. 
I was still in the field when, in mid-2013, he finally fulfilled his dream, and left to the US 
in order to get a Master’s degree in Development Studies within the Fulbright program. 
The only problem with such idyllic picture, is that all Fulbright scholars commit to return 
to their country after graduating in the US, in order to apply their enhanced knowledge to 
the country’s benefit. It is part of the deal, and there is no way out of it. Wahid will be 
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obliged to go back to Afghanistan after completing his degree, unless he goes to another 
country. 
The way I first met Wahid is indicative of the character he represented. A loose 
acquaintance of mine in Jalalabad, in summer 2010, told me that a classmate of his from 
university spoke very good English, and he thought he might be interested in talking to me. 
I happily accepted the offer and we went to meet his friend Wahid at the university playing 
field. Wahid was intent in a basketball game with other young Afghans. At the end of the 
game we were introduced. Besides surprising me with the quality of his spoken English, 
he explained to me that basketball was a sport that had been introduced vigorously by the 
few foreigners who, over the years, had lived in Jalalabad, and taught English, either 
privately or at the university. These foreigners were usually American or Canadian. I would 
realize later (after meeting two of them) that they were invariably Christian Evangelical 
missionaries. Proselytizing is an illegal practice in Afghanistan, as it had been for a long 
time, and the missionaries usually covered up their main activities by teaching English (for 
free) or getting employed in a foreign NGO working in the area. In his goal-oriented “fury”, 
Wahid had befriended a few of those living in Jalalabad, and used to spend a sizable amount 
of his time together with them. After the last missionary left, in mid-2012, he kept 
frequenting a group of US contractors who worked for the Department of Defense on 
satellite imaging and Internet connections in the region. They resided in a heavily fortified 
guesthouse for foreigners only on the outskirts of Jalalabad. In 2012, Wahid took to spend 
a few evenings every week at this guesthouse, which my wife and I visited once. I doubt 
the place escaped the attention of the local people, who very likely understood that 
 
 
 
329 
foreigners were living and working inside the compound. Wahid’s acquaintances certainly 
helped his knowledge of the language, and kept him emotionally close to his dream of 
reaching the New World, by helping him network in order to facilitate a future move to the 
US. However, he underestimated the social consequences of his too evident frequentations 
and in the end he paid a high price for it.  
Wahid was fatally attracted to anything that was American. He had chosen the 
United States as his own lifeboat out of Afghanistan.  By age 22 in 2010, he had spent his 
adolescence in a province militarily occupied only by US troops. Though we never 
discussed the presence of the US soldiers all around him, it is easy to imagine how such 
state of facts might have acquired a positive, even alluring, feature for Wahid’s life plans. 
Not that the materialization of the (armed) “Other” in town in the wake of the demise of 
the Taliban should be considered the only cause for a whole structure of meaning, dreams, 
and wishes, that Wahid constructed during his adolescence. It might well be that this 
“Other” came just at the right time to embody and give concreteness to ideas and emotions 
that Wahid might have been (whether consciously or unconsciously) developing 
autonomously. This is roughly the version by which Wahid himself interpreted his 
adolescent trajectory. In January 2011, he told me: 
 
I started questioning things since the very beginning…since I can remember, in 
school. I would ask myself why this and why that, especially about religion. I would 
sometimes ask the teacher in school about things like fasting during Ramadan or 
heaven, and Mohammed…he could not give me any explanation, he just kept on 
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repeating what we found written in our books, without actually explaining 
anything…the whole school was like that…all the subjects, just repetition, no 
thinking…useless, completely useless…a bunch of idiots, that’s what they were. I 
started reading things by myself, I wasn’t even listening anymore to the teacher in 
class…School in Afghanistan is good for nothing… 
 
With our relationship continuing over time, his defenses also came down little by 
little, and he could afford to talk more openly about “incriminating” topics. Right after 
Ramadan 2011, while walking back to my apartment from the house of a common friend 
in Jalalabad, we finally discussed religion: 
 
Wahid - I don’t give a damn about religion…it’s all nonsense to me… 
Andrea – You mean Islam? Yeah, I had the impression you might not be the perfect 
kind of pious Muslim… 
Wahid – No, not Islam, I mean religion in general…I really don’t care about any 
of the official religions…it’s all stories for the uneducated people… 
Andrea – Ha, that’s interesting…you know, I was starting to think that you might 
have secretly converted to Christianity, with all the time you spent with the 
missionaries… 
Wahid – No, no, are you kidding? No, I don’t care about that either…I mean, not 
that they did not try, you know how they work, they do try sooner or later, they do 
talk about Jesus…but I never picked up on that, I just did not care…they kept on 
 
 
 
331 
spending time with me because probably they never lose completely hope in 
someone to convert…I just wanted to keep practicing English, you know that… 
Andrea – Well, OK, but all the more if you did not convert, you have to be careful 
not to spend too much time openly with them, you are putting yourself in a risky 
position…I mean, also the guys at the guesthouse, people know what they do…it 
can become dangerous for you to hang out too often with them…  
Wahid – I know, don’t worry, I know that I have to be careful…so far everything is 
under control…don’t worry…I only want to get out of this place… 
 
He also explained to me that he does not fast during Ramadan and does not go to 
mosque. He does pray when in public though, when others do the same. This he perceived 
as hypocrisy on his part and that of many others’. He justified this by the extreme 
intolerance of the environment. With an amused tone, he described to me all the logistical 
gymnastics that he goes through in order to eat secretly, away from anybody’s gaze, during 
the holy month of Ramadan. His parents do not know he does not fast, he told me, and he 
has to hide food here and there around the house in order to eat whenever nobody is 
looking. The whole ordeal makes him feel “trapped, like in jail…and very sad”, he added. 
Unfortunately, Wahid, at a certain point, must have overstepped, or something must 
have gone the wrong way for him. When I came back to Afghanistan for the last, long-term 
section of my fieldwork, in summer 2012, I called Wahid on the phone upon arriving in 
Kabul, thinking we would arrange to see each other as soon as I would get to Jalalabad 
again. Yet he was already in Kabul, where he had relocated a few weeks earlier. In early 
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2012, he and a close friend of his, who shared his same acquaintances, suffered personally 
the consequences of the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the province. 
Somehow a rumor spread that Wahid and his friend had converted to Christianity. 
Suddenly posters with their two pictures, a description of both, and an inflammatory text 
appeared on the walls of the university in Jalalabad.  The text described how the two had 
for years been close to Christian preachers and missionaries in town, and how they had 
been working for US organizations. It stated that Wahid and his friend had become 
Christians and must pay with their lives, as shari’a law requires in cases of apostasy (i.e., 
abandoning Islam for another faith). In addition, Wahid told me that the house of the only 
one missionary left in Jalalabad, where he lived with his wife and two young daughters, 
had been bombed at the beginning of the summer, although fortunately nobody was injured 
in the attack. My wife and I had been guests of the family for dinner, in the same house, in 
summer 2011. They reportedly left Jalalabad after the attack. 
After updating me on the situation by phone, we eventually met in Kabul a few 
hours later. Wahid had left precipitously Jalalabad for Kabul after the posters appeared on 
the university walls, and he was living alone in an undisclosed location. When we met, in 
a Kabul restaurant, he was clearly in distress. He was angry at what had happened to him. 
He was angry at his people.  
 
I hate these people…I hate Pashtuns…They’re only a bunch of ignorant 
savages…with their customs, and their rules…what kind of life is this? They’re like 
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fanatics, about religion, about their way of life…but they are just ignorant…I have 
no place among these people… 
Andrea – Well, you are a Pashtun as well… 
Wahid – Yes, I know, but I have nothing to do with them, I am not like them…Yes, 
I am a Pashtun because I was born here and I speak Pashto, but I am a different 
person, I don’t live like them… 
 
He told me that his family had also paid a toll because of his lifestyle. Both his 
mother and father had been dismissed from their jobs (the mother as a school teacher, the 
father in a construction company), and had been harassed and marginalized by their 
neighbors. His mother did not leave the house any longer, while his father was still in a 
state of confusion, he said, not quite sure about what they should do. Yet, Wahid did not 
seem too worried about the predicament in which his public behavior had plunged his 
family. He was well under way through the application for a Fulbright Scholarship to the 
US, and it seemed that the high hopes he held in this regard were enough to keep his morale 
up. I would have frankly expected some more concern for the plight of his parents. Being 
the mother and father of a suspected apostate may bring fatal consequences in a Pashtun 
milieu, all the more in the light of the recent spike in religious radicalism. The life itself of 
his parents might have been in danger as long as they remained in Jalalabad. I suggested 
that he urged his parents and brother to move to Kabul with him, at least temporarily, and 
help the storm die down for the time being. He explained to me that his father was resistant 
to relocation, and that they would try to continue living in Jalalabad as long as possible. 
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 All in all, however, it seemed to me that Wahid was somewhat oblivious to the 
responsibilities that he had in the dramatic development of the situation. I had warned him 
over the years several times of the possible backlash that his all too patent and public 
association with figures who people knew had a “suspicious” background might have in 
the community. Wahid always dismissed my warnings by professing his awareness of the 
situation, and underlining his efforts at defusing the dangers. Yet I could not help but think 
that his behavior was rather reckless, within the volatile and precarious conditions of 
security in Nangarhar province during those years.  
It was obvious to me that Wahid had a very strong desire (and ambition) to leave 
Afghanistan. This was a vital priority in his life plan and he was ready to take any risk in 
order to ensure a higher chance of succeeding in the task, even if this would have meant 
jeopardizing the safety of his family in the process. Many other Afghan friends, as Wahid, 
had expressed to me the burning desire to leave their country, a place where they saw no 
viable future for themselves. Some had even taken the extreme measure of illegally 
emigrating to Europe, only to face the grim fate of being sent back after being caught by 
the authorities of one of the European border countries. However, choosing to illegally 
emigrate was an accepted, “culturally legitimate” way of finding a way out for oneself, 
which entailed financial sacrifice in order to find the necessary money to organize the trip, 
personal risk while undertaking the enterprise, and, above all, no social consequences for 
any of the people left behind – all features that were consistent with a historically 
established tradition of “manly” Pashtun responses to familial hardships and social crises 
(see Nichols 2007). The way Wahid chose to find a way out of Afghanistan, however, was 
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anything but “culturally legitimate”. He was trying to take advantage of connections and 
networking that he created through the years with US and Canadian nationals, who were 
in Afghanistan to conduct activities that were not only prohibited by law, but notoriously 
considered offensive and reprehensible by the vast majority of Afghan Muslims. Sure 
enough, he was applying the concept of “andiwalay” (exploiting connections) in a very 
culturally coherent and effective way, but he was doing it with the “wrong” people. His 
excessive public exposure alongside foreign individuals of a “suspicious” kind will have 
certainly facilitated his plan to leave Afghanistan, yet the price that his family paid for it 
was dire. Wahid in the end left for the US on a Fulbright Scholarship, which made his 
strategy fully successful, but his family was left behind to deal with the social consequences 
of having a son who was thought by most to have really converted to Christianity. 
Furthermore, the fact that he would spend the following two years in the US would 
reinforce and corroborate the suspicions of many about Wahid having abandoned Islam.         
 
What always fascinated and intrigued me about Wahid, was the puzzle of how a 
fairly traditional and rural Pashtun environment, such as the one he had lived in, split 
between the city and Khogiany district, could have produced such a sanguine, vitriolic and 
rebellious character, so vociferously opposed to the cultural representational world, and 
social arrangements that his own milieu upheld and performed. The lack of interest, on the 
part of Wahid, to explore together with me the potential reasons for his personal 
development, prevents me from even attempting to elaborate a possible explanation. 
Certainly, a powerful independent variable in Wahid’s life’s equation must be represented 
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by the massive influx of Western ideas and allegedly universal social principles that poured 
into the country after the demise of the Taliban, in the guise of NGO workers, United 
Nations programs, political advisers, and military personnel. Wahid spent his adolescence 
in the midst of this ideological turmoil, and it would be unrealistic to imagine that it did 
not influence profoundly the imaginary, and self-representation, of a developing young 
man. To what degree, and in which specific directions, such influence interacted with 
Wahid’s private world, and social dynamics, is not possible for me to discern.  
To be sure, Wahid was probably “more Pashtun” than he would have liked to admit, 
at least in certain regards. For example, he was the one who made great fun of me for not 
having sexual relationships other than with my wife, even before the wedding, after 
agreeing to be her partner. Not only could he not fathom why I wanted to “eat every day 
the same rice”, as he put it, but he did consider within the legitimate prerogatives of a man 
(of whatever background) that of having extra-marital relationships with whomever he 
wanted. My wife, obviously, was not accorded by him the same prerogatives. Wahid was 
well aware that adultery is frowned upon, and punished, in Islam, for women as well as for 
men. “That’s how it goes here, everybody does it…”, he commented, in justification of his 
position. Thus, in spite of the “hyper-Westernism” that he displays in admiring life and 
customs of “the West” (which for him means mostly the US), and condemning those of his 
own socio-cultural milieu, Wahid in certain respects is still very much a man of his time 
and place – especially when he has something to gain from it, as it seems. And it could not 
be otherwise, after all.  
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Nevertheless, whatever the contradictions and inconsistencies, the very fact that 
such a (by and large) iconoclastic and non-conformist figure came to the public surface (so 
much to become exposed publicly on the walls of his university campus), speaks to the 
great dynamism and creativity that the Pashtun socio-cultural environment, despite its 
reputation for stability and traditionalism, acquired in recent years (at least), in the wake of 
the international intervention in the Afghanistan.    
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CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation has dissected the lives of four major protagonists, and four 
secondary characters. I have tried to detail the inner dynamics of my informants, their 
thought processes, emotional trajectories and unconscious phenomena. The critic might 
point out that four individuals (plus four more, though from a broader perspective) do not 
constitute a statistically relevant sample as understood in the social sciences. It is certainly 
so, yet I hope I made a “good-enough” case for my choice of focusing on depth instead of 
breadth.  I believe I detailed and uncovered aspects of the subjectivity and private life of 
my informants that in most cases escape the attention of the ethnographer. This is due to 
the specificity of the methodology and the epistemological approach that I employed 
during my fieldwork, as well as the subsequent analysis of the material gathered. My choice 
was premised on the belief in the centrality of understanding the individual in order to 
better interpret the value and meaning of the cultural production and social arrangements 
that the environment in which such individual lives produces. Far from reducing society 
and culture to the individual’s dynamics (and is so doing, assuming a starting point in a 
process of linear development, from the individual to socio-cultural systems), I assumed 
that culture and society revolve around a set of mutually influencing and reinforcing 
elements (psychological, ecological, economic, historical/diachronic, and so on), of which 
I chose to emphasize the private and subjective one. 
 One main assumption that I tried to counter in this dissertation, one that claims that, 
in Michelle Rosaldo’s words, “individuals – with their different histories, different bodies, 
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and different ways of being more or less emotionally involved – are cultural systems cast 
in miniature” (1984:141, emphasis added). Rather, I find myself in agreement with Steven 
Parish when he writes that “the mind here does not – mindlessly – duplicate external 
cultural forms. What was external, part of culture and society, becomes internal, part of 
mind and self, but is transformed. This transformation creates distance between culture and 
self, but links them in a dynamic, dialectical relationship. This cultural self is not 
“programmed” by culture, but is primed to find meaning in culture” (Parish 1994:294, 
emphasis added).This is, after all, the lesson that Edward Sapir taught us a long time ago. 
And in fact, “meaning” has been my constant preoccupation throughout this dissertation, 
as well as the specific significance that I give to (psychological) “authenticity”.   
 The interplay between culture, society and mind (“mind” understood here as 
psychic dynamics and processes) is a complex and dialectical affair. I obviously do not 
claim to have definitively solved the conundrum as to how these parts of a complex whole 
stand in relation to each other. What I hope I have accomplished, however, is to open a 
window onto the work and role of the mind in such interplay.  
Quantitatively-inclined researchers might contend that my statistically limited 
sample will not help define “new patterns of behavior” for Pashtun men in Afghanistan in 
general. Yet I would disagree. It is true that my research was geared towards acquiring 
explanatory power rather than predictive power, and that such “patterns” were not the main 
objective of it. Nevertheless, it would be short-sighted to consider the individuals whose 
lives are analyzed here as merely isolated exceptions who stand alone in a sea of 
conformity. The social (and cultural) personae that they embody serve as powerful models 
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that many others are faced with, might embrace, or analogously develop through their own 
idiosyncratic processes. The masculine legitimacy that, for example, Umar found in his 
achievements as father and manager, that Rohullah endorsed as a well-educated and 
decreasingly violent “nar”, that Rahmat developed as a “nostalgic” nar looking back to 
what a nar represented in a more “authentic” (in his opinion), pre-conflict respectable 
Pashtun manly man, are all ways of interpreting masculinity in a quickly metamorphosing 
Pashtun environment. These individuals are certainly not the only ones who are 
subjectively reworking their cultural idioms by displaying publicly peculiar “patterns of 
behavior” (or, rather, privately authenticated models of comportment). I believe the 
importance of the research I conducted (its “explanatory power”), lies also in the deeper 
understanding of the (conscious and unconscious) reasons and motives that moved these 
men towards certain specific personal and public choices. My contention is that their 
choices do have a strong social impact and understanding what lies behind these choices 
does implicitly lead to a fuller understanding of a broader socio-cultural context. Much of 
the work involved in construing a private, legitimate subjectivity (and its social persona) 
took place in  a conflictive and unconscious way. Yet this takes nothing away from the 
force and potential of what resulted from such work.  This implicit outcome must be kept 
in mind, in spite of the myriad specificities, peculiarities, minutiae, variances that emerged 
from the observation and analysis of my informants’ life trajectories.  
The (mostly) unconscious work at construing “new” public paradigms and models 
is more evident in the fact that the private “manipulation” of the cultural material, 
narratives and idioms in which my informants were immersed seemed to hold a greater 
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importance for them, than predetermined and expected patterns of behavior. The effort at 
authenticating the peculiar praxis each of them created every day for themselves seemed 
more relevant to them than simply conforming to any culturally anticipated behavior. This 
is why, in this dissertation, I have constantly referred to cultural idioms, instead of patterns 
of behavior. One of my efforts has been to demonstrate through the words and actions of 
my informants that from idioms do not necessarily descend behaviors, and that around 
those idioms they construed their own behavior and set of meanings. 49 I learned not to 
expect (to “predict”) any behavior in particular, but rather to “receive” the behaviors  I 
witnessed and recorded, trying to understand their motives and roots as grounded in the 
cultural idioms and psychological dynamics of the individual I was observing. Variance of 
behavior on a general cultural theme was great, and my informants were more preoccupied 
with how to satisfy their own subjective meanings (even when unconscious - their motives) 
when pitted against a dominant cultural idiom, than to stick necessarily to a determined or 
expected pattern of behavior. It was obviously not always possible to accomplish such a 
task in a “smooth”, non-conflictive manner. Indeed, we have seen that social pressure was 
always strong, and sometimes unforgiving. Inner conflict arose also because of the 
dissonance between social expectations and private wishes and fantasies (whether 
conscious or unconscious). Yet, as Pierre Bourdieu intuited, if we want to look for rules, 
then strategizing and circumventing was the “rule”. In this regard, the people I worked 
amongst appeared to me much more “human” than “Pashtun”, more “people” than exotic 
                                                          
49 And, as again Edward Sapir understood, that there is no such thing as the symbolic meaning of 
a cultural idiom, in general, but rather only the specific, private meaning that each individual gives 
to it. 
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animals whose behavior I had to record. I believe I showed in this dissertation that they 
had indeed to deal with a culturally-specific symbolic material that partially shaped and 
constrained their capacity to go about their lives daily. However, I also hope I showed that 
the power of such material was not strong enough to turn them in outright “cultural 
animals”. I could investigate their deep dynamics, their thought processes, and their 
emotional developments precisely because their “culture” did not completely define them.  
 And in this, I maintain, lies the strength of the methodological and epistemological 
approach I selected for my research. Choosing depth over breadth, spending numerous 
hours in private conversation with one individual only, allowing him to express thoughts 
and emotions he otherwise would not have expressed, and, more importantly, facilitating a 
dynamic emergence of conscious and unconscious affective material, gave me the 
possibility to “complicate” a reality that too often we are tempted to see as seamless, or, at 
least, whose causes and roots we might want to infer simply from observing and recording 
cultural idioms and overt patterned behaviors. What lies underneath is far more complex 
than it would seem at first sight (not surprisingly).  I hope I gave the reader enough evidence 
to reckon that the psychodynamic approach that I took in this study allowed me to cut 
through the shield constituted by the cultural idioms and behavioral patterns, and get deeper 
into the reality of those who live these idioms and patterns, and who, even more crucially, 
make them and re-make them on a constant basis (again, there is no full duplication in 
repetition. See Butler 1988). Beyond the shield rests a reality that we, as ethnographers, 
have to acknowledge and come to terms with, if we want to have a fuller understanding of 
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the social and cultural milieu in which our informants live (not to mention their 
subjectivities in the first place). 
 When we acknowledge that the individuals whom we study are the locus (the 
agents) for the creation and negotiation of cultural and social material, we have also to 
realize that analyzing the (publicly) unseen, unspoken, even unconfessed inner dynamics 
that these individuals harbor takes us one step closer to understanding the “mechanics” 
through which such cultural and social material may change over time, diachronically. I 
hope I showed convincingly enough that the uncertainties, fears, conflicts, contradictions, 
achievements, fantasies, rejections, rebellions, endorsements, which my informants 
displayed in their relationship with me, and in their daily life behaviors, sow the seeds of 
change in the communities where they live. Umar and his shift from radical militant to 
“enlightened” pious Muslim; Kamran and his stubborn insistence in a more “Islamic” way 
of being a good Pashtun; Rohullah and his effort (not always successful) to leave behind 
the violent side of his being a Pashtun nar (manly man). These are but some of the instances 
that I have analyzed in detail,  in which single individuals operate powerfully on their social 
and cultural milieu, and by way of their public example constitute a new paradigm, or a 
new model, that may inspire others as well. The pace of cultural and social change is 
unfortunately too slow for an immediate observer to obtain any inescapable proof of such 
dynamics. Yet it seems likely to me that when the number of individuals embracing a 
certain attitude slowly and incrementally reach a critical mass, then models will be replaced 
and new paradigms will take hold. Fredrik Barth (1966) and Anthony Wallace (1956) - in 
my opinion two of the most lucid and perceptive authors who dealt with this issue - 
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envisioned change in these exact terms. We need to understand the individual to reach a 
fuller perspective on how, and why, change may eventually happen.         
 
 From the standpoint of the individual psychological dynamics with which this 
dissertation has been primarily concerned, several main threads emerged.  I emphasized a 
multiplicity of subjectivities, of self-images (of selves, more broadly speaking) that my 
informants gave birth to and managed, in order to cope with changing historical 
circumstances that were greatly affecting their personal lives. Contemporary psychological 
and psychoanalytic literature have now acknowledged that the reification of a concept such 
as “the self”, as if in the guise of a real entity clashing with other inner entities (the ego, à 
la Freud, and ego-psychology authors), or a monolithic structure which could undergo 
processes of fragmentation and even disintegration (à la Heinz Kohut, and subsequent self-
psychology), is not a satisfactory way to deal with what people (and analysts) would 
experientially term “self”. Together with many others, I feel that with “self” we must now 
mean a set of different, yet in most cases coherent, subjective states, which coexist, 
complement each other, and compete within an overarching self-representational world 
maintained by the individual. Each set of subjective states gains its meanings, and symbolic 
material, from the private management of the social and cultural context in which the 
individual exists, and yet is “operated” through common psychic dynamics and 
mechanisms that all humans share. The idea of the existence of a coherent self, or ego, 
must be replaced by the notion of the illusion of the existence of a coherent self, which in 
reality represents the coherence of multiple, shifting states of subjectivity. The fact that it 
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should be considered an illusion does not take anything away from the fact that it is 
nonetheless a necessary illusion, in order for the individual to maintain a productive, 
functional, and, in the end, healthy psychological equilibrium. I think that the material that 
my informants presented to me, and the analysis that I gave of it, might corroborate such a 
theoretical position.  
My informants were socially and culturally functional individuals (i.e., not subject 
to any major and crippling psychological disturbance), who evidently managed to work 
their subjective states towards the overarching sense of coherence they needed. We have 
seen how their efforts at coherence were not devoid of contradictions, conflicts, and inner 
suffering. Nevertheless, as individuals who displayed a reasonably healthy psychological 
state, they achieved the goal of bringing their shifting and competing subjective states into 
some sort of internal cohesiveness. 
 An important corollary of this approach to subjectivity is represented by the aspect 
of individual agency, which also looms large throughout the dissertation. I hope that the 
narration and analysis of my informants’ diverse vicissitudes and predicaments showed 
convincingly that, far from being individuals at the mercy of their own cultural schemata 
and social arrangements, they managed to maintain (to various degrees) a productive and 
healthy contact with the subjective state that at any given moment represented their 
“perceptual truth” (what Wilfred Bion calls being “relatively truthful” to oneself. Bion 
1982:8). In the paradigm that I have proposed in this dissertation, this happens when the 
shifting subjective states, of which the “illusion” of a coherent self is composed, are kept 
in productive communication with each other. In turn, this is achieved by a positive use of 
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(unconscious) dissociative processes, whose culmination in conscious conflicts (i.e., the 
emergence into awareness of the dissimilarities between different subjective states) 
provides the material for psychological growth and emotional advancement (see also 
Bromberg 1996, 2003). I believe that the evidence presented by my informants may be 
interpreted, and understood, through acknowledging such phenomena.  
These processes, when successfully achieved, allowed my informants to “sense” 
where their “individuality” lies vis-à-vis the constraints imposed on them by their socio-
cultural context.  We have also seen in the course of the chapters that the interconnectivity 
that links to each other the lived experiences and emotional perceptions that my informant 
s share with the people who surround them more closely, are part and parcel of their 
“authentic” selves (see Slavin and Kriegman 1992:83-106), as a functionally adjusted 
element of their behavioral environment (Hallowell 1955). In a socio-cultural context such 
as the Pashtuns’, the self of each individual (his/her states of subjectivities) is also partially 
made up of aspects of the selves of other significant ones. It would be fallacious, I argued, 
to posit tout court any pathological side to this state of facts.   
 From a broader socio-cultural and political perspective, I have contended that the 
very cultural idiom for masculinity (or rather, masculinities) among Afghan Pashtuns has 
undergone profound modifications over the past thirty-five years, due to continuous 
conflict within the country. Those informants who were born before the series of conflicts 
began were unanimous in reporting the perception that the boundaries which defined who 
was a nar (a manly man) had dramatically changed. They recognized that certain 
excessively violent and abusive behaviors, that were deemed a necessary evil during the 
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war, had slowly become routinized and institutionalized in the absence of peace. The moral 
“state of exception” first applied during the revolt against the Communist governments 
continued during the civil war and the Taliban regime. The exception became the rule. The 
expression of one’s own masculinity and manly worth premised on sheer force, 
ruthlessness and violence became a new paradigm for a legitimate and culturally 
appropriate masculinity. I interpreted such phenomenon through the lens of Fredrik Barth’s 
transactional theory, which I believe fits the dynamics of change that Pashtun society in 
the south-east of Afghanistan was subject to. Just like Anthony Wallace’s understanding 
of the change brought about by religious revitalization movements during times of 
profound  social and cultural disruption (Wallace 1956), Barth’s analysis stresses the role 
of the individual as the main actor of change, whether advertently or inadvertently. 
 A further aspect of socio-cultural dynamics that I tried to bring attention to in the 
preceding chapters concerns the role of external influences onto the Weltanschauung of the 
people I worked with. This is a constant underlying thread that runs throughout the present 
work. I believe that in certain cases (especially in Umar’s, Wahid’s, and Rohullah’s) it was 
clear that the vigorous and sweeping social and cultural external inputs, which Afghanistan 
had been absorbing since the demise of the Taliban regime, did indeed have a significant 
impact on their imaginary and worldview. It would not go unnoticed to anyone who had 
spent an extensive time in Afghanistan that since the start of the international military and 
civilian intervention in the country in 2001, a vast range of ideas, ideologies, moral 
standards and ethical paradigms, prevalently springing from Euro-American sources, 
flooded the country in a massive fashion. The fact that the cellular telephone network in 
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the country was the very first thing to be created anew is no coincidence, and this mere 
technological development facilitated the propagation of certain ideological messages that 
the occupying powers (both military and civilian) deemed necessary to spread among the 
population (a number of other, conflicting messages were spread as well through the very 
same technological channels). Quantifying the extent of such impact on rural Pashtun 
Afghans is a prohibitive task (for multiple reasons), which is also why I let my informants 
spontaneously factor in such phenomenon into the narratives they presented to me. I do 
take the fact into consideration, of course, during the analysis I give of the material, and I 
hope that the reader was able to detect the passages in which this phenomenon seems to 
have been more subjectively significant for each of my informants.        
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